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Executive summary 
This report summarizes the main results from the Cross-Compliance project (EU 6th 
Framework Programme, Priority 8.1; European Commission, DG RTD, contract no. SSPE-
CT-2005-006489). The core aim of this EU funded research project is to analyse the external 
competitiveness impact arising from an improvement in the level of compliance with 
mandatory standards. Important factors affecting this are the degree of compliance with 
standards and the (additional) costs associated with complying to standards, as well as the 
expected improvement in compliance with standard. Potential improvement in compliance 
depends on the (estimated) existing degrees of compliance and the extent to which they 
deviate from full compliance. Achieved improvement in compliance is likely to be affected by 
various factors, including policies aiming at improving compliance such as the EU’s 
(obligatory) cross compliance policy. Another factor might be the interaction with voluntary 
standards. For this reason within the project also the role (requirements, participation, costs) 
of a selected number of voluntary standards has been analysed and potential interactions are 
explored. 
This report summarises the main results of this work. Although attention is paid to 
intermediate results (deriving best-estimates of degrees of compliance and costs of 
compliance; relevance of voluntary standards) it in particular focuses on the main aim of this 
project, i.e. the possible trade impacts of an improvement in compliance with selected 
standards for a number of sectors (beef, dairy, pigs, poultry, cereals, fruit and vegetables, 
olives). This rise in compliance could be attributed to cross compliance. The aggregated 
impact on trade across all sectors is also shown. The work presented here follows on from an 
earlier phase of the project, which focused on the level of compliance with standards and the 
costs associated with compliance. 
The standards considered for the quantitative competitiveness impact assessment are selected 
from those included in the EU’s cross compliance package i.e. the 19 Statutory Management 
Requirements (SMRs) and the standards imposed under the Good Agricultural and 
Environmental Condition (GAEC) framework (which refers to soil management and habitat 
maintenance). For two member states (Netherlands, Spain) and one region (England in the 
UK) the overlap between standards that exist in certification schemes and in cross compliance 
was examined. The results show that, although there are some strong limitations, there is 
sufficient overlap in the standards set and in approaches to control to warrant further 
investigation of the potential for the harmonisation of standards and collaborative approaches 
to control. The main limitations lie in the differences in the standards set and arguments about 
the mutual role of government and private bodies in ensuring compliance with both legal 
standards and standards that sit outside of the regulatory framework. The conclusions of the 
comparison suggest that the further assessment of these synergies would provide an additional 
dimension to current and prospective debates not only on cross compliance, which is 
reviewed by the European Commission in 2007, but also about the CAP Health Check 
scheduled to take place in 2008.  
Cross compliance, introduced with the 2003 CAP reform, is best understood to be an 
additional enforcement mechanism, which uses financial leverage to encourage compliance 
with standards. The SMRs are all pre-existing items of EU legislation, although there have 
been compliance issues in the past. The GAEC standards, whilst presenting a new framework 
to impose standards, have largely been utilised by Member States as a tool to enforce and 
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enhance understanding of other pre-existing mandatory requirements. Only in some cases 
have entirely new standards been introduced.  Most costs and benefits that arise are associated 
in this analysis with the standard itself. Cross compliance does present some additional 
benefits as an enforcement mechanism that stimulates improved understanding of legal 
requirements and, through the threat of financial penalties, an improvement in compliance 
levels where these were previously less than universal. Some of these benefits are explored in 
this paper.   
The scope of the research is limited in that it focuses on seven agricultural products (dairy 
products, beef, pigs, poultry, cereals, fruit and olives) and seven EU Member States 
(Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Poland). For each product and 
each Member State, the most relevant standards were identified and an assessment was made 
of the level of compliance and the cost of compliance. The subsequent analysis then focused, 
first, on the additional cost of compliance if compliance levels were to become universal, and 
second, on the impact this would have on trade flows.  
In parallel, standards applied to farmers in the US, Canada and New Zealand are taken into 
account as they are considered to be among the key competitors of the EU. In these three non-
EU countries, comparable standards to those in the EU were identified, and an attempt made 
to assess the level of compliance and the cost of compliance.  
 
Table 1:   Standards Selected for Each Product in EU and non-EU Countries 
Chapter Product Evaluated standards 
4 Dairy • Nitrates (EU, non-EU)  
• Identification and Registration (EU) 
• Food Safety (bST) (non-EU) 
5 Beef • Nitrates (EU) 
• Identification and Registration (EU) 
• Food Safety (growth hormones) (non-
EU) 
6 Pigs and 
poultry 
• Nitrates (EU) 
• Animal Welfare (EU) 
• Clean Water (non-EU) 
7 Cereals • GAEC Standards (EU, non-EU) 
8  Fruit & 
vegetables  
• Nitrates (Spain) 
• Plant Protection (Spain) 
• GAEC Standards ( in particular, water 
conservation in Spain) 
9 Olives GAEC Standards (Spain):  
• Erosion, Soil organic matter, Soil 
structure 
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From the review of all SMR and GAEC standards (see Chapter 2) it appeared that in 
particular the Nitrates Directive, food safety requirements and animal welfare standards might 
give rise to non-negligible cost of production increases, at least at individual farm level and 
potentially also at sector level. Although the potential cost impact of the rules concerning the 
identification and registration of farmed livestock (i.e. using eartags, passports etc) is low, the 
analysis shows that farmers face significant problems with compliance. Whilst the SMRs 
mainly affect animal production, many of the GAEC standards mainly affect the arable sector. 
Based on this review, a selected number of products and standards were selected for the 
quantitative competitiveness impact assessment (see Table 1 for overview). 
 
Summary of main findings for the dairy sector 
At sector level full compliance to the nitrates standard for all affected farmers would involve a 
percentage cost of production increase of 0.1 to 0.6 percent, with rates varying between 
Member States. The estimated percentage cost increases associated with full compliance with 
the Identification and Registration standard for all affected farmers would be less than 0.15 
percent and thus rather marginal. As shown in Table 2 the negative impact of these measures 
(for nitrates, and animal identification and registration) on EU imports and exports are less 
than 3 percent. If a smaller increase in compliance takes place, these already relatively small 
trade impacts will be further diminished. 
When the standards for nitrate pollution taken by the US, Canada and New Zealand are taken 
into account and it is assumed that compliance to these measures improves to full compliance, 
just like was assumed for the EU, this would more or less ‘neutralise’ the trade impacts. The 
projected change in EU exports would be approximately -0.1%. As such this underscores that 
for a competitiveness impact analysis assumptions about what is happening in key competitor 
countries are rather important. The trade impacts obtained when no changes are assumed to 
happen in key competitor countries can thus be argued as providing the upper bound of the 
likely trade impacts.  
 
Summary of main findings for the beef sector 
Within the EU, beef is produced in a wide range of farming systems, ranging from the 
extensive cow calf farms in Ireland, the UK and the centre of France down to the very 
intensive beef fattening systems located in Italy and parts of Spain. The Nitrates Directive 
affects 4.2% of beef cattle raised in intensive finishing farms and 3.0% of beef produced on 
cow calf farms. This low percentage of farms affected by the Nitrates Directive explains the 
limited sector cost increase, which has been estimated to be 0.095%. The relatively low cost 
impact associated with the standards arising from the Nitrates Directive does not have a 
significant consequence for the competitive position of the EU beef production on the world 
market. The actual trade deficit in EU beef would increase, as exports would fall by 0.68% 
and imports would rise by 0.51%.  
The regulations concerning the identification and registration of beef cattle are highly relevant 
to beef farms. Implemented as a reaction to the BSE crisis the beef farmers have to register all 
cattle movements and make sure that all animals are correctly identified. According to the 
estimates carried out these important measures would generate a cost increase for EU beef 
farms of 0.454% if full compliance was achieved. As a consequence of this measure, the EU’s 
beef imports would grow by 2.2% and exports would decline by the same percentage. 
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Summary of main findings for the cereals sector 
As regard the cereals sector, the estimated percentage cost increases associated with the 
GAEC standards are in all cases less than one per cent of total production costs. Several 
factors explain this result. The additional costs per hectare are generally low, although the 
cost of maintaining idled land is an exception. The best estimates of the current level of 
compliance are rather high. Partly this is due to the fact that farmers have, for several reasons, 
already included a number of GAEC standards into their existing farming practices. This is 
partly because many GAEC standards simply reinforce pre-existing national legislation, 
whilst many standards underline good farming practice and result in benefits generated from 
preventing soil erosion and maintaining the soil condition. 
Since the estimated costs associated with satisfying the GAEC standards for normally 
cultivated land and for idled land are different, the use of set-aside land (e.g. use of set-aside 
land to cultivate energy crops) and the set-aside rate will affect the estimated percentage costs 
increases. To test for the potential impact of idled land, different scenarios were established 
based on the assumption that higher cultivation rates of set-aside land or lower set-aside rates 
lead to less idled land and thus lower costs. Of course a reduced set-aside rate will also affect 
total cereal supply and farmers’ other costs and revenues but here the focus is on doing a 
sensitivity analysis of the pure GAEC standard costs impact, rather than on evaluating all 
impacts of the set-aside policy. With the set-aside rate set to zero (or alternatively assuming 
all set-aside land is cultivated with special crops), the calculated percentage cost increase 
more or less halved as compared to the baseline scenario assuming a 10% set-aside rate and 
all set-aside land being idled land. The 3% buffer strip requirement in France, previously 
accounted for within the 10% set-aside requirement, can be interpreted as effectively a 3% 
minimum set-aside requirement (which holds even when the formal rate goes down to zero). 
The impact of full compliance with the GAEC standards on the EU’s cereals sector’s external 
competitiveness would vary from a 1.8% reduction in exports (assuming a set-aside rate of 
10% with all land idled) to a reduction of 1.1% (assuming a set-aside rate of 0% or no land 
idled). EU imports would increase with approximately a similar percentage as exports decline. 
Total world trade would hardly be affected by the impact of the GAEC standard (although it 
is likely to be affected by changes to the set-side policy).  
 
Summary of main findings for the pig and poultry sectors 
As the pig and poultry sectors are the most intensive livestock activities in the EU it is quite 
comprehensible that these sectors are the most affected by the Nitrates Directive. In the 
present analysis the effects have been quantified only for the pig sector, as poultry farms are 
very marginally touched by cross compliance. The overall EU cost increase to be attributed to 
the pig sector assuming if full compliance with the Nitrates Directive is attained has been 
estimated to be 0.55%. Such a cost increase results in a significant impact on the EU trade 
balance of pigmeat. Total EU exports would decline by 3% and imports would increase by 4.4 
%. 
A comparison was made with the impact of the Clean Water Act in the US. This Act raises 
the cost to the US pig sector by 1.08%, almost double the impact of the Nitrates Directive in 
the EU. The reason for this substantial rise of costs has to be attributed to the large percentage 
of pigs affected by this measure and its rather recent application to US pig farms, which 
implies a rather low degree of compliance. This rise in costs would cause a fall in US exports 
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of pigmeat of 7.3% whereas its imports from the EU would increase by approximately 4.5%. 
Canada would gain the most from this situation, increasing its exports to the world market by 
4%, and increasing exports to the US by 4.5% and to Japan by 2.1%. 
A calculation of the cost of achieving full compliance with the animal welfare regulations for 
all pig farmers in the EU shows that the cost increase would be very limited. The reasons for 
this minor cost impact are the high degree of compliance with the standards and the limited 
rise in costs for farmers who still have to adapt their farm to the new legislation. At farm level 
the cost increase is well below 1% and this generates a rise of costs at sector level of 0.11%. 
This cost impact would cause a growth of imports of only 0.8% and a decline of exports of 
0.7%. 
 
Summary of main findings for the fruit, vegetable and olive sectors 
Case studies were undertaken for the fruit and vegetables and olive sectors. Competitiveness 
impacts were analysed using a farm level approach (calculated according to relative changes 
in gross margin due to compliance with standards). From these studies it emerged that, in 
general terms, the cost of compliance with the environmental regulations for these sectors in 
Spain is likely to be small (or might even be zero or lead to cost savings in some specific 
cases).  It has to be noted, however, that due to the limitations of the study, not all production 
regions have been considered and, therefore, these general conclusions may differ across 
regions, farming systems and types of farms. 
 
Summary of aggregated results 
The impact of the achievement of total compliance with the various standards for those 
sectors considered by this study on the EU’s trade position is summarised in Table 0.2. A 
trade position can be considered in terms of imports, exports and product trade balances. The 
changes were calculated according to the GTAP model. 
As the first row of Table 2 indicates, the cost increases associated with full compliance to the 
Nitrates and Identification and Registration standards in the EU dairy sector lead to a decline 
in EU dairy product exports of 0.87 percent and an increase in imports of 1.01 percent. The 
associated impact on the trade balance for dairy products is a loss of US$27 million , which is 
the sum of, on the one hand, the loss in export revenues and, on the other hand, the increase in 
expenditure on imports. Similarly, the cost increase associated with full compliance to the 
GAEC standards for the cereals sector across the examined Member States leads to a decline 
in EU exports of 1.8 percent and an increase of imports of 2.2 percent (see final row of Table 
2). The impact on the cereals trade balance is a loss of US$42 million. Aggregating all trade 
balance impacts (see right-hand column of Table 2) generates a total reduction in value of the 
considered products and measures of US$289 million (measured in US$ of 2001). As the 
small percentage changes (see middle columns) confirm, this amount is only a small fraction 
of the total trade balance value. Moreover, when looking to the overall trade balance impact, 
taking into account the spill-over effects to other sectors (e.g. food industry, etc.) in the EU 
economy, the net impact is almost zero (see further details in Chapter 8).  
The information presented in Table 2 is based on a number of assumptions. Firstly, it is 
assumed that all EU Member States unilaterally introduce GAEC standards and SMRs in the 
context of cross compliance. Secondly, it is assumed the level of compliance increases to 
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100% compared with the baseline level of compliance (taken to be before cross compliance 
was introduced). Thirdly, it is assumed that no changes to comparable standards in the three 
non-EU countries have taken place.  
The numbers given in Table 2 (see third column) show, for each product, the trade impact for 
all standards considered together (e.g. the combined impact of standards relating to nitrates 
and animal welfare in the pigs sector). Also the interaction effects rising from simultaneously 
imposing the analysed standards in the four considered sectors are accounted for (spill-over 
and feedback effects). The total aggregated impact comes down to 289 million US dollar 
(measured in constant prices of 2001). 
The estimates provided in this study are likely to present the upper bound of the expected 
impacts. For, example, in reality full compliance might not actually be achieved. Or instead of 
passing on the cost burden to the buyers of their products, farmers may partly or wholly bear 
the burden themselves.  
Table 2  Trade impact on EU imports, exports and product trade balances arising from 
full compliance with selected EU standards  
 EU-15 Imports 
(%-change) 
EU-15 Exports 
(%-change) 
Product trade balance 
(million US$ in constant 
prices of 2001) 
Dairy 1.08 -0.82 -27.1 
Beef 2.7 -2.7 -94.1 
Pigs & poultry 5.2 -3.7 -125.4 
Cereals 2.2 -1.8 -42.1 
 Source: Own calculations with GTAP model, calibrated on base year data for 2001.  
The pigs and poultry sector is the most significantly impacted by a rise in compliance levels. 
As these sectors are the most intensive livestock activities in the EU it is quite understandable 
that these sectors are the most affected by the Nitrates Directive, if fully enforced (whilst 
noting some Member States have derogations). However, the change in trade balance should 
not be attributed wholly to cross compliance. In particular, the poultry sector is barely 
concerned by cross compliance since poultry farmers do not generally receive the Single 
Payment. The same is true for pig farmers, unless they have a mixed enterprise. 
Cross compliance bears more of an influence on the dairy, beef and cereal sectors because the 
majority of farmers in these sectors receive the Single Payment. Cross compliance, as an 
enforcement mechanism, may encourage compliance with the examined standards. Of these 
three product sectors, the greatest impact is on dairy, followed by beef and cereals. This is in 
line with expectations, given that the SMRs more greatly affect livestock producers, and that 
the underlying EU legislation may be more costly to comply with. The cereals sector shows 
the lowest product trade balance impact. 
The estimates provided in this study are likely to present the upper bound of the expected 
impacts. For example, if the EU does not act unilaterally, but its key competitors also adopt 
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similar standards or aim for increasing compliance with existing standards, this is likely to 
‘neutralise’ the impact on trade flows.  
 
Although there are some uncertainties in the calculations (for example, with respect to the 
assessment of costs, the best estimates of the degree of compliance, the actually achievable 
improvement of compliance, as well as limitations in the modelling tool) the general picture 
that emerges is that the impact of improvements in compliance with the considered standards 
on the EU’s competitiveness is rather limited.    
 
Concluding remarks and brief policy outlook 
Cross compliance is a policy mechanism designed to achieve some specific benefits in the 
agriculture sector but which may, as a result of the way in which the policy is applied, impose 
some new costs on the farming sector. Cross compliance only imposes new costs on farmers 
where new standards are introduced e.g. through GAEC or by imposing new administrative 
requirements. Since SMRs are based on pre-existing legislation, any costs associated with 
meeting SMRs are costs of the underpinning legislation and not costs of cross compliance. 
The balance between benefits and costs is critical in determining the acceptability as well as 
the efficiency of the policy. This study is particularly concerned with the extent to which 
cross compliance results in costs which are negatively affecting the competitive position of 
EU agriculture when compared to agriculture in certain non EU countries included in this 
project (US, Canada and New Zealand).  
The results derived from this research state that the costs of compliance can be significant at 
individual farm level in the EU, at least for certain farm types affected by certain standards. 
These costs may, in turn, affect the competitiveness of such farms. However, when scaled up 
to sectoral level, the costs of compliance with standards are relatively limited and do not have 
any substantive impact on trade flows. For the dairy, beef, pigs and poultry and cereals 
sectors, full compliance with selected standards results in a cumulative total loss of trade of 
US$289 million, a small fraction of the total EU trade balance for these sectors. Furthermore, 
when the EU does not act unilaterally, but its key competitors also adopt similar standards or 
aim for increased compliance with existing standards, the impact on any trade flow is 
reduced.  
The costs identified and the impacts on competitiveness are those associated with achieving 
compliance with certain selected EU standards. These standards form part of the cross 
compliance policy but most of the costs and impacts identified are not those of the cross 
compliance policy since, in the majority of cases, farmers were already required to meet these 
standards i.e. they pre-existed cross compliance. Cross compliance is likely however to have 
encouraged farmers to comply with the standards examined and can therefore be said to have 
induced certain costs. These costs are rather limited at sectoral level and unlikely to 
competitively disadvantage EU farmers.  Based on this evidence, arguments put forward 
against the use of cross compliance as a means of meeting standards - on the basis of the high 
costs imposed on the agriculture sector - appear rather weak.  
The non EU countries considered by this research appear to use alternative and fewer 
regulatory approaches to achieving compliance with standards in the agriculture sector. 
Voluntary approaches, cost sharing programmes and technical assistance appear to be much 
more common. Such differences may reflect different institutional structures, the lower 
intensity of the problems needing to be addressed or different cultural values or societal 
expectations in relation to agriculture. It may also be possible for the EU to learn from 
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experiences in non EU countries regarding alternative methods of meeting standards in the 
agriculture sector. For example, it might be worth considering whether cost sharing 
programmes and technical assistance can achieve the same or similar benefits to cross 
compliance at lower cost.  
Regarding the future of cross compliance in the EU, several observations can be made. Cross 
compliance is a relatively new mechanism and early experiences of implementation led to the 
need for some technical and administrative revisions,). The scope of cross compliance is also 
open to scrutiny. Cross compliance currently consists of a defined list of legislation in Annex 
III and a set of issues and standards in Annex IV. As new pressures become more apparent, 
there is an opportunity to revise these Annexes to incorporate new standards in relation to 
issues such as climate change and water management. Some existing standards may also be 
considered unnecessary as circumstances change. The inclusion of any new requirements 
should always however be determined on the basis of the relative costs and benefits of any 
such addition and consideration of alternative means of achieving similar outcomes. The 
question of incentive led approaches versus regulatory approaches is likely to play out here.  
Finally, the future of cross compliance is inextricably linked with the future of CAP 
payments. Currently, the threat of reductions or withdrawal of payments is a strong lever the 
EU can use to influence farmer behaviour.  The reduction of direct payments in the future 
could lessen the leverage administrations have on compliance behaviour.  In addition, the role 
of cross compliance and direct payments could be shaped by increasing internal (societal) or 
external (WTO) pressure to demonstrate that payments are linked to the provision of public 
goods that are not provided by the regulatory baseline.  These questions may be rehearsed 
during the CAP Health Check and the EU Budget Review and the answers will have a 
significant bearing on the future of cross compliance.  It is certain that the cross compliance 
mechanism will need to adapt and evolve to the changing circumstances around it. Currently, 
its use as a mechanism to achieve compliance with standards appears justified as the impact 
on costs and competitiveness are rather limited. As the CAP evolves, the need for a 
mechanism that defines a link between payments, mandatory standards and basic 
environmentally beneficial land management requirements is likely to remain appropriate.
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1 Introduction and overview 
1.1 CAP and cross-compliance 
The 2003 Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) introduced a 
number of adjustments to agricultural support. One of the most substantive changes was the 
introduction of a system of decoupled payments per farm (known as the Single Farm 
Payment). Moreover these payments were made conditional on recipients meeting 
environmental, food safety, animal and plant health, animal welfare requirements as well as 
standards of good agricultural and environmental practice (cross-compliance). The primary 
objective of this policy reform was to promote a more market-oriented agriculture and 
sustainable agriculture. This summary report evaluates the impact of a selected number of 
standards on the EU’s external competitiveness. As such special attention will be given to the 
impact of the requirements on costs of production, which is in part determined by the current 
degree of compliance and the expected feasible improvements in the degree of compliance. 
The concept of cross-compliance originated in the United States, where it was used from the 
1970s and onwards. It referred to conditions farmers must meet in order to be eligible for 
assistance under government support schemes for agriculture, notably commodity programs. 
Claiming support under one program, US farmers had to meet the rules of that program and 
simultaneously also certain obligations of other programs. In that way a linkage between 
programs, or ‘cross-compliance’ was introduced. Since its first application in the US, the term 
has been extended and used to in particular refer to linkages between agricultural and 
environmental policies. Currently such conditions are attached to the Conservation Reserve 
Programme (IEEP, 2006). 
With the growing commitment in the EC in the late 1980s to integrating environmental 
considerations into the CAP, cross-compliance became part of the debate on agricultural 
policy reforms. The 1992 MacSharry reforms of the CAP, which increased the reliance on 
direct payment-instruments, also increased the potential relevance of cross-compliance. The 
greater transparency of these payments prompted a debate about the return-transfer EU 
agriculture should give to society. This intensified the debate about the tangible social and 
environmental benefits farmers should provide in return for these payments. Although 
elements of environmental cross-compliance were introduced into the CAP by the MacSharry 
reform its impact remained rather limited. Member states were obliged to apply so-called 
appropriate environmental conditions to the management of compulsory set-aside in arable 
cropping. Moreover, they were allowed (but not obliged) to introduce environmental 
conditions on the direct payments offered as headage payments for beef cattle and sheep. 
Only a limited number of Member States (notably the UK) implemented such schemes. 
The Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP extended the switch from traditional price support to 
direct payments already initiated under MacSharry. Also cross-compliance started to play a 
more prominent role in the agricultural policy package. Regulation 1259/1999 (Article 3) 
required member states to take measures to ensure that agricultural activities within the scope 
of the ‘common rules regulation’ were compatible with environmental projection 
requirements. It allowed Member States several options for such measures among which 
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support in return for agri-environmental commitments, the introduction of general mandatory 
environmental requirements, and the introduction of specific environmental requirements 
constituting a condition for direct payments (cross-compliance). Member States were able to 
decide on a sanctioning system punishing violations. Punishment should be appropriate and 
proportionate and could include withdrawal or even cancellation of direct payments. Only a 
limited number of Member States (among them Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands 
and the UK) set down conditions for direct payments. 
With the 2003 MTR policy reform, cross-compliance became a compulsory measure. 
Together with decoupling of support and the renewed rural development pillar that were then 
introduced, it (what does the it refer to here, cross compliance? You should make that clear) 
intrinsically sought to promote and contribute to sustainable agriculture (Swales, 2006). At 
the same time it could be seen as a means to justify the direct payments to farmers. Moreover, 
its scope was extended from its original environmental focus to one dealing with a much 
wider range of public concerns, each of which was already covered by EU legislation; added 
concerns regarded animal welfare, food safety and good agricultural practice. More 
specifically, Regulation 1782/2003 in return for direct payments under the SFP-scheme 
requires farmers to observe certain standards in the following areas: 
• Environment 
• Identification and registration of animals 
• Public, animal and plant health 
• Animal welfare 
• Good agricultural and environmental condition 
More precisely farmers must comply with 19 Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs) 
defined in Annex III of the regulation, and a number of standards ensuring good agricultural 
and environmental condition of agricultural land (GAEC) as defined in Annex IV of the 
Regulation. 
SMRs cannot be interpreted as cross-compliance standards, as they all are pre-existing EU 
Directives and Regulations such as the Birds and Habitat Directives and the Nitrates 
Directive. Cross-compliance, with respect to these SMRs acts as an additional incentive to 
stimulate enforcement of existing legislation (see Figure 1.1; Jongeneel and Brouwer, 2007)1. 
                                                 
1
 Because the GAEC standards were newly introduced together with cross-compliance they are often seen as 
belonging together (we follow that convention). However, following Figure 1.1. also here a distinction could 
be made between standard and standard-enforcement mechanisms just like with the SMRs. 
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Figure 1.1: Standards, enforcement, compliance and benefits and costs 
 
The GAEC framework represents a new requirement and consists of a total of 11 standards 
relating to the protection of soils and maintenance of habitats. In addition, Member States 
must ensure that area of permanent pasture is maintained at the same magnitude as in 2003. 
The latter addition was added to avoid the abandonment of land and associated environmental 
degradation. Abandonment of land was feared as a potential by-effect of the introduced 
decoupling, which delinked support from production activities. As such the GAEC 
requirements can be seen as a precautionary policy to prevent potential problems which might 
occur in the future.  
With respect to the GAEC standards, Member States have introduced a wide range of 
measures to implement the standards as set out in Annex IV. The majority of Member States 
have implemented measures for some, but not all of the Annex IV standards. The 
requirements vary from very basic, simple and already required or satisfied measures, to more 
complex measures (see next Chapter for further details). The result is a highly variable 
approach to Annex IV standards. Given the aim of of the standards and taking into account 
the specific characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic conditions, 
existing farming systems, land use, crop rotation, farming practices and farming structures, 
the variability is not surprising. Member States do not have an obligation to justify their 
choice of GAEC standards. 
Detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance are set down in Regulation 
796/2004. The implementation started in year 2005 with the SMRs on environment, public 
and animal health, and the identification and registration of animals. The  GAEC standards 
were also imposed in 2005. In 2006 additional SMRs related to food safety (public health) 
and notification of diseases were implemented. The last SMR, regarding animal welfare was 
implemented in 2007. 
1.2 Why regulate and why standards? 
As is well-known from economic theory, market processes, in the presence of negative and 
positive externalities do not allocate resources in an economically efficient way (i.e. market 
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failure).  To correct for this failure, governments intervene in the market by for example 
setting standards for the achievement of environmental quality and the provision of public 
goods, both of which will enhance the well-being of society. Such standards, those especially 
relevant to cross-compliance, relate among others, the preservation of habitats, a certain level 
of biodiversity, environmental quality (e.g. water and air), food safety, animal welfare, 
preservation of landscape characteristics, erosion control, etc.  
As is well-known from the economics of production and environmental economics literature, 
the market process does not automatically ensure a proper level of standards. In particular 
when the agricultural production process involves negative and positive externalities, or the 
public goods the market may fail to deliver an adequate provision (i.e. market failure). As 
Figure 1.1 shows, the main aim of imposed standards is to achieve certain benefits or policy 
objectives, which could in the case of the cross-compliance related standards vary from 
preserved habitats, a certain level of biodiversity, environmental quality, food safety, animal 
welfare, preservation of landscape characteristics, avoidance of erosion losses, etc. The 
benefits that these standards create for society may have a public character, but could also be 
private. For example, the GAEC standard to preserve soil organic matter affects soil fertility 
and will positively impact on yields, and therewith hence on private revenuesreturns, 
depending on how the standards have been implemented by the Member State or Region. In 
this Report report the focus is not on the benefits arising from cross compliance but rather on 
the costs. But the discussion of costs and cost-impacts should not distract attention from the 
benefits or policy objectives the standards aim for. 
As regards the cross-compliance enforcement mechanism, its benefits and costs need to be 
considered in terms of its own objectives. A strict reading of Regulation 1782/2003 reveals 
two main purposes, although, as suggested in the text below, it can be argued that there are 
additional less clearly articulated objectives. The Regulation expresses the requirement to 
attach basic standards to the receipt of direct aid and to avoid the abandonment of agricultural 
land and ensure that it is maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition. The 
Regulation also gives an idea of the level at which cross compliance is aiming. It is the 
intention for it to deliver no more than basic standards, to avoid abandonment and to 
maintain, as opposed to enhance, agricultural and environmental condition. Cross compliance 
plays a role in wider agricultural policy and can also be interpreted as providing the baseline 
of standards upon which more targeted actions are promoted through agri-environment 
schemes. 
The benefits also need to be considered relative to the situation when cross compliance was 
introduced. If the overall aim of cross compliance can be considered to improve compliance 
with statutory requirements, its added value and ability to provide benefits very much depends 
on there being less than satisfactory levels of compliance before its introduction. The chief 
parameter for success, “added value” and benefit is therefore improved compliance. 
Improving levels of compliance is however dependent on a range of sub-factors, which may 
also provide benefits relative to the status quo. These can be grouped into two broad 
categories. The first refers to the operational benefits arising from the introduction of the 
system of cross compliance. The second set directly arises from the implementation of 
standards in the form of SMRs and GAEC standards. Thus, the first group is process oriented, 
whilst the second refers to on-the-ground impacts of improved regulatory compliance. There 
is also a more fundamental, overarching benefit. This can be expressed in terms of cross 
compliance’s role in contributing to sustainable land management. 
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1.3 Outline of the report 
The report starts with an introduction (Chapter 1), which briefly introduces the EU’s cross 
compliance policy, its origin and development. It distinguishes cross compliance as an 
enforcement mechanism from the underlying standards and the costs and benefits associated 
with compliance with these standards. In addition Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the 
modelling approach chosen to evaluate the impacts on competitiveness, including some 
remarks on strength and weaknesses of this approach. Chapter 2 presents the overall 
methodological framework of the analysis. Chapter 3 reviews the SMR and GAEC standards 
included under the cross-compliance regime and examines at a general level the (potential) 
cost implications at farm level of these standards. The outcome of Chapter 3 is used to make a 
selection of standards, which will be analysed in a quantitative way in subsequent chapters. 
The following six chapters analyse various product-measure combinations (see Table 1.1).  
 
Table 1.1: Standards Selected for Each Product in EU and non-EU Countries 
Chapter Product Evaluated standards 
4 Dairy • Nitrates (EU, non-EU)  
• Identification and Registration (EU) 
• Food Safety (bST) (non-EU) 
5 Beef • Nitrates (EU) 
• Identification and Registration (EU) 
• Food Safety (growth hormones) (non-EU) 
6 Pigs and poultry • Nitrates (EU) 
• Animal Welfare (EU) 
• Clean Water (non-EU) 
7 Cereals • GAEC Standards (EU, non-EU) 
8 Fruit & 
vegetables, and 
olives 
• Nitrates (Spain) 
• Plant Protection (Spain) 
• GAEC Standards ( in particular, water 
conservation in Spain) 
9 Olives • GAEC Standards (erosion) 
 
Each of the chapters (4 – 9) for the selected products, starts with introduction to the main 
trade and production relationships of that product.  This is followed by an exposition about 
the determination of the impacts of the selected standards on the sector’s cost of production. 
Estimates concerning the extent to which farms are or are not affected, as well as best 
estimates of their current degrees of compliance have been used to upscale the farm based 
impact analysis to sector level. Next the estimated increases in the costs of production at 
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sector level are used in the economic trade model, which is than used to simulate the impacts 
on trade, for the EU as well as main other world regions or countries. Each chapter finishes 
with a concluding section. The simulated scenarios not only consider unilateral changes in 
compliance within the EU, but where relevant and feasible also the impact of bilateral 
changes (changes both within the EU and changes within one or more of the EU’s key 
competitors). 
Chapter 10 reviews possible benefits of the cross-compliance. The final chapter of the report 
(Chapter 10) closes with some conclusions and a comparative overview of all the products 
(based on a monetary evaluation of the trade balance impacts). 
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2 Methodological approach 
2.1 Overall procedure  
The focus of this research is on the assessment of the impact of standards on 
competitiveness. The methodological approach and design of the study is based on 
qualitative as well as quantitative modelling assessments, drawing from the experiences of 
earlier studies, and a series of workshops and interviews with experts in the field. 
Differentiation is made with regard to ‘long term’ and ‘short term’ impacts on 
competitiveness, at farm, sector and global level..  
As Figure 1.1 shows that standards not only involve benefits but also costs (private costs 
less the private benefits of regulation) to farmers. Costs associated with achieving 
compliance with mandatory cross compliance standards can occur in the following ways:  
- Investment costs: need to purchase new equipment (e.g. storage facilities), build new 
facilities etc. 
- Production costs: potentially reduced yield due to change in production practises (e.g. 
minimum maintenance, standards on tillage/ploughing), seed for green cover, et. 
- Administrative costs: time needed to become familiar with new requirements/ 
procedures/ controls (training events etc.); time needed to complete documentation, 
prepare controls and inspection time. 
- non-compliance costs: deduction made from the SFP, potential loss of accreditation 
 
The main determinants of farm level costs arising from both SMRs and GAECs are: 
- whether the requirement is applicable to the farm, and if whether the farm is already 
compliant (or to which degree he or she is already compliant) with the requirements. 
(There are no additional costs associated if the farmer is already fully compliant, but 
s/he might have faced costs in the past to achieve compliance. It could also be true 
that the requirements are part of the farmer’s normal farming practises and therefore 
invoke no additional costs). 
- whether the standard is based on items of national legislation or EU legislation2 that 
was already in place before the introduction of cross compliance, meaning that there 
was already a need to comply.  
 
Moreover, it needs to be noted that SMRs and GAEC standards only apply to farmers 
claiming Single Farm Payment. 
Costs associated with achieving compliance with mandatory standards are studied in this 
report. If compliance to standards affects production costs at the farm-level, aggregate 
agricultural production is affected, which might spatially shift production from the most 
affected farm groups to the least affected ones (see also Isik, 2004). At the aggregate level, 
these production shifts translate into a shift of the supply curve, i.e. a supply response. The 
supply response, in  turn, displaces the equilibrium between supply, demand and 
                                                 
2
 Note that all SMRs represent pre-existing legislation, whereas a number of GAEC imply new legislation.  
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international trade. Differing standards and degrees of compliance to standards, and 
heterogeneity of farming conditions can change the market share of a trading partner within 
a sector. Market share between sectors is also affected, due to substitution and 
complementarity and spill-over effects between produced commodities in the economy. 
To account for effects that occur at farm, sector and economy level, the following steps are 
taken in the analysis: 
Step 1: Review and select the standards which will be quantitatively evaluated; 
Step 2: Create best estimates of current degree of compliance and assumed improvement in 
the degree of compliance  
Step 3: Determine the percentage cost increase at the farm level, taking into account farm 
structure; 
 a. Determine the relevant number of farms affected by the regulation; 
b. Calculate the costs of compliance with the regulation for the affected farms; 
c. Calculate additional costs of compliance taking into account the best-estimate base 
year level of compliance and the improvement in compliance (various assumptions 
can be used here, including full compliance); 
d. Calculate measures of competitiveness (e.g. gross margin) for the initial and 
improved levels of compliance.  
Step 4: Determine the percentage cost increase at sector level taking into account prevailing 
and estimated final compliance levels as well as taking into account the relative shares 
of affected and non-affected farms; 
Step 5: Analyse the impact on market conditions and trade patterns (imports, exports), i.e. 
perform external competitiveness analysis. 
 
The sectoral analysis performed for the livestock sectors considered closely follow the above 
outline, for the fruit& vegetable and olives however, a case study approach based on selected 
regions was used.  In addition, a bio-physical farm model is employed in this case study to 
assess cost impacts of selected cross compliance measures. Moving from Step 3 to 4 requires 
an aggregation (or up-scaling) procedure, which is needed to assess competitiveness at the 
global level. 
In Step 1 the selection of sectors, standards but also countries and data is made. The  selection 
of sectors is based on several criteria, such as the EU’s share in global production, the 
importance of the products for external trade with non-EU countries, the socio-economic 
importance for the northern and southern parts of the EU and the linkage to market and price 
support measures of the CAP as well as the direct payment schemes.   
The selection of the standards analysed is based on several considerations: information about 
the importance of standards, best estimates of degrees of compliance and qualitative 
assessment of effects (marginal, limited, significant) and costs (negligible, low, potentially 
significant) across standards, sectors and countries. Qualitative assessments were made during 
the first stage of the project (Jongeneel et. al., 2007). 
With respect to countries, the analysis is performed for selected EU-countries, EU-15 as a 
whole, and such non-EU countries as US, Canada and New Zealand. The selected non-EU 
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countries are important competitors of the EU in the selected products.  Individual member 
states are selected upon their contribution to EU production and to some extent upon data 
availability. If not specified otherwise, the assumption made is that other EU countries have 
minor exports and import shares (<5%) and therefore do not influence the global 
competitiveness analysis. While the old member states are struggling with implementation of 
standards since 1991, the new member states have to only start to introduce the standards in 
the next years.  Therefore a case study approach with limited reference to farm data and costs 
of compliance is used for Poland in the current analysis. 
The following major data sources are used in the analysis. For a single EU country, data have 
been processed from the Farm Structure Survey (FSS) or from Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN). For an overview and individual EU country-specific contributions to the 
EU-15 or EU-27 the EUROSTAT aggregated data were assessed. In many cases regional 
databases were used, for example (REGIO). The data from existing networks, for example 
International Farm Comparison Network Dairy (IFCN) or a network of European research 
institutes coordinated by the Meat and Livestock Commission and the British Pig Executive 
(Interpig) were used to enable for international comparison of competitiveness. For non-EU 
countries, the farm as well as regional data were used. From the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Statistics Canada (for Canada) and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(for New Zealand) and regional authorities were enquired among numerous sources. 
Survey data are used for selected case studies at the province level of two EU countries: Italy 
and Spain. 
In Step 2, expert judgments, discussions within the project group, the outcomes of seminars 
and discussions within the Enduser Group (including representatives form DG Research, DG 
Agri, OECD, some national governments and other stakeholders (COPA)), and findings 
obtained from other projects and a literature review are used to establish the initial level of 
compliance to certain directives and to suggest the degree of possible improvement. The 
distinction is made between SMRs and GAECs, since GAECs were introduced after the Cross 
Compliance regulation came operative. An overview is thus performed for each of SMRs and 
GAECs directives across different sectors and countries for which policy areas/legislation are 
likely to have cost implications on the examined sectors. Requirements with potential cost 
implications are listed as well.  
When considering potential cost implications due the compliance with standards, it needs to 
be noted that implementation of standards varies considerably between Member States. 
Therefore the assessment of potential costs is done for particular member states.  In addition, 
to assure comparability of competitiveness between EU and non-EU countries, 
implementation of comparable standards and potential cost implications are provided for New 
Zealand, Canada and USA.  
The estimates about the prevailing level of compliance and the improvement in compliance is 
estimated as the change in compliance as compared to 2005, the year for which best estimates 
of compliance could be obtained. 
In Step 3, the procedure followed in determining the costs of compliance follows a bottom-up 
approach, which starts from farm level (taking into account farm type, production intensity, 
and farm location). To define the number of affected farms (animals) in the sector of each 
European country, the map of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones was used. 
In non-EU countries, case study approach was used. The results are presented in individual 
product-chapters and in the Annex to this report.    
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The costs associated with (assumed full) compliance to the standards have to be related to the 
costs of production in order to be suitable for incorporation in the GTAP-model (see Demont 
et al., 2007b; Demont et al., 2007a for details and also in section 2.3).  For European 
countries, the most recent and available farm accountancy data (FADN, year 2003) and FSS 
(year 2005) data are used for the analysis. In non-EU countries, data from 2005 are used.   
A modelling framework as applied in Spanish case complements the work done at the farm 
level A model-based analysis integrating an economic (mathematical programming model) 
and agronomic model (Cropsyst) is performed to simulate policies and assess  the cost of 
selected cross compliance measures (nitrates directive and water use). The data from years 
2005 and 2006 are used. In the Spanish case of the Olive sector, main data sources are from 
2005 (cost of compliance with standards on erosion or green covers maintenance). 
 
For Step 4 an up-scaling procedure is employed to derive the percentage cost increase at the 
national level. In EU countries, the percentage costs increase as a whole is determined by a 
production weighted share of the specialised farms which faced a cost increase and the 
specialised farms which do not face a costs increase (affected and non-affected farms). Under 
these assumptions the aggregation of costs to the national level is done for all sectors and 
countries where GTAP  model was specified (see Step 5 and also Table 2.1). 
In Step 5, a multiregion, multisector, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which is 
capable to take into account the various behavioural responses and related market 
adjustments, is exploited to determine the impacts on the EU’s and other countries trade 
positions from the increases in the cost of production.. The percentage costs increase at the 
sector level of each major market player is inputted into GTAP model to simulate changes in 
trade. More details are presented in section 2.3 
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Table 2.1: Design of competitiveness analysis in selected countries for selected sectors 
Data Farm level competitiveness 
(Year) 
Sector Country 
Average farm Case study % costs increase Gross Margin 
Global level 
competitiveness, 
countries included (Year 
2001)** 
EU-15 (BE, NL, FR, DE, UK, DK, ES) 2003 IT (Lombardia) 2005 2003 2001 and 2005 
 (see Table 4.8) 
New Zealand 2005  2005 2001 and 2005 
 (see Table 4.8) 
Canada     minor trade 
Dairy 
USA 2005 Wisconsin, California, 2005 2005 2001 and 2005 
 
EU-15 (BE, NL, FR, DE, UK, IT, ES, IR)     
 (see Table 5.15) 
New Zealand     
 
Canada     
 
Beef 
USA  Texas, 2007   
 
EU-15 (NL, FR, DE, UK, IT, ES, IR) 2005 IT (Lombardia) 2005   
 (see Table 6.11) 
New Zealand     minor trade 
Canada     no data 
Pigs* and 
Poultry 
USA  Iowa 2006  
 
EU-15     
 (see Table 7.11) 
New Zealand     minor trade 
Canada     minor trade 
Cereals 
USA     
 
Spain  2003 Valencia and Castilla la 
Mancha, 2005 
2003 and 2005 2005 Fruits and  
Vegetables US   2005  
No data 
 
Olives Spain (Andalusia) 2003 Andalusia, 2005 2005 2005 No data 
Notes:  The box is ticked-off when changes in costs due to the compliance to standards in this country are modelled in GTAP model; corresponding percentage changes for non-
EU countries are mentioned in parentheses.  The box is not ticked off when the country is included in the model but changes are not modelled. In all other cases the country is not 
included either due to low (<5%) percentage in the total trade, or when no data is available (no data). 
* Analysis in GTAP is only done for the pig sector. Poultry sector is not distinguished in the model. 
** Year 2001 is a base year; price situation of the year 2003 is introduced in the dairy sector to account for the reform of 2003. 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
2.2 Challenges in assessing farm level competitiveness  
In the project the main emphasis is on external competitiveness of each sector (see section 2.3 
in this report). In that the GTAP trade-impact analysis plays a key-role and therefore the 
results of farm level analysis which form the input to the GTAP model – percent cost increase 
– should be aligned as much as possible. Using farm-budget analysis allows for comparability 
of the results across sectors as well as countries. Using different units and currencies is not 
critical since the percentage cost increase is calculated, that later enters as input into he GTAP 
model.  
Although knowledge of the components of costs are useful for a better understanding of 
competitiveness, one should be careful to draw conclusions about competitiveness from 
simple cost of production comparisons. It could be argued that alongside costs also revenues 
should be taken into account, because ultimately it is profitability rather than costs which 
drives competitiveness. Competitiveness addresses the comparison of firms on one market: 
one firm is more competitive compared to one other if it can supply a product at lower costs, 
without affecting its overall profitability on the long term. In the case of farms, the 
profitability can therefore be approached by the farm’s gross income (revenue earned with 
main product and by products as well as product related policy payments and subsidies) 
minus the costs of variable and (quasi-)fixed factors.  
Given the context the following set-up of the farm level competitiveness analysis is realised. 
1. Farm level analysis is performed, which corresponds to the external competitiveness 
analyses as done within the GTAP approach. For the selected measures and countries 
the average farm accountancy figures and the calculated on-farm impacts are 
provided. Both short- and long-term competitiveness are analysed. 
2. For the in-depth analysis of specific issues, a number of selected cases (countries) is 
analysed, using typical farm data (rather than average farms). 
 
The implementation of the farm competitiveness analysis requires detailed data on (i) the 
average farm-level impact of the regulations under research, (ii) the degree of compliance to 
standards in the sector and (iii) average farming budgets (production costs) representative for 
the sector. Difficulties to derive the imputed value of family labour directly from FADN data 
and thus to allow for a comparability of results across countries is limited. For example, for 
dairy sector the costs of imputed labour are available only for the Netherlands (LEI, 2006) 
and the US (Winrock, 2007). Therefore, the analysis of competitiveness focuses on gross 
margin (revenues minus variable costs) as the performance measure across countries and not 
on net result. 
Since results at the farm level are likely dependant on farm structure, which varies across 
Europe and to a  greater extent between the countries under investigation, the calculations of 
costs as well as impacts on competitiveness in some cases are presented for farms of different 
structure (size, intensity). However, it is impossible to account for all the heterogeneity in 
production. Rather representative farm studies (per country) were done and used as a basis for 
the cost increase calculations. More emphasis on farm representativity is paid in Spanish case 
studies, which as expected is a time-consuming investment that permits to use a farm-based 
model approach in one of the inland regions. This representative farm approach is also used in 
the other regions considered for homogenizing the analysis on competitiveness. Aggregation 
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of farm types to the national level will require further analysis and specific assumptions that 
will reflect the intra-regional differences and variations. Best-estimates of compliance are 
used, but these still contain a certain degree of uncertainty. In a number of cases alternative 
approaches and the different sources were used to cross-check both cost of production and 
degree of compliance estimates in order to test for the robustness in terms of order of 
magnitude. To allow for cross-country comparisons, the typical farm data from the well 
established networks are used. Two of these, for example, are International Farm Comparison 
Network (IFCN, see Hemme, 2002) and a network of European research institutes 
coordinated by the Meat and Livestock Commission and the British Pig Executive (Fowler, 
2006). The advantage of these data is that they have been harmonized prior to analysis and 
distinguish family labour costs, thereby allowing to focus on the net results.  
As it was mentioned earlier, an aggregation (or up-scaling) procedure has been performed in 
order to assess percentage cost change at the national level by using the farm level results. 
Estimates of the number of farms affected by the specific SMR or GAEC and of the degree of 
compliance have been used in order to carry out this up-scaling procedure. As attended the 
impact of full compliance with the SMRs is minor at sector level than at the single farm level 
as not all farms are affected. Significant differences between Member States occur due to 
relevant differences in the degree of compliance. 
 
2.3 Challenges in assessing global level competitiveness 
The approach chosen for the costs impact calculations follows the procedures as outlined in 
Deliverable 7 (De Roest et al., 2006) of this project and as further detailed and put in an 
competitiveness context in (Demont et al., 2007a). The main focus is on assessing external 
competitiveness for which the world trade consequences of the considered regulations have to 
be analysed. The tool used for this latter exercise is the GTAP computable general 
equilibrium model.  
The highest level of disaggregation of the GTAP 6 Data Package is 87 regions, 57 sectors and 
5 production factors. To model production factors, we use the full disaggregation of five 
production factors available in GTAP (land, unskilled labour, skilled labour, capital and 
natural resources). We shock total factor productivity to simulate an increase in total 
production costs engendered by standards on agricultural production. The sectors are 
aggregated to three main sectors, i.e. food, manufactures and services. In our modelling 
framework, we consider four sectors, i.e. (i) the sector under research, (ii) the rest of the food 
sector, (iii) manufactures and (iv) services. The focus is however on the agricultural sector. 
GTAP models are develop for four sectors, i.e. the beef, pigmeat, dairy and cereal sectors. 
About 30 GTAP experiments were designed to tune with factoral aggregation, modelling of 
shocks, regional aggregation (see also Demont et al, 2007a). Thus, for each sector, the major 
trade partners are identified and the relevant trade model is constructed for assessing the 
impact of standards on the external competitiveness of European agriculture and generating 
global export quantity elasticities.  
The following procedure was followed to create four GTAP models for each sector: 
1. Generate the full regional disaggregated trade matrix of 87 regions using GTAP; 
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2. Create EU-15 aggregate. We use the EU-15 as the correct aggregate as the GTAP 
database is constructed on 2001 data, i.e. before accession of the 10 New Member 
States; 
3. Select the trade partners that represent at least 5% of global exports or imports of the 
sector under research. This step ensures that the major exporters and importers of the 
global sector are included; 
4. Aggregate the remaining countries in two regions: (i) the rest of OECD (ROECD) 
countries and (ii) the rest of the world (ROW); 
5. Correct for intra-trade. In GTAP, aggregating does not eliminate intra-trade. 
Therefore, the trade matrix has to be corrected for this by setting the intra-trade of the 
EU-15, the ROECD and the ROW to zero and recalculating the totals of the matrix; 
6. Repeat step 3. The trade matrix created so far is square, implying that also exports of 
net importing sectors are tabulated. Therefore, only trade partners that represent at 
least 5% of global exports or imports of the sector under research are selected. 
 
The 30 GTAP experiments, which were assessed before the percentage cost estimates were 
derived, allow for sensitivity analysis, which identified possible ranges of solutions in 
simulation of trade effects. One could in addition perform tests on the distribution of costs, 
which to some extent was delivered within the analysis of Nitrate Directive impacts by 
varying the final degree of compliance.  
As regards the GTAP model alongside it strengths it has some drawbacks. Firstly, the model 
has a high product aggregation level, which makes the analysis a bit rough. For example, 
where for dairy there are a host of derived traded products (like butter, skimmed milk powder, 
hard cheese, soft cheese, cream, whole milk powder, casein, etc.) GTAP distinguishes only 
one dairy product, and therewith looses a lot of detail. The beef sector is not disaggregated in 
GTAP (includes bovine animals, sheep, goats, horses, asses, mules). This is however does not 
have strong implications since the shares of traded sheep, goats, horses are minor among 
countries  selected for the analysis. The model does not distinguish pig and poultry production 
and therefore this aggregated sector has been disaggregated using the tool “Splitcom”. In the 
standard settings of the tool, the sector is split in two identical sectors. However, based on 
trade data form FAOSTAT, we created a new split taking into account the real trade patterns 
but kept the elasticities from the original sector. Partly this might be remedied by the used 
Armington assumptions, which allow to account for product heterogeneity, but it is not 
always easy to understand the relationship between the elasticity of substitution parameters 
and actual market conditions.  
Secondly, the GTAP model version used for this analysis uses 2001 as a base year. Since the 
reform in the dairy sector was very prominent not to account for it, we introduced a price 
decrease in the base year of 2001, i.e. replicating the situation in the dairy sector of 2003 
which is closer to the situation when compliance to standards was introduced. The 
improvement in compliance is estimated as the change in compliance as compared to 2005, 
the year for which best estimates of compliance could be obtained. The results of the GTAP 
model are then interpreted as estimates of improvement in compliance since 2005 are 
evaluated as if they are happening in 2001 (the GTAP base year data). For this reason 
percentage changes as compared to the baseline scenario are analysed and not absolute 
numbers.  
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Thirdly, the GTAP model is a relatively static model, reacting instantaneously to changes in 
costs, etc., where in reality adjustments might be more less fast. Capital and labour factors are 
mobile in the model, therefore negative effect on one sector is balanced out by other sectors. 
Financial sectors are fixed (no money borrowing from country to country) and overall shifts 
in production factors are rather long-term effects and are not important with respect to Cross 
Compliance regulations. 
More importantly, the GTAP model assumes rational profit maximizing producer behaviour, 
like most production models based on micro economic theory do. It is known however, that in 
agriculture farmers might, at least in the short term, behave sometimes in an adverse manner. 
For the case analysed here, this can imply that the burden of the calculated cost increases is 
partly or fully carried by family labor rather than passed on to buyers of farm products. The 
GTAP calculation procedure does not take this into account. To the extent that this 
phenomenon yet occurs, the calculations given below are likely to give an upper bound of the 
impacts, where the really observed impacts on trade patterns might be smaller than the 
predicted ones.   
Formulation of a scenario on hormone ban deserves special attention. When simulating the 
trade impact of hormone use ban in the U.S. for dairy and beef sectors, the percent costs 
increase is imposed on the U.S. One may argue that since the hormone use is allowed in the 
U.S. and prohibited in the EU, the effects on trade are foregone benefits for the EU in case the 
hormone use is allowed. From the modelling perspective, the shifts of supply curves in these 
polar cases would in fact lead to the same net trade effect. Since both formulations of this 
scenario are hypothetical and since the results of potential cost decrease for the EU are not 
available and contrarily it is easier to obtain numbers on costs associated with hormone use in 
the U.S., the scenario is modelled as mentioned above: increase of costs for the U.S. For the 
GTAP simulation, a point for discussion is whether the estimate of percentage cost decrease 
due to use of hormone applies to a combination of production expansion (a movement along 
the cost curve) and the innovation-shift (a shift of the supply curve), as it is assumed.  For the 
GTAP percentage cost increase it seems important to isolate the pure costs reduction 
percentage rather than the cost change associated with the combined effect. The latter is likely 
to lead to an underestimation. 
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3 Review of SMR and GAEC standards and their likely cost 
implications on farms 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter will outline which cross compliance standards (SMR and GAECs) 
are likely to have cost implications on farm sectors examined within this project. 
These farm sectors are: dairy products, cereals, pigs and poultry, beef, fruits and olive oil. 
This paper is intended to stimulate discussion at the project meeting on cost impacts of 
compliance with cross compliance standards. 
 
The results of this paper are preliminary and based on the outcomes of the project 
deliverables within previous work packages, expert judgement and discussions within the 
project group, with DG Agri as well as the end user group. Results are also based on the 
analysis of compliance rates3 and the outcome of the Brussels workshop in 2006. 
Moreover, it builds on some of the findings of the CC net project and other projects.4  
 
First an overview will be given of which policy areas/ legislation included in Annex III of 
regulation 1782/2003 (SMRs) are likely to have cost implications on the examined sectors 
(see Table 3.1). The cost implications in Table 3.1 refer to an assumed situation of 
introducing standards that have not yet been implemented. However, it is important to 
highlight that these are not the “(additional) costs of cross compliance”, but the “cost 
implications of compliance with (previously existing) standards”. Costs of cross 
compliance will be the subject of the second part of this paper. 
 
A clear distinction of both concepts (“costs of compliance” versus “cost of cross 
compliance”) is crucial to correctly interpret the project’s results. In this respect, the costs 
for farmers for reaching standards pre-existing to the introduction of cross compliance 
cannot be considered as due to cross compliance. 
 
                                                 
3
 With restrictions the current level of compliance with SMRs and GAEC can serve as an indicator for an 
estimation on the proportion of farmers that may incur costs now or in the future 
4
 particularly Farmer, Martin et al 2007: The Possible Impacts of Cross Compliance on Farm Costs and 
Competitiveness, Deliverable 21, A Research Paper of the Cross Compliance Network, Institute for European 
Environmental Policy (IEEP), January 2007, also Muessner, Karaczun, Dworak, Marsden 2006: WFD and 
Agriculture Linkages at the EU Level. Final Report about Cross Compliance and the WFD”, june 2006, 
Deliverable within the projec “CAP & WFD”, supported by the European Commission 
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Costs associated with achieving compliance with mandatory cross compliance standards 
can occur in the following ways:  
- Investment costs: need to purchase new equipment (e.g. storage facilities), build new 
facilities etc. 
- Production costs: potentially reduced yield due to change in production practises (e.g. 
minimum maintenance, standards on tillage/ ploughing) etc. 
- Administrative costs: time needed to become familiar with new requirements/ 
procedures/ controls (training events etc.); time needed to complete documentation, 
prepare controls and inspection time. 
- non-compliance costs: deduction made from the SFP, potential loss of accreditation 
 
However, these costs can only be attributed to cross compliance if the requirement was not 
mandatory before the introduction of cross compliance. If the requirement was mandatory 
before cross compliance, than this is a cost of meeting the pre-existing legislation. 
Moreover differentiations should be made with regard to ‘long term’ and ‘short term’ 
impacts on competitiveness: the impacts should decline in the longer term as farmers 
become more aware of the standards and what needs to be done to achieve compliance. 
 
The main determinants of farm level costs arising from both SMR and GAEC are: 
- whether the requirement is applicable to the farm 
- if so, whether the farm is already compliant (or to which degree he or she is already 
compliant) with the requirements. (There are no additional costs associated if the farmer 
is already fully compliant, but s/he might have faced costs in the past to achieve 
compliance. It could also be true that the requirements are part of the farmer’s normal 
farming practises and therefore invoke no additional costs). 
- whether the standard is based on items of national legislation that was already in place 
before the introduction of cross compliance, meaning that there was a already need to 
comply.  
Moreover, it needs to be noted that SMRs and GAEC standards only apply to farmers 
claiming Single Payment. 
 
3.2 Costs of Compliance 
The following Table 3.1 gives an overview of which policy areas/ legislation included in 
Annex III of regulation 1782/20035  (SMRs) are likely to have cost implications on the 
examined sectors.  
 
                                                 
5
 Only those aspects of the respective regulations and directives have been analysed that are part of the SMRs. 
e.g.. for the Nitrates Directive this would be the Articles 4 and 5 (see Reg 1782/ 2003, Annex III) 
instead of the whole Directive. 
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Three categories of cost implications can be distinguished:  
+ No costs: Policy indicated as a marginal constraint on farming and implies 
no costs to the sector 
++ Marginal costs: Policy indicated as a noteworthy constraint on farming 
and implies marginal costs to the sector (e.g. limited geographical 
coverage or low-cost implications) 
+++ Noteworthy costs: Policy indicated as a significant constraint on farming 
and implies noteworthy costs to the sector 
Empty cells: not relevant  
 
These categories of evaluation will be used further on in the report evaluating cost 
implications implementing national GAECs standards in selected Member States. 
 
It needs to be noted that the classification can only be rough, since concrete cost 
implications will always be case specific (e.g. depending on country/region, farm size, 
reference year, farm type and structure, etc.).  
 
Table 3.1: Cost implications of compliance with SMRs for selected sectors  
Directive 
[with year of 
introduction of 
regulation/ directive] Ce
re
a
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
v
eg
et
a
bl
es
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) Requirements with 
potential cost 
implications 
Environment 
1979 
Conservation of wild 
birds 
++
6
 
++ ++ + ++ ++ Management inside and 
outside protected areas, 
establishment of biotopes, 
no disturbance of birds 
during breeding (loss of 
yields?) 
1980 
Protection of 
groundwater 
++ ++ ++ ++ + + Limitations on discharge 
of substances 
1986 
Sewage sludge 
++    + + Prohibitions on use 
1991 
Nitrates from 
agriculture 
++ +++ ++ +++ +++
7
 
++ Prohibitions on periods 
when the application of 
fertilizer is inappropriate, 
storage facilities, might be 
                                                 
6
 With regards to the Birds Directive and cereal sector: It may be more a constraint for cereal farmers because 
some valued farmland bird species nest and breed in cereal fields. 
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Directive 
[with year of 
introduction of 
regulation/ directive] Ce
re
a
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
v
eg
et
a
bl
es
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) Requirements with 
potential cost 
implications 
costly for farmers in 
Vulnerable Zones 
1992 
Conservation of 
natural habitats, wild 
flora and fauna 
++ ++ ++  ++ ++ Maintenance habitats and 
conservation measures 
Public and animal health; identification and registration of animals  
1992 
Identification and 
registration of 
animals8  
 ++ ++ ++   Administrative 
requirements on the 
identification and 
registration systems 
1997 
Identification and 
registration of bovine 
animals 
 ++ ++    Rules as regards 
identification and 
registration systems   
2000 
Identification of 
bovine animals, 
labelling of beef 
 ++ ++    Rules as regards 
identification and 
registration systems and 
labelling of beef 
2004 
Identification and 
registration of ovine 
and caprine animals 
 +     Rules as regards 
identification and 
registration systems 
Public, animal and plant health 
1991 
Placing of plant 
protection products on 
the market 
+++    +++  Use and control of Plant 
protection Products, 
requirements on 
classification, packaging 
and labelling 
1996 
Use of hormones 
 +++ +++ +++   Prohibition of the 
respective substances 
2002 
Requirements of food 
++
+ 
+++ +++ +++ +++  Food safety requirements, 
traceability of food 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 Although the Nitrates Directive has a major impact on the cereals sector, it is the most relevant standard in the 
vegetables sector, as it produces important yield decreases in some crops, mainly in potato.  
8
 With regard to the I&R Directive: as a pre-existing requirement, any costs arising should be attributed to the 
legislation and not cross compliance. These costs are likely to be those of replacing eartags and 
accompanying inspectors on farm when the animals are checked (can take a long time on larger units).  
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Directive 
[with year of 
introduction of 
regulation/ directive] Ce
re
a
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
v
eg
et
a
bl
es
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) Requirements with 
potential cost 
implications 
law 
2001 
Prevention, control 
and eradication of 
spongiform 
encephalopathies 
 +++ +++    Prohibitions concerning 
animal feeding (feeding 
of ruminants with protein 
derived from mammals 
prohibited), animal health 
certificates 
Notification of diseases 
1985 
Control of foot-and-
mouth disease 
 ++ ++ ++   Control measures in the 
event of outbreak, 
notification of authority 
1992 
Control of swine 
vesicular disease 
   ++   Control measures in the 
event of outbreak, 
notification of authority 
2000 
Control of bluetongue 
 +++ +++    Control rules in the event 
of outbreak, notification 
of authority 
Animal welfare 
1991 
Standards for the 
protection of calves 
 +++ +++    Requirements to holdings/ 
space allowances/ 
conditions for rearing 
calves 
1991 
Standards for the 
protection of pigs 
   +++   Space allowances/ 
Standards for rearing and 
fattening 
1998 
Protection of animals 
kept for farming 
purposes 
 ++ ++ ++   Conditions under which 
animals are bred or kept 
(staffing, inspection, 
record keeping, 
equipment, feed, water 
etc.) 
 
3.3 Costs of Cross-Compliance 
When considering the additional costs of cross compliance at farm level, one has mainly to 
consider the costs derived from meeting the standards of GAEC. Unlike the SMRs, the 
standards in Annex IV of Regulation 1782/2003 are not based on EU legislation. This 
therefore enhanced the possibility of the introduction of entirely new standards, depending 
on the extent to which Member States have pre-existing national legislation for soil erosion, 
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soil organic matter, soil structure and minimum maintenance and whether this legislation is 
included as GAEC standards.9 
The applicability of GAECs to different farm sectors varies and affects some more than 
others. For example, in France the requirement to create a buffer strip on three per cent of 
UAA has a cost implication in particular for arable farms, as a small amount of land is 
taken out of production. In Lithuania, a more significant cost impact is expected on farmers 
grazing livestock in more remote areas in order to meet the minimum maintenance 
requirement, where the farmer will either need to keep more animals or pay to have the 
grass removed.10 
If costs are applicable to cross compliance depends on the level of implementation of 
standards into national legislation before they were part of cross compliance and if the 
GAECs are applicable to the farm. In most cases, Member State GAEC standards are, as with 
SMRs, based on pre-existing national legal requirements. However, several Member States 
have included new standards within the national GAEC framework, and it is these standards 
that may result in a cost that the farmer did not have to meet before the introduction of cross 
compliance.11 
3.4 Implementation of GAECs into national legislation 
As outlined above, when considering potential cost implications due the introduction of 
GAEC, it needs to be noted that implementation of GAEC standards varies considerably 
between Member States. For UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Italy and France 
the following tables will therefore outline the differences in implementation. Moreover it will 
be noted, which of the GAECs are new legislation rather than covering pre-existing 
legislation. An additional text section will comment on the evaluations and analysis made.  
In addition, implementation of GAEC comparable standards and potential cost implications 
will be provided for the three not-EU countries New Zealand, Canada and USA. The same 
four categories of evaluation of cost implications, i.e. “+”, “++”, “+++” and an empty cell, are 
used, as provided in the text above for costs of compliance with SMRs.  
3.4.1 Implementation of GAEC standards in England and costs associated 
The Table 3.3 shows for each GAEC standard, the corresponding Annex IV standard (note in 
some cases we use ‘other’ where the English standard does not clearly match an Annex IV 
standard), whether the requirement was newly introduced with cross compliance (i.e. it was 
not part of pre-existing national legislation) and a judgement as to the extent each sector of 
interest to this study is likely to be affected in terms of costs. 
 
This table probably requires greater contextualisation e.g. farms with smaller fields with more 
hedgerows are exempt from the 2m margins requirement. Also, specialist pig and poultry 
                                                 
9
 Farmer et al 2007 
10
 Farmer et al 2007 
11
 Farmer et al 2007. See also for an overview which GAEC standards were newly introduced (for selected 
Member States: Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, UK) 
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producers and fruit horticulture producers are less likely to receive the Single Payment and 
therefore be subject to cross compliance. In the UK uptake of the Single Payment was lowest 
among pig, poultry and horticultural holdings (see Table 3.2 below).  
Table 3.2: Uptake of the Single Payment in the UK 
 
 
The following Table 3.3 gives an overview of which GAEC standards are likely to have cost 
implications on the examined sectors. The Table 3.3 shows that GAEC standards have the 
greatest cost implication for cereal farmers. Although this cost is fairly minimal, it affects 
88% of all cereal holdings (see above Table 3.2). This is in contrast to the SMRs where 
livestock farmers are more affected (mainly dairy and LFA farmers, as uptake of SPS among 
pig and poultry farmers is low although not insignificant). 
In England there are often several separate GAEC standards for each Annex IV standard.  The 
constraints imposed for each standard are therefore listed (in italics in the table), as is the 
overall constraint for each Annex IV standard (minimum soil cover etc, shown with a bullet 
point in the table). Some caution is required when interpreting the table, particularly where 
strong effects have been identified, and where constraints from different standards have been 
averaged out in order to make a judgement as to the total constraint in relation to each Annex 
IV standard. These effects are purely relative and in the wider policy/regulatory context may 
not impose the greatest constraints.  
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Table 3.3: Cost implications implementing GAEC standards in England 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
ho
rt
ic
u
ltu
re
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) 
New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
(Soil Protection 
Review, SPR) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ + +  N 
Impact on farmers will 
depend on existing 
management, farm type 
and conditions (e.g. 
crops grown, livestock 
housed or outside, 
rainfall, topography, 
etc.).  
Post-harvest 
management 
+      N 
Involves requirement 
for some soil cover over 
winter. 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ + + + +  N 
SPR has potential to 
limit soil damaging 
activities. 
Soil Protection Review 
(SPR) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ + +  N 
(see comments above) 
Post-harvest 
management 
+      N 
Applies after harvest of 
oilseeds, grain legumes 
and cereals (not maize). 
Waterlogged soil     +  N 
Applies to harvesting of 
fruit & veg. Main 
impact on potatoes + 
root crops. 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 
• Retain terraces       Not relevant to 
England. 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
      No corresponding 
GAEC standard 
implemented in 
England. 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
ho
rt
ic
u
ltu
re
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) 
New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
• Arable stubble 
management 
(Burning of crop 
residues) 
+      P 
Marginal constraints 
upon farming 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
(Waterlogged soil – 
mechanical 
operations) 
    +  N  
Applies to harvesting of 
fruit & veg. Main 
impact on potatoes + 
root crops. Could limit 
access to livestock in 
extreme cases. 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
 + + +   N 
(Previous requirement 
under GFP) 
Overgrazing and 
unsuitable 
supplementary feeding. 
Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural 
grasslands, mainly beef 
and sheep farming.  
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ + + + +  P 
Requirement for EIA on 
uncultivated and semi-
natural areas. Unclear 
what impact this has on 
farmers in practice. 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ + + + +  N 
Main impacts are hedge 
cutting dates and 
protection of hedges 
and watercourses (both 
N) 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
Stone walls + + + + +  N 
Stone walls are 
protected where they 
occur but minor 
constraint on farming. 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
ho
rt
ic
u
ltu
re
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) 
New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
Hedgerows (cutting 
dates) 
+ + + + +  N 
No hedge cutting 
between 1 March and 
31 July (bird nesting 
season). 
Hedgerows removal       P 
Authorisation needed to 
remove hedges based 
on pre-existing 
legislation.  
Farmers with large filed 
and few hedges 
particularly unaffected. 
Protection of 
hedges and 
watercourses 
+ + + + +  N 
2m margins from centre 
of hedge. 1m margin 
from edge of 
watercourse. Fields < 
2ha exempt.  
Does not prevent 
livestock grazing on 
margins but does 
prevent cultivations, 
input applications and 
supplementary feeding. 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land 
+ + + + +  N, P. 
Eligible land not in 
agricultural 
production 
+ + + + +  N 
Only applies to non set-
aside ungrazed or 
uncultivated land. Many 
farms unaffected. 
Requirement to cut 
scrub. Also relevant for 
permanent pasture.  
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
/ 
ho
rt
ic
u
ltu
re
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) 
New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
Control of weeds + + + + +  P 
All reasonable steps to 
be taken to control 
injurious weeds where 
they occur.  
Marginal constraint on 
farming except where 
infestations occur. 
 
Other 
Scheduled 
monuments; 
SSSIs (sites of 
special scientific 
interest);  
Public rights of 
way; 
Heather and grass 
burning; 
Felling of trees; 
Tree Preservation 
Orders. 
      P 
All based on pre-
existing legislation.  
Inclusion within GAEC 
may improve awareness 
and enforceability of 
existing obligations but 
they are not new. 
Marginal constraints 
upon farming. Heather 
and grass burning 
applies to upland areas.  
 
3.4.2 Implementation of GAEC standards in Germany and costs associated 
In 2004, a new national ordinance (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004)12 containing the provisions on 
maintenance of agricultural land in good agricultural and environmental conditions has been 
issued by the German federal government and covers the majority of the GAEC standards set 
by the Annex IV of Council Regulation 1782/2003. Although the ordinance sets uniform 
standards for GAEC in Germany, they are implemented under the responsibility of the 
Länder. The Länder (regional) authorities may approve exceptions in certain cases or areas, 
and are also responsible for measures concerning the retention of permanent pasture.  
                                                 
12
 National ordinance on maintenance of agricultural land in good agricultural and environmental conditions 
(2004): Verordnung über die Grundsätze der Erhaltung landwirtschaftlicher Flächen in einem guten 
landwirtschaftlichen und ökologischen Zustand (Direktzahlungen-Verpflichtungenverordnung - 
DirektZahlVerpflV) vom 4. November 2004 (BGBl 2004 I, S. 2778 ff. vom 12.11.2004 Nr. 58) and 
Change of the national ordinance on maintenance of agricultural land in GAEC (26.5.2006, BGBl. 2006 
I S. 1252).  
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Nevertheless, rules on soil use and good agricultural practice (GAP)13 applied to agricultural 
land have existed in Germany before this new ordinance was adopted. The Federal Soil 
Protection Act (BBodSchG14 1998, Art. 17) and the Federal Nature Conservation Act 
(BNatSchG15 2002, Art. 5) define the principles of GAP related to soil and prescribe several 
rules concerning agricultural soil use. The national GAP standards are legally binding for all 
farmers, while the German GAEC standards (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) are binding only for 
farmers receiving direct payments.  
In summary, the previously existing German legislation overlaps in large parts with the new 
GAEC standards, the latter being more specific and detailed or in several cases going beyond 
GAP rules, for instance regarding crop rotation, minimum soil coverage, and the definition of 
landscape features. Against this background, it can be assumed that the GAEC requirements, 
or cross-compliance hardly can introduce new costs, with the exception of additional 
administrative costs (for more information see Chapter 8.2 in D5 for Germany (Müssner et al 
200616)). Cross compliance might however pose a greater challenge to small scale and part-
time farmers as well as specialised farms. The Table 3.5 to Table 3.7 (as adapted from D5 for 
Germany (Müssner et al 200617)) below present the GAEC standards as given by Annex IV of 
Council Regulation 1782/2003 and the national implementation of these standards. Where 
possible, they also list the corresponding provisions of national law that define the GAP 
independent of cross compliance. The following Table 3.4 gives an overview of which GAEC 
standards are likely to have cost implications on the examined sectors.  
Table 3.4: Cost implications implementing GAEC standards in Germany 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
+
+ 
+ + + +  N, P  
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific conditions 
      P 
                                                 
13
 “Good Agricultural Practice” and “Good Farming Practice” are understood as synonymous terms. German 
term: “Gute fachliche Praxis”.  
14
 BBodSchG 1998: Gesetz zum Schutz vor schädlichen Bodenveränderungen und zur Sanierung von Altlasten 
(Bundes-Bodenschutzgesetz - BBodSchG) vom 17. März 1998 (BGBl. I S. 502), zuletzt geändert durch 
Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 9. Dezember 2004 (BGBl. I S. 3214). [Federal Soil Protection Act 1998].  
15
 BNatSchG 2002: Gesetz über Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege (Bundesnaturschutzgesetz - BNatSchG), 
vom 25. März 2002 (BGBl. I S. 1193), zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 9. Dezember 
2006 (BGBl. I S. 2833). [Federal Nature Conservation Act 2002].  
16
 Müssner, Rainer; Anna Leipprand and Stephanie Schlegel 2006: Deliverable 5: Mandatory standards in 7 EU 
countries and 3 non-EU countries. Germany Country Report. Project no. SSPE-CT-2005-006489: 
Cross-Compliance - Facilitating the CAP reform: Compliance and Competitiveness of European 
Agriculture. Ecologic. Germany.  
17
 Müssner, Rainer; Anna Leipprand and Stephanie Schlegel 2006: Deliverable 5: Mandatory standards in 7 EU 
countries and 3 non-EU countries. Germany Country Report. Project no. SSPE-CT-2005-006489: 
Cross-Compliance - Facilitating the CAP reform: Compliance and Competitiveness of European 
Agriculture. Ecologic. Germany.  
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
• Retain terraces     +  N  
• Standards for crop 
rotations  
+
+ 
+ +    N, P  
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
• Arable stubble 
management 
+ + +    N, P  
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: • Appropriate 
machinery use 
+    +  P 
• Minimum 
livestock stocking 
rates or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
 + +    P 
• Protection of 
permanent pasture 
(Maintenance of 
set-aside land) 
+ + +    N, P  
• Retention of 
landscape features 
+ + +  +  N, P  
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural land 
      Not defined by the 
national legislation.  
 
The German GAEC standards (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) address all the issues indicated by 
the Annex IV of the Council Regulation 1782/2003 (e.g. soil erosion, soil organic matter, soil 
structure and minimum level of maintenance), however do not deal with all the indicated 
standards (see Table 3.5 to Table 3.7 below). Although soil structure is not addressed 
specifically by the German GAEC standards, the requirements for maintenance of soil organic 
matter are seen as sufficient to address the issue of soil structure at the same time (Nitsch and 
Osterburg 200718).  
The German GAEC standards focus on erosion, soil organic matter, and minimum level of 
maintenance. Most emphasis receives the minimum level of maintenance, defining 
requirements for greening and removing of vegetation on land taken out of production, and 
also describing in detail the landscape elements to be maintained. Another important aspect of 
GAEC is the maintenance of soil organic matter with minimum requirements concerning the 
share of crops or, as an alternative detailed prescription, for the determination of the content 
of soil organic matter and compliance with thresholds. The standards on minimum soil cover, 
                                                 
18
 According to protocol of meeting of the working group cross-compliance 30.10.2003 and 6.11.2003.  
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standards for crop rotations and retention of landscape features are more specific and going 
beyond the principles of GAP defined in the Federal Soil Protection Act and the Federal 
Nature Conservation Act. These standards are mostly relevant to the arable, dairy and beef 
sectors, as far as dairy and beef farms have arable land, for example because of fodder maize 
growing. For example, the standards relating to the minimum maintenance of land taken out 
of production have been adapted in 200619. Before this adaptation the frequency of mulching 
or mowing on arable land out of production was not specified and is now the same as for 
grassland. The time where mulching or mowing is not allowed has been reduced to the 30 
June. Standards for the minimum maintenance of land taken out of production are not based 
on existing legislation. The landscape elements were also not generally protected, although 
some of them have already been covered by Federal and Regional Nature Conservation 
Legislation (protected wetland habitats and single trees). In some Laender certain types of 
hedges have already been protected by the regional legislation (e.g. “Knicks” in Schleswig-
Holstein and Lower Saxony) (Nitsch and Osterburg 2007).  
The general discussion in Germany and most statements by stakeholders focus on the 
requirements for the maintenance of set-aside land, since 700,000 hectares of set-aside land 
exist in Germany, and the de-coupling of the agricultural subsidies may lead to additional 
areas being set aside (Müssner et al 200620). For example, mulching as a standardised 
mechanical low-cost measure is approved for the maintenance of lands, it might increasingly 
compete with more costly extensive livestock keeping practices on grassland areas.21 
Soil erosion (Minimum soil cover)22: Farmers may have to sow winter grain or winter catch 
crop on 40% of the farm’s crop land area. Costs for the sowing of winter crops lie in the range 
of 550-650 EUR/ha (including the costs for seeds, fertiliser and equipment).
 
However, since a 
positive profit margin is to be expected when the product is marketed, below the line farmers 
will incur no extra costs.  
Maintenance of organic matter and soil structure23: With regard to the Standards for crop 
rotations, farmers probably only choose the crop ratio option if additional crops can be 
marketed, which again implies that extra costs will not arise. For the compilation of the 
humus balance, farmers may purchase software for 20-50 EUR, but it can also be done by 
hand. The alternative, analysis of soil samples, costs approximately 50 to 80 EUR, but has to 
be done only once in six years. 
Maintenance of set-aside lands24: The maintenance measures, i.e. sowing of grassland, 
mulching and mowing, which are required of farmers may constitute a cost factor. 
The costs for sowing on set-aside land were estimated to be between 400 and 500 EUR/ha by 
farmers’ associations. However, sowing is not mandatory, and farmers can also choose to 
allow natural regeneration of vegetation cover.  
                                                 
19
 Change of the Regulation on the principles of maintaining agricultural land in GAEC (26.5.2006, BGBl. 2006 
I S. 1252).  
20
 Müssner, Rainer; Anna Leipprand and Stephanie Schlegel 2006: Deliverable 5: Mandatory standards in 7 EU 
countries and 3 non-EU countries. Germany Country Report. Project no. SSPE-CT-2005-006489: 
Cross-Compliance - Facilitating the CAP reform: Compliance and Competitiveness of European 
Agriculture. Ecologic. Germany.  
21
 DVL and NABU 2005. 
22
 Müssner et al, (2006). 
23
 Müssner et al, (2006). 
24
 Müssner et al, (2006). 
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Mulching costs between 35 and 60 EUR/ha, depending on the size of the parcel of land and 
on working width.  
As an alternative to mulching once a year, set-aside land may be mowed every second year. 
The costs of mowing and removal of cut material depend on machinery used, size of the 
parcel of land, distance from the farm, and quantity of hay per hectare and may vary between 
50 and 300 EUR/ha. 
Recovering of grassland could however cause costs, which cannot be quantified at this stage.  
Due to the prohibition of mulching and mowing on set-aside land during the period from 
April 1 to July 15, weed growth could not be controlled sufficiently, which implies an 
increased need for plant protection products later on.  
Maintenance of permanent pasture25: In a few regions, permanent pasture area might decline 
in the future to an extent that will require Länder governments to restrict the ploughing of 
permanent pasture or even to demand re-sowing. Re-sowing of grassland could cause costs; 
however, it cannot be quantified at this stage to what extent these costs will become relevant. 
Retention of landscape features: No significant cost implications are associated with the 
retention of landscape features standard. 
 
No direct requirements are specified for minimum land management reflecting site-specific 
conditions, appropriate machinery use, and minimum livestock stocking rates. However, 
indirectly the German GAP provisions are constraining them, e.g. recommendations on the 
equipment used for agricultural soil use, and animal husbandry can be found in guidance 
documents on GAP, however, these are not relevant for cross compliance. Avoidance of the 
encroachment of unwanted vegetation on agricultural land are not relevant and/or no 
constraints were specified.  
 
Table 3.5: National implementation of GAEC standards in Germany: soil erosion26  
Annex IV 
standard (Reg. 
1782/2003) 
German national standards for cross 
compliance (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) 
German GAP standards (national 
law) 
Minimum soil 
cover 
DirektZahlVerpflV 2004, Art. 2, clause 
1-3:  
To prevent soil erosion, at least 40% of 
the arable area of the farm has to be 
covered by plants, i.e. not ploughed 
BnatSchG 2002, Art. 5(4):  
(e) “On erosion-prone slopes, in 
flood plains, at sites with elevated 
groundwater table and in boggy 
locations, farmers shall refrain 
                                                 
25
 Müssner et al, (2006). 
26
 According to the National act on cross compliance [Gesetz zur Regelung der Einhaltung anderweitiger 
Verpflichtungen durch Landwirte im Rahmen gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften über 
Direktzahlungen (Direktzahlungen-Verpflichtungengesetz - DirektZahlVerpflG) vom 21. Juli 2004 
(BGB1 I 2004,S. 1767 vom 26.7.2004 Nr. 38)], standards for prevention of erosion will be based on a 
classification of agricultural soils according to their vulnerability to erosion from 2009 on.  
27
 For example, a farmer may choose either to grow at least 40 % winter grain or winter catch crop and to sow 
them before 1 December, or not to plough in the harvest residues before the 15 of February. In Bavaria, 
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Annex IV 
standard (Reg. 
1782/2003) 
German national standards for cross 
compliance (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) 
German GAP standards (national 
law) 
after harvest till the 15 of February of 
the following year, unless sown again 
before the 1 of December.27 
The regional administrations of the 
Laender can decide that this is not 
applicable in areas with low danger of 
erosion or fair weather conditions.  
from ploughing up grassland”.  
Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site 
specific 
conditions 
Not defined by the DirektZahlVerpflV 
2004. 
BbodSchG 1998, Art. 17(2):  
1. “The soil shall be worked in a 
manner that is appropriate for the 
relevant site, taking weather 
conditions into account”.  
4. “Soil erosion shall be avoided 
wherever possible, by means of 
site-adapted use, especially use 
that takes slope, water and wind 
conditions and the soil cover into 
account”.  
 
BnatSchG 2002, Art. 5(4):  
(a) “Land used for agriculture 
must be appropriately managed in 
accordance with the requirements 
of the site in question, and the 
sustained fertility of the soil and 
long-term usability of the land 
must be ensured”.  
Retain terraces DirektZahlVerpflV 2004, Art. 2, clause 
4-5:  
Terraces28 must not be removed.  
The competent regional authority can 
approve the removal of a terrace if there 
are no soil erosion risks. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
exceptions from this rule are possible under certain conditions (AGRA-EUROPE 43/06, 23.Oktober 
2006, KM 26).  
28
 According to the Art. 2 clause 2 of the National act on cross compliance 2004 [Gesetz zur Regelung der 
Einhaltung anderweitiger Verpflichtungen durch Landwirte im Rahmen gemeinschaftsrechtlicher 
Vorschriften über Direktzahlungen (Direktzahlungen-Verpflichtungengesetz - DirektZahlVerpflG) vom 
21. Juli 2004 (BGB1 I 2004,S. 1767 vom 26.7.2004 Nr. 38)]: Terraces are man-made straight-line 
structures in the agricultural landscape destined to reduce the slope steepness of the area used.  
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Table 3.6: National implementation of GAEC standards in Germany: soil organic 
matter and soil structure 
Annex IV 
standard (Reg. 
1782/2003) 
German national standards for cross 
compliance (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) 
German GAP standards (national 
law) 
Soil organic 
matter 
  
Standards for 
crop rotations 
where applicable 
DirektZahlVerpflV 2004, Art. 3, clause 
1-5: 
For the maintenance of organic matter in 
the soil and of the soil structure, farmers 
can choose between different options.29  
Either a crop ratio may be kept that 
includes at least three crop cultures, 
each of which has to cover at least 15% 
of the crop land area. Different cereal 
species count as independent cultures, as 
well as summer and winter crops and 
set-aside land. Crop land where 
permanent cultures or perennial cultures 
are grown are exempted from these 
provisions.  
If this crop ratio is not realised, farmers 
have to either provide an annual humus 
balance or a soil analysis on the basis of 
soil samples at least every six years. 
Detailed guidance is provided on how 
these analyses are to be conducted, and 
limit values for the content of humus are 
defined. If these limit values are 
exceeded, the farmers are obliged to 
make use of consulting offers and 
eventually to prove that farming 
practices have been changed in order to 
increase or maintain the organic matter 
content of the soil.  
BbodSchG 1998, Art. 17(2): 
6. “The soil's biological activity 
shall be conserved or promoted by 
means of appropriate crop 
rotation”.  
7. “The soil's humus content, as is 
typical for the site in question, 
shall be conserved, especially by 
means of adequate input of 
organic substances or of reduction 
of the intensity with which the 
soil is worked”.  
Arable stubble 
management 
DirektZahlVerpflV 2004, Art. 3, clause 
6-7:  
Stubble burning is prohibited.  
For phytosanitary reasons, the 
responsible authority of the Laender can 
approve exceptions to the ban on stubble 
burning. 
Majority of German Länder 
define this standard in their 
Nature Protection Acts or 
Regulation on Plant Wastes (e.g. 
Saarland).  
Soil structure   
                                                 
29
 Here, Germany has established measures in their cross compliance that go beyond the compulsory 
requirements in Annex IV of Reg. 1782/03.  
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Appropriate 
machinery use 
Not defined by the DirektZahlVerpflV 
2004. 
BbodSchG 1998, Art. 17(2):  
2. “The soil structure shall be 
conserved or improved”. 
3. “Soil compaction shall be 
avoided as far as possible, 
especially by taking the relevant 
soil type and soil humidity into 
account, and by controlling the 
pressure exerted on the soil by 
equipment used for agricultural 
soil use”.  
 
Table 3.7: National implementation of GAEC standards in Germany: maintenance 
of set-aside lands 
Annex IV 
standard (Reg. 
1782/2003) 
German national standards for cross 
compliance (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) 
German GAP standards 
(national law) 
Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
Not defined by the DirektZahlVerpflV 2004.  BnatSchG 2002, Art 5(4):  
(d) “Animal husbandry 
must to be in a balanced 
relationship to cropping; 
any adverse impacts on the 
environment are to be 
avoided“.  
Maintenance of 
set-aside 
land/Protection 
of permanent 
pasture 
DirektZahlVerpflV 2004, Art. 4, clause 1-6:  
On obligatory or voluntary set-aside arable 
land, vegetation cover has to be re-established, 
either by natural regeneration or by sowing. 
The plant cover is to be cut and mulched or to 
be mowed and removed. 
Set-aside permanent pasture has to be cut and 
mulched at least once a year, or mowed with 
removal of the cut material at least every 
second year.  
For reasons of nature conservation or water 
protection the competent authority of the 
Länder can approve exceptions. 
With regard to the protection of wildlife, 
mulching, cutting and mowing is not permitted 
between 1 April and 15 July. However, a 
shortening of this period to two months is 
currently being discussed. According to a draft 
new ordinance, the retention period would end 
In many cases permanent 
pasture is already protected 
under agri-environmental 
schemes 
                                                 
30
 Agra-Europe 11/06, Länderberichte p. 40.  
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Annex IV 
standard (Reg. 
1782/2003) 
German national standards for cross 
compliance (DirektZahlVerpflV 2004) 
German GAP standards 
(national law) 
15 June.30  
Retention of 
landscape 
features 
DirektZahlVerpflV 2004, Art. 5, clause 1-3:  
Several landscape features are defined that may 
not be removed by farmers. Elements such as 
hedges, tree rows, field woods, wetlands and 
single trees fall under this regulation if they 
fulfil certain criteria: hedges (minimum length 
20 m); tree rows (minimum length of 50 m and 
at least 5 trees; not agriculturally used trees); 
field woods (size of 100 –2000 m²); wetland 
habitats up to 2000 m² that are registered and 
protected according to the German Federal 
Nature Conservation Act 2002, Art. 30; single 
trees that are protected according to the 
German Federal Nature Conservation Act 
2002, Art. 28. 
Laender maintain the right to approve the 
removal of the terraces or the destruction of 
certain landscape features (e.g. trees or 
hedges). 
BbodSchG 1998, Art. 
17(2):  
5. “The predominantly 
natural structural elements 
of field parcels that are 
needed for soil 
conservation, especially 
hedges, field shrubbery and 
trees, field boundaries and 
terracing, shall be 
preserved”.  
 
BnatSchG 2002, Art. 5(4):  
(b) “Any avoidable 
impairments of existing 
biotopes must not be 
incurred”.  
(c) “The landscape 
components required for 
the interlinking of biotopes 
must be preserved and, 
where possible, increased”.  
Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural land 
Not defined by the DirektZahlVerpflV 2004.   
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3.4.3 Implementation of GAEC standards in Italy and costs associated 
The following Table 3.8 gives an overview of which GAEC standards are likely to have cost 
implications on the examined sectors.  
Table 3.8: Cost implications implementing GAEC standards in Italy 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
 
• Appropriate 
measures against 
water runoff on 
slopes  
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
  N 
Relevant for dairy, 
beef, pigs and poultry 
too as often these 
farms produce cereals 
and other arable crops 
on farm 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
 
• Arable stubble 
management 
+ + + +   N 
Relevant for dairy, 
beef, pigs and poultry 
too as often these 
farms produce cereals 
and other arable crops 
on farm 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: • Maintenance of 
draining network 
efficiency 
+ + + + + + N 
Relevant for all sectors 
but with low cost 
implications 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pastures 
 +
+
+ 
+
+
+ 
   N 
Rather strong cost 
implications in 
mountain farming 
• Management of 
set aside land  
+ + + +   P 
• Maintenance of 
olive groves 
     +
+ 
N 
Only for olive groves 
with risk of 
abandonment 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Retain terraces  +
+ 
+
+ 
 +
+ 
+
+ 
N 
Relevant only for 
fruits, permanent grass 
and olive trees grown 
on terraces 
 
Soil erosion 
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In order to protect soil against erosion in Italy one GAEC has been established which 
provides for the realisation of temporary furrows for collecting rainwater in channels and 
natural watercourses placed at the edges of the fields. This measure applies to the GAEC 
standard “minimum land management reflecting site-specific conditions”. The standard 
applies to arable areas (ex art. 2, point 1 Reg. 796/04 EC), only if they show erosive 
phenomena. The standard does not apply to these areas if constantly covered with grass or 
cropped all the year around. 
The total costs of compliance for this measure has been estimated by CRPA31 in € 
28,638,000, which represents approximately 3,5% of the production value of arable crops in 
mountain and hill farming. 
 
Soil organic matter 
In order to maintain soil organic matter levels this single standard enforces the prohibition of 
burning stubble, straw and crop residues left in the field after harvesting. The standard applies 
to arable areas and to areas subjected to set-aside. Regions may established time intervals for 
the application of the standard and alternative obligations in the presence of specific regional 
or local measures allowing a derogation of burning stubble prohibitions. 
Three types of costs for farmers are to be expected: 
1. lower production of straw;  
2. longer ploughing time due to the presence of stubble and straw to be covered with earth; 
and  
3. costs related to the shredding of maize poles. 
 
The total costs of these operations on part of the cultivated interested by this GAEC has been 
estimated in € 17,316,600 which represents 0,3% of the production value of cereals in Italy. 
The GAEC standard “arable stubble management” only refers to the prohibition to burn the 
stubble. According to cost estimates carried out by CRPA this measure has only minor cost 
impact on arable crops at national scale.  
 
Soil structure 
The standard establishes that the farmers must maintain the efficiency of the draining network 
for the outflow of the surface waters and, if present, the convexity of the surfaces. The 
standard applies to any agricultural area eligible for single farm payments and enforces the 
clean-up of the drains and maintenance intervention of the collecting channels to keep them 
efficient. Over the last years, farmers have neglected these practices in order to reduce 
“immediate” costs or due to the shortage of labour.  
 
The costs related to this GAEC are: 
1. expenses deriving from a proper levelling of the surface;  
2. drastic cleaning of the sluices and collecting channels; and 
                                                 
31
 Details of the cost calculation can be found in the national report for Italy D5.  
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3. yearly cleaning of ditches and sluices.  
 
The costs inherent to this GAEC equals about € 238,000,000, which represents 1,1% of the 
production value of agricultural products produced in the plains of Italy. 
Minimum level of maintenance. 
In Italy four GAEC measures have been implemented in order to obtain a minimum level of 
maintenance. 
 
- Protection of permanent pastures 
The standard contemplates the prohibition of reducing the permanent pasture surface or 
converting the permanent pasture surface to other productive destinations. The main purpose 
is to assure the protection of the permanent pasture in such a way as to assure a constant 
vegetal covering of the land. The greatest danger of pasture degradation derives from an 
incorrect management of surface waters. If the surface waters are not properly regulated, they 
can cause surface creeps that become more and more important in time causing the separation 
of the grass layer and landslides in particularly on clay soils. 
 
The costs generated by this GAEC for farmers are: 
1. expenses for the thickening the grass layer and the removal of undesirable vegetation; and 
2. cleaning of small water channels and supplementary fertilisation.  
 
Together these costs sum up to € 192.812,000 which represents 16,8% of the production value 
of agricultural products of mountain farming in Italy. 
 
- Set aside management 
This GAEC applies to arable areas subject to set-aside and other areas voluntary withdrawn 
from production and eligible for single farm payments. This measure applies to the GAEC 
standard “avoiding the encroachment of unwanted vegetation on agricultural land”. On these 
lands the standard prescribes: 
1. to maintain a vegetal covering all the year round; 
2. to carry out mowing or other equivalent operations in order to preserve the state of 
fertility of the land, protect the wild fauna, prevent fire and avoid the diffusion of weeds. 
Frequency of mowing interventions must be at least once a year; and 
3. in Natura 2000 areas the standard does not permit harvesting before the 15th of July.  
 
Costs inherent to this GAEC are essentially due to the preservation of vegetal covering during 
the year and the creation of fire barriers. The costs of this measure has been estimated by 
CRPA in € 107,184,000 which interests 264,000 ha of set-aside land. These costs can 
however be discarded as this is not a new measure introduced within the framework of the 
cross-compliance policy. 
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- Maintenance of olive groves 
Objective of this standard is to maintain the olive groves in a good vegetative conditions in 
order to have an equilibrated development of the grove and to prevent a deterioration of its 
status. Those cultivation techniques should be used which may guarantee this minimum 
maintenance objective. Moreover the olives have to be pruned at least each five years. The 
main purpose is to assure a minimum level of maintenance of the areas destined to olive tree 
cultivation through a proper plant care. 
CRPA has estimated the costs of compliance of this GAEC in € 146,900,000, primarily 
related to pruning the olive tree at least each five years. As olive groves in full production are 
pruned anyhow, only those groves which are at risk of abandonment have been taken into 
consideration. These costs represent about 5.6 % of the production value of olive oil in Italy.  
 
- Retention of landscape features 
The main requirements to satisfy according to this standard are: 
1. The prohibition to eliminate terraces. Terraces can be remodelled in order to make  them 
more efficient and mechanisable;  
2. to comply with the measures adopted by regional administration for the preservation of 
the elements of the agricultural landscape of historical and cultural importance not 
included in the previous point; and  
3. to comply with the management plans laid down by the regional administrations to fulfil 
the objectives of the Wild Bird and Habitat Directive.  
 
The main purpose is to assure the preservation of the rural landscape and prevent the 
deterioration of the habitats by maintaining their typical elements. Terracing is one of the 
elements that characterises the landscape in Liguria, some valleys of the Alps and areas of the 
inner Apennines.  
The cost of compliance with this new measure interests about one third of the total area 
dedicated to terraces in Italy and can be estimated in € 55,680,000, which implies about € 520 
per hectare of terrace. An estimate of the total area dedicated to terraces is about 106,700 ha, 
which represents only 0,8% of the Utilised Agricultural Area of Italy. 
An estimate of the costs of compliance with management plans in Natura 2000 areas has not 
been carried out, as most of these plans have not been implemented yet. 
If we aggregate the compliance costs of all the single GAECs which have been introduced by 
Italy we will end up with the following calculation (see Table 3.9). The total production value 
of Italian agriculture is € 44,989,542,000. The cross-compliance costs of the six new GAECs 
represent therefore 1.5% of the production value of Italian agriculture. 
In Italy the GAEC standard “arable stubble management” only refers to the prohibition to 
burn the stubble. According to cost estimates carried out by CRPA this measure has only 
minor cost impact on arable crops at national scale.  
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Table 3.9: Compliance costs of new GAEC standards 
Type of GAEC € per year 
Soil erosion 28.638.000 
Soil organic matter 17.316.600 
Soil structure 238.000.000 
Permanent pastures 192.812.000 
Olive groves 146.900.000 
Landscape features 55.680.000 
Total 679.346.600 
 
3.4.4 Implementation of GAEC standards in Spain and costs associated 
The following Table 3.10 gives an overview of which GAEC standards are likely to have cost 
implications on the examined sectors.  
Table 3.10: Cost implications implementing GAEC standards in Spain 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)?  
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
+    + ++ P 
(in previous Agri-
Environmental 
programme, voluntary) 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
    + ++ P 
(in certain areas of 
protection of bird 
species, SPAs) 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 
• Retain terraces     + ++ P 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where applicable 
+    + + N 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
 
• Arable stubble 
management 
+    + ++ P 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: • Appropriate 
machinery use 
+    + ++ N 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)?  
(and comments) 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
 + + +   P 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+   +   P 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+    ++ ++ P 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural land 
+    + + N 
• Water and 
irrigation: in 
over-exploited 
aquifers holding 
legal water use 
administrative 
concession and 
installing water 
meters 
++    ++ ++ N for the Agricultural 
administration (1) 
 
P for the Water 
Administration 
(requirements for the 
control of water 
abstractions) (2)  
 
• Water and 
irrigation: 
Avoiding 
manure, 
fertilizers and 
other substances 
on certain 
sources of water 
++    ++ + P (Agri-Environmental 
programme, voluntary) 
(3) 
 
Some of the requirements on soil covers, stubble management and minimum level of 
maintenance have been regulated through  agri-environmental programmes (AEPs) in Spain 
as voluntary requirements. The minimum land management reflecting site conditions have 
been established in Special Protected Areas for bird species conservation (in Spain called 
ZEPAS, Zonas de Especial Protección para las Aves).  
(1) In relation to the new measures that Spain has introduced in Annex IV (section related to 
avoid deterioration of habitats), that relate to water use in areas of over-exploited aquifers, the 
new requirements are controlled by the Regional Agricultural Administrations (Agriculture 
Departments in the regional governments) in charge of the application of the Cross 
Compliance measures (see D5). These new measures establish that irrigators in these areas 
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must hold legal water use concessions and have installed a water meter device but do not 
require the obligation to comply with the water abstraction maximum volumes permitted by 
the water administration. Therefore the new cross compliance measures related to water 
consumption by the agricultural sector can be regarded as synergy measures of the already 
existing water abstraction limitations whose control is the responsibility of the River Basin 
authority (2).  
As the river basin Authority is the administrative unit responsible for the application of the 
EU Water Framework Directive (requiring to reach the ‘good ecological status of all water 
bodies’ by 2015, article 4 WFD), these new Cross Compliance measures can be regarded as a 
clear  benefit for policy integration of both water policies and agricultural policies at EU 
level. In sum, these measures are direct control measures of water abstractions for the Water 
Administration and indirect control measures of water abstractions for the Agricultural 
Administration.   
(3) In some areas in Spain, special agri-environmental programs were implemented (and are 
still open) to limit water abstractions and also the use of fertilizers, pesticides and other 
environmentally damaging substances utilized for irrigation agriculture as part of past and 
present CAP measures32.  
3.4.5 Implementation of GAEC standards in the Netherlands and costs 
associated 
For the Netherlands all GAEC requirements specified reflect previously existing national 
legislation. As such the GAEC requirements, or cross-compliance hardly can be said to 
introduces new costs, except for maybe some additional efforts to improve the record keeping 
level. Farms in erosion sensitive areas have to come up with an erosion plan, in which they 
indicate the erosion problems and the strategy chosen to avoid erosion damage. This plan has 
to be evaluated and the evaluator can add additional elements if the proposed strategy is 
interpreted to be unsatisfactory. Submission of such a plan involves a cost to the farmer of 
€114. The following Table 3.11 gives an overview of which GAEC standards are likely to 
have cost implications on the examined sectors.  
Table 3.11: Cost implications implementing GAEC standards in the Netherlands 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)?  
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
+
+ 
     P 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+
+ 
     P 
                                                 
32
 See Brouwer, F. and Van der Straaten, J. (eds) (2002): Nature and Agriculture Policy in the European Union. 
International Library of Ecological Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Cheltenham, UK.  
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)?  
(and comments) 
• Retain terraces       Not relevant  
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where applicable 
+
+ 
     P 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
 
• Arable stubble 
management 
+
+ 
     P 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: • Appropriate 
machinery use 
+
+ 
     P 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
      Not applied since no 
fear for land 
abandonment due to 
high land scarcity 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
 +
+ 
+
+ 
   P 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
      Has low relevance 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural land 
      Has low relevance  
 
Most GAEC measures are focused on erosion, and particularly affecting the arable sector in 
one particular region (Limburg province). As far as dairy and beef farms have arable land (for 
example because of fodder maize growing), what applies to the arable sector also applies to 
them. 
There are some standards for crop rotation, but they are mainly following from the strategy to 
combat erosion and not primarily aimed at improving the soil organic matter. There are some 
requirements with respect to stubble management, which only apply if no green cover crops 
are sown ( if not stubble material has to remain on the fields). 
The appropriate machinery use regards the removing of wheel compaction lines in case of 
cereals and maize. 
No direct stocking density requirements are specified. However, indirectly the Dutch manure 
legislation (based on the Nitrate Directive-SMR) is constraining (maximum) stocking 
densities. 
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Protection of permanent pasture actually applies to all permanent pasture, which is however 
mainly allocated to dairy and beef producers. 
Terracing, retention of landscape features and the avoidance of the encroachment of unwanted 
vegetation are not relevant and/or no constraints were specified. 
3.4.6 Implementation of GAEC standards in Poland and costs associated 
On 1 May 2004 Poland as a new EU member state started to implement CAP measures, 
including direct payments under the First Pillar of the CAP. Poland has chosen to receive the 
payments under the Single Area Payment Scheme. There were several reasons behind that 
decision, but one of the main ones was lower level of payments that farmers from the new 
member states received when compared to the payments for farmers of the EU 1533. The 
minimum size of the plot which has to be cultivated in order to be eligible for payments 
equals 1 ha.  
When choosing payments based on the Single Area Payment Scheme, Polish Government  
becomes responsible for ensuring that farmers obtaining direct payments maintain their 
farmland, especially if it is not used for production purposes, in good agricultural and 
environmental condition (GEAC). This requirement differs substantially from the standards 
that have to be fulfilled by farmers from the EU 15, which not only have to maintain their 
farmland in good environmental and agricultural condition but also are obliged to meet the 
SMR. The following Table 3.12 gives an overview of which GAEC standards are likely to 
have cost implications on the examined sectors.  
Table 3.12: Cost implications implementing GAEC standards in Poland 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
      Lack of requirements 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ + + + +  N 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 
• Retain terraces +
+ 
   +
+ 
 N 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
e • Standards for 
crop rotations 
where applicable 
      Lack of requirements 
                                                 
33
 In order to compensate for lower payment rates, the European Commission agreed that the governments 
of the new member states increase the amount of payments from their own financial resources (until 2006 a part 
of funds from the budget of the Second Pillar can be allocated for this purpose). Direct payments rates should 
become equal before the end of 2013. 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) New requirement (N) 
or pre-existing 
legislation (P)? 
(and comments) 
• Arable stubble 
management (1) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
   N 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: • Appropriate 
machinery use 
+ + + + +  N 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
      Lack of requirements 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ + +  +  N 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ + +  +  N 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural land 
(2) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
 +
+ 
 N 
(1) The cost of the arable stubble management in dairy and beef sector in Poland is mostly due to 
the specific of the Polish agriculture sector, where still mixed farms (plant and animal production in 
the same farm) still dominate. Implementation of this requirement by the typical dairy and beef 
producers will not induce additional cost.  
(2) The reason of the showing cost for the dairy and beef sector is same as in the note (1) –above.  
 
Poland has implemented limited numbers of GEAC requirements, most of them are rather 
general. The GEAC requirements are not new for farmers, but previously they were form of 
the general framework for the good agriculture practices, currently they are based on the 
regulation issued by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development.  Therefore their 
implementation seems problematic for some farmers but it could be assess that their influence 
on the cost of the agriculture production in Poland are rather limited.  
3.4.7 Implementation of GAEC standards in France and costs associated 
GAEC standards defined by France principally concern buffer strips, crop rotation, arable 
stubble management, regulation of irrigation and land maintenance (cultivated land, set-aside, 
grassland and non-productive land). 
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The French GAEC standards are summarized in the following Table 3.13. 
Table 3.13: GAEC standards in France 
Issue GAEC standards 
1. Soil erosion: protection of soil 
through appropriate measures 
- Set-aside of farmland (3%) = buffer strips 
- Obligation of land maintenance (set-aside 
land, grassland, non productive land) 
2. Soil organic matter: maintain soil 
organic matter levels through 
appropriate practices 
- Interdiction of burning straw 
- Diversity of cropping pattern 
3. Soil structure: maintain soil structure 
through appropriate measures 
- Regulation of irrigation 
- Diversity of cropping pattern 
4. Minimum level of maintenance: 
ensure a minimum level of 
maintenance and avoid deterioration of 
habitats 
- Set-aside of farmland = buffer strips 
- General regulations of land maintenance 
- Maintenance regulations of cultivated land 
- Maintenance regulations of set-aside land 
- Maintenance regulations of grassland 
- Maintenance regulations of non productive 
land 
Permanent pasture maintenance No obligation at farm level until now 
 
 
GAEC in their present state imply no costs for dairy and beef farmers34. Cereals and crop 
systems are, in principle, largely affected by the GAEC standards, but some dispensations 
weaken the requirements (Poux 2007)35: 
- Buffer strips: The main constraint from GAEC in crop systems will deal with the 
requirement of 3% uncultivated land nearby the watercourses (buffer strip). As these 3% are 
part of the 10% of mandatory set-aside, the economic impact will be none36. However GAEC 
will affect farming systems having less than 3 % of permanent pastures, i.e. principally types 
“specialist cereals” and “general field cropping”37. 
- Diversity of cropping patterns:  It affects in principle all types of farming systems. As for 
crop systems diversity already comply with the existing standards of the SMR38. But 
                                                 
34
 Poux, Ramain 2006: Country report France (D5): Mandatory standards in 7 EU countries and 3 non-EU 
countries (France), Xavier Poux, Blandine Ramain, May, 29, 2006. 
35
 Xavier Poux 2007. 
36
 Poux, Ramain 2006: Country report France (D5): Mandatory standards in 7 EU countries and 3 non-EU 
countries (France), Xavier Poux, Blandine Ramain, May, 29, 2006. 
37
 Poux 2007. 
38
 source: AScA, 2003, cited in Poux 2006. 
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dispensations exist for those with monocropping maize due to expected disproportionate 
economic impacts expected39. 
- Interdiction of burning straw: It principally affects crop production, so farm types “specialist 
cereals” and “general field cropping”, situated in NUTS 3 Indre, Cher and Yonne, in north of 
the Massif Central (cf. enquête pratique 2002). Local dispensation are provided till now40. 
 
3.4.8 Implementation of GAEC comparable standards in New Zealand and 
costs associated 
The following Table 3.14 gives an overview of which GAEC comparable standards are likely 
to have cost implications on the examined sectors.  
Table 3.14: Cost implications implementing GAEC comparable standards in New 
Zealand  
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
l 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
/S
he
ep
 
Pi
gs
 
Fr
u
it 
O
liv
es
(O
il)
 National requirements  
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover  
      No requirements 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site 
specific 
conditions 
  +
+ 
   P vegetation clearance 
rules specific to steep 
country 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
• Retain terraces       Not relevant 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
      Not relevant 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
• Arable stubble 
management 
      Not relevant 
So
il 
St
ru
ct
u
re
:  
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
 +     P appropriate machinery 
for effluent disposal  
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f 
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Minimum 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
      No rules 
                                                 
39
 Poux 2007. 
40
 Poux 2007. 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
l 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
/S
he
ep
 
Pi
gs
 
Fr
u
it 
O
liv
es
(O
il)
 National requirements  
(and comments) 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
  +    P burning of native 
tussock rules only in a 
few areas. The cost 
implications are small 
and it is in two regions in 
NZ.  
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
      P forestry harvesting 
rules to protect landscape 
only 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land 
+ + + + + + P weed control applies to 
regions not to specific 
crops. The cost 
implications for farmers 
are not that great and the 
overall sector cost is 
minimal.  
 
GAEC rules as such do not exist in New Zealand however, many Regional Councils (the 
decision making bodies with regard to the use of natural resources) encourage farmers 
through advice, farm plans, and inputs to especially deal with soil erosion issues. However, 
most regions have in place rules with regard to vegetation removal. The cost of those rules 
(implied costs of not being able to use the land for productive use) is not high. However in 
some regions (similar to provinces) Regional Councils are now enforcing rules which require 
farmers to plant eroding land types in trees or other vegetation and stops them from removing 
vegetation. This rule has only been fully implemented on one region and will impose 
significant costs on high country sheep and beef farmers. However, as a percentage of the 
total sheep/beef sector this is still only a small cost.  
Rules relating to appropriate machinery use only applies to effluent disposal machinery 
(effluent sprayers) and imply only a small part of the total cost of effluent disposal.  
Protection of permanent pasture only applies to two regions in NZ where a burning ban is in 
place regarding burning of native tussock (native pasture).  The cost of this rule are not great 
especially not when considered from a sector point of view.  
3.4.9 Implementation of GAEC comparable standards in Canada and costs 
associated 
In Canada, management practices similar to the GAECs in the EU are implemented through 
various cost share programs. These agricultural practices are known as Beneficial 
Management Practices or BMP’s. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) (2006) defines 
Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs) as “farm management practices that: minimise and 
mitigate impacts and risks to the environment, by maintaining or improving the quality of 
soil, water, air and biodiversity; ensure the long term health and sustainability of natural 
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resources used for agricultural production; and, support the long-term economic and 
environmental viability of the agriculture industry. 
In order to help agricultural producers develop and implement Beneficial Management 
Practices, the Government of Canada initiated Canada's National Environmental Farm 
Planning Initiative through provincially delivered Environmental Farm Plan (EFP) programs. 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2006) states that the objectives of the National 
Environmental Farm Plan Initiative include helping the agriculture sector better identify its 
impacts on the environment; and promoting the growth of stewardship activities within the 
agriculture industry. At this point the program is scheduled to end with the expiration of the 
current Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) in 2008, but it is likely that it will be continued 
in a similar form in the new Agricultural Policy Framework. 
As part of the program, farmers attend an Environmental Farm Plan workshop and complete a 
workbook designed to assess the current state of the farm and identify areas of concern. Then 
farmers develop an action plan for addressing the areas of concern. The action plan is 
confidentially reviewed by a group of locally appointed farmers. Once the Peer Review 
Committee approves the Action Plan, a farmer can participate in the EFP Cost-Share Program 
that helps cover a portion of the costs of implementing eligible projects from the action plan 
(Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, 2006). Producers are eligible to 
apply for cost-share incentives through the Canada Farm Stewardship Program, Greencover 
Canada, and the Canada Water Supply Expansion Program. 
There are 36 Best Management Practice categories, each containing several practices eligible 
for funding. Federal government covers up to 60% of the cost of implementing eligible 
practices. Many practices covered through federal cost share programs are also eligible for 
funding under different provincial cost share programs. As a result up to 90% of the total 
project cost can be covered by combining federal and provincial funds. However, the 
coverage varies depending on farmer eligibility, provinces and type of Best Management 
Practices. In Ontario, funding is available through the Nutrient Management Financial 
Assistance Program Wetland Farm Stewardship Incentive Program, Oak Ridges Moraine 
Environmental Enhancement Program and Greenbelt Farm Stewardship Program.  
Despite the fact that the implementation of Best Management Practices is not mandatory, 
there has been a relatively high degree of participation. For example, between 2005 and 2007, 
more than 11,000 of 57,211 Ontario farmers implemented or were in the process of 
implementation of BMP’s. Even though the implementation of Beneficial Management 
Practices is partly subsidized by the federal and provincial governments, it is not costless to 
the farmers. As an example, Ontario farmers bore about a third of the cost of implementation 
of the management practices eligible for funding. 
Table 3.15 summarises the allocation of federal, provincial and farmer funds for 
implementation of Best Management Practices in Ontario41. The 10 BMP categories 
highlighted in blue can be considered similar in form or purpose to the GAECs in the EU. 
Management practices eligible for federal and provincial funding and a list of eligible costs 
are summarised in Table 3.17. The farmer cost share, estimated by subtracting the average 
provincial cost share under different programs from the federal cost share, was between 18% 
                                                 
41
 Similar information may be available for other provinces but we came across this data fairly late in the project. 
Thus, obtaining the relevant data may not be feasible within the time frame of the project. We assume 
the participation rates and funding is similar. 
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and 25% of the total project cost. A project refers to one best management practice being 
implemented on one farm. The last column, representing the average cost per project borne by 
the farm, was used as a guide for filling Table 3.16. It is evident that most of the costs are at 
about $1,500 per project or below. Only improved cropping systems involved more 
significant costs at about $9,000 per project. Most fames implement one project; thus, this can 
also be interpreted as a per farm cost.  
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Table 3.15: Allocation of federal, provincial and farmer funds for implementation of Best Management Practices in Ontario 
Provincial cost 
share under 
different programs 
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1 Improved manure storage and handling 30% 60% 45%     1,145 53% 18%$17,314,323 $30,300,065 10,100,022 8,821
2 Manure treatment 30% 60% 45%     87 53% 18% $912,726 $1,597,271 532,424 6,120
3 Manure land application 30% 60%       298 60% 10% $1,479,427 $2,958,854 493,142 1,655
4 In barn improvements 30% 60%       209 60% 10% $840,489 $1,680,978 280,163 1,340
5 
Relocation of livestock confinement and 
horticultural facilities from riparian areas 50% 40% 25%     741 33% 18% $4,793,000 $3,115,450 1,677,550 2,264
6 
Farmyard and horticultural facilities runoff 
control 50% 40% 25%     85 33% 18% $1,260,194 $819,126 441,068 5,189
7 Wintering site pasture management 50%        88 0% 50% $346,308 $0 346,308 3,935
8 Product and waste management 30%   45%     875 45% 25% $2,241,727 $3,362,591 1,868,106 2,135
9 Water well management 50% 40%       989 40% 10% $1,082,773 $866,218 216,555 219
10 Riparian area management 50% 40% 25% 40%   570 33% 18% $1,681,895 $1,093,232 588,663 1,033
11 Erosion control structures (riparian) 50% 40% 25% 40%   159 33% 18% $670,421 $435,774 234,647 1,476
12 Erosion control structures (non riparian) 50% 40% 25% 40%   182 33% 18% $879,998 $571,999 307,999 1,692
13 Land management for soils at risk 50%   25%     29 25% 25% $57,174 $28,587 28,587 986
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14 Improved cropping systems 30%        1,992 0% 70% $7,684,700 $0 17,930,967 9,001
15 Cover crops 30%   45%     159 45% 25% $167,705 $251,558 139,754 879
16 Improved pest management 30%   45%     956 45% 25% $1,619,973 $2,429,960 1,349,978 1,412
17 Nutrient recovery from waste water 30% 60% 45%     75 53% 18% $635,018 $1,111,282 370,427 4,939
18 Irrigation management 30%        211 0% 70% $981,076 $0 2,289,177 10,849
19 Shelterbelt establishment 50%   25% 40%   297 25% 25% $519,866 $259,933 259,933 875
20 Invasive alien plant species control 50%   25%     6 25% 25% $18,715 $9,358 9,358 1,560
21 Enhancing wildlife habitat and biodiversity 50%   25% 40%  50% 193 25% 25% $530,493 $265,247 265,247 1,374
22 Species at risk 50%   25% 40%   6 25% 25% $14,645 $7,323 7,323 1,220
23 Preventing wildlife damage 30%     60%   163 60% 10% $582,184 $1,164,368 194,061 1,191
24 Nutrient Management planning 50% 40% 25%     778 33% 18% $1,244,548 $808,956 435,592 560
25 Integrated pest management planning 50%   25%     26 25% 25% $40,414 $20,207 20,207 777
26 Grazing management planning 50%   25%     6 25% 25% $8,187 $4,094 4,094 682
27 Soil erosion and salinity control planning 50% 40% 25%     3 33% 18% $4,108 $2,670 1,438 479
28 Biodiversity enhancement planning 50%   25%    50% 6 25% 25% $4,140 $2,070 2,070 345
29 Irrigation management planning 50%        10 0% 50% $15,804 $0 15,804 1,580
30 Riparian health assessment 50% 40% 25%     2 33% 18% $2,650 $1,723 928 464
31 New water wells for agricultural purposes 33%        532 0% 67% $1,369,149 $0 2,779,787 5,225
32 Ponds for storing water for agricultural purposes 33%     57%   227 57% 10% $613,986 $1,060,521 186,056 820
33 
Spring and sand point development for 
agricultural purposes 33%        4 0% 67% $4,290 $0 8,710 2,178
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34 Water supply to farm for agricultural use 33%        34 0% 67% $124,435 $0 252,641 7,431
35 
Farm water treatment equipment for agricultural 
use 33%       174 0% 67% $306,426 $0 622,138 3,576
36 Water supply expansion planning 33%        9 0% 67% $33,626 $0 68,271 7,586
 
Total 
     11,326  $50,086,593 $54,229,41144,329,192 3,914
Notes: 
Federal Cost Share under Canada-Ontario Farm Stewardship Program, Greencover Canada and Canada-Ontario Water Supply Expansion Program 
Provincial cost share under Nutrient Management Financial Assistance Program 
Provincial cost share under the Greenbelt Program (protection of agricultural land from urban development in the Greater Toronto Area 
Provincial cost share under the Oak Ridges Moraine Environmental Enhancement Program 
Cost share covered by Ducks Unlimited under the Wetlands Farm Stewardship Incentive Program 
Reported federal funds allocation 
Provincial funds allocation estimated using the available cost share figures 
Farmer funds allocation estimated using the available cost share figures 
Calculated by dividing the total funds allocated to a given BMP category by the number of projects under that category 
Sources:  
Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement Association (2007) (http://ontariosoilcrop.org/cms/en/program_divide.aspx?menuid=58) 
Conservation Ontario (2006) (http://conservation-ontario.on.ca/news/files/ORMEEP_brochure_final.pdf) 
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Table 3.16: Cost implications implementing GAEC comparable standards in Canada  
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard Comparable 
Best 
Management 
Practice in 
Canada 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/p
o
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
42
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l)4
3  
National requirements44 
(and comments) 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
• Cover 
crops 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 Establishment of a non-
economic crop (crop 
cannot be harvested or 
grazed) 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
       Not relevant  
• Retain terraces • Erosion 
control 
structures 
(riparian) 
+ 
+ 
+ + +   Contour terraces, gully 
stabilisation, bank 
stabilization, drop inlets, 
enhanced infiltration 
systems, in-channel 
control, and water and 
sediment control basins  
 • Erosion 
control 
structures 
(non 
riparian) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
  Contour terraces, gully 
stabilisation, drop inlet 
systems and enhanced 
infiltration systems, 
water and sediment 
control basins and 
constructed wind screens 
 • Soil 
erosion and 
salinity 
control 
planning 
+ + + +   Consultative services to 
develop soil erosion and 
salinity control plans 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 • Land 
manageme
nt for soils 
at risk 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
  Forage or annual barrier 
establishment for soils at 
risk ; straw mulching to 
assist; grazing 
management; alternative 
watering systems, cross 
fencing 
                                                 
42
 Not examined 
43
 Not examined 
44
 None of the practices is mandatory. Practices eligible for funding are generally consistent across provinces. 
More detailed description of eligible practices and cost items is presented in a separate table. 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard Comparable 
Best 
Management 
Practice in 
Canada 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/p
o
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
42
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l)4
3  
National requirements44 
(and comments) 
 • Riparian 
health 
assessment 
+ + + +   Consultative services for 
assessing riparian health 
and planning 
 • Shelter-
belt 
establishm
ent 
      Establishment of shelter-
belts/windbreaks for 
farmyard, field. Erosion 
reduction not the main 
purpose but often results 
from using this practice 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
       Crop rotation is a 
common practice 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
• Arable stubble 
management 
      Cover crops and 
Improved cropping 
systems BMP’s likely to 
overlap with this standard 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
• Improved 
cropping 
systems 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
  Equipment modification 
for lower soil 
disturbance; chaff 
collectors and chaff 
spreaders installed onto 
combines; precision 
farming applications 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
• Grazing 
manageme
nt 
planning45 
 + +    Consultative services to 
develop range and 
grazing management 
plans 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture  
      Not relevant 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f 
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
       Not relevant 
                                                 
45
 The purpose of grazing management and planning in Canada is not related to minimum level of maintenance; 
rather, this measure is intended for decreasing the negative effects of grazing on water and soil quality 
and wildlife habitat. 
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard Comparable 
Best 
Management 
Practice in 
Canada 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/p
o
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
42
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l)4
3  
National requirements44 
(and comments) 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land 
• Invasive 
alien plant 
species 
control 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
  Integrated approaches 
(cultural, mechanical, 
and biological) control of 
invasive and alien plant 
species (e.g. leafy spurge, 
purple loose-strife, 
scentless camomile) 
 
Table 3.17: Management practices eligible for federal and provincial funding and a 
list of eligible costs  
Best 
Management 
Practice 
Category 
Eligible practices Eligible costs 
Riparian area 
management 
Develop livestock watering systems 
• Summer/winter water systems 
(e.g. solar, wind, pipeline, other) 
Establish a buffer (greater than 10 
metres) 
• Establishment/planting of 
forages, shrubs, trees; weed 
control, and mulch 
Construct fences to manage grazing 
and improve riparian 
conditions/function 
Restore or establish native 
rangeland 
Manage grazing in uplands 
surrounding riparian areas 
• Cross-fencing to implement 
rotational, seasonal, rest, swath, 
and extended grazing systems, 
summer/winter watering 
systems 
Improve stream crossings 
• Improve or remove structures to 
enhance riparian condition  
Engineering and consultative fees 
• Fencing/construction materials 
and fees 
• Watering systems equipment 
and installation 
• Seed and seeding operation for 
re-vegetation 
Eligible in-kind costs - Labour 
($15.00 per hour) 
• Equipment use (Manitoba Farm 
Machinery Rental and Custom 
Rate Guide) 
Ineligible costs - Perimeter fencing 
for upland grazing management 
Erosion 
control 
structures 
Constructed works: 
• Contour terraces 
• Engineering and consultative 
fees 
• Geotechnical costs 
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Best 
Management 
Practice 
Category 
Eligible practices Eligible costs 
(riparian) • Grassed waterways (earthwork, 
seedbed preparation, seed, outlet 
structures) 
• Bank stabilisation works (bank 
shaping, re-vegetation, gabions, 
riprap, crib walls, blanketing)  
• Drop inlet structures and in-
channel control structures 
• Retention ponds and erosion 
control dams 
• Works to improve infiltration of 
concentrated water flow (e.g. 
filter trenches, filter wells, 
diffusing wells, etc.) 
• Engineering design work 
• Earthwork 
• Construction materials 
• Seed and seeding operation for 
re-vegetation 
• Labour costs 
Eligible in-kind - Labour ($15.00 
per hour)  
Costs - Applicant’s equipment use 
(Manitoba Farm Machinery Rental 
and Custom Rate Guide) 
Erosion 
control 
structures 
(non riparian) 
Constructed works: 
• Contour terraces 
• Gully stabilization/grassed 
waterways 
• Bank stabilization works 
• Retention ponds and erosion 
control dams 50% $20,000 
• Drop inlet structures and in-
channel control 
• Works to improve infiltration of 
concentrated water flow (e.g. 
filter trenches, filter wells, 
diffusing wells, etc.) 
• Mechanical wind screens 
• Engineering and consultative 
fees 
• Geotechnical costs 
• Earthwork 
• Construction materials 
• Labour costs 
Eligible in-kind - Labour ($15.00 
per hour)  
Costs - Applicant’s equipment use 
(Manitoba Farm Machinery and 
Custom Rate Guide) 
Land 
management 
for soils at 
risk 
Establish a perennial (e.g. forage) or 
annual (e.g. cereals, corn, 
sunflowers) barrier crop 
Grassed waterway construction 
Perennial forage establishment on 
severely erodible or saline soils 
Strip cropping 
Straw mulching 
Grazing management in critical 
erosion areas not associated with 
riparian zones (e.g. watering 
systems, cross-fencing) 
Engineering and consultative fees 
• Earthwork 
• Seed and seeding operation for 
re-vegetation 
• Fencing materials used to 
protect critical areas 
• Construction materials and 
contractor services 
• Labour costs 
Eligible - Labour ($15.00 per hour) 
in-kind costs - Applicant’s 
equipment use (Manitoba Farm 
Machinery Rental and Custom Rate 
Guide) 
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Best 
Management 
Practice 
Category 
Eligible practices Eligible costs 
Improved 
cropping 
systems 
• Equipment modification on: re-
seeding implements for 
restricted zone tillage for row 
crops, seeding and post-seeding 
implements for low disturbance 
placement of seed and fertilizer 
• Chaff collectors and chaff 
spreaders installed onto 
combines 
• Precision farming applications: 
GPS information collection, 
GPS guidance, manual and 
variable rate controllers for 
fertiliser application 
Costs related to equipment 
modification46 
Cover crops Establishment of a non-economic crop 
(crop cannot be harvested or grazed) 
Options include: 
• Winter cover crops (seeded after 
harvest for late fall, winter, and 
spring soil protection); 
• Relay crops (planted with 
primary crop but remain after 
primary crop is removed); 
• Green fallow crops (annual 
legumes seeded during fallow 
year); and 
• Biennial green manure crops 
(under seeded crops providing 
soil protection for the following 
year). 
Equipment modification to facilitate 
inter-row seeding of relay crop 
within an existing row crop 
Cost of seeding and weed control (see 
conditions above) 
• Materials, supplies, and 
modifications for equipment 
• Installation costs for equipment 
Eligible in-kind - Labour ($15.00 
per hour) costs - Applicant's 
equipment use (Manitoba Farm 
Machinery Rental and Custom Rate 
Guide) 
• Funding will not be provided for 
complete seeding units, only 
components required to modify 
existing equipment 
Shelter-belt 
establishment 
First year establishment costs such as 
site preparation, planting, weed 
control, irrigation, and temporary 
fencing; 
Cost of purchasing tree or shrub 
seedlings. 
Eligible costs - Site preparation 
• Planting 
• Weed control (e.g. mulches) 
• Irrigation (e.g. trickle or drip 
systems including pumps) 
• Temporary fencing to prevent 
livestock damage 
• Tree and shrub seedlings or 
cuttings for appropriate species 
(purchased tree and shrub 
                                                 
46
 This is an assumption. We have not been able to find the exact information on eligible costs 
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Best 
Management 
Practice 
Category 
Eligible practices Eligible costs 
seedlings must be less than 5 
years old) 
Eligible – labour ($15.00 per hour) 
in-kind costs - Use of applicant’s 
equipment (Manitoba Farm Machinery 
Rental and Custom Rate Guide) 
Invasive alien 
plant species 
control 
Biological Control: Selective Grazers 
and Biological Control Agents 
• Purchase of selective grazers 
(e.g. sheep for Leafy Spurge) or 
biological control agents 
(insects, fungi and bacteria) 
Cultural Control: Improved Grazing 
and Perennial Forages 
• Improved Grazing Systems: 
Cross-fencing where cross-
fencing is expected to improve 
management of invasive alien 
plants, fencing supplies, 
equipment rental and labour will 
be eligible. 
• Perennial Forage: Purchase of 
forage species seeds or other 
plant material that can compete 
with invasive aliens. 
Mechanical Control: 
• Equipment modification and 
rental and/or associated labour 
to control alien invasive plants 
by pulling by hand, mowing, 
cutting, scraping, shearing, 
uprooting, discing and 
prescribed burning. 
Chemical Control: 
• Establishing competitive forage 
stands: 
• Chemical application for site 
preparation and stand 
establishment. 
• Integrated weed management 
strategies: 
Chemical application after consultation 
with the Technical Lead or other 
AAFC- PFRA or MAFRI staff as part 
of an integrated weed management 
Purchase of selective grazers or 
biological control agents (at market 
price) 
Purchase of fencing supplies, forage 
species seeds or other plant material 
Herbicides 
Eligible Use of applicant’s equipment 
(Manitoba Farm Machinery Rental and 
Custom Rate Guide) 
In-kind costs labour ($15.00 per hour) 
Ineligible costs The primary goal of 
eligible projects will be environmental 
improvement. Projects intended to 
increase agricultural production will 
not be considered for funding. 
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Best 
Management 
Practice 
Category 
Eligible practices Eligible costs 
program. 
Grazing 
management 
planning 
Consultative services to complete a 
grazing management plan 
• Consultant fees 
• Planning and decision support 
tools (computer software, aerial 
photos) 
Ineligible costs - Computer 
hardware 
Soil erosion 
and salinity 
control 
planning 
Consultative services to complete a 
soil erosion and/or salinity 
control plan 
Eligible costs - Planning and 
decision support tools (computer 
software, aerial photos) 
• Electromagnetic (EM) surveys 
Ineligible costs - Computer 
hardware 
Riparian 
health 
assessment 
Consultative services to complete a 
riparian health assessment 
Eligible costs -Planning and 
decision-support tools (computer 
software, aerial photos) 
Ineligible costs - Computer 
hardware 
Sources:  
1. Government Canada – Canada-Manitoba Farm Stewardship Program BMP Description Sheet 
(http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1182887804040&lang=e) 
2. Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement Association ; Canada-Ontario Farm Stewardship 
Program 
(http://www.ontariosoilcrop.org/cms/en/Programs/ProgramsAboutCOFSP.aspx?menuid=63) 
 
3.4.10 Implementation of GAEC comparable standards in USA and costs 
associated 
The GAEC comparable standards in USA can be found in the section labelled "Voluntary 
Cost-Share and Payment Programs" (see Table 3.18).  
Table 3.18: Cost implications of compliance for selected sectors  
Regulatory 
Compliance and 
Financial Assistance 
Program 
Requirements 
D
a
ir
y 
Pi
gs
 
Be
ef
 
To
m
a
to
es
 
O
ra
n
ge
s 
Requirements with potential cost 
implications 
Regulatory Compliance 
Conservation Compliance  + + + + + Prohibitions on wetland conversion to cropland 
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Regulatory 
Compliance and 
Financial Assistance 
Program 
Requirements 
D
a
ir
y 
Pi
gs
 
Be
ef
 
To
m
a
to
es
 
O
ra
n
ge
s 
Requirements with potential cost 
implications 
"Swampbuster" 
Conservation Compliance 
-"Sodbuster" + + + + + 
Prohibitions on plowing native sod 
Conservation Compliance 
-"HEL" ++ ++ + + + 
Prohibitions on cropping practices that allow 
excessive soil erosion 
Clean Water Act (incl. 
CAFO Regs) +++ +++ ++ + + 
Prohibitions on point and non-point water 
pollution from CAFOs and other ag. Uses 
 Clean Air Act +++ +++ ++ ++ ++ 
Prohibitions on excessive emissions of 6 criteria 
pollutants 
--  Methyl Bromide Regs N/A N/A N/A ++ + Prohibition on methyl bromide use 
Comprehensive 
Environment Response, 
Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) +++ +++ N/A N/A N/A 
Prohibition on large quantities of certain 
substances released to the environment, 
including ambient air (including ammonia 
emissions) 
Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act + + + + + 
Prohibition on improper hazardous waste (such 
as pesticide container) disposal. 
   Endangered Species Act + + + + + 
Prohibitions on removing endangered species 
habitat 
Animal ID and Registration  
National Animal 
Identification System 
(NAIS) ++ + ++ N/A N/A 
Requirements for animal identification for 
certain species of meat animals 
Plant, Animal, and Human Health 
Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) + +   ++ ++ 
Regulates control of pesticide distribution, sale, 
and use through federal licensing.  
Hormones & beta-agonists 
regs (not applicable) Certain synthetic growth hormones are allowed 
BSE regulations +  ++ N/A N/A 
Regulates use of Specified Risk Materials 
(SRMs) 
Federal Meat Inspection 
Act + + + N/A N/A 
Regulates condition of animals and conditions of 
slaughter for animals meant for food. 
Poultry Products 
Inspection Act N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Regulates condition of animals and conditions of 
slaughter for poultry meant for food. 
Egg Products Inspection 
Act  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Regulates eggs and egg product handling 
Animal Welfare  
Animal Welfare Act Does not apply to agriculture 
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Regulatory 
Compliance and 
Financial Assistance 
Program 
Requirements 
D
a
ir
y 
Pi
gs
 
Be
ef
 
To
m
a
to
es
 
O
ra
n
ge
s 
Requirements with potential cost 
implications 
Voluntary Cost-Share and Payment Programs 
Conservation Reserve 
(Enhancement) 
Program (CRP & 
CREP) + + + + + 
Land retirement program, also requires certain 
conservation practices to be installed in return for 
any payment. 
Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program 
(EQIP) ++ ++ ++ + + 
Requires certain conservation practices to be 
installed for partial payment. Additional 
productivity reductions may also occur. 
Wetland Reserve Program + + + + + 
Land retirement program, also requires certain 
conservation practices to be installed in return for 
any payment. 
Farm & Ranchland 
Protection Program ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Requires certain conservation practices to be 
installed for partial payment. Additional 
productivity reductions may also occur. Land 
easements are likely also applied. 
Wildlife Habitat Incentive 
Program (WHIP) + + + + + 
Requires certain conservation practices to be 
installed for partial payment. Additional 
productivity reductions may also occur. 
Conservation Security 
Program (CSP) + + + + + 
Requires certain conservation and other 
enhancement practices to be installed for partial 
payment. Additional productivity reductions may 
also occur. 
Grassland Reserve 
Program (GRP)     +     
Requires certain conservation practices to be 
installed for partial payment. Additional 
productivity reductions may also occur. Land 
easements may also be applied which restrict 
cropping use. 
 
The following graph highlights how much USDA payments are subject to compliance 
regulations.  
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3.5 Summarised evaluation of national GAEC implementation and 
associated costs 
As mentioned above, the implementation of the GAEC standards varies considerably between 
Member States. It is due to the fact that Member States define minimum requirements to keep 
land in the good agricultural and environmental conditions, taking into account the specific 
characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic condition, existing farming 
systems, land use, crop rotation, farming practices and farm structures. This results in a high 
variety of minimum requirements depending on the country, and the location within the 
country, depending on the area chosen. For more details please see the tables in the Chapter 
“Implementation of GAECs into national legislation”.  
While some Member States have used cross compliance to compensate for gaps in their 
existing national legislation (e.g. Poland and Italy define the GAEC standards solely as new 
requirements), other Member States already had a legislative framework in place and merely 
adopted that framework for cross compliance (in particular, the Netherlands, where 
requirements are based just on pre-existing legislation). This resulted in some Member States 
incorporating measures within their GAEC framework that go beyond the scope and 
philosophy of Annex IV of Reg. 1782/03, i.e. “other” standards (e.g. Spain and England).  
The Table 3.19 presents an overview of the national implementation of the GAEC standards 
in the selected Member States. (N) means that GAEC standard is set as a new requirement; 
and (P) means that the requirement has already been defined in the pre-existing legislation. 
The “other” standards mentioned above are not included in this summarising table. France is 
not included in the table due to non comparable data.  
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Table 3.19: National implementation of GAEC standards in selected Member States 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
En
gl
a
n
d 
G
er
m
a
n
y 
It
a
ly
 
Sp
a
in
 
N
et
he
rl
a
n
ds
 
Po
la
n
d 
• Minimum soil cover N N, P  P P 47 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific conditions 
N P N P P N 
So
il 
er
o
sio
n
: 
 
• Retain terraces 48 N  P 49 N 
• Standards for crop 
rotations where 
applicable 
50
 N, P  N P 51 
So
il 
o
rg
a
n
ic
 
m
a
tt
er
: 
• Arable stubble 
management 
P N, P N P P N 
So
il 
st
ru
ct
u
re
: • Appropriate 
machinery use 
N P N N P N 
• Minimum livestock 
stocking rates or/and 
appropriate regimes 
N P  P 52 53 
• Protection of 
permanent pasture 
P N, P N P P N 
• Retention of 
landscape features 
N N, P N P 54 N 
M
in
im
u
m
 
le
v
el
 
o
f 
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
: 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted vegetation 
on agricultural land 
N, P 55 P N 56 N 
 
The Table 3.20 to Table 3.25 present an overview of cost implications on each farm sector 
examined in selected Member States. It is understood, that the selected six Member States 
does not reflect the overall situation in the EU, but it can however serve as a preliminary 
estimation.  
                                                 
47
 Lack of requirements.  
48
 Not relevant to England.  
49
 Not relevant.  
50
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England.  
51
 Lack of requirements.  
52
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
53
 Lack of requirements.  
54
 Has low relevance.  
55
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
56
 Has low relevance.  
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Table 3.20: Cost implications on cereals sector implementing GAEC standards 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
++ 
(N) 
++ 
(N, P) 
 + 
(P)57 
++ 
(P) 
58
 
• Minimum 
land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ (N) (P) ++ 
(N)59 
(P)60 ++ 
(P) 
+ (N) 
Soil erosion:  
Protect soil 
through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain 
terraces 
61
 (N)  (P) 62 ++ 
(N) 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
63
 ++ 
(N, P) 
 + (N) ++ 
(P) 
64
 Soil organic 
matter: 
Maintain soil 
organic matter 
levels through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
+ (P)65 + (N, 
P) 
+ 
(N)66 
+ (P) ++ 
(P) 
++ 
(N) 
Soil structure: 
Maintain soil 
structure through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
(N)67 + (P) + 
(N)68 
+ (N) ++ 
(P) 
+ (N) 
                                                 
57
 In previous Agri-Environmental programme, voluntary. 
58
 Lack of requirements.  
59
 The national standard is called “Appropriate measures against water runoff on slopes” and is prescribed to the 
GAEC standard “minimum land management reflecting site-specific conditions” on the issue “Soil 
erosion”. Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other 
arable crops on farm.  
60
 In certain areas of protection of bird species, SPAs. 
61
 Not relevant to England. 
62
 Not relevant.  
63
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England. 
64
 Lack of requirements.  
65
 Marginal constraints upon farming. 
66
 Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other arable crops on 
farm.  
67
 Applies to harvesting of fruit & veg. Main impact on potatoes and root crops.  
68
 The national standard is called “Maintenance of draining network efficiency”. Relevant for all sectors but with 
low cost implications.  
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 88 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
(N)69 (P)  (P) 70 71 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ 
(P)72 
+ (N, 
P) 
(N) + (P) (P) + (N) 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ 
(N)73 
+ (N, 
P) 
(N)74 + (P) 75 + (N) 
Minimum level 
of maintenance: 
Ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and 
avoid the 
deterioration of 
habitats 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land  
+ (N) 
(P) 
76
 + (P) + (N) 77 ++ 
(N) 
 
Table 3.21: Cost implications on dairy sector implementing GAEC standards 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
Soil erosion:  
Protect soil 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
++ 
(N) 
+ (N, 
P) 
 (P)78 (P) 79 
                                                 
69
 Previous requirement under GFP. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding. Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural grasslands, mainly beef and sheep farming.  
70
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
71
 Lack of requirements.  
72
 Requirement for EIA on uncultivated and semi-natural areas. Unclear what impact this has on farmers in 
practice.  
73
 Main impacts are hedge cutting days and protection of hedges and watercourses – both N. 
74
 The national standard is called “Retain terraces”.   
75
 Has low relevance.  
76
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
77
 Has low relevance.  
78
 In previous Agri-Environmental programme, voluntary. 
79
 Lack of requirements.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum 
land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ (N) (P) ++ 
(N)80 
(P)81 (P) + (N) through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain 
terraces 
82
 (N)  (P) 83 (N) 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
84
 + (N, 
P) 
 (N) (P) 85 Soil organic 
matter: 
Maintain soil 
organic matter 
levels through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
(P)86 + (N, 
P) 
+ 
(N)87 
(P) (P) ++ 
(N)88 
Soil structure: 
Maintain soil 
structure through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
(N)89 (P) + 
(N)90 
(N) (P) + (N) 
                                                 
80
 The national standard is called “Appropriate measures against water runoff on slopes” and is prescribed to the  
GAEC standard “minimum land requirements reflecting site-specific conditions” on the issue “Soil 
erosion”. Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other 
arable crops on farm.   
81
 In certain areas of protection of bird species, SPAs. 
82
 Not relevant to England. 
83
 Not relevant.  
84
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England. 
85
 Lack of requirements.  
86
 Marginal constraints upon farming. 
87
 Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other arable crops on 
farm.  
88
 Relevant for dairy and beef sectors as most of the farms in Poland with those animal production produce as 
well cereals and other arable crops on farm.  
89
 Applies to harvesting of fruit & veg. Main impact on potatoes and root crops.  
90
 The national standard is called “Maintenance of draining network efficiency”. Relevant for all sectors but with 
low cost implications.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
+ 
(N)91 
+ (P)  + (P) 92 93 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ 
(P)94 
+ (N, 
P) 
+++ 
(N)95 
(P) ++ 
(P) 
+ (N) 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ 
(N)96 
+ (N, 
P) 
++ 
(N)97 
(P) 98 + (N) 
Minimum level 
of maintenance: 
Ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and 
avoid the 
deterioration of 
habitats 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land  
+ (N) 
(P) 
99
 + (P) (N) 100 ++ 
(N)101 
 
Table 3.22: Cost implications on beef sector implementing GAEC standards 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
Soil erosion:  
Protect soil 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
+ (N) + (N, 
P) 
 (P)102 (P) 103 
                                                 
91
 Previous requirement under GFP. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding. Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural grasslands, mainly beef and sheep farming.  
92
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
93
 Lack of requirements.  
94
 Requirement for EIA on uncultivated and semi-natural areas. Unclear what impact this has on farmers in 
practice.  
95
 Rather strong cost implications in mountain farming.  
96
 Main impacts are hedge cutting dates and protection of hedges and watercourses – both N. 
97
 The national standard is called “Retain terraces”. Relevant only for fruits, permanent grass and olive trees 
grown on terraces.  
98
 Has low relevance.  
99
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
100
 Has low relevance.  
101
 Relevant for dairy and beef sectors as most of the farms in Poland with those animal production produce as 
well cereals and other arable crops on farm.  
102
 In previous Agri-Environmental programme, voluntary. 
103
 Lack of requirements.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum 
land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ (N) (P) ++ 
(N)104 
(P)105 (P) + (N) through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain 
terraces 
106
 (N)  (P) 107 (N) 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
108
 + (N, 
P) 
 (N) (P) 109 Soil organic 
matter: 
Maintain soil 
organic matter 
levels through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
(P) + (N, 
P) 
+ 
(N)110 
(P) (P) ++ 
(N)111 
Soil structure: 
Maintain soil 
structure through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
(N)112 (P) + 
(N)113 
(N) (P) + (N) 
                                                 
104
 The national standard is called “Appropriate measures against water runoff on slopes” and is prescribed to the  
GAEC standard “minimum land requirements reflecting site-specific conditions” on the issue “Soil 
erosion”. Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other 
arable crops on farm.   
105
 In certain areas of protection of bird species, SPAs. 
106
 Not relevant to England. 
107
 Not relevant.  
108
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England. 
109
 Lack of requirements.  
110
 Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other arable crops on 
farm.  
111
 Relevant for dairy and beef sectors as most of the farms in Poland with those animal production produce as 
well cereals and other arable crops on farm.  
112
 Applies to harvesting of fruit & veg. Main impact on potatoes and root crops. Could limit access to livestock 
in extreme cases.   
113
 The national standard is called “Maintenance of draining network efficiency”. Relevant for all sectors but 
with low cost implications.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
+ 
(N)114 
+ (P)  + (P) 115 116 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ 
(P)117 
+ (N, 
P) 
+++ 
(N)118 
(P) ++ 
(P) 
+ (N) 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ 
(N)119 
+ (N, 
P) 
++ 
(N)120 
(P) 121 + (N) 
Minimum level 
of maintenance: 
Ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and 
avoid the 
deterioration of 
habitats 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land  
+ (N) 
(P) 
122
 + (P) (N) 123 ++ 
(N)124 
 
Table 3.23: Cost implications on pigs/poultry sector implementing GAEC standards 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
Soil erosion:  
Protect soil 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
+ (N) + (N, 
P) 
 (P)125 (P) 126 
                                                 
114
 Previous requirement under GFP. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding. Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural grasslands, mainly beef and sheep farming.  
115
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
116
 Lack of requirements.  
117
 Requirement for EIA on uncultivated and semi-natural areas. Unclear what impact this has on farmers in 
practice.  
118
 Rather strong cost implications in mountain farming.  
119
 Main impacts are hedge cutting dates and protection of hedges and watercourses – both N. 
120
 The national standard is called “Retain terraces”. Relevant only for fruits, permanent grass and olive trees 
grown on terraces.  
121
 Has low relevance.  
122
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
123
 Has low relevance.  
124
 Relevant for dairy and beef sectors as most of the farms in Poland with those animal production produce as 
well cereals and other arable crops on farm.  
125
 In previous Agri-Environmental programme, voluntary. 
126
 Lack of requirements.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum 
land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ (N) (P) ++ 
(N)127 
(P)128 (P) + (N) through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain 
terraces 
129
 (N)  (P) 130 (N) 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
131
 (N, P)  (N) (P) 132 Soil organic 
matter: 
Maintain soil 
organic matter 
levels through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
(P) (N, P) + 
(N)133 
(P) (P) (N) 
Soil structure: 
Maintain soil 
structure through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
(N) (P) + 
(N)134 
(N) (P) + (N) 
Minimum level 
of maintenance: 
Ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
+ 
(N)135 
(P)  + (P) 136 137 
                                                 
127
 The national standard is called “Appropriate measures against water runoff on slopes” and is prescribed to the  
GAEC standard “minimum land requirements reflecting site-specific conditions” on the issue “Soil 
erosion”. Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other 
arable crops on farm.  
128
 In certain areas of protection of bird species, SPAs. 
129
 Not relevant to England. 
130
 Not relevant.  
131
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England. 
132
 Lack of requirements.  
133
 Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other arable crops on 
farm.  
134
 The national standard is called “Maintenance of draining network efficiency”. Relevant for all sectors but 
with low cost implications.  
135
 Previous requirement under GFP. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding. Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural grasslands.  
136
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
137
 Lack of requirements.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ 
(P)138 
(N, P) (N) + (P) (P) (N) 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ 
(N)139 
(N, P) (N)140 (P) 141 (N) 
avoid the 
deterioration of 
habitats 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land  
+ (N) 
(P) 
142
 + (P) (N) 143 (N) 
 
Table 3.24: Cost implications on fruits sector implementing GAEC standards 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
+ (N) + (N, 
P) 
 + 
(P)144 
(P) 145 
• Minimum 
land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
+ (N) (P) (N)146 + 
(P)147 
(P) + (N) 
Soil erosion:  
Protect soil 
through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain 
terraces 
148
 + (N)  + (P) 149 ++ 
(N) 
                                                 
138
 Requirement for EIA on uncultivated and semi-natural areas. 
139
 Main impacts are hedge cutting dates and protection of hedges and watercourses – both N. 
140
 The national standard is called “Retain terraces”. Relevant only for fruits, permanent grass and olive trees 
grown on terraces.  
141
 Has low relevance.  
142
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
143
 Has low relevance.  
144
 In previous Agri-Environmental programme, voluntary. 
145
 Lack of requirements.  
146
 The national standard is called “Appropriate measures against water runoff on slopes” and is prescribed to the  
GAEC standard “minimum land requirements reflecting site-specific conditions” on the issue “Soil 
erosion”. Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other 
arable crops on farm.  
147
 In certain areas of protection of bird species, SPAs. 
148
 Not relevant to England. 
149
 Not relevant.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
150
 (N, P)  + (N) (P) 151 Soil organic 
matter: 
Maintain soil 
organic matter 
levels through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
(P) (N, P) (N)152 + (P) (P) (N) 
Soil structure: 
Maintain soil 
structure through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
+ 
(N)153 
+ (P) + 
(N)154 
+ (N) (P) + (N) 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
(N)155 (P)  (P) 156 157 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
+ 
(P)158 
(N, P) (N)159 (P) (P) + (N) 
Minimum level 
of maintenance: 
Ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and 
avoid the 
deterioration of 
habitats 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
+ 
(N)160 
+ (N, 
P) 
++ 
(N)161 
++ 
(P) 
162
 + (N) 
                                                 
150
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England. 
151
 Lack of requirements.  
152
 Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other arable crops on 
farm.  
153
 Applies to harvesting of fruit & veg. Main impact on potatoes and root crops.  
154
 The national standard is called “Maintenance of draining network efficiency”. Relevant for all sectors but 
with low cost implications.  
155
 Previous requirement under GFP. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding. Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural grasslands.  
156
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
157
 Lack of requirements.  
158
 Requirement for EIA on uncultivated and semi-natural areas. 
159
 Rather strong cost implications in mountain farming.  
160
 Main impacts are hedge cutting dates and protection of hedges and watercourses – both N. 
161
 The national standard is called “Retain terraces”. Relevant only for fruits, permanent grass and olive trees 
grown on terraces.  
162
 Has low relevance.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land  
+ (N) 
(P) 
163
 (P) + (N) 164 ++ 
(N) 
 
Table 3.25: Cost implications on olives (oil) sector implementing GAEC standards 
GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
• Minimum soil 
cover 
(N) (N, P)  ++ 
(P)165 
(P) 166 
• Minimum 
land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
(N) (P) (N)167 ++ 
(P)168 
(P) (N) 
Soil erosion:  
Protect soil 
through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain 
terraces 
169
 (N)  ++ 
(P) 
170
 (N) 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
171
 (N, P)  + (N) (P) 172 Soil organic 
matter: 
Maintain soil 
organic matter 
levels through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
(P) (N, P) (N)173 ++ 
(P) 
(P) (N) 
                                                 
163
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
164
 Has low relevance.  
165
 In previous Agri-Environmental programme, voluntary. 
166
 Lack of requirements.  
167
 The national standard is called “Appropriate measures against water runoff on slopes” and is not prescribed to 
any one GAEC standard on “Soil erosion”. Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these 
farms produce cereals and other arable crops on farm.  
168
 In certain areas of protection of bird species, SPAs. 
169
 Not relevant to England. 
170
 Not relevant.  
171
 No corresponding GAEC standard implemented in England. 
172
 Lack of requirements.  
173
 Relevant for dairy, beef, pigs and poultry too as often these farms produce cereals and other arable crops on 
farm.  
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GAEC Issue GAEC 
standard 
EN
 
D
E 
IT
 
SP
 
N
L 
PL
 
Soil structure: 
Maintain soil 
structure through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
(N)174 (P) + 
(N)175 
++ 
(N) 
(P) (N) 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
(N)176 (P)  (P) 177 178 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
(P)179 (N, P) (N)180 (P) (P) (N) 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
(N)181 (N, P) ++ 
(N)182 
++ 
(P) 
183
 (N) 
Minimum level 
of maintenance: 
Ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and 
avoid the 
deterioration of 
habitats 
• Avoiding the 
encroachment 
of unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural 
land  
(N) 
(P) 
184
 (P) + (N) 185 (N) 
 
The Member States evaluate the costs implications in a different fashion. While some 
countries (e.g. Italy) give comprehensive calculation, majority of countries give general 
assumptions. For example, Italy assesses that the cross compliance costs represent around 680 
millions Euro per year or 1.5% of the agricultural production value in Italy. On the other end 
of scales is Poland that assesses the impact on the costs as limited, even if all the GAEC 
standards are defined as new requirements. In the Netherlands, all GAEC requirements 
                                                 
174
 Applies to harvesting of fruit & veg. Main impact on potatoes and root crops.  
175
 The national standard is called “Maintenance of draining network efficiency”. Relevant for all sectors but 
with low cost implications.  
176
 Previous requirement under GFP. Overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding. Applies only to natural 
and semi-natural grasslands, mainly beef and sheep farming.  
177
 Not applied since no fear for land abandonment due to high land scarcity.  
178
 Lack of requirements.  
179
 Requirement for EIA on uncultivated and semi-natural areas. 
180
 Rather strong cost implications in mountain farming.  
181
 Main impacts are hedge cutting dates and protection of hedges and watercourses – both N. 
182
 The national standard is called “Retain terraces”. Relevant only for fruits, permanent grass and olive trees 
grown on terraces.  
183
 Has low relevance.  
184
 Not defined by the national legislation. 
185
 Has low relevance.  
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specified reflect pre-existing national legislation, therefore it is assumed that cross compliance 
will hardly introduce new costs, with the exception of some additional administrative efforts. 
In Germany, the previously existing legislation overlaps in large parts with the new GAEC 
standards, the latter being more specific and detailed. Against this background, much higher 
costs are not expected introducing the GAEC standards, with the exception of some additional 
administrative costs. England assumes that all newly introduced GAEC requirements will 
impose costs on each sector of interest to this study; the greatest costs implications expecting 
for cereal farmers. Spain does not expect additional costs for the implementation of the new 
GAEC measures related to water consumption by the agricultural sector. This measure is 
regarded as a synergy measure of the already existing water abstraction limitations under the 
direct responsibility of water authority.  
 
The Netherlands evaluates that the GAEC measures will particularly affect the arable 
(cereals) sector. Spain expects the strongest effect on the olives sector and evaluate that 
erosion requirements will have the highest cost implications. On the one hand, Italy estimates 
the highest costs implementing the soil structure requirement, since this standard applies to 
any agricultural land eligible for single farm payments. On the other hand, the protection of 
permanent pastures standard will have a strong effect on dairy and beef sectors in Italy. 
Germany assumes that the requirements for minimum soil cover, crop rotation and protection 
of permanent pasture will particularly affect the cereals sector, since they are specific and 
going beyond the principles of GAP defined in the pre-existing legislation. England assumes 
that soil erosion measures will have an effect on all sectors with exception of olives sector; 
The strongest effect expected on cereals sector. Poland expects constrains in cereals and dairy 
sectors.  
The following Table 3.26 shows the range of country evaluations given in Table 3.20 to Table 
3.25. It gives an overview of which GAEC standards are likely to have cost implications on 
the examined sectors.  
Considering potential cost implications due the introduction of GAEC, it needs to be noted 
that implementation of GAEC standards varies considerably between Member States. For 
example, some countries have very detailed and different requirements for crop rotation (e.g. 
Germany, Slovenia), whereas others have not implemented crop rotation requirements into 
national GAECs (e.g. Austria). The range of country evaluations presented in Table 3.26 can 
therefore only serve as preliminary assessments, which need to be seen against the 
background of the national legislation (see chapter above). 
Table 3.26: Range of cost implications on examined sectors implementing GAEC 
standards 
GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) 
Soil 
erosion:  
• Minimum soil 
cover 
n.r./++ n.r./++
186
 
n.r./+
187
 
n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r./++ 
                                                 
186
 In particular, if farm combines activity with fodder crop growing, e.g. silage maize. 
187
 In particular, if farm combines activity with fodder crop growing, e.g. silage maize.  
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GAEC 
Issue 
GAEC standard 
C
er
ea
ls 
D
a
ir
y 
Be
ef
 
Pi
gs
/ 
po
u
ltr
y 
Fr
u
its
 
O
liv
es
 
(oi
l) 
• Minimum land 
management 
reflecting site-
specific 
conditions 
n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./+ n.r./++ Protect soil 
through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Retain terraces n.r./++ n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r./++ n.r./++ 
• Standards for 
crop rotations 
where 
applicable 
n.r./++ n.r./+ 
188
 
n.r./+ 
189
 
n.r. n.r./+ n.r./+ Soil 
organic 
matter: 
Maintain 
soil organic 
matter 
levels 
through 
appropriate 
practices 
• Arable stubble 
management 
+/++ n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r./++ 
Soil 
structure: 
Maintain 
soil 
structure 
through 
appropriate 
measures 
• Appropriate 
machinery use 
n.r./++ n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r./++ 
• Minimum 
livestock 
stocking rates 
or/and 
appropriate 
regimes 
n.r. n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r. n.r. 
• Protection of 
permanent 
pasture 
n.r./+ n.r./++
+ 
n.r./++
+ 
n.r./+ n.r./+ n.r. 
• Retention of 
landscape 
features 
n.r./+ n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./+ n.r./++ n.r./++ 
Minimum 
level of 
maintenan
ce: 
Ensure a 
minimum 
level of 
maintenanc
e and avoid 
the 
deterioratio
n of 
habitats • Avoiding the 
encroachment of 
unwanted 
vegetation on 
agricultural land  
n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./++ n.r./+ n.r./++ n.r./+ 
 n.r. – not relevant (an empty cell was left by evaluation of cost implications).  
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 In particular, if farm combines activity with fodder crop growing, e.g. silage maize. 
189
 In particular, if farm combines activity with fodder crop growing, e.g. silage maize. 
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3.6 Summary 
To analyse cost of compliance and cost of cross compliance on different farm sectors both 
impacts of SMRs and GAEC have been analysed. In this regard a clear distinction of both 
concepts (“costs of compliance” versus “cost of cross compliance”) is crucial to correctly 
interpret the project’s results. As SMRs refer to previously existing requirements costs for 
farmers for reaching standards pre-existing to the introduction of cross compliance cannot be 
considered as due to cross compliance.  
In order to analyse the costs of compliance to SMR requirements the analysis therefore 
refered to an assumed situation of introducing standards that have not yet been implemented. 
The analysis shows that the requirements have different impacts in different sectors. The 
sectors that are mostly affected are the beef and dairy sector. As for specific SMR 
requirements the nitrates directive and food safety requirements concern most sectors.  
When considering the additional costs of cross compliance at farm level, one has mainly to 
consider the costs derived from meeting the standards of GAEC. Unlike the SMRs, the 
standards in Annex IV of Regulation 1782/2003 are not based on pre-existing EU legislation. 
However, also costs resulting from pre-existing requirements comparable to GAEC can not 
be attributed to cross compliance. It is therefore crucial for the evaluation of cost 
implications to see which standards have been newly introduced. Several Member States 
have included new standards within the national GAEC framework, and it is these standards 
that may result in a cost that the farmer did not have to meet before the introduction of cross 
compliance. 
With regard to the selected EU Member States it became apparent that some Member States 
have used cross compliance to compensate for gaps in their existing national legislation (e.g. 
Poland defines the GAEC standards solely as new requirements and Italy has just one pre-
existing standard), while other Member States already had a legislative framework in place 
and merely adopted that framework for cross compliance (e.g. the Netherlands, where 
requirements are based just on pre-existing legislation).  
As for the additional costs of cross compliance no significant costs could be analysed, 
however constraints on farming and marginal costs on farm level may apply. While there is a 
significant range between Member States evaluations on cost relevance of certain standards 
(due to different implementations of GAEC), evaluations on impacts on different sectors are 
relatively homogenous. 
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4 The impact of standards on the competitiveness of the EU 
with respect to dairy 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a comparative overview of the competitive assessment of CC-
requirements in dairy production. The focus is on five EU Member States (the Netherlands, 
France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy) and on two key competitors to the EU (United 
States and New Zealand).   
As Chapter 2 notes, competitiveness has many aspects which relate to the four sets of 
conditions: 
• Initial conditions: farm type, farm size, farming intensity, farm localisation (field 
topology, soil, agro-climatic conditions, proximity to water sources, local 
environmental pressure, …) 
• Industry conditions: industry competences (e.g., logistics), rivalry, supplier relations, 
customer relations, substitutes, voluntary standards 
• Institutional conditions: implementation and enforcement of legislation 
• Macro-economic conditions: interest rate, exchange rate 
Cross-compliance includes a large set of requirements (19 SMRs and 9 GAECs), which 
potentially all might affect the costs of production and thus competitiveness. However, as 
argued in Chapter 2 of this report most requirements introduce low or negligible costs. In this 
assessment therefore only a limited subset of the total number of measures is evaluated. The 
main focus will be on the Nitrate Directive, the Identification and Registration requirements 
and the food safety issue (in particular the impact of prohibited use of milk yield growth 
promoters in the EU).   
In this Chapter, before presenting the main results of simulated impacts on competitiveness at 
farm and country level, the first section – Introduction – focuses on initial conditions (sector 
structure, depicted in degree of specialization, herd size, milk yield, milk output per hectare, 
grassland share), institutional conditions (legislations) and macro-economic (depicted through 
milk prices, trade patterns).  
4.1.1 Trade patterns 
This section provides overview of trade patterns and specific characteristics of dairy sector of 
Europe, U.S. and New Zealand. When possible, a special focus is paid to national case studies 
in Europe: the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Dairy products 
range from fairly standardized goods, such as milk, butter, and nonfat dry milk powder, to 
multivariety, multiflavored products, such as specialty cheeses, fermented drinks, and milk 
protein fractions used in food and beverage items. Some dairy product markets are local or 
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national, while others are global (Table 4.1). Products such as fresh milk, yogurt, and cheese 
are intended for direct consumption. Dairy products are also consumed indirectly as 
ingredients in other foods, such as pizza, snack bars, and bakery products. Nonfood uses 
range from nutriceuticals to industrial applications. 
Table 4.1: Dairy products and their characteristics 
 
Source: Blayney et al., 2006 
 
Processed-food manufacturers have shown renewed interest in using dairy derived ingredients 
in their products in recent years. Milkfat, skim solids, whey proteins, and lactose have 
emerged as important food ingredients mostly due to desirable taste, nutritional, and 
functional characteristics—but partly also due to cost advantages (Miller and Blayney, 2006). 
New markets are expected to emerge for milk-based fractions but the net addition to milk 
demand is unclear. The breakdown of fresh milk into dairy products is presented in Figure 
4.1. As Figure 4.1 shows a host of dairy products is produced using different combinations of 
raw milk ingredients, such as fat, protein, and others. Two important observations can be 
made from this: 1) Because of the competition for ingredients the quantities produced of 
various dairy products are highly interrelated (milk balance consistency). 2) As regards the 
demand side dairy products are highly differentiated, among them high value added products 
as well as commodity-like base products (SMP and butter). Whereas economic models 
usually treat dairy products in a highly aggregated way, depending on the actual product mix 
in a certain export market, price-sensitivity might significantly vary (and deviate from the 
average aggregate). 
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Figure 4.1: Products made from dairy cow’s milk 
 
Source: Comission, 2006 
 
Global milk production is largely from cows (84 percent), but a growing share of milk is 
produced from other animals, such as buffaloes, goats, and sheep. The quantity of milk 
produced by animals other than cows is not large, but cheese varieties produced from sheep 
and goats are traded  internationally, and their overall share of production has increased 
slightly since 2000. From 2000 to 2004, global milk production grew about 6 percent, while 
cow’s milk production grew somewhat less (Blayney et al., 2006).  
The focus of assessment is on five EU Member States (the Netherlands, France, United 
Kingdom, Germany and Italy) and on two key competitors to the EU (United States and New 
Zealand). The EU’s presence on the world market is strong for all the major dairy products 
(see Figure 4.1). In 2005, the value of total dairy exports out of the EU was EUR 5.4 billion – 
for 2,5 million tonnes of products.  
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Figure 4.2: EU-25 shares in World Exports in 2004 (quantities in tonnes in parentheses) 
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Source: EC, 2006 and Blayney et al., 2006  
In the previous two decades, the EU was the dominant supplier of dairy products worldwide. 
From EU-15, three selected case study countries (Germany, France and The Netherlands) are 
remarkable players adding up to 55% of the EU export share. With the enlargement of the 
European Union in 2007, the dairy industry in the EU-27 becomes very large with estimated 
24 million dairy cows in comparison with 9.1, and 4.1 million dairy cows in the United States, 
and New Zealand, respectively (OECD, ). Milk production in the EU-27 in 2006 is  almost 
twice as much as that of the US and about ten times larger than in New Zealand. Quotas and 
environmental restrictions, however, have limited the EU’s dairy production; moreover, its 
dairy manufacturing sector has tended to focus on specialty cheeses exported and sold at 
premium prices. Australia and New Zealand now control a growing share of world trade in 
dairy products as presented in Figure 4.2. Exports from the European Union (34%), New 
Zealand (33%), and Australia (13%) provide over 80% of dairy products traded worldwide. 
New Zealand’s share of world dairy trade is significant making it the world’s largest exporter 
of butter, skim milk powder and casein, and the second largest exporter of cheese and whole 
milk powder (excluding intra-EU trade).  
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Figure 4.3:  Major global trade flows of dairy products in 2004 
 
Source: Blayney et al., 2006 
 
In the EU the dairy production represents the first largest agricultural sector (EC, 2006), 
whereas in the US this is the second largest sector in terms of cash receipts at the farm level 
(Miller and Blayney, 2006). Milk production has been controlled under a system of milk 
quotas, which explains why the collection of cow’s milk in the EU-15 has remained relatively 
steady (Feith et al., 2007). Over the past several decades, the U.S. dairy sector has undergone 
significant changes both in scale and structure. As with most agricultural industries, there 
have been movements to large-scale, specialized production units including fewer, yet larger 
farms (see Isik, 2004). Over the past fifteen years the New Zealand dairy industry has grown 
steadily. The number of dairy farms has fallen, but average farm and herd sizes have 
increased, while productivity, both per hectare and per cow, has substantially improved. The 
dairy industry is expected to expand, but at a slower rate than in the past few years. The 
increasing environmental concerns about intensive dairying required dairy farmers to move 
toward land-based effluent disposal systems in order to reduce these nitrate levels (ABARE 
and MAF, 2006). 
One would expect traded dairy products to flow from low-cost production regions to higher 
cost regions. However, product differentiation and consumer preferences play major roles in 
shaping dairy product demand and trade flows. All high-income countries, including major 
dairy producers like New Zealand, import EU cheese. The largest dairy trade flow worldwide 
is cheese from the EU to the United States, even though milk production costs in the EU are 
higher than in the United States.  Consumer preferences for differentiated products provide 
suppliers incentives to make such generally higher priced products available even in markets 
where lower cost alternatives exist (Blayney et al., 2006). 
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The growing demand for milk in developing countries has affected trade patterns. For 
example, in 1980, the EU was the single largest importer of New Zealand dairy products, 
accounting for 30 percent of the country’s exports; by 2004, that share had declined to 8 
percent. Over the period, exports to the EU remained nearly unchanged, while exports to 
China and other developing countries spiked. In many of the countries triggering New 
Zealand’s shift in dairy trade, the storyline is the same: demand for milk is outstripping the 
capacity of producers and processors to manufacture and transport finished products to fast-
growing urban populations (Blayney et al., 2006). 
As a result of New Zealand’s relatively small population and small domestic market for dairy 
products, 95 per cent of manufactured dairy products are exported. New Zealand’s share of 
world dairy trade is significant. Approximately 5 per cent of world dairy production is traded 
(excluding trade within the European Union) and, of this 5 per cent, exports from New 
Zealand provide 33 per cent. In fact, exports from New Zealand, the European Union (34 per 
cent) and Australia (13 per cent) provide over 80 per cent of dairy products traded worldwide. 
New Zealand is the world’s largest exporter of butter, skim milk powder and casein, and the 
second largest exporter of cheese and whole milk powder (excluding intra-EU trade). New 
Zealand has achieved this position without reliance on production or export subsidies, and 
without protecting its domestic market from overseas competition. New Zealand’s overall 
share of world dairy product exports continues to increase as its dairy industry develops to 
suit the needs of diverse markets. Between 1989-90 and 2005-06 the largest growth in dairy 
exports occurred in whole milk powder and cheese. The top five countries importing New 
Zealand dairy products in 2005-06 were the United States (12.2 per cent), Japan (6.3 per cent) 
China (5.6 per cent) Mexico (5.3 per cent) and the Philippines (5.1 per cent). 
4.1.2 Sector structure 
This section provides overview of the dairy farming structures, with a focus on farming 
intensity, farm scale, etc.  
With the enlargement of the European Union in 2007, the dairy industry in the EU is very 
large with (estimated) 24 million dairy cows in 2006 in comparison with 9.1, and 4.1 million 
dairy cows in the United States, and New Zealand, respectively (OECD). Milk production in 
the EU-27 in 2006 is  almost twice as much as that of the US and about ten times larger than 
in New Zealand (OECD, see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Milk production and dairy cows inventory in selected countries, 2007(1) 
 Milk production, 1,000 metric 
tons 
cows, 1,000 heads 
EU-27 146171 (23%) 24285 (5%) 
United States 82509  (13%) 9105  (2%) 
New Zealand 14199 (2%) 4106 (1%) 
World 639761 (100%) 518321 (100%) 
(1)Projected values 
Source: OECD,  2007. 
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In the EU the dairy production represents the first largest agricultural sector (Comission, 
2006), whereas in the US this is the second largest sector in terms of cash receipts at the farm 
level (Miller and Blayney, 2006). Milk production has been controlled under a system of milk 
quotas, which explains why the collection of cow’s milk in the EU-15 has remained relatively 
steady (M. Feith, 2007).  
Dairy production is much more dispersed across the US.  In recent years, western states such 
as California, Idaho, and New Mexico have greatly increased their milk production.  The top 
10 dairy states are listed in Table 4 in Annex (separate document to this report). Over the past 
several decades, The U.S. dairy sector has undergone significant changes both in scale and 
structure. As with most agricultural industries, there have been movements to large-scale, 
specialized production units including fewer, yet larger farms (see Isik, 2004).  
Since 1980, the number of milk cows on farms in the U.S. has declined by about 16.5 percent 
and the number of dairy farms (operations) has fallen almost 75 percent. As a result, the 
average operation has more than tripled in size, from 32 to 111 cows. Output per cow and 
total milk production have moved upward, driven by genetic, technological, and production 
management improvements. Milk per cow in 2004 was 8600 kg, almost 60 percent above 
1980, and total production increased by nearly one third over the same period, to about 7.7 
million tons. Technological advances in dairy facilities and equipment, better understanding 
of animal breeding, health, nutrition, and improved input management have all contributed to 
milk production increases (Miller and Blayney, 2006). 
Aggregate farm number and milk production data mask significant structural changes in dairy 
farming in the United States. The smallest dairy operations have declined the most, while 
large operations have increased. Very large operations (500 or more milk cows) represented 
3.7 percent of all dairy farms in 2004 but they produced over 47 percent of the milk. 
The top 10 milk-producing States in 2004—California, Wisconsin, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Idaho, Minnesota, New Mexico, Michigan, Texas, and Washington—accounted for over 71 
percent of total U.S. output (Table 4 in Annex), up modestly from 66 percent in 1980. Two 
noteworthy facets of this production growth emerge. First, the 71 percent of output in 2004 
represents almost 122 billion pounds of milk compared to the almost 38.6 million tons 
produced by the top 10 States in 1980 (Miller and Blayney, 2006). 
California has overtaken Wisconsin, the historical hub of US dairying, to be the largest 
producer.  Average herd sizes in the western states are vastly greater than those in the 
traditional Dairybelt (the northern tier, from Maine to Minnesota).  The larger herd sizes are 
the object of recently enforced Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act regulations, making some 
western states, particularly California a logical choice for analysis of the dairy sector.   
Map 1 in Annex shows the concentration of dairy cattle at the county level as of 1997.  The 
USDA report that these maps are taken from shows significant changes in the geography of 
production and frequency of farms with greater than 1,000 animal units.  Such farms that feed 
animals primarily in confinement are designated by Clean Water Act rules as Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) and are the focus of water quality regulations at the 
federal and state levels. 
In New Zealand farming is a significant part of society.  For more than 100 years, farming has 
been considered the ‘backbone’ of the economy.  Physically, farming dominates New 
Zealand’s landscape. To the outside world, New Zealand’s first introduction is that of “a land 
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where there are more sheep than human’s” and our famous “Clean and Green” image190 
(Meister & Shakur, 2003 Meister and Shakur, 2003).  Currently, although more than 85 
percent of the population now lives in urban areas, the agriculture and forestry sectors 
continue to play a vital role in New Zealand’s economy (Meister, 2002; PCE, 2004).  Over 
the past fifteen years the New Zealand dairy industry has grown steadily. Dairy farming 
extends over a further 2 million hectares with about 12,000 dairy farms (Stringleman, 2006). 
Its contribution to agricultural gross revenue and agricultural exports has expanded and 
pastoral land has been converted to dairy farms, while dairy cow numbers, herd sizes and 
productivity have all increased. Maintaining production growth is a challenge for the dairy 
industry for several reasons. These include environment concerns (for example, limitations on 
water for irrigation in Canterbury and concerns about nitrates), greater competition for land, 
and weaker international dairy prices. The dairy industry is working with other pastoral 
sectors, and local and central government on initiatives for sustainable freshwater 
management. 
The dairy industry is expected to expand, but at a slower rate than in the past few years. The 
expansion will be at the expense of beef, deer and, to a lesser extent, sheep operations in areas 
that are suitable for dairy farming. More recently, there have been some spectacular rises (and 
falls) in farmer incomes. The large rise in 2000-01 for dairying triggered more major 
conversions of sheep farms to dairy farms (ABARE and MAF, 2006). At the same time the 
increasing environmental concerns about intensive dairying required dairy farmers to move 
toward land-based effluent disposal systems in order to reduce these nitrate levels. Fonterra, 
twice the size of any other New Zealand company, is the world’s largest dairy ingredients 
company and is responsible for around 40 percent of world cross-border dairy trade in 2005 - 
New Zealand’s only truly global business (Meister, 2002 ; MAF, 2005).   
In New Zealand, dairy revenue in 2005-6 was about 34% and is projected to reach 35 per cent 
of total agricultural gross revenue in 2009-10. The industry had approximately 12,000 herds 
as at June 2005, with 4.1 million in-calf cows and heifers (49 per cent Holstein–Friesian and 
28 per cent Friesian–Jersey cross), producing over 1.2 billion kilograms of milk solids. The 
‘average’ New Zealand dairy farm in 2004-05 was 115 hectares in size, and milked 315 cows 
to produce 1.15 million litres of milk containing 98 800 kilograms of milk solids. In the past 
twenty years, the number of dairy farms has fallen, but average farm and herd sizes have 
increased, while productivity, both per hectare and per cow, has substantially improved. 
Continued gains in milk production per cow are expected from better farm management 
practices and genetic improvements. The seasonal milk production system relies 
predominantly on highly productive, rotationally grazed pasture and herds of high genetic 
merit. It is this system that enables farmers to produce milk substantially below average world 
costs, giving New Zealand its advantage over competitors world-wide. The warm climate and 
productive pastures enable herds to graze in pasture year-round, thus avoiding the need for 
indoor housing and expensive feed supplements. 
Worldwide, the EU is both the biggest producer and consumer of milk, with a share of 21% in 
both world production and consumption. However, the share of milk in total milk output of 
                                                 
190
 ‘Clean and Green’ is an image New Zealand attempts to project of the environment in which agriculture is 
conducted. It was based on its clean water, air and soil (low use of fertilisers and pesticides and it 
reliance on all year outside grass feeding), low population density and wide open spaces. This chapter 
demonstrates that relative to many other countries, New Zealand is greener and cleaner but that it needs 
to work hard at being able to preserve that image. 
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the EU varies widely between member states. According to Wieck and Heckelei, 2007, with 
14% of the total value of agricultural production in 2000, milk production is the most 
important activity both in the EU as a whole and for a majority of the member states. In 2000, 
the most important producer (according to total produced milk quantity) in the EU-15 was 
Germany, with a share of 23.7%, followed by France (20.6%), the United Kingdom (12.4%), 
and the Netherlands (9.4%). The next five countries (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden) 
together account for a quarter of total EU-15 production. The remaining six countries 
contribute only a minor part (around 10%) to overall production. 
 
Figure 4.4: Collection of cow’s milk per capita, 2004 (1) 
 
Source: M. Feith, 2007 
(1) EU-25 not available 
 
In May 2004, eight Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Malta, and Cyprus joined the 
EU-15 to form the EU-25. With the addition of the 10 new member states, the EU increased 
its population by nearly 30 percent and its arable land by nearly 40 percent (Blayney et al., 
2006). The next phase of EU enlargement is scheduled to bring membership to Bulgaria and 
Romania in January 2007. They too have significant dairy industries, even though their state 
of development is different from that of the EU-25. They together brought about 1.3 million 
dairy farms (with 1-2 cows) yielding annually 6.4 million tons of milk production 
(Comission, 2006).  
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Figure 4.5: Milk share of Member States’ agricultural production (by value) in 2004 
 
Source: (Comission, 2006).  
 
In the EU-25, the share of milk in total production varies between Member states from 5.8% 
(Spain) to 33.5% (Estonia)(Comission, 2006). The share tends to be higher in northern Europe 
and lower in Mediterranean countries (see Figure 4.5).  
Dairy farming is structured differently from Member State to Member State. Farm and dairy 
herd sizes vary enormously, as do yields (particularly following the May 2004 EU 
enlargement that brought ten new Member States into the EU). However, as the dairy sector 
develops throughout the EU, so variations in yield and other technical factors are being 
reduced – less developed dairy producers are rapidly catching up with those who had 
restructured and modernised first (Comission, 2006).  
The size of a farm is an important dimension in relation to economic as well as social aspects 
of farming. Small farms, with or without additional income from other sources than farming, 
often react differently to policy measures and/or market changes than larger farms and might, 
in many cases, contribute to the viability of rural areas in other ways than the larger farms. In 
the agricultural statistics the Standard Gross Margin is calculated by the national statistical 
bureaus based on regional standard values for each crop and livestock item based on 3 years 
averages. This again is summarised per farm and expressed in terms of European Size Units 
(ESU), where 1 ESU corresponds to 1,200 Euro. It might be argued that the calculated SGMs 
do not reflect the diversity in output of the farms as this is blurred by using standard values in 
the calculations. 
The intensity of farming is an important dimension in relation to both the economic output 
and, especially, the environmental performance of a farm. Farms farming at a low intensity 
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level – low input and normally low yields – are generally likely to have a lower pressure on 
the environment, than farms farming at a high intensity level. In case of dairy farming it might 
even be that the maintenance of important farmland habitats through extensive farming  
practices is a pre-condition for the conservation of landscape values and biodiversity. In this 
overview we refer to stocking density as a measure of intensity. Table 4.3 presents farm 
structure characteristics for the five European case countries derived on the basis of year 2003 
from FADN data. The numbers are given for specialized dairy farms for which the milk 
revenue accounts more than 2/3 of total revenue. The EU farms are distinguished by classes: 
small and large. For reasons of  comparison also information on some typical dairy farms in 
the US and New Zealand was added. Although the numbers between the EU countries, the US 
and New Zealand are not directly comparable, Table 4.3 indicates that specialized dairy farms 
in the EU are substantially smaller than typical dairy farms in the US or New Zealand. There 
are big differences between the average and large sized farms in Germany and USA. The 
establishment of large scale dairy farming (>800 cows/ farm) in Australia and New Zealand 
widens the size range significantly (Hemme, 2002). 
Wieck and Heckelei, 2007) study competitiveness of dairy farms in important production 
regions of the EU –  Germany, France, The Netherlands, Denmark, England – by focussing 
on cost estimations as a measure of competitiveness. Wieck and Heckelei, 2007 conclude that 
a higher degree of specialisation, larger herd size, higher milk yield and higher milk output 
per hectare are associated with lower marginal costs in most regions, whereas higher farm-
specific milk prices, and a higher grassland share are associated in most regions with higher 
marginal costs. 
Considerable structural differences were observed between the member states of the EU-15. 
Among the case countries, in 2003, the largest number of dairy farmers was located in 
Germany, followed by France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Denmark. Wieck and 
Heckelei, 2007) refer to the annual rates of change over the period 1991–1999 showing that 
Denmark (−7.7%) faced the sharpest decrease in number of farms, followed by Germany 
(−7.1%). France and the Netherlands recorded more moderate annual declines of −4.9% and 
−3.9%, respectively, whereas in the United Kingdom, the farm decline was much slower at 
−2.6% annually. Structural differences among the member states related to farm size are even 
more pronounced. In 2003, the average herd size in the EU-15 was 44 dairy cows (see Table 
4.3). The member states considered here all lie above the average but still vary between 
Germany (31) and France (33) at the lower end and the United Kingdom (72) at the upper 
end. In 1991, this herd size difference increased to about 48 cows. Considerable structural 
development in the Netherlands and Denmark resulted in average herd sizes of 47 and 57 
cows in 2003, respectively (European Commission, various years). 
With the new member states, the variation in farming structures has increased in the EU-25. 
From the 8-CEECs (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak, 
and Slovenia), Poland is by far the largest cow milk producer (12.4 million ton in 2004 or 10 
per cent of the total production in the EU-15) (Jongeneel, 2005, EDIMA report). Czech 
Republic and Hungary are respectively the second and third most important cow milk 
producers in the 8-CEECs.  
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Table 4.3: Farm structure of specialized typical dairy farms in the case study countries by size categories, 2001 
 
 (1) Data for the EU countries are obtained from EU-FADN, DG AGRI G3 (averages per group, year 2001). Data for other countries are obtained from the dairy network 
(observed farm data, year 2001, see Hemme, 2002). (2) Size classes for the EU countries are given in Economic Size Units per hectare of utilised agricultural area. In the 
agricultural statistics the Standard Gross Margin is calculated by the national statistical bureaus based on regional standard values for each crop and livestock item based on 3 
years averages. This again is summarised per farm and expressed in terms of European Size Units (ESU), where 1 ESU corresponds to 1,200 Euro.  
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Assuming that farms are significantly affected by the environmental regulations only if they 
rely on an intensive way of production. Table 4.4 presents the percentage of farms in the 
selected EU countries for which the criterion of intensity expressed in livestock density per 
hectare is ≥2. As can be seen, especially the farms in the Netherlands can potentially be 
affected by regulations.  
Table 4.4: Percentage of specialised dairy farms with the stocking density ≥2 (livestock per 
hectare) in selected EU countries, 2003  
 Percentage of dairy farms 
Percentage to EU-15 dairy 
farms 
Germany 20% 4% 
France 5% 1% 
Italy 57% 6% 
Netherlands 76% 5% 
United Kingdom 41% 2% 
Source: EU-FADN, DG AGRI G3 
4.2 Legal structures 
In Europe the main producers of milk are family farms. In the US milk production decisions 
are firmly in the hands of individuals and families. In 2002, almost 85 percent of dairy farms 
were either individual or family-operated businesses or family-held corporations. Many 
partnerships are also restricted to family members. Dairy farms, overwhelmingly family-
owned and managed regardless of size, are generally members of producer cooperatives. 
The New Zealand dairy sector, like its overseas counterparts, is dominated by cooperatives, 
reflecting the perishable nature of milk, the sector’s relative homogeneity and economies of 
scale in processing, market and distribution. Agricultural land is predominantly privately 
owned, and generally farmed by the landowner as a commercial operation (Anon, 2002).  
New Zealand dairy farmers face additional exposure, compared with their overseas 
counterparts, from New Zealand’s remoteness from its key export markets and high shipping 
costs. Cooperatives help to protect small producers from downstream market power and allow 
for better coordination of production, distribution, processing and marketing.  
4.2.1 Institutional factors 
Almost all countries acting in the world dairy market have tariffs or tariff-rate quota (TRQ) 
systems in place and at least two countries have both. Four countries with significant 
institutional structures, other than tariffs and TRQs, in place to provide domestic dairy 
industry support are the EU, Canada, Japan, and the United States. With the exception of the 
EU, the four countries/regions where significant domestic support for dairy is prevalent are 
not dominant players in international dairy product markets. 
 
The EU dairy regime has undergone significant  change over its near 40-year life. The most 
significant  of  these changes were the introduction of milk quotas in 1984 and the 2003 CAP 
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reform, which both accelerated developments in the dairy sector (Comission, 2006). The 
fundamental dairy policy components of the current CAP include a milk production quota and 
intervention programs for butter and nonfat dry milk, both aimed at price reductions. The EU 
will make direct payments, which may be coupled to milk production or not, to cover lost 
revenues due to price reductions (Comission, 2006.). A central element of the 2003 CAP 
reform is the introduction of the ‘Single Payment Scheme’ (SPS) – a decoupled aid payment. 
Dairy farmers are eligible to receive SPS payments – the payments are conditional on the 
fulfillment of ‘Cross Compliance’ requirements whereby farmers receive payments provided 
they comply with environmental, health and welfare standards (Comission, 2006). 
U.S. milk producers have received government support since the 1930s. Current domestic 
programs include milk price support, the Federal milk marketing order system, and direct 
payments under the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program. Dairy policies and 
programs have been modified to meet changing economic relationships over time, but 
underlying general objectives remain the same: ensure the orderly marketing of an adequate 
supply of fresh wholesome milk to meet consumer demands at reasonable prices and provide 
adequate returns to milk producers (Manchester and Blayney, 2001). 
 
If compliance to standards affects production costs at the farm-level, aggregate agricultural 
production is affected, shifting production from the most affected farm groups to the least 
affected ones (D12). Study of Isik, 2004 analyses geographical shifts in supply response of 
US dairy production to environmental regulation. The added costs associated with compliance 
to environmental regulations are often factored into the choice of firm location (Bartik, 1998). 
In the US, the environmental regulation affects the dairy cow inventories, the per-farm dairy 
inventories, and the absolute and relative changes in the dairy inventories. Dairy farm 
concentrations shift to the states with less stringent environmental regulations (Isik, 2004).  
Unlike most of its OECD partners, New Zealand has a large agricultural sector that is thriving 
with almost no government support.  Whatever meagre government support there is, is 
restricted to agricultural research, extension and pest control activities.  It is concluded in the 
project report (Jongeneel et al., 2007) that none of the EU’s key competitors (Canada, the 
United States and New Zealand) has a system of requirements comparable to the EU’s one. A 
comparative analysis covering all the themes addressed in the SMRs and GAECs shows that 
in general the intensity of regulation is less in these countries as compared to the EU. 
However, similar issues play a role and although the policy-approaches currently rely more on 
voluntary actions, more stringent forms of regulation might be introduced in the future. As 
such as part of this competitiveness assessment not only the impacts of selected EU 
requirements will be evaluated, but also some scenario’s will consider changes in regulations 
for key competitor countries. 
4.3 Evaluated measures  
4.3.1 Nitrate Directive 
From the first part of the project in became clear that the Nitrate Directive is one of the most 
serious ones facing EU dairy farmers. Although it became clear that there are potentially 
significant cost impacts, the information in the Country Reports (D5) was in general rather 
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fragmentised and showed a lot of variation over member states. Therefore a further research 
effort was done to improve on the cost estimates, as well as on the estimates of the 
(effectively) affected area and/or number of farms. Moreover, in order to obtain an estimate 
for the EU as a whole, in principle an aggregation step including the impacts in all EU 
member states is necessary. However, in the previous phase of this project only a subset of the 
member states was taken into account. Where possible and relevant supplementary 
information for other member states was gathered. 
The Nitrate Directive (91/676/EEC) was adopted in 1991 by the Council of Ministers aiming 
at the protection of waters against pollution by nitrate form agricultural sources. The Directive 
had to be transposed in national law of the member states by 1993. The directive includes 
various provisions, among which the identification of nitrate vulnerable zones (NVZs) (either 
where 50 mg/l drinking water standard for nitrate is exceeded or may be exceeded in the near 
future if no measures are taken or where eutrophication exists); the establishment of a code of 
good agricultural practice (by the end of 1993) to be implemented on a voluntary basis on the 
whole territory; and action programmes formulated by the end of 1995 and implemented by 
1999 for designated zones based on standards contained in the code of practices, which then 
become binding for farmers in NVZ-areas. Included in the action plans must be a maximum 
per hectare application rate for nitrate from animal manure (210kgN/ha before 1999, and 
170kgN/ha  after 1999). The code of good practice had to include measures on when and 
where manure fertilizer and chemical fertilizer should be applied, as well as measures on the 
proper storage of manure (capacity and construction) (see Annexes II and III of the Directive). 
Whereas Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands designated their 
whole territories as NVZ-area, other countries designated more limited zones (Ireland even 
imposed no NVZ area at all). 
In order to comply, farmers can respond in various ways to the Directive.  Examples of 
farmer’s actions are: reduced fertilizer application; changed application practices, creating 
sufficient livestock manure storage capacity; emission control measures for storage plant; 
changes in crop rotation system; vegetation cover during raining periods; development and 
implementation of farm fertilizer plans; changing the composition of animal feedstuffs; 
changing animal feed practices (limiting outdoor grazing of dairy cows); etc. 
4.3.2 Identification and registration 
From the previous research in the project it became obvious that identification and 
registration of animals has significant degree of non-compliance, with 30% non-compliance 
not being an exception (D9). A large part of the lack of compliance appeared to be due to the 
loss of eartags, which are inherent to the EU’s current system. From survey information it 
also appeared that identification and registration of animals is one of the most frustrating 
requirements to the farmers. Besides,  the inclusion of animal identification and registration 
results in very high effort for controlling agencies (about 36 hours per farm for the RPA in 
England or 40 hours for the AID in the Netherlands, who controls most SMRs and soil 
organic matter). By far most time consuming is the check of animal identification especially  
in extensive farms or in cattle breeding, as animals are often outside and in different fields 
and sometimes difficult to approach, compared to dairy cows kept indoors ( Nietsch and 
Osterburg, 2007 , D18). 
The EU Directives on Identification and Registration of animals (92/102/EEG, and 
Regulations 911/2004, 1760/2000, and 21/2004) imply: 
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a. Eartags: 
1. Calves born on the holding (or imported from outside the EC) must be tagged 
with approved eartags with the same unique identification code. 
2. Calves must be tagged within 20 days of birth, or before they leave the holding, if this 
is sooner. Dairy calves must be tagged with one eartag within 36 hours and the other 
eartag within 20 days. 
3. Eartags must not be removed or replaced without permission. Illegible or lost tags 
must be replaced within 28 days. 
b. Cattle passports: 
1. An application must be made for a cattle passport within seven days of a calf being 
tagged (that is, no more than 27 days after birth). 
2. When cattle are moved, you must ensure that they are accompanied by their cattle 
passports, which must be completed and signed. 
c. Notification: 
1. Births must be notified to the responsible authorities by an application for a cattle 
passport within seven days of tagging (that is, no more than 27 days after birth). 
2. Deaths must be notified to the registration authorities within seven days. 
3. Movements of cattle on and off a holding must be notified within three days. 
d. On-farm registers: 
1. Up-to-date on-farm registers must be kept with the required information ,including 
births and deaths of cattle and movements of cattle on and off your holding. The dates 
of these events must also be recorded. 
2. For movements, the details of keepers who sent the cattle and to whom cattle are 
consigned must be recorded. 
3. The register must be completed within 36 hours of a movement, within seven days of 
a death and within seven days of a birth in a dairy herd (or within 30 days of the birth 
of any other calf). 
4. The register must be kept for ten years and be available to the authorities on request. 
4.3.3 Food safety (hormone use)  
Consumer concerns as regards food safety have led to hormone use prohibition in the EU. In 
the U.S. a recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), a growth hormone that stimulates milk 
production has been approved for use in dairy cows since 1994. Alongside the US BST (or 
rBST) is at least used by 16 other dairy producing countries (Jarvis, 2002).  The EU, Canada 
and Japan rejected legal BST use, and also within the US the technique was (and still is) 
controversial, at least within certain groups and regions. See Jarvis (2002, 103) for further 
details. 
From the literature (Tauer and Knolbach, 1997; Knoblauch and Putnam, 1998; Stefanides and 
Tauer, 1999,  and Tauer, 2002) it appears that there is a production increase effect (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5: Impact of  bST on average herd milk yields (kg/animal.year) * 
Application time 1 st year medium 4 years (continuous) 
 296 486 689 
Milk yield level low middle high 
 419 575 - 
Source: Based on Tauer (2002). 
*) 
 Only significant numbers are presented 
The history effect suggest that there is a clear learning effect: when longer using it farmers are 
better able to exploit the milk enhancing advantage of bST. Late adopters appeared to be able 
to directly realize a milk yield increase of about 480kg/animal.year (not reported in Table). 
It should be noted that the yield increases are changes in herd averages. bST might have been 
applied to some but not all cows within the herd. More detailed information about the 
application rate was lacking, which complicates easy generalizations form these findings 
beyond the sample population191. 
The results found with respect to milk yield variation (low, middle, high) fit in with the 
experimental results reported by Patton and Head (1992), which also show that in particular 
low producing cows respond to bST. 
However, from the literature no statistically significant profit increase effect was found. It is 
suggested that applicant farms may sometimes loose and sometimes gain from the use of bST. 
It is suggested that middle production per cow-farms (which often are located at larger farms) 
and well-managed farms192 belong to the gainers. In one case for large farms a significant 
profit increase per cow of US$229 was found.  
From these findings (a significant yield effect and non-significant profit effects) it can be 
concluded that whereas bST will increase yields and thus revenues it simultaneously increases 
input use (feed) and thus costs (including the costs/fee for bST use farmers have to pay). A 
possibility might be that Monsanto succeeds in exploiting its monopoly power in such a way 
to more or less exactly extract the rent from the use of this milk output enhancing 
innovation193. 
Monsanto – the monopoly-supplier of the product (brand name: POSILAC) – reports that in 
1999 about 13.000 US dairy farms were using BST, applying it to 9 million dairy cows 
(approximately 30% of the cows in supplemented herds). The use of this hormone leads to 
production increases. Tauer (2002) shows that application of rBST in the first year may 
increase an average herd’s milk yield by 419-575 kg, whereas late adopters are able to 
directly realize a milk yield increase of about 480kg/animal.year. Jarvis (2002) who analyzed 
                                                 
191
 Henriques and Butler (2002) state that experimental results indicate that for individual cows milk yield 
increases in the range of 10-20% are found. This is significantly higher that the numbers reported in 
Table 1. In general no more tan 65% of the herds will be available for bST application since cows are 
generally treated only the last 215 days of their 305 day lactation, while during the firs 60 days of the 
lactation cycle the response to bST is not strong. Moreover, always some cows cease treatment because 
of poor condition or health problems (Jarvis, 2002, 104). 
192
 Animal science studies of Coppock (1992) and Shaver (1998) have shown that ‘profitable’ bST use requires 
consistency and improvement of management and production (well-balanced diets) technologies. 
193
 There is similar evidence for exploitation of market power by Monsanto for GMO soybeans (see Moschini 
and Lapan, 2002). 
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the potential effects of BST on world dairy markets estimates that the total US milk supply 
increased by 3% due to the (pure) BST application194.  
Whereas BST will increase yields and thus revenues it simultaneously also increases input use 
(feed) and thus costs (including the costs/fee for BST use farmers have to pay). In an ex-ante 
analysis Perrin (1991) estimated per unit cost savings varying from 0.5 to 4.4 percent, 
although milk yields were increasing by approximately 15% (note the simultaneous cost 
increase effect). Jarvis (2002, 109) using a slightly different approach provides a maximum 
per unit cost decline of 5% (per unit average). When simulating the trade impact of hormone 
use ban in the U.S. this translates into 5% cost increase imposed on the U.S. 
4.4 Estimating regulatory costs of Nitrate Directive in EU-countries 
As regards the costs of the Nitrate Directive for the EU member states the work of Andrews et 
al (2000) and Kuik (2006) was scrutiny analyzed. As regards the costs associated with similar 
standards in non-EU countries, we rely on the estimates provided by Cassels and Meister 
(2001), as well as on their degree of compliance-corrections (See subsection 3.3.4 for more 
details). 
The studies provide insight into both ex-ante (Andrews, Cassels and Meister) and ex-post 
costs of regulation estimates. Moreover, alongside their own analysis they summarize a 
number of national estimates. Table 4.6 provides a comparative overview of the cost 
estimates associated with the Nitrate Directive for selected EU member states as obtained by 
Andrews et al (2000) and Kuik (2006), with a specific focus on the dairy sector. 
Table 4.6: Ex-ante and ex-post estimates of compliance costs associated with the Nitrate 
Directive (prices of ‘97/98) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Unit Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy
Nether-
lands Spain 
United 
Kingdom EU-15
Ex ante estimates
Andrews et al (2000)
€ mio.y-1 63 78 215 125
Dairy €.ha-1.y-1 45 45 45 129 45 45
Total/ha €.ha-1.y-1 58 79 93 64 75 129 70 44 75
National estimates
€.ha-1.y-1 103 25-61 236 6
Ex-post estimates
Kuik (2006)
€.ha-1.y-1 62 174
ex-post/ex-ante ratio 0.60 0.74
 
Source: based on Andrews, 2000 
As Table 4.6 shows Andrews et al (2000) average per hectare compliance cost estimates vary 
from €44/ha (United Kingdom) to €129/ha (Netherlands). However, these estimates, which 
are based on the calculated costs aggregated over all agricultural sectors divided by the 
affected area. These averages of total costs hide a lot of variation over farms. As can be seen 
from the line on dairy farms, they are estimated to face lower costs than the calculated 
national average cost impacts. Farms facing higher than the national) average costs will be 
                                                 
194
 For comparative reasons note that the autonomous (genetic) milk yield increase is about 2% per annum. 
Where bST application creates a one-shot increase, genetic progress creates a continuous milk yield increase. 
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mainly intensive livestock farms. For Denmark, France, The Netherlands and the UK also 
some national estimates are given. For Denmark and The Netherlands these are substantially 
higher than those obtained by Andrews et al, whereas for France and the UK they are 
substantially lower. For Denmark and The Netherlands Kuik (2006) comes up with ex-post 
estimates of €62 and €174 per hectare affected land respectively. As compared to the national 
ex-ante estimates the ex-post estimates (which include the impact of all kinds of mitigation 
measures taken at the farms) for Denmark and the Netherlands are respectively 40% and 26% 
lower. As compared to the estimates of Andrews et al, Kuik’s ex-post deviation can be 
calculated to be 22% lower for Denmark, but 35% higher for the Netherlands. In particular the 
higher estimate for The Netherlands is not expected, since in general ex-post estimates are 
expected to be lower than ex-ante ones. However, the estimates in Andrews et al are based on 
previous studies, that include substitutability possibilities and as such some impacts of farm 
mitigation strategies to reduce the cost impacts. 
The bottom-up procedure as outlined in Chapter 2 was followed to assess the costs estimates 
starting from identifying the relevant number of dairy farms affected by the regulation (with a 
livestock density per hectare ≥ 2). Next, initial compliance levels, costs of compliance with 
the regulation for affected farms and the expected final degree of compliance are defined. As 
regards the cost measures for the selected EU countries we relied on per hectare cost estimates 
based on the Kuik (2006). The only exception to this is that the requirement to keep record of 
manure applications are (to our information) not yet included in the Kuik estimates. These are 
estimated to be €150 per (dairy) farm in a NVZ-area, and are added separately. To translate 
the percentage of additional costs of compliance to total costs at the sector level, both affected 
and non-affected farms are accounted for. 
The additional costs depend on the final rate of compliance assumed. Several scenario’s are 
possible here and reported below. As an example, if the final rate of compliance is full 
compliance and the base year rate of compliance is 80 percent, the additional costs are equal 
to (1.00-0.80)*total costs associated with full compliance. In order to determine the 
percentage cost increase associated with the improvement in the compliance rate, the 
estimated additional costs of the Nitrate Directive are related to the costs of production and 
multiplied with 100%. The percentage costs increase for the dairy sector as a whole was 
determined by a production weighted share of the dairy farms which faced a cost increase and 
the dairy farms which do not face a costs increase (extensive dairy production). 
The exception to the above procedure concerns the estimates for Italy. The costs of 
compliance to the Nitrate directive are based on a case study of CRPA (De Roest et al., 2007), 
see also section 4.8.2. The costs per farm with 100-cows are estimated at the level of 
€11045.7, thereby leading to €8836.6 additional costs per farm (associated with achieving full 
compliance) as reported in Table 4.7.  
The obtained results are presented in Table 4.7 along the three scenarios 195: 
1) The first one, labelled as FULL COMPLIANCE, gives the additional costs (as a 
percentage of total costs) assuming all farms improve their degree of compliance in 
such a way that they all achieve full compliance. 
2) The second one assumes that all affected farms improve heir degree of compliance 
with 20% as compared to the base year level (prevailing degree of compliance)196.   
                                                 
195
 Other scenarios are also possible. Since the estimated initial levels of compliance are uncertain, also some 
scenario’s could be done in order to analyse the sensitivity for different initial compliance levels. 
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3) The third scenario assumes that the degree of compliance is increased in general with 
10% (as compared to base year level), and additionally that no country will have a 
degree of compliance less than 75%. So countries performing poorly in the base year 
are assumed to do additional efforts. 
As Table 4.7 shows for the FULL COMPLIANCE scenario the percentage increase in total 
production associated wit the additional costs necessary to be made to achieve full 
compliance, varies between 0.06 till 0.58 percent of the total production costs. Here it is 
assumed that at specialized dairy farms all production costs can be related to dairy production. 
So no attempt was made to decompose and attribute costs to specific outputs even if farms 
had multiple outputs (often dairy farm output includes some beef meat output). Moreover, it 
should be noted that a lot of the less intensive specialised dairy farms, as well as the non-
specialized dairy farms are assumed to have zero compliance costs. The low cost increase at 
sector level as such does not exclude more significant percentage cost of production increases 
at specific farms. For the intensive specialized dairy farms (>2LU/ha) percentage cost 
increases varying from 0.16 till 3.63 percent were found. The absolute cost increases for this 
group varied from €83 per farm to €3798 per farm197.  For the alternative scenario’s (2, and 3) 
the percentage increase in production costs are lower. However, the distribution of the costs 
might be different since in particular in scenario 3 a non-proportional factor in the calculation 
of the improved compliance rate is used (each country should obtain at least a degree of 
compliance of 75%). 
Care should be taken with respect to interpreting the most right column of Table 4.7. The 
impact at EU-15 level is based on averaging farm data of all dairy farms with LU/ha greater  
or equal than 2. When the aim is to calculate a cost impact at EU-15 level, it will be better to 
create a weighted aggregate (weighting the cost increases obtained at member state level with 
their shares in total milk production). For this some further assumptions have to be made with 
respect to the member states which are currently omitted from Table 4.7 (notably Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden and Finland). From the inspection of the 
(specialized) dairy farm sample data for these latter countries it appeared that dairy farms with 
production intensities of 2LU/ha or more, where hardly occurring in these countries. There 
will be dairy farms there, located in NVZ areas which face record keeping costs. However, it 
might be assumed that the costs associated with specific actions necessary in order to comply 
with the Nitrate Directive are negligible.  
                                                                                                                                                        
196
 Taking into account that at a factor of 1 (full compliance) is the maximum which no country can go beyond. 
197
 The order of magnitude of these numbers fit in with the specific cost estimates that were obtained earlier in 
the specific country assessments (e.g. D5 Netherlands). For further elaboration see the separate section on the 
farm approach to competitiveness assessment. 
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Table 4.7: Calculated cost of production increases due to compliance with the Nitrate Directive standard 
 
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy 
Nether-
lands Spain  
United 
Kingdom EU-15 
Revised cost estimate €/ha dairy farms (using all previous studies) 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 94.5 45.0 99.3 45.0 
     Idem (but now updated for inflation) 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 105.0 50.0 110.3 50.0 
Per annum record keeping costs (€ per farm) 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 
Nitrate directive costs € per farm 1826.9 3261.5 6330.0 2119.0 11045.7 4694.4 838.5 8380.9 1883.0 
Total costs (per farm) as in FADN database 2003 95454.4 241366.4 121197.1 112586.4 184095.6 177804.9 52283.6 219474.3 131911.1 
Estimated prevailing degree of compliance 0.80 0.80 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.8 
% Nitrate directive costs/ 'corrected' total farm costs 1.53 1.08 2.09 1.13 1.20 1.98 1.44 3.63 1.14 
Share of specialized dairy farms in total milk production (based on 
output value) 0.44 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.52 0.43 
Scenario 1: FULL COMPLIANCE         
    Final level of compliance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Calculated additional costs per farm (associated with achieving 
full compliance) 365.4 652.3 3798.0 847.6 8836.6 1173.6 83.8 419.0 376.6 
   % Additional costs associated with full compliance to Nitrate 
Directive 0.383 0.270 3.134 0.753 4.800 0.660 0.160 0.191 0.285 
   Approximated additional total sector cost % increase (full 
compliance) 0.169 0.062 0.166 0.171 4.090 0.522 0.121 0.099 0.124 
Scenario 2: 20% INCREASE IN COMPLIANCE         
   Final level of compliance 0.96 0.96 0.48 0.72 0.24 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.96 
   Calculated additional costs per farm (associated with +20% 
compliance) 292.3 521.8 506.4 254.3 441.8 704.2 83.8 419.0 301.3 
   % Additional costs associated with +20% compliance to Nitrate 
Directive 0.306 0.216 0.418 0.226 0.240 0.396 0.160 0.191 0.228 
   Approximated additional total sector cost % increase (increased 
compliance) 0.135 0.050 0.022 0.051 0.204 0.313 0.121 0.099 0.099 
Scenario 3: 10% INCREASE IN COMPLIANCE and COMPLIANCE >75%         
   Final level of compliance 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.825 0.99 1.00 0.88 
   Calculated additional costs per farm (associated compliance 
assumption made) 146.15 260.92 2215.49 317.85 6075.14 352.08 75.46 419.04 150.64 
   % Additional costs associated with compliance assumption to 
Nitrate Directive 0.153 0.108 1.828 0.282 3.300 0.198 0.144 0.191 0.114 
   Approximated additional total sector cost % increase (increased 
compliance) 0.068 0.025 0.097 0.064 2.812 0.157 0.109 0.099 0.049 
Source: own calculations following the procedure described above. The Estimates for Italy are those from the CRPA study (De Roest et al., 2007)(see section 0). 
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4.5 Compliance costs of Nitrate regulations in non-EU countries 
As regards the costs associated with similar standards in New Zealand, the estimates from 
Cassells and Meister, 2001) were updated (see Meister, 2006). An exception is the US, where 
(partly) own calculations were made. Their estimates are in Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8: Costs of compliance for non-EU countries 
Country Best estimate of % 
costs increase at farm 
level 
Estimated degree of 
compliance 
Best estimate of 
additional costs (% cost 
increase) at sector level 
New Zealand 3.2 85% 0.5 
Australia 3.2 85% 0.5 
USA 2 - 4 50% 0.02 
EU (own estimate)  Own estimates in 
Table 4.7  
Own estimates in Table 
4.7 
Own estimates in Table 
4.7 
Source: Based on Cassels and Meister (2001) and Winsten (2007). 
*the estimate is based on case study, see section 4.5.2. 
 
4.5.1 Cost of Compliance with Environmental Regulations: the New 
Zealand case study 
A number of environmental issues have been raised over the past century by the development 
of New Zealand’s agriculture.  Although farming in New Zealand is generally much less 
intensive than in other countries, nevertheless, in some areas of New Zealand significant soil 
erosion problems have resulted from removal of the natural forest cover for pastoral farming. 
The resulting sediment along with nutrient run-off and discharge of agricultural wastes has 
also contributed to water quality concerns in some areas.  The removal of indigenous 
vegetation raised the issue of protecting biodiversity.  The continual conversion of land to 
horticultural and dairy production has made water allocation, water quality and minimum 
stream flow, all issues of importance. 
In many cases, environmental problems associated with agriculture can be attributed to 
government policies.  Until the mid-1980s, for example, agricultural support programmes 
encouraged over-intensive use of chemical inputs and other physical resources.  Following the 
removal of subsidies, the number of sheep in New Zealand declined by well over 35 percent 
(Statistics New Zealand, 1998).  Well over half a million hectares of pasture have been 
converted to exotic pine forests over the same period. An even larger area of marginal pasture 
on steep erodible slopes has been left to regenerate in scrub and native forest (Ministry for the 
Environment, 1997).  While the decline in sheep numbers has continued, this has been 
partially offset by an increase in the number of dairy cows and other livestock.  Fertilizer and 
pesticide use, which significantly decreased after the economic reforms of the 80s, increased 
again when farm incomes started to rise (MAF, 1997).  
The key environmental issue associated with dairy farming is that of water quality, which is 
compromised by excessive levels of nitrate.  With increasing herd sizes and stocking 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 123 
densities, growing pasture cannot always absorb the increasing quantities of nitrate that are 
delivered to the soil.  The result is excess nutrient levels in water leading to eutrophication 
and concerns regarding livestock and human health (Cassells & Meister, 2000).      
This analysis has estimated the costs of compliance with regulations concerning water quality.  
 
Water quality regulations 
In New Zealand there is one overriding piece of legislation, the Resource Management Act, 
1991 (RMA 1991) that deals with the management of natural resources, including the quality 
of surface and ground water.  Prior to the RMA 1991, most discharge of dairy effluent was to 
water, the control of which was the responsibility of Catchment Boards, under the Water and 
Soil Conservation Act, 1967.  However local government reform in the late 1980’s shifted 
this responsibility to the Regional Councils.  Since 1991, discharges to water or land have 
become subject to the requirements of the RMA 1991.  Under the Act discharges to water are 
not allowed unless they are specifically permitted in a regional plan, or allowed by a consent 
issued by the relevant Regional Council.  In most regions discharges of effluent to land 
require a consent.  Several Regional Councils, however, have made discharge of effluent to 
land a permitted activity, done as of right provided they do not contravene the provisions 
allowed for in the regional plan (Cassells & Meister, 2000).  
 
Policy DL 3: Restrictions on nitrogen loadings from wastewater discharges 
The loading of nitrogen in discharges of wastewater to grazed pasture should not exceed 
150kgN/ha in any 12-month period and should not exceed 50kgN/ha in any 24-hour period, 
unless it can be demonstrated that increased application is safe. This policy does not restrict 
the application of fertiliser.  Fertiliser is applied to pasture and crops specifically to promote 
plant growth, not to dispose of an unwanted product (i.e. animal effluent).  For some 
industries the over application of crop fertiliser would be uneconomic and inefficient, and 
would represent a cost to the farmer.  Regional Councils actively promote the adherence to 
the Code of Practice for Fertiliser Use, developed by the New Zealand Fertiliser 
Manufacturers’ Research Association.  The rules in this Plan therefore differentiate between 
nitrate applications that need to remain regulated and those that can be left to the discretion of 
those applying the fertiliser. 
Councils are not satisfied that regulating fertiliser use is the most effective way to avoid or 
mitigate the effects of the activity.  Some improvement in groundwater quality should be 
achievable through controls imposed on other sources of nitrate, such as sewage and 
agricultural effluent, which are regulated to control the effects from organic and microbial 
contaminants.  In areas where fertiliser application could cause adverse effects, councils will 
provide users with information about more efficient and effective means of using fertiliser 
(LM Method 1). 
 
DL Rule 4: Discharges of agricultural effluent 
 Any discharge onto or into land, of 
a. wastewater and/or sludge from dairysheds, piggeries, or feedlots, or 
b. sludge from agricultural waste water treatment ponds; or 
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c. poultry farm litter or wastewater. 
 
is a Controlled Activity. 
 
The Activity shall comply with the following standards 
these standards refer to buffer zones (to separate from rivers, lakes, houses); rates of 
application (150kgN/has/year or not to exceed 50kg/N/24 hour period); ponding. 
Applications for controlled activities must provide information on proof that standards are 
achieved, loading rates, and areas to be used.  N-loading rate calculations are based on 20g of 
N/cow/day x 270 days/year.  A rate of 150kgN/year requires an area of 6.35ha per 100 cows 
for the spread of dairy shed effluent. 
Beyond the context of specific regulatory approaches under the RMA (largely confined to 
effluent disposal and water takes and discharges), remedial strategies for mitigating adverse 
environmental effects in the dairy sector have tended to be voluntary and focused on good 
practice, that is, “education is more appropriate than legislation.”  By way of example, 
fertiliser use is not regulated as occurs in some European countries.  Rather nutrient budgeting 
is encouraged as good practice through the provision of tools such as the Code of Practice and 
OVERSEER (computer software to do nutrient budgeting; provided freely).  The Dairying 
and Clean Streams Accord signals a more comprehensive approach using a suite of tools 
including improved treatment, protection of sensitive environment and reduction of fertiliser 
inputs through efficiency (Parliamentary Commission for the Environment, 2004, 136). This 
approach, managed by Fonterra (the Dairy Company) and the Regional Councils is still 
voluntary, however, in the future it may become a condition of being able to supply to 
Fonterra. 
Currently, in the large dairy regions of New Zealand almost 80 percent of dairy farmers are 
applying effluent to land.  In spite of this there is concern in New Zealand that what is being 
done in terms of managing nutrients (especially nitrogen) is not enough.  There are major 
concerns about New Zealand’s waterways and lakes becoming nutrient enriched and 
degraded.  The lag time for nutrients to enter these water bodies suggests that any problems 
will get worse before they eventually improve.  In one region the Regional Council is 
implementing a trading system for nitrogen emissions from a major catchment, due to the 
grave concern for water quality in one of New Zealand’s most valuable lakes. 
 
Compliance costs for water quality regulations 
Environmental regulations, as stipulated in the RMA 1991 have on the whole, required dairy 
farms to cease discharging their effluent directly to waterways in favour of a land-based 
effluent treatment system.  In several regions there remains some consent for discharge of 
treated dairy effluent to water, monitored annually, however, this will eventually be phased 
out.  There is also a move away from the system whereby dairy effluent is stored in ponds and 
spread onto pasture two or three times per year.  This is being replaced by the daily irrigation 
of effluent to pasture.  A storage facility or sump allows the effluent to be held for a number 
of days, when soil conditions are not suitable for effluent irrigation.     
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In order to estimate the cost to the New Zealand dairy industry of complying with current 
water quality regulations, it has been assumed that all dairy farms will dispose of their dairy 
shed effluent by daily irrigation onto pasture.  Compliance costs include construction costs, 
annual operating costs, consent and monitoring costs.  Herd sizes vary considerably in 
different parts of the country and so for this reason construction and operating costs are 
estimated for three different herd sizes, a 150 – 249 cow herd, a 250 – 449 cow herd and a 
450+ cow herd. The costs of Land Disposal Effluent treatment facilities using either a 
Travelling Irrigator or a pond system are assessed for for two farm sizes (150-249 cows, and 
250-549 cows). Estimated construction costs are presented in Table 4.9 and annual operating 
costs in Table 4.10.198 A travelling irrigator system could be expected to last about 15 years 
before the pump, irrigator, hydrants and piping need replacing, therefore construction costs 
(and consent costs) are financed through a 15-year loan. 
Table 4.9: Construction costs for a travelling irrigator system 
 150 – 249 cow herd 250 – 449 cow herd 450 + 
cow herd 
Fibreglass/concrete sump   $  2,500   $  5,500 $10,000 – 30,000 
Motor   $  2,500   $  4,500   $8,000 –   9,500  
Pipeline, fittings   $  4,300   $10,000 $15,000 – 20,000 
Hydrants   $  1,000   $  2,000   $4,500 –   6,000  
Irrigator   $  4,000   $  5,500 $25,000 – 30,000 
Labour to install   $  3,000   $  4,500 $10,000 
Electrical (wiring/fittings)   $  3,000   $  3,000 $12,000 – 14,000  
Shed     $1,500 
Total   $20,500   $35,000 $86,000 -121,000   
Note 1:  Costs are based on 2005 estimates from the Waikato, which is New Zealand’s largest dairy region.  
Totals are rounded to the nearest $500. 
Note 2:  In the 450 + herd category, there is quite a variation in herd sizes with some dairy units milking more 
than 1500 cows.  As a consequence there is marked variation in costs.   
Source:  Irrigationworks Ltd (data obtained via interview). 
Table 4.10: Annual running cost estimates for a travelling irrigator system  
 150 – 249 cow 
herd 
250 – 449 cow 
herd 
450 + 
cow herd 
Repairs and maintenance1 $325 $500   $1,400 –   1,975  
Labour2     @ $15 – 20/hr 
(turning & moving irrigator) 
$490 – 660 $860 – 1,150   $3,040 –   8,400  
Motorbike running  @ $10/hr $330 $570   $2,030 –   4,200  
Electricity3 $610 $810   $5,670 – 24,090 
Total annual running costs $1,755 – 1,925 $2,740 – 3,030 $12,140 – 38,665 
1
 Repairs and maintenance are estimated at 5% of capital cost of pump and irrigator. 
2
 Labour costs: for 150 – 249 cow herd, turning every 4 days taking 15 mins per turn and changing paddocks 
every 16 days, with time per shift, 30 mins.  Total time estimated for labour (incl. motorbike running) is 33 hours 
for a 270-day season.  For a large herd the time taken may be 0.75 - 1.5 hrs/day. 
3
 A smaller herd size may require an 11kw pump running at 70 percent capacity, at a cost of 0.75c/hr, 3 hours per 
day, for a 270 day season.  A herd of approximately 500 cows may require a pump operating at capacity, at 
                                                 
198
 There is likely to be some increase in both construction costs and operating costs where the irrigator has to 
operate on steeper farmland.  This has not been factored into the analysis as the number of farms on 
such terrain is not known. 
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$1.50/hr, 14 hours/day for 270 days, and for the very large herds (approximately 1600 cows) two 11kw pumps 
may be operating at $1.50/hr each, 22 hours/day, 365 days per year.  
Source:   Irrigationworks Ltd (data obtained via interview by the author). 
The RMA 1991 provides Regional Councils with some flexibility in how they administer and 
enforce the Act.  Thus differences have been observed between regions as to how strongly the 
discharge of dairy effluent to water is discouraged.  Regional variations in consent and 
monitoring costs are presented in detail in Table 4.11.   
Table 4.11: Consent and monitoring charges for discharge of dairy effluent to land:   
Region Consent 
required 
Cost of 
Consent 
Annual charge Monitoring & 
Inspection 
Northland permitted - included in 
inspection 
$90 
Waikato permitted  -  - ~$200 every 1.5-2yr 
(permitted/consent) 
Bay of Plenty consent $427.50 + $120 – 
compliant 
$160 – less 
compliant 
included in annual 
charge 
 
Taranaki consent $350 - $100 - $150 
Lower North 
Island 
consent $500 $30 $230 – compliant 
(every 2yrs) 
$345 + non-compliant 
West Coast consent $200 + - $50 
Canterbury consent $1000 included in 
inspection 
$250 
+ for non-compliance 
Southland consent 
>50 cows 
$400 + $90 $240   <600 cows 
$480   >600 cows 
Notes: 
1)  The addition of + to costs indicates that the fee quoted is the base fee and additional costs may be 
incurred for extra officer time, travel, etc. 
2)   Northland:  Discharge to land is a permitted activity requiring a visual inspection 2 years out of 3 
(where there is compliance).  Average cost of inspection is $90.  Three-quarters of dairy farms discharge treated 
effluent to water which requires a consent (application cost is $450) and an annual inspection where water 
quality is tested upstream, at the point of discharge, and downstream.  Annual cost (including annual 
administration charge) is $350.  
3)   Waikato:  Discharge to land is a permitted activity with no annual charge.  One-third of dairy farms 
discharge treated effluent to water, requiring a consent at a cost of around $700 and an annual charge of $243.  
All farms are monitored every 18 months to 2 years and the average cost of inspection is around $200.   
4)   Bay of Plenty:  Discharge of treated effluent to water requires a consent with a deposit of $675 and 
possible further costs.  Monitoring of land-based disposal may be as infrequently as once every 3 years for a 
good operation, otherwise annually for those requiring further monitoring (this is the case for discharge to 
water).  Monitoring costs are converted to an annual fee, which is less for compliant operations.  Further 
monitoring may incur actual costs additional to the $160 per year. 
5)   Manawatu-Wanganui:  Fees for this regional council have been used for the Lower North Island.  There 
is a fixed inspection fee of $230 for operations which are compliant, but once inspected it may 2 – 3 years before 
the next inspection.  For an operation which is not compliant the inspection fee is $345.  A further inspection is 
carried out within 2 – 4 weeks and if there is compliance the second inspection costs $230, if not the cost is 
$345, with further inspection.  Regardless of the outcome of the second visit, this farm will be inspected the 
following year.    
6)   Canterbury:  Dairy operations that are non-compliant require further inspection and so incur additional 
monitoring costs. 
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7)   Southland:  Discharge to land is a permitted activity for a herd of less than 50 cows.  Inspection is 
carried out annually at a cost of $240, but for herds of over 600 cows there is a second inspection in the year.   
Source: Data obtained through interview of the respective Regional Council officers) 
The cost of consent application and the on-going cost of monitoring vary from region to 
region, depending on whether land-based effluent treatment is given permitted activity status 
with no initial consent cost, as a compliance incentive to the farmer.  Minimum application 
fees for a resource consent vary from $200 to $1000 with actual costs for officer time, travel 
and administration being added to this in some regions.  Some regions require annual 
inspection and the monitoring of farm dairy effluent disposal systems.  Others reduce this to 
every second year (or even less frequently) where a farmer is operating a good effective 
system.  In general, where the effluent disposal system is not up to standard, a further 
inspection is undertaken within two to four weeks at a higher cost to the farmer (Table 4.11).  
If there is no improvement the farmer is served with an abatement notice (at a cost of $200), 
which requires compliance within seven days.  Failure to do so incurs an infringement notice 
(at a cost of $750) and a court case.  Regional Councils report that approximately 85 – 90 
percent of dairy farms operate a system which complies with the requirements.  In the 
analysis it has been assumed that all dairy farms operate a compliant land-based effluent 
disposal system. 
There is indirect benefit to society from the disposal of dairy effluent to land in terms of water 
protection for both surface and ground water.  There is, however, uncertainty regarding the 
fertiliser value and possible increase in productivity attributable to land-based disposal of 
dairy shed effluent.  Both the volume generated and the nutrient content of effluent is variable 
and is dependent on feed quality and quantity, the amount of water used for washing down, 
and the handling of cows in the farm dairy (Parminter, 1998).  The application of effluent to 
land, however, has the potential to reduce the amount of fertiliser required.199  The value of 
the equivalent quantity of fertiliser has been estimated at $218/ha.200  To achieve the 
acceptable level of 150 kg of nitrogen per hectare in a season, an area of 6.35 hectare would 
need to be irrigated with effluent (ibid).201  There is also the possibility that land application of 
farm dairy effluent may improve grass production since it applies a greater quantity of some 
nutrients than the standard fertiliser programme used.  This in turn could improve dairy 
production and returns.  Details on how the annual benefit figures have been estimated are 
presented in Table 4.12. 
                                                 
199
 Raw effluent has been estimated to contain 10.4g/cow/day of nitrogen, 1.76g/cow/day of phosphorus, and 
8g/cow/day of potassium (Vanderholm, 1984).   
200
 The Value of the fertiliser equivalent was estimated at $290/ha based on the assumption of 0.04%, 0.008% 
and 0.03% contents of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium respectively (Waikato Regional Council, 
1997).  However, Parminter (1998) reduces this estimate for a number of reasons.  Firstly, not all the 
nutrients in raw effluent are able to be utilised, and volatilisation of ammonia-N from the ground’s 
surface reduces the amount available to plants by 10 – 30% (Cameron and Rate, 1992; Lincoln 
Environmental, 1997).  Secondly, where effluent application rates are too high, nutrients may flow 
through the soil and be lost to groundwater (Singleton, 1995).  Alternatively, they may build up in the 
soil in forms not immediately available to plants. 
201
 Again this is for the model farm. These figures have assumed a 270 day season and an average washdown 
volume of 50 litres/cow/day to achieve the 150kg N/ha/season.  
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Table 4.12: Fertiliser and production benefits of applied effluent (150-249 cow herd in 
1997/1998 season)  
 1. Total applied 
nutrient approach 
2. Adjusted 
standard fertiliser 
3. Standard 
fertiliser 
Saved fertiliser costs  ($) 1,390 1,390 0 
Production benefits  ($)        313 - 938       313 - 938   606 - 1,817 
Total annual benefits  ($)     1,703 - 2,328    1,703 - 2,328   606 - 1,817 
Source:  Parminter 1998.    
It cannot be assumed that all farmers would alter the fertiliser regime on the land to which the 
effluent is applied to compensate exactly for the nutrients from the effluent.  Therefore three 
approaches have been assumed:  
Total applied nutrient approach.  Here the farmer tailors the fertiliser on the effluent-treated 
land to apply exactly the same nutrients in total as on the rest of the farm.  The saved fertiliser 
costs are a measure of the dollar value of the benefits of the land-based effluent treatment. 
Adjusted standard fertiliser regime approach. The farmer adjusts the fertilisers applied on the 
treated block, while minimising the complication to fertiliser management of the farm. 
Standard fertiliser approach. The standard fertiliser programme is applied uniformly to the 
whole farm, including the block already treated with effluent. 
It is then assumed that one-third of farmers follow each strategy, and that the “average” 
farmer gains half the maximum potential gains from the production effects. This means that 
the total annual benefits per farm are approximately $1,800 for systems which apply fresh 
farm dairy effluent to the land.   
The farm monitoring data (MAF) providing data on categories of total costs (in terms of 
$/head of cow) are used for each of the 21 dairy regions in New Zealand in year 2005. The 
combined annual benefit of saved fertiliser costs and suggested production benefits have been 
estimated for a 150 – 249 cow herd, in the 1997/1998 season at approximately $1,800.202  This 
has been converted to a value of $2,050 for a 150 – 249 cow herd, $3,600 for a 250 – 449 cow 
herd and $6,300 for a 450+ cow herd for the 2004/2005 season.  To summarise, compliance 
costs relating to water quality regulations are calculated at the farm level for the land-based 
disposal of dairy shed effluent.  The percentage of farms that still had to comply is assessed 
for the period 2000/2001. Regional differences in average herd sizes and in consent and 
monitoring costs are incorporated into the analysis.  Compliance costs at the farm level are 
then aggregated to obtain a total cost for the New Zealand dairy industry to comply with 
water quality regulations.  From this total cost an estimate is made of the compliance costs per 
kilogram of Milk Solids produced.  In addition, several sensitivity analyses are conducted.  
The first includes loan calculations for interest rates of both 8 percent and 10 percent.  Due to 
the uncertainty regarding the fertiliser value and possible increased productivity of the 
application of dairy effluent to land, the second sensitivity analysis includes estimations with, 
and without, the inclusion of annual benefit estimates.  The results of these analyses are 
presented in Table 4.14 with the detailed analyses given in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16.  
                                                 
202
 Calculations were done for the MAF Farm Monitoring Waikato/South Auckland model dairy farm which 
milks 196 cows (MAF, 1997), though the model has recently been adjusted to more closely reflect the 
mean size of dairy farms in the Waikato region. 
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Table 4.13: Capital, annual opertaing costs and benefits per farm of different size group 
 Capital cost  Annual operating costs Annual benefit 
150 - 249 herd 20500 1755 2050 
250 - 449 herd 35000 2740 3600 
450 - 649 herd 86000 12140 6300 
 
Table 4.14: Overview of costs of regulatory compliance at various interest rates 
Compliance Costs 
 
Interest rate = 8% Interest rate = 10% 
Cost in cents per kilogram of Milk Solids 
- fertiliser and productivity benefits included 
 
4.92 
 
5.50 
Cost in cents per kilogram of Milk Solids 
- excluding fertiliser and productivity 
benefits 
 
8.66 
 
9.25 
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Table 4.15: Calculating compliance costs for land-based discharge of dairyshed effluent (without on-farm benefits included) 
Region 
No. 
herds 
Av. herd 
size 
Av.Milk 
Solid/hd 
(kg) 
Regional 
output   (kg 
milk solids) 
Capital 
cost 
Consent  
cost 
Annual 
loan pmt 
Monitor*& 
annual 
costs 
Total 
annual 
costs/farm 
Total 
Regional 
cost 
Regional 
cost 
(c/kg MS) 
Northland 1118 255 67366 75315188 35000 0 $4,089 2830 $6,919 $7,735,480 10.3  
Waikato 5038 288 88230 444502740 35000 0 $4,089 2840 $6,929 $34,908,474 7.9  
Bay of Plenty 647 292 88300 57130100 35000 427.5 $4,139 2860 $6,999 $4,528,339 7.9  
Taranaki 2006 246 74943 150335658 20500 350 $2,436 1905 $4,341 $8,707,837 5.8  
Lower Nth 
Island 1201 324 101523 121929123 35000 500 $4,147 2885 $7,032 $8,445,971 6.9  
West Coast 657 318 95311 62619327 35000 200 $4,112 2790 $6,902 $4,534,877 7.2  
Canterbury 654 615 221622 144940788 86000 1000 $10,164 12390 $22,554 $14,750,427 10.2  
Southland 950 477 164118 155912100 86000 400 $10,094 12470 $22,564 $21,435,869 13.7  
National total    1212685024      $105,047,275 8.66 
*monitoring costs are for compliant operations, since Regional Councils say that at least 85% of dairy farms comply with the regulations 
Notes: interest rate is 0.08; term of loan is 15 years 
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Table 4.16:  Calculating compliance costs for land-based discharge of dairyshed effluent (including on-farm benefits) 
Region No. herds 
Av. herd 
size 
Av. 
Milk 
Solid/hd 
(kg) 
Regional 
output 
Capital 
cost 
Consent 
cost 
Annual 
loan pmt 
Monitor*
& annual 
costs 
Annual 
benefit/ 
farm 
Total 
annual 
costs/farm 
Total 
Regional 
cost  
Regional 
cost (c/kg 
MS) 
Northland 1118 255 67366 75315188 35000 0 $4,089 2830 3600 $3,319 $3,710,680 4.9 
Waikato 5038 288 88230 444502740 35000 0 $4,089 2840 3600 $3,329 $16,771,674 3.8 
Bay of 
Plenty 647 292 88300 57130100 35000 427.5 $4,139 2860 3600 $3,399 $2,199,139 3.8 
Taranaki 2006 246 74943 150335658 20500 350 $2,436 1905 2050 $2,291 $4,595,537 3.1 
Lower Nth 
Island 1201 324 101523 121929123 35000 500 $4,147 2885 3600 $3,432 $4,122,371 3.4 
West Coast 657 318 95311 62619327 35000 200 $4,112 2790 3600 $3,302 $2,169,677 3.5 
Canterbury 654 615 221622 144940788 86000 1000 $10,164 12390 6300 $16,254 $10,630,227 7.3 
Southland 950 477 164118 155912100 86000 400 $10,094 12470 6300 $16,264 $15,450,869 9.9 
National 
total    1212685024       $59,650,175 4.92 
*  monitoring costs are for compliant operations, since Regional Councils say that at least 85% of dairy farms comply with the regulations 
Notes: interest rate is 0.08; term of loan is 15 years 
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From Table 4.17 it can be seen that the inclusion of reduced fertiliser expenditure and 
farm productivity makes a measurable difference to the regulatory compliance costs 
expressed per kilogram of Milk Solids produced.  The overall estimate of farm 
compliance with water quality regulations is estimated at between 4.92 and 9.25 
cents/kg Milk Solids. 
Table 4.17: Net national cost (% total farm cost) of Regulatory compliance*   
 Travelling 
Irrigator 
 Pond Storage If we assume 60% 
of farms in NZ will 
use storage and 
40% travel irrg. 
Then the weighted 
cost increases are 
Fertiliser ben 
included 
0.78% (0.92%) 0.78% is the 
average of 0.51 
and 1.05%  
3.05% (3.11%) 2.14%(2.23%) 
Fertiliser ben 
excluded 
1.61% (1.75%)  Same average 4.14% (4.19%) 3.12%(3.2%) 
*Numbers in brackers are the costs increase when we use a 10% discount rate).  
So total increase in annual cost due to the remainder of the farmers having to comply 
lies beween 2.14 – 3.2% depending on the assumptions. The percentage of farms that 
still had to comply for the period 2005/2006 is assessed to be 15%. For the industry 
as a whole the percentage costs increase is 0.5%, given that 85% of farms are already 
compliant.  
4.5.2 Cost of Compliance with Environmental Regulations: the U.S. 
case study 
This analysis has estimated the costs of compliance with regulations concerning water 
quality for dairy farms typical of Wisconsin and California.  These two states were 
chosen not only because they are the top two dairy states, but also because they 
represent two distinct milk production systems.  Wisconsin dairy farming is typical of 
the traditional, smaller dairy farm, with an average herd size of 92 cows per farm in 
2006.  California dairy farming is typical of the modern, expanded confinement 
feeding systems found in increasing numbers in various locations throughout the 
western states, with an average herd size of 980 cows per farm.  Obviously, the 
relative burden of complying with environmental regulations is expected to be 
markedly different between these two types of farms. 
 
The Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act  
As described above, the primary manifestation of environmental regulations for 
livestock agriculture in the U.S. is the requirement to develop and follow a 
Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan (CNMP) in order to comply with the 
Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Water Act regulatory requirements.  These 
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mandatory regulations apply in Wisconsin and California.  With regard to the Clean 
Air Act regulations, Wisconsin does not have any non-attainment areas for PM10 or 
PM2.5, hence is not required to develop an EPA mitigation plan. Therefore farmers in 
this area do not have to apply additional measures to comply with the Clean Air Act.  
As described below, however, California does have non-attainment areas in dairy 
producing regions, so the regulations do apply. 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has estimated the costs for 
developing and implementing a successful CNMP.  Documentation of these costs can 
be found in USDA's "Costs Associated with Development and Implementation of 
Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plans. Part 1 - Nutrient Management, Land 
Treatment, Manure and Wastewater Handling and Storage, and Recordkeeping".  
Table 4.18, presented below, provides the typical costs of the various components 
required in a CNMP by animal sector and farm size in the United States. These costs 
are the basis for calculating the CNMP costs of the dairy, hog and beef operations 
described in this document. The dairy costs presented in Table 4.18 are an average 
cost of all dairy farms in the U.S. and are presented per-1,000 lb animal unit (AU).  
Because many of the costs associated with compliance require capital investments in 
farm infrastructure (e.g. manure storage facilities), herd size and additional factors 
will impact individual farm costs. In order to account for these variations, more 
specific actual cost information was obtained for the Wisconsin example. 
Unfortunately, similar state-level cost information, based on actual data, was not 
available for California.  Therefore, the USDA national compliance costs were 
modified to reflect the much larger dairy farms found in that state.  The costs per AU 
for larger farms were used to construct farm-level costs for the average California 
herd size of 980 cows.  These numbers were adjusted from a per-animal unit basis to 
a per-cow basis (using 1.4 animal units per dairy cow), to be consistent with the ERS 
ARMS financial data. Then, a CNMP cost per-hundred weight of milk was estimated 
from the CNMP cost per-cow estimate.  The procedure used to estimate typical 
California dairy CNMP costs are discussed in more detail below. 
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Table 4.18: Costs per farm for Comprehensive Nutrient Management Planning (CNMP) requirement 
  Total CNMP implementation costs per farm 
Dominant 
Livestock 
Type 
Number 
of farms 
Animal 
units 
per 
farm** 
Record-
keeping 
costs 
per farm 
Nutrient 
management 
costs per 
farm 
Off-farm 
transport 
costs per 
farm 
Land 
treatment 
costs per 
farm 
Manure 
costs 
per 
farm Average Low*** High*** 
Per 
animal 
unit 
      ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) ($/yr) 
Fattened 
cattle 10,159 1,298 142 1,655 4,646 2,613 9,112 18,167 1,026 308,005 14 
Dairy 79,318 195 160 2,101 1,619 2,660 3,249 9,788 2,362 97,013 50 
Swine 32,955 276 224 1,601 2,450 3,615 4,139 12,029 2,060 75,159 44 
Broilers 16,251 183 90 248 1,667 1,220 2,351 5,576 1,128 36,187 30 
Farm Size 
                      
Large 19,746 1,419 168 1,526 9,679 3,925 15,167 30,465 2,199 252,014 21 
Medium 39,437 252 150 1,085 2,281 2,897 3,397 9,809 1,210 64,426 39 
Small 198,018 80 106 987 345 1,267 1,070 3,773 161 25,298 47 
  
                      
All Farms 257,201 210 117 1,043 1,358 1,721 2,509 6,748 195 67,429 32 
Source: "Costs Associated With Development and Implementation of Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plans. Part 1 - Nutrient Management, Land Treatment, 
Manure and Wastewater Handling and Storage, and Recordkeeping." USDA NRCS. June 2003. Table 38. pg. 105 
** Represents all animal units on the farm, but does not include animal units for specialty livestock types, which were not estimated. 
*** The low estimate corresponds to the one-percentile value for the farms in each group, and the high estimate corresponds to the 99th-percentile value. 
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Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin office of the USDA provided data for 3 years (2003, 2005 & 2006) of 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) applications for Wisconsin dairies 
needing to upgrade their facilities in order to comply with CNMP regulations. These 
data include the type of practices needed, total cost to implement those practices, and 
the number of animal units to be treated, as well as other variables.  On average, the 
farms applying for EQIP funds in Wisconsin were larger than the average Wisconsin 
dairy farm.  Because larger farms have the ability to spread investment costs over a 
larger number of AUs, the average costs of compliance per AU from this sample of 
dairies would most likely underestimate the true cost of an average dairy in 
Wisconsin.  As described below, costs of compliance for the average Wisconsin dairy 
farm were calculated from these data by using a subset of the EQIP diary farm data.  
This subset was used to create estimates of compliance costs in order to determine the 
costs of a farm that is more representative of a typical size dairy farm in Wisconsin. 
A total of 263 dairy farms applied for EQIP assistance in the 3 years of data obtained.  
The distribution of herd sizes across these farms was heavily skewed toward larger 
herd sizes.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the average (mean) number of 
animal units for the 263 Wisconsin farms applying for EQIP assistance was 402, 
while the median number was 246.  The average Wisconsin dairy farm has 92 dairy 
cows or 129 animal units.  Therefore, to develop a CNMP cost estimate that is 
representative of Wisconsin dairy farms, we used a subset of the data from the 263 
farms that applied for EQIP funding to comply with the Clean Water Act regulations.  
Of the 263 farms, 111 had 200 or less animal units.  Of these 111 farms, the average 
(mean) number of animal units was 122, which is close to the Wisconsin average of 
129. 
The total costs for CNMP implementation for the smaller farms over the 3 year period 
is US$10,685,406, which would provide compliance for a total of 13,702 animal 
units. Therefore, the average total cost can be calculated to be  $780 per animal unit 
($10,685,406 total cost/13,702 animal units) or $1,092 per dairy cow (1 dairy cow = 
1.4 animal units).  
The USDA CNMP analysis assumes that a typical structural life of a full CNMP is 10 
years and an 8% interest rate was used in the annual cost calculations.  Therefore, to 
remain consistent, the same assumptions were used in this analysis.  Table 4.18 shows 
the average annual cost estimate per animal unit (10 year, 8% interest) for all U.S. 
dairy farms is $50 (or $70 per dairy cow). The three years of EQIP data shows an 
average CNMP costs for all Wisconsin dairies that applied for EQIP assistance $48 
per animal unit.  However, the impact of compliance costs on smaller farms is 
illustrated by comparing the average costs of the 111 smaller farms (200 or less AUs) 
with the average costs of the larger (>200 AUs) dairy farms requesting EQIP funding 
in Wisconsin. The average annual cost (10 year, 8% interest) for smaller farms is 
$163 per animal unit, while larger farms is significantly less at $43 per animal unit.   
The difference between these two estimates (smaller EQIP farm applications vs larger 
EQIP farm applications) highlights the impact that farm size can have on total farm 
CNMP costs.  
These data lead to the conclusion that compliance with CNMP requirements costs the 
typical Wisconsin dairy farm $0.83 per cwt of milk produced.  As shown in Table 
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4.13, this translates into an increase of 4.19% in total production costs and 7.46% of 
direct costs. 
 
California 
Since no actual California-specific CNMP cost data are available for this analysis, the 
national USDA estimates were used.  As illustrated in the Wisconsin EQIP data, the 
CNMP-related costs per animal unit significantly decrease as farm size increases. 
Table 4.18 does provide average costs per animal unit for large, medium and small 
farms for all livestock types, as well as average per animal unit costs for all dairies.  
Data from USDA indicate that the average U.S. dairy herd is 155 cows.  Therefore, a 
typical California dairy with 980 cows would be considered a large dairy on a 
national scale.    
Table 4.18 illustrates that dairies have the greatest per animal unit CNMP 
implementation costs of all livestock farms. Additionally, Table 4.18 illustrates that 
for all U.S. livestock farms, the average costs per animal unit decrease as farm size 
increases. The estimated CNMP implementation for all U.S. livestock farms, by farm 
size would, therefore, underestimate the total costs for dairy farms.  To account for 
the higher CNMP costs associated with dairies, an adjustment factor was calculated.  
To estimate the decreasing costs on large dairy farms the adjustment factor was 
obtained by dividing the $21/AU average annual costs for all U.S. large livestock 
farms by the $39 average annual costs for all U.S. medium livestock farms in Table 
4.18. The resulting adjustment factor of .538 was then applied to the $50/AU cost for 
a typical US dairy to estimate the per-animal unit costs of $26.90/AU (or $37.69 
/dairy cow) for a typical California dairy to comply with CNMP regulations.  
Based on the average milk production per cow on California farms (19,973 lbs.), the 
$37.69 CNMP compliance costs result in a cost per cwt of milk produced of $0.19 
(Table 4.13).  This translates into an increase of 2.00% of total production costs and 
3.33% of direct costs.  Due to the much larger scale of the California dairy farms, the 
burden of the CNMP requirements less than 25% of that on average Wisconsin farm. 
California dairies must also comply with various air quality regulations, which are 
determined by Air Quality Districts. California's San Joaquin Valley is a high dairy 
production region. This area is a designated air quality non-attainment region for PM 
2.5,10, and ozone. Therefore, all farms within these areas must submit plans to their 
local Air Quality District. Currently, plans must be developed for PM10, 
documenting dust control practices, and Ozone plans documenting a 20% reduction in 
nitrogen oxide and volatile organic compounds. By June 2008, these farms will also 
be required to have completed a PM 2.5 plan. 
Agriculture within the San Joaquin valley has recently been determined to be 
compliant with EPA's PM10 standards. To be compliant with these standards every 
farm must have developed and met a dust reduction (conservation management) plan, 
which addresses all on-field activities (pre and post harvest) and "other" activities 
which include dust control on roads, wind erosion control, equipment yards and 
staging areas, and diesel engine replacement or conversion.  The local Air Districts do 
random spot-checks to assure that every farm is in compliance with its dust reduction 
plan.  
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Table 4.19: Wisconsin Dairy Farms Requesting EQIP Funds For CNMP Implementation (3 years) 
Farm Size 
No 
Farms No. AUS Total Cost 
Cost Share 
Requested 
% C/S 
Requested 
Avg. Total 
Cost/AU1 
Average Annual Total 
Cost/AU2 
200 or less AUs 111 13,702 $10,685,406 $6,554,998 61%   $780  $163 
>200 AUs 151 105,769 $36,975,779 $13,422,866 36% $451 $43 
Total EQIP 
Applications 262 119471 $47,661,184 $19,977,864 42% $402 $48 
1 If funded for cost share, producer cost would be the difference between Total Cost and Cost Share Requested. Not all applications were funded, therefore 
for unfunded applications the producer may either reapply for c/s funds in later years, or pay total CNMP costs without assistance. 
2  Based on total cost, 10 years, 8% interest.      
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EPA mandates that there must be separate plans for each principal pollutant not 
meeting standards within an area. That includes ozone in the San Joaquin Valley.  
Therefore, farms within this area must also complete an 8-hour Ozone plan by June of 
2007 and are required to comply with Tier 3 EPA/ARB off-road engine standards by 
the year 2015. All farms with calculated NOx and VOC emissions from the 
agricultural operation that is equal to or greater than 12.5 tons/year (about 350 or 
more contiguous acres or more than 1,900 milk cows) are required to have an air 
permit203. The San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District provides a calculator 
on its website for each producer to self-determine whether they would need to comply 
with these regulations. Also known as Rule 4550,  it requires owners/operators of 
dairy and feedlot facilities with population equal to or more than 500 mature dairy 
cows (whether milked or dry)  to provide a Conservation Management Practices 
(CMP)  Plan to control dust. Additionally, operators who also grow field crops on 
land greater than 100 acres contiguous or adjacent farmland are required to submit 
CMP applications for their field crops. 
 
The CMP plan is designed to document reductions in PM10 emissions. In order to 
comply, operators must: 
 
• Select one CMP for implementation from each of the specified categories,  
• Implement the selected CMPs starting July 1, 2004 and keep a record of the 
implementation of CMPs to be available upon request by the District 
representative, 
• Complete the applications and submit them to the District by December 31, 2004 for 
approval. The submitted applications constitute a CMP Plan once approved by 
the District, and 
• Keep a copy of each submitted applications and each CMP Plan to be available 
upon request by the District representative.  
 
Dust control, especially on farm and field roads, can be a large expense item for a 
typical San Joaquin Valley dairy producer to comply with EPA's Clean Air Act PM10 
regulations. Treatment measures range from daily spraying with water, to spraying a 
sealant every other year. Both treatments can be expensive, running about $2/foot, or 
$10,000 per treated mile of road204. 
Draft Rule 4570 would provide Confined Animal Feeding operators with the 
flexibility to comply with the Volatile Organic Compound control requirements by 
choosing any mitigation measures from a list of multiple measures listed by the air 
district or by implementing district-approved alternative mitigation measures that 
would achieve equivalent emissions reductions as those listed in the rule. The rule 
impacts dairies within the San Joachuin Valley with 1,000 or more milk cows (not 
including dry cows). This rule is believed to only impact in a limited number of 
                                                 
203
 San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District Requirements for Agricultural Operations. 
http://www.valleyair.org/General_Info/AGLoader.htm   
204
 Phone conversation with John Beyer, NRCS California State Air Quality Specialist. 8/27/2007. 
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dairies (233 dairies out of a total of 1,500 in the region), requiring them to implement 
additional mitigation measures not already used on the facility205.  
For those dairies that are required to comply with rule 4570, the costs of compliance 
are estimated to be $18/cow. Since our example dairy in below the threshold, no 
additional compliance costs are assigned for this rule206. 
Based on the cost specification (see Table 4.20), this translates into an increase of 
4.19% in total production costs and 7.46% of direct costs (1.84% and 3.33% for 
California). Given the low percentage of farms which are subject to CAFO’s and that 
about 44% of farms are already compliant, the percentage costs increase at the 
national level averages to 0.02%. 
                                                 
205
 Appendix D: Socioeconomic Analysis for Rule 4570 June 15, 2006, Pg. 8. 
http://www.valleyair.org/workshops/postings/2006/06-15-06-4/r4570_appd_phrev%20.pdf 
206
 APPENDIX C: COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED RULE 4570 
(CONFINED ANIMAL FACILITIES) June 15, 2006, pgs C-3:C-5. 
http://www.valleyair.org/workshops/postings/2006/06-15-06-4/r4570_appc_phrev.pdf 
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Table 4.20: Milk production costs and returns per 45.4 kg sold, 2005 1/ 
Item 
  
Wisconsin California 
All 
U.S. 
farms 
Direct (Operating) costs:                       
      Purchased feed 3.60 6.61 5.03 
      Homegrown harvested feed 4.32 1.51 3.02 
      Grazed feed 0.10 0.05 0.09 
         Total, feed costs 8.02 8.17 8.14 
  Other--                       
     Veterinary and medicine 0.94 0.54 0.78 
     Bedding and litter 0.23 0.04 0.22 
     Marketing 0.20 0.28 0.26 
     Custom services 0.37 0.31 0.41 
     Fuel, lube, and electricity 0.56 0.41 0.55 
     Repairs 0.62 0.33 0.56 
     Other operating costs 3/ 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     Interest on operating capital 0.18 0.17 0.18 
         Total, Direct Cost 11.12 10.25 11.10 
Allocated Overhead Costs:                       
   Hired labor 1.40 1.41 1.47 
   Opportunity cost of unpaid labor 3.30 0.39 2.30 
   Capital recovery of machinery and equipment 4/ 2.97 1.74 2.83 
   Opportunity cost of land (rental rate) 0.03 0.00 0.03 
   Taxes and insurance 0.29 0.14 0.21 
   General farm overhead 0.69 0.23 0.52 
         Total, allocated overhead 8.68 3.91 7.36 
Total costs listed 19.80 14.16 18.46 
   Total costs (per 45.4 kg milk) due to CNMP requirement 5/ 0.83 0.19 0.37 
   Percentage of Direct Costs 7.47% 1.84% 3.33% 
   Percentage of Total Costs 4.20% 1.33% 2.00% 
1/ Developed from the 2005 Agricultural Resource Management Survey of dairy operations. 2/ Income 
from renting or leasing dairy stock to other operations; renting space to other dairy operations; co-op 
patronage dividends associated with the dairy; assessment rebates, refunds, and other dairy-related 
resources; and the fertilizer value of manure production. 3/ Costs for third party organic certification. 
4/ Machinery and  equipment, and housing, manure handling, and feed storage structures, and dairy 
breeding herd. 5/ Per cow CNMP costs estimated by pro-rating average dairy CNMP/cow costs by 
large farm CNMP/AU costs ($70 * .538 = 37.68) - see Table 4.18. 
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4.6 Costs of Identification and Registration 
For the Council Directives related to the identification of animals the ordinary costs 
are constructed as follows. First the total number of animals per farm is determined. It 
is assumed that per dairy cow about 0.8 number of other animals (heifers/bulls) is 
present at the farm. Moreover it is assumed that 95% of the dairy cows give birth to a 
calve, which has to be registered. In addition it is assumed that there is an eartag loss 
rate of 15%, which requires a proper and timely eartag replacement. The costs consist 
of the eartag costs and the labor costs (time a farmer has to spend on registration). 
Based on the survey in the first phase of the project the labour costs per animal that 
has to be registered are estimated. When relevant also fixed costs per farm are 
included (see €9/farm for France).  
 
The total costs per farm are calculated as the sum of the eartag costs, labour costs207 
and fixed costs. This total cost is related to the total farm costs (as obtained from the 
FADN data). It is taken into account that a certain amount of these costs (depending 
on the prevailing degree of compliance) is already included in the reported total costs. 
A correction is made for this, taking into account the estimated degree of compliance. 
The estimates for the degree of compliance were based on a previous assessment as 
done in the first phase of this CC project. The additional costs that have to be made in 
order to achieve full compliance with the regulation is equal to 1 minus the rate of 
compliance times the total cost of compliance per farm. This amount is related to the 
farms (corrected) total costs and expressed in terms of a percentage cost increase. 
 
 The obtained results for six selected member states are presented in Table 4.21, 
which also gives an estimate for the EU-15 average dairy farm. As the able shows for 
the EU the percentage costs increase is estimated to be 0.04%. There is some 
variation, in particular due to the estimated labour time and the estimated varying 
labour costs per hour. Also the variation in the estimated degree of (non-)compliance 
affects the height of the additional costs.  
In all cases the estimated cost are below 0.2%. Since the percentage cost increases 
related to the I&R directive are relatively marginal, it seems not useful to distinguish 
several scenario’s characterized by different degree’s of compliance (increase).  In the 
simulation therefore only the impact of achieving full compliance is estimated.  
If less that full compliance is realized the cost increase numbers as provided in Table 
4.21, have to be downwardly adjusted. 
                                                 
207
 For the UK no specific labour costs were distinguished. They are included in the costs per animal. 
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Table 4.21: Costs of I&R for the dairy sector: estimates for selected member states 
Unit France Germany Italy 
Nether-
lands Spain  
United 
Kingdom EU-15 
Number of specialized dairy farms (all included) (*1000) 63.68 73.55 40.82 21.70 29.36 21.60 356.79 
Average farm size specialized dairy farms (all farms) 67.08 52.72 30.11 45.10 18.62 88.53 48.44 
Ave # of animals/farm 76.46 77.73 81.82 114.19 41.66 158.58 76.35 
Estimated # calves born 40.35 41.02 43.18 60.27 21.99 83.70 40.30 
Estimated # eartag loss (15% loss rate) 11.47 11.66 12.27 17.13 6.25 23.79 11.45 
Labour costs per animal (€*h*wage/h) 1.75 1.75 12.00 1.75 12.00  2.50 
I&R costs per animal  (costs tags) 1.80 2.92 3.00 2.75 2.50 4.20 2.00 
Fixed per farm costs  (€, when relevant) 9.00       
Total I&R costs per farm 192.97 246.03 831.84 348.28 409.43 451.42 232.87 
        
Total costs (per farm) as in FADN database 2003 121197.1 112586.4 184095.6 177804.9 52283.59 219474.3 131911.1 
(Specialised costs (per farm) as in FADN database 2003 41656 46144 128038 65691 39093 109607 70700 
Estimated prevailing degree of compliance 0.9 0.65 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 
 'Corrected' costs per farm (excluding  impl. Nitrate costs) 121023 112426 183513 177491 51915 219158 131725 
% additional costs I&R/ 'corrected' total farm costs 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04 
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4.7 Costs of hormone use 
Alongside the US bST (or rbST) is at least used by 16 other dairy producing countries (Jarvis, 
2002) The EU, Canada and Japan rejected legal bST use, and also within the US the technique 
was (and still is) controversial, at least within certain groups and regions208. 
Jarvis (2002) who analyzed the potential effects of bST on world dairy markets, estimates that 
the total US milk supply increased by 3 percent due to the (pure) bST application209. 
For the US economies of scale effects were found. It is more attractive to apply bST on the 
larger farms. In the EU the farm structure differs from that in the US (much higher frequency 
of relatively small farms). This implies that when bST use would be permitted in the EU the 
application rates are likely to be different (lower) from those in the US (c.p. bST costs). 
The impact of bST application on yields seems to be rather similar for the developed Western 
dairy producing countries (like EU, Canada, Japan, etc.). The impact of bST on dairy 
production in developing countries, usually characterized by a much less favorable production 
environment, are likely to be rather marginal. This will be in particular so if other production 
yield limiting factors are not at the same time remedied.  
When accounting for costs of hormone use at the sector level, one option is to take the bST 
issue into account by only changing the allowance in the US (making their situation more 
restrictive, rather than soften EU standards. Following this procedure might be attractive from 
an EU policy perspective, and assuming others should do like us. It also gives meaningful 
insight into trade aspects. Of course it does lead us away form the opportunity cost 
interpretation of (specific) CC constraints, which cannot properly be derived in that way. 
For the GTAP simulation we are interested to translate the impact in terms of a percentage 
costs reduction (or its equivalent). In an ex-ante analysis Perrin (1991) estimated per unit cost 
savings varying from 0.5 to 4.4 percent, although milk yields were increasing by 
approximately 15% (note the simultaneous cost increase effect)210. Jarvis (2002, 109) using a 
slightly different approach provides a maximum per unit cost decline of 5%. This percentage 
of costs reduction (per unit average) is taken in follow up analysis.  
For the GTAP simulation, a point for discussion is whether the estimate of 5% cost reduction 
applies to a combination of production expansion (a movement along the cost curve) and the 
innovation-shift (a shift of the supply curve), as it is assumed.  For the GTAP percentage cost 
increase it seems important to isolate the pure costs reduction percentage rather than the cost 
change associated with the combined effect. The latter is likely to lead to an underestimation. 
 
                                                 
208
 The EU’s Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products did not fear direct health effects but pointed to a 
potential indirect health effect by affecting the human growth hormone. Health Canada pointed to an 
impact on animal welfare (udder infections, shortened productive life, burn-out). The FDA scientifically 
examined these claims and refuted their validity. See Jarvis (2002, 103) for further details. 
209
 For comparative reasons note that the autonomous (genetic) milk yield increase is about 2% per annum. 
Where bST application creates a one-shot increase, genetic progress creates a continuous milk yield 
increase. 
210
 When implementing a bST scenario in GTAP we have to check whether the costs reduction percentage is 
adequate in this case. We primarily in our analysis focus on a supply response effect which is much 
more significant than the cost reduction equivalent. (Needs maybe further discussion). 
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4.8 Farm competitiveness analysis: Nitrate Directive case 
4.8.1 Farm level competitiveness: typical dairy farm data of EU an non-EU 
farms 
In the project the main emphasis is on external competitiveness. In that the GTAP trade-
impact analysis plays a key-role. The farm level competitiveness analysis will also be mainly 
focused on external competitiveness (comparing of farm level/impact results of the EU with 
key trading partners). Moreover, the farm level competitiveness analysis might be used to 
give some in-depth insights with respect to specific issues. 
The farm level competitiveness analysis summarised below gives some in-depth insights with 
respect to Nitrate Directive (Table 4.22). Two typical farms from the countries under 
investigation were selected from the IFCN publication (Hemme, 2002) to represent different 
size (small and large) and structure. The percentage rates of cost increase presented in Table 
4.7 are applied.  
The costs and revenue data have been harmonized prior to analysis by the IFCN (measured in 
US $). The lowest line of Table 4.22 shows the impact of (full) compliance with the Nitrate 
Directive (or similar regulations outside the EU) on farm profitability and gross margin, both 
are recalculated in EU €. As the table shows, small changes in costs can significantly affect 
gross margin and (even more so) profitability. The results for Italy are not presented in Table 
4.22 since the data for Italian specialized farms are not in the IFCN network before 2005. As 
follows from the study of De Roest et al., 2007 (see also section 4.8.2) performed in two 
Nothern regions Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, milk production cost will due to the effects 
of the Nitrate Directive, increase by 8.4% in farms with 100 cows and by 6.7% in the larger 
ones (with 350 cows). Costs om farms in Emilia-Romagna increase less than in Lombardy 
(per 100 kg from € 35.74 to € 38.42 per 100 kg in Lombardy) since the number of animals in 
the area is significantly lower that makes it possible to spreading excess manure for 
agronomic purpose on additional sites which are closer than in Lombardy. In the short run, 
application of the Nitrates Directive regulations to farms in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna 
may entail, in areas with a high animal concentration, the closure of less efficient or smaller 
farms. This will allow other farmers to use nearby lands suitable for manure and sludge 
spreading with reduced cost compared to use of farther lands. The fact that these farms 
produce less slurry and more manure will certainly help dairy farmers to dispose of waste 
more easily than pig farmers. 
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Table 4.22: Farm structure and level of competitiveness in selected countries in 2001  
Codes as in Hemme, 2002) NZ-229 NZ-835 US-70WI US-2100ID DE-68 DE-650 FR-30 FR-70 NL-51 NL-90 UK-100h 
Number of dairy cows, LU 229 835 70 2100 68 650 30 70 51 90 100 
Share grassland, % 100 100 54 62 40 32 80 26 95 81 100 
Milk production per cow, kg FCM 4200 4200 9900 9500 8049 8250 5863 7527 8326 8645 7531 
Costs per 100 kg FCM, US $ 
           
costs for means of production 7.60 9.54 22.91 18.48 22.44 20.36 17.99 20.71 19.20 18.12 18.78 
labour costs 2.82 2.70 12.60 3.30 10.20 8.40 15.00 9.30 13.50 9.60 8.70 
land costs 1.74 1.44 1.80 0.18 1.80 2.00 3.00 1.44 3.12 2.52 2.88 
capital costs 1.75 1.54 1.96 2.59 2.38 1.96 2.06 2.10 1.82 1.26 1.96 
total costs  13.91 15.22 39.27 24.55 36.82 32.73 38.05 33.55 37.64 31.50 32.32 
    variable costs 9.00 12.68 24.55 22.91 20.45 28.64 17.18 18.82 13.09 11.45 18.41 
    fixed costs 4.91 2.54 14.73 1.64 16.36 4.09 20.86 14.73 24.55 20.05 13.91 
Revenue per 100 kg FCM, US $ 
           
milk price 16.82 16.82 35.91 32.27 29.09 29.09 28.18 29.09 28.18 28.64 26.59 
other returns 2.27 1.64 3.68 3.20 2.69 2.67 3.60 2.43 3.78 3.64 1.42 
direct payments 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.16 1.31 1.96 1.31 2.21 0.49 0.82 2.54 
total revenue 19.09 18.45 40.41 35.64 33.09 33.73 33.09 33.73 32.45 33.09 30.55 
Results per 100 kg FCM in € 
           
gross margin (revenue – var.costs) 9.01 5.15 14.16 11.36 11.28 4.55 14.20 13.31 17.29 19.32 10.84 
profitability (gross margin – fix. costs) 4.63 2.89 1.01 9.90 -3.33 0.89 -4.42 0.16 -4.63 1.42 -1.58 
Additional costs of compliance to Nitrate Directive (see Table 4.7 for prevailing degree of compliance and further details)  
   
% Additional costs associated with full 
compliance to Nitrate Directive  3.2 3.2 4.20 2.00 0.75 0.75 3.13 3.13 0.66 0.66 0.19 
profitability at full compliance, €/100kg 4.23 2.45 -0.46 9.46 -3.58 0.67 -5.49 -0.78 -4.85 1.23 -1.64 
% in profitability -8.6 -15.1 -144.7 -4.4 -7.4 -24.6 -24.1 -578.2 -4.8 -13.1 -3.5 
gross margin, €/100kg 8.75 4.79 13.24 10.96 11.15 4.35 13.73 12.79 17.21 19.25 10.81 
% in gross margin -2.85 -7.03 -6.50 -3.60 -1.21 -4.22 -3.38 -3.95 -0.45 -0.35 -0.29 
Note: FCM is milk adjusted for fat content.  Source: based on data from Hemme, 2002) and Table 4.7.   
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4.8.2 Farm level competitiveness: Nitrate Directive case for 2 Nothern 
regions in Italy 
The survey area is composed of the plain area of the nothern provinces of Brescia, Mantova, 
Cremona Parma and Reggio Emilia, which rank among the first ten provinces in Italy in terms 
of animal density. Part of the study area is in Lombardy and the other in Emilia-Romagna. 
Costs of adjustement to Nitrate Directive are calculated for farms of different size: 100 cows 
and 350 cows at different level of the maximum doze of nitrogen and various storage 
scenarios. The amounts of nitrogen produced, net of volatilisation losses, have been calculated 
at municipality level by applying the specific conversion parameters to the number of cattle, 
pigs and poultry listed in the 2006 census of the veterinarian authorities, which contains a 
yearly municipal animal inventory.  First, a baseline situation is presented followed by two 
scenarios for each farm. In the baseline situation a farm is allowed to spread 340 kg of 
nitrogen per hectare. Scenario 1 in both cases refers to allowing to spread only 170 kg of 
nitrogen per hectare. In addition to the maximum dose of nitrogen (170 kg/ha/year) the April 
2006 decree introduced new values for the allowed nitrogen per cow, which was raised from 
43 kg to 83 kg per cow. This means that many intensive farmers now must find a way to 
dispose of the sludge outside of their farm. Thus, adaptation to regulation requirements is 
done through increasing available land for spreading.  Next, different manure and sludge 
management techniques are assumed in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. Manure treatment assumes 
use of manure for agronomic purposes after 90 days storage and sludge treatment assumes use 
of manure for  agronomic purposes after 120 days storage and separation of solid fraction 
with sieve and further aeration of liquid fraction prior to storage.  Scenario 1 allows for 
manure management and Scenario 2 allows for sludge management.  
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Table 4.23: Manure management situation on a farm with 100 cows 
 
 Baseline: spreading kg 
340/hectare of nitrogen in ordinary 
zone 
Scenario 1: spreading only of 170 
kg of nitrogen per hectare in 
vulnerable zone after 90 days 
storage for manure and 120 days 
for sludge 
 
Scenario 2: same as Scenario 1 
with adapting to regulation 
requirements by reducing nitrogen 
in sludge by 20% and increasing 
available land for spreading 
Size 100 dairy cows and 80 replacement cows 
Shed With stalls, deployed back-to-back, straw in resting zone 
Milk production  Kg 850,000 
Sludge and manure production Manure m3 1,596 – nitrogen kg 3,024 
 Sludge cub.m. 1,680 – nitrogen kg 4,872 
Manure treatment Use for agronomic purposes after 90 days storage 
Sludge treatment Use for agronomic purposes 
 after 90 days storage 
Use for agronomic purposes  
after 120 days storage 
Use for agronomic purposes  
after 120 days storage and 
separation of solid fraction with 
separator and further aeration of 
liquid fraction. Reduction of 
nitrogen by 20% 
Available land 23 hectares, enough to use kg 340 
N / ha 
23 hectares 23 hectares 
Land needed to comply requirement  66 hectares 58 hectares 
 
Land that must be acquired 
  
43 hectares in vulnerable zone 
 
35 hectares in vulnerable zone 
  21 hectares in ordinary zone 17.5 hectares in ordinary zone 
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Table 4.24: Sludge processing (baseline) and sludge management (Scenario 1 and 2) costs on a farm with 100 cows 
 Technical data Economic data, € 
 units Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
 
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Manure yard Sq. m. 131 131 137 8,000 8,000 8,000 
Storage tank Cub. m. 414 552 530 15,000 20,000 20,000 
Manure spreading truck Cub. m. 6 6 6 8,000 8,000 8,000 
Tanker truck Cub. m. 10 10 10 17,000 17,000 17,000 
Separator       20,000 
manure storage shelf Sq. m.   22   3,000 
Aeration tank Cub. m.   76   5,000 
Aerator       2,000 
INVESTMENTS TOTAL     51,000 53,000 83,000 
Management costs        
Manure and sludge storage (in yard and tank 
respectively) 
    513 513 503 
Manure transportation and spreading     696   
Sludge transportation and spreading   1,001  610 376  
Sludge transportation and spreading 30 km away   679   6,113  
Manure transportation and spreading 30 km away   1,596   11,970  
Solid fraction separation       1,344 
Liquid fraction separation in farm Cub. m.   1,492   537 
Liquid fraction transportation and spreading 30 km 
away 
Cub. m.   121   1,649 
Solid fraction transportation and spreading 30 km 
away 
Cub. m.   1665   11,642 
Depreciations     4,160 4,415 6,789 
Interests on costs and investments     1,743 2,170 3,171 
Purchase of right to spread on new land      2,985 2,445 
Production loss due to decreased amount of 
nitrogen spread 
     2,087 2,087 
TOTAL COSTS     7,722 30,629 30,167 
COST PER kg OF MILK PRODUCED     0.009 0.036 0.035 
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Table 4.25: Sludge management situation on a farm with 350 cows 
 
   
 Baseline: spreading kg 
340/hectare of nitrogen in 
ordinary zone 
Scenario 1: spreading only of 170 kg of nitrogen 
per hectare in vulnerable zone after 90 days 
storage for manure and 120 days for sludge 
 
Scenario 2: same as Scenario 1 with adapting to 
regulation requirements by reducing nitrogen in sludge 
by 20% and increasing available land for spreading 
Size 350 dairy cows and 280 replacement cows 
Shed With stalls, deployed back-to-back, no straw 
Milk production  Kg 2,975,000 
Sludge and 
manure production 
Manure cub. m. 0 – nitrogen kg 0 
 Sludge cub. m. 9,702 – nitrogen kg 27,636 
Sludge treatment Use for agronomic 
purposes after 90 days 
storage 
Use for agronomic purposes  
after 120 days storage 
Use for agronomic purposes  
after 120 days storage and separation of solid fraction 
with separator and further aeration of liquid fraction. 
Reduction of nitrogen by 20% 
Available land 81 hectares, enough to use 
340 kg N / ha 
81 hectares 131 hectares  
Land needed to 
comply 
requirement 
 230 hectares 81 hectares 
Land that must be 
acquired 
 149 hectares in vulnerable zone 50 hectares in vulnerable zone 
  74.5 hectares in ordinary zone 25 hectares in ordinary zone 
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Table 4.26: Sludge processing (baseline) and sludge management (Scenario 1 and 2) costs on a farm with 350 cows 
 Technical data Economic data, € 
 units Baseline Scenario 
1 
Scenario 2 Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Storage tank Cub. m. 2,392 3,190 3,676 79,000 105,000 134,000 
Manure spreading truck Cub. m.       
Tanker truck Cub. m. 10 10 15 17,000 17,000 23,000 
Separator       75,000 
manure storage shelf Sq. m.   400   60,000 
Aeration tank Cub. m.   391   20,000 
Aerator       10,000 
INVESTMENTS TOTAL     96,000 122,000 322,000 
Management costs        
Manure and sludge storage (in yard and tank respectively)     1,458 1,458 1,004 
Manure transportation and spreading       7,762 
Sludge transportation and spreading   3,420  4,902 1,726  
Sludge transportation and spreading 30 km away   6,282   56,535  
Manure transportation and spreading 30 km away        
Solid fraction separation Cub. m.      4,287 
Liquid fraction separation in farm Cub. m.   8,247   2,474 
Liquid fraction transportation and spreading 30 km away Cub. m.   1,455   22,647 
Solid fraction transportation and spreading 30 km away Cub. m.      11,653 
Depreciations     5,987 7,303 3,498 
Interests on costs and investments     3,492 5,189 7,348 
Purchase of right to spread on new land      10,414 3,498 
Production loss due to decreased amount of nitrogen spread      7,348 7,348 
TOTAL COSTS     15,839 89,973 60,673 
COST PER kg OF MILK PRODUCED     0.005 0.030 0.020 
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According to calculations in Table 4.23, the management cost for sludge and manure amounts 
to 0.009 Euro per Kg of produced milk. In Scenario 1 and 2, the significant land increase is 
required due to the new land classification (vulnerable/non vulnerable) but also due to the 
significant increase of the Ministry parameters used to calculate nitrogen produced by cattle, 
which increased from 94 kg per ton (live weight) for all cattle to 138 kg per ton (live weight) 
for dairy cows and 120 kg for replacement animals. In this case the farmer will have to search 
for land in ordinary zone if we assume that no land in vulnerable zone is available. Therefore 
in Scenario 1 we will assume that the farmer shall use a 21 hectare site 30 km away from the 
farm, paying the manure spreading fee. In Scenario 2 the adaptation to regulation 
requirements by reducing nitrogen in sludge by 20% and increasing available land for 
spreading requires the farmer to search for a land in an ordinary zone. Assuming that no 
nearby land in the vulnerable zone is available, the farmer shall use a 17.5 hectare site 30 km 
away from the farm, paying the manure spreading fee  (Table 4.23).  
What concerns the costs the change of the zone classification in the area where the farm is 
located raises sludge management cost from € 0.009 per kg of milk produced to € 0.036 
(Scenario 1), four times higher, moreover there is the need for further investments to adapt the 
tanks to the new regulations, total cost €  10,000. The technique in Scenario 2 does not yield 
any significant economic advantage with respect to the solution proposed in Scenario 1 and, 
in addition to that, sludge management cost increases significantly compared to the original 
cost (from € 0.009 per kg of milk produced up to € 0.035). However this technique may be 
profitable for farmers in that it requires less additional land, therefore simplifying the whole 
process. A drawback to this technique is that it requires additional investments worth € 
32,000.   
According to the calculations (see Table 4.26), the management cost for sludge and manure 
on these large dairy farms amounts to 0.005 Euro per Kg of produced milk for the baseline 
Scenario. By adapting to regulation requirements by increasing available land for spreading 
(Scenario 1), the farmer will have to search for land in an ordinary zone if we assume that no 
land in vulnerable zone is available. Therefore we will assume that the farmer shall use a 74.5 
hectare site 30 km away from the farm, paying the manure spreading fee. By adapting to 
regulation requirements by reducing nitrogen in sludge by 43% and increasing available land 
for spreading (Scenario 2), the farmer has to search for a land in an ordinary zone, assuming 
that no nearby land in the vulnerable zone is available. Therefore we will assume that the 
farmer shall use a 25 hectare site 30 km away from the farm, paying the manure spreading 
fee. With respect to costs, changing of zone classification in the area where the farm is located 
raises sludge management cost from € 0.005 per kg of milk produced to € 0.030, six times 
higher, moreover there is the need for further investments to adapt the tanks to the new 
regulations with a total cost €  52,000.  The techniques in Scenario 2  yields a significant 
economic advantage with respect to the solution proposed in Scenario 1  since sludge 
management cost per kg of milk decreases by one third. Nonetheless, sludge management 
cost remains significantly higher compared to the original cost (from € 0.005 per kg of milk 
produced up to € 0.020), however this technique may be profitable for farmers in that it 
requires less additional land, therefore simplifying the whole process. A substantial drawback 
to this technique is that it requires additional investments worth € 226,000. 
Next, before concluding on the impact of Nitrate Directive on farm compeptitiveness in Italy, 
the year 2005 production costs of 100 kg of milk for two regions are presented: for a dairy 
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farm with on average 83 dairy cows in Parmigiano-Reggiano and a dairy farm with on 
average 133 dairy cows in Lombardy (Table 4.27). The overall cost to produce milk and meat 
has slightly increased with respect to 2005 (1.1%), but, thanks to higher larger CAP refunds 
and higher turnover from meat the net production costs of Parmigiano-Reggiano milk have 
decreased by 2.4%. The production cost gap between Parmigiano-Reggiano milk and 
industrial milk has reached 19.1%. Most of the difference in production costs is first of all due 
to higher cow feeding costs and also to labour/processing costs as Parmigiano-Reggiano dairy 
farmers have to comply with strict production regulations. Despite the drop in milk price, 
extra refunds received by farmers from the CMO milk has made it possible to improve returns 
to per hour which is 7.51 €/h for Parmigiano-Reggiano workers versus 14.00 € in farms that 
produce milk for Grana Padano and for consumption.  
Table 4.27: Production costs for Parmigiano-Reggiano milk and Grana Padano / 
industry milk 
 Parmigiano-Reggiano Grana Padano / industry milk 
 2004 2005 2004 2005 
 
€/100kg % €/100kg % €/100kg % €/100kg % 
Feeding 16.04 33.38 14.23 29.30 13.31 32.33 11.10 26.18 
Processing 11.47 23.86 11.98 24.67 10.74 26.08 10.69 25.22 
Miscellaneous 12.79 26.61 13.84 28.49 11.08 26.90 13.38 31.57 
Direct costs total 40.30 83.85 40.05 82.46 35.13 85.31 35.17 82.97 
Interests and 
depreciations 7.76 16.15 8.52 17.54 6.05 14.69 7.22 17.03 
Gross cost total 48.06 100.00 48.57 100.00 41.18 100.00 42.39 100.00 
Meat profit (gross) + 
funds 2.72 5.67 4.37 9.00 4.80 11.68 6.65 15.69 
Net cost 45.34 94.33 44.20 91.00 36.38 88.32 35.74 84.31 
Source: CRPA study. 
Taking into account the increase of production costs per kg milk due to the Nitrate Directive 
and the total production costs exposed in the previous paragraph the following conclusions 
can be drawn. Milk production cost will, due to the effects of the Nitrate Directive, increase 
by 8.4% in farms with 100 cows and 6.7% in the larger ones, raising the cost per 100 kg from 
€ 35.74 to € 38.42 per 100 kg in Lombardy farms with 100 dairy cows. Milk for Parmigiano-
Reggiano's cost will increase less since the number of animals in the area is significantly 
lower, a fact which makes it possible to carry out spreading for agronomic purpose on 
additional sites which are closer than in Lombardy. 
The Table 4.28 shows that the distance from available lands is essential in choosing the 
strategy. Indeed, if lands are closer (15 km as opposed to 30 km) overall increase in 
production costs can amount to +6.8 %.  
On the short run, application of the Nitrates Directive may entail, in areas with a high animal 
concentration, the closure of less efficient or smaller farms. This will allow other farmers to 
use nearby lands suitable for manure and sludge spreading with reduced cost compared to use 
of farther lands. The fact that these farms produce less slurry and more manure will certainly 
help dairy farmers to dispose of waste more easily than pig farmers. 
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Table 4.28: Comparison between current status and proposed solutions 
  
Farm with 350 cows Farm with 100 cows 
  Current 
status 
Transport 
and land 
licence costs 
Nitrogen 
reduction 
Current 
status 
Transport and 
land licence 
costs 
Nitrogen 
reduction 
  AVAILABLE LANDS 30 km AWAY 
Milk production cost €/kg                         0.295 0.295 0.295 0.348 0.348 0.348 
Manure costs€/kg €/kg 0.005 0.030 0.020 0.009 0.036 0.035 
Total production costs 
with sites 30 km 
€/kg  0.300 0.325 0.315 0.357 0.384 0.383 
  AVAILABLE LANDS 15 km AWAY 
Milk cost  €/kg 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.348 0.348 0.348 
Manure costs€/kg €/kg 0.005 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.024 0.027 
Total production costs 
with sites at 15 km  
€/kg 0.300 0.315 0.315 0.357 0.372 0.375 
 
4.9 Simulated impact on external competitiveness 
This section presents the results of modelling assessment. The framework as described in 
detail in D11 in used. The percentage change in sectoral production costs is introduced in the 
GTAP model as a decrease in total factor productivity (variable AO) to investigate the effect 
of standards on the export volumes and shares. Only Member States which have an EU export 
share of more than 5% are made compliant to the standards. Other countries are too small to 
have an effect on the European competitiveness. For one of these countries (Ireland) no data 
are available which made us choose to introduce Spain (4% export share) ni the model 
instead. The represented countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, 
Italy and the Netherlands) make up 88% of the European export of dairy products. Detailed 
results are reported in Table 4.29 - Table 4.36 and a summarising Table 4.37can be found at 
the end of the section. The following trading partners are displayed in Tables: EU-15, USA, 
Rest of OECD countries, Rest of the world countries.  
The costs of compliance with the EU nitrate directive allow assessing the competitiveness of 
the EU dairy sector under standards, the N-directive in this particular case. The first scenario 
simulates full compliance to the N-directive in EU Member States. The results of this first 
simulation can be seen in Table 4.29. 
Table 4.29: Scenario 1 - Effect of full compliance in the EU-15 to the N-directive 
Export to: 
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 0.75% 0.13% 0.10% 0.12% 0.15% 
New Zealand 0.68% 0.07% 0.05% 0.07% 0.13% 
EU15 0.00% -0.70% -0.77% -0.70% -0.71% 
USA 0.72% 0.00% 0.11% 0.14% 0.16% 
ROECD 0.89% 0.13% 0.00% 0.13% 0.41% 
ROW 0.79% 0.13% 0.10% 0.09% 0.34% 
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Export to: 
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Total Import 0.80% -0.13% -0.11% -0.18% -0.05% 
 
Table 4.30 and  
Table 4.31 present the results of a sensitivity change on the percentage of 
compliance, as was discussed in section 4.4. Figure 4.6 graphically 
illustrates the effects of varying the degree of compliance to the Nitrate 
directive on exports and imports in the EU. 
Table 4.30: Scenario 2 - Effect of 20% increase in compliance in the EU-15 for the N-directive 
Export to:  
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 0.42% 0.08% 0.06% 0.07% 0.08% 
New Zealand 0.42% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.08% 
EU15 0.00% -0.45% -0.46% -0.40% -0.42% 
USA 0.47% 0.00% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 
ROECD 0.58% 0.09% 0.00% 0.07% 0.26% 
ROW 0.49% 0.08% 0.06% 0.04% 0.21% 
Total Import 0.51% -0.08% -0.06% -0.11% -0.02% 
 
Table 4.31: Scenario 3 - Effect of an 10% increase (75%minimum) in compliance to the 
N-directive in EU-15 
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 0.35% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 
NewZealand 0.34% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 
EU15 0.00% -0.37% -0.37% -0.31% -0.33% 
USA 0.40% 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 0.08% 
ROECD 0.46% 0.07% 0.00% 0.06% 0.21% 
ROW 0.38% 0.07% 0.05% 0.00% 0.16% 
Total Import 0.40% -0.07% -0.05% -0.08% -0.02% 
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Figure 4.6:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of compliance to the N-Directive 
 
Table 4.32: Scenario 4 - Effect of full compliance in the EU-15 to the N-directive and 
similar measures abroad  
 Export to:  
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia -3.17% -3.90% -3.52% -3.51% -3.50% 
New Zealand -2.54% -3.27% -3.01% -2.85% -2.87% 
EU15 0.00% -0.63% -0.44% -0.38% -0.41% 
USA 1.23% 0.00% 0.85% 0.93% 0.91% 
ROECD 1.52% 0.78% 0.00% 1.09% 1.19% 
ROW 1.47% 0.75% 1.00% 3.68% 1.16% 
Total Import 0.30% -0.57% -1.04% -1.42% -1.07% 
  
Table 4.33: Scenario 5 - Effect of Identification and registration in the EU-15 
 Export to: 
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 0.18% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 
New Zealand 0.16% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 
EU15 0.00% -0.18% -0.18% -0.14% -0.15% 
USA 0.21% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 
ROECD 0.24% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.10% 
ROW 0.20% 0.03% 0.02% 0.00% 0.08% 
Total Import 0.21% -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.01% 
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Table 4.34: Scenario 6 - Effect of full compliance to N-directive and identification 
 Export to: 
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 0.93% 0.15% 0.12% 0.14% 0.18% 
New Zealand 0.84% 0.10% 0.06% 0.08% 0.15% 
EU15 0.00% -0.89% -0.95% -0.85% -0.87% 
USA 0.93% 0.00% 0.13% 0.16% 0.20% 
ROECD 1.14% 0.17% 0.00% 0.16% 0.51% 
ROW 0.98% 0.16% 0.12% 0.13% 0.42% 
Total Import 1.01% -0.16% -0.13% -0.22% -0.06% 
 
Table 4.35: Scenario 7 - Effect of full compliance to N-directive and identification 
standards in dairy sector and in all other analysed sectors (beef, pig&poultry, cereals) 
Export to: 
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 0.75% 0.10% 0.00% 0.11% 0.15% 
New Zealand 0.55% -0.07% 0.00% -0.08% -0.01% 
EU15 0.00% -0.62% -0.65% -0.62% -0.62% 
USA 0.77% 0.00% 0.20% 0.14% 0.17% 
ROECD 0.94% 0.11% 0.23% 0.11% 0.46% 
ROW 0.80% 0.13% 0.00% 0.12% 0.21% 
Total Import 0.80% -0.13% -0.37% -0.10% -0.03% 
 
Table 4.36: Scenario 8 -  Ban on BSTr hormone use in the U.S. 
 Export to:  
 EU15 USA ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
Australia 1.97% 30.45% 4.73% 1.37% 2.92% 
New Zealand 0.96% 29.13% 3.65% 0.31% 2.65% 
EU15 0.00% 27.57% 2.52% -0.80% 2.44% 
USA -40.08% 0.00% -38.76% -40.14% -39.42% 
ROECD 2.00% 30.53% 0.00% 1.41% 6.24% 
ROW 2.11% 30.63% 4.86% 1.52% 11.15% 
Total Import -0.25% 29.42% -6.20% -2.11% 0.24% 
 
For the case of full compliance to Nitrate Directive in EU countries (scenario 1), the European 
dairy sector loses 0.71% of its export mainly to the rest of OECD and USA. Moreover, it 
increases its imports by 0.80%. As was already noted in the introduction, EU imports are 
playing a very limited role, and the main impact will be thus on exports. Since the GTAP 
model does not distinguish disaggregated dairy product markets, it is impossible to indicate 
how various product markets (e.g. butter, skimmed milk powder, whole milk powder, hard 
and soft cheeses, casein, etc.) will be affected. For example, the EU is known to export 
various speciality cheeses tot the US market. The exports of such high value-added products 
are likely to be less affected than the ‘average’ dairy export product simulated within GTAP. 
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The predicted export reduction of 0.70% of the EU to the US is therefore likely to be an upper 
bound. The extra imports may be an overestimation due to the way tariff rate quotas (TRQ) 
are modelled in GTAP. All TRQs in the dairy sector are modelled as a bilateral TRQs and an 
arrhythmic mean tariff is calculated from the in- and out-quota tariff. However, for the dairy 
sector this representation is acceptable because of the fixed nature of the global TRQ in the 
sector (based on historic trade volumes). The other countries will increase their export in 
order to fill the gap the EU leaves. However, the total traded volume decreases with 0.05%, 
which is quite small. 
Table 4.37: Percentage changes in trade due to compliance to various standards 
Exports of which to…  Scenario EU 
Import: 
total 
EU 
Export: 
total 
USA Rest of 
OECD 
Rest of  
World 
Total 
Trade 
1 Nitrate EU: 100% 0.80 -0.71 -0.70 -0.77 -0.70 -0.05 
2 Nitrate EU: +20% 0.51 -0.42 -0.45 -0.46 -0.40 -0.02 
3 Nitrate EU: +10%, 
minimum 75% 0.40 -0.33 -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.02 
4 Nitrate EU and non-EU: 
100% 0.30 -0.41 -0.63 -0.44 -0.38 -1.07 
5 I&R EU : 100% 0.21 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.14 -0.01 
6 I&R EU : 100% 
and Nitrate EU : 100% 1.08 -0.82 -0.89 -0.95 -0.85 -0.06 
7 Like scenario 6 but also 
full compliance to 
selected standards in all 
other analyzed sectors 
0.82 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.65 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.03 
 
8 Ban on hormone use in 
US: 100% -0.25 2.44 27.57 2.52 -0.80 0.24 
Notes: Regional impacts are presented for the situation of EU being a net exporter.  
Source: GTAP calculations. 
Because of the lower costs for European farmers in Scenario 2 and 3 compared to the first 
scenario (see also Table 4.7) there is a smaller effect on the competitiveness of the European 
dairy sector. The decrease in export volume is 0.4% and 0.33% respectively. Because of the 
smaller price effect on the world market the total traded volume only reduces with 0.02%. 
The rest of the OECD and the rest of the world fill most of the reduced European export. In 
scenario 4, when next to the EU countries also their competitors fully comply with nitrate 
measures, the results do not change substantially when compared to scenario 1: total trade 
reduces by a higher percent (1.07) whereas the total export of the EU still decreases (by 
0.41%). This is not surprising given quite low percentage cost increase at sector level in the 
non-EU countries.   
Scenarios 5 and 6 report the simulation results of compliance of EU countries to the 
Identification & Registration standards. There are no costs for non-EU countries and slightly 
increased costs for EU countries resulting in the smallest of all the scenarios trade decline of 
0.01%. A combined effect of full compliance of EU countries to Nitrate Directive and I&R 
leads to 0.6% loss of EU exports. 
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Scenario 7 simulates the impact of full compliance with the Nitrate, identification and 
registration requirements in the dairy sector as well in all other sectors (beef, pigs & poultry, 
cereals) involved in the quantitative external competitiveness assessment with the GTAP tool. 
As such it takes into account feedbacks to and spill-overs from other markets. A comparison 
of scenario 6 (isolated standard introduction in dairy and not simultaneously in all other 
sectors) with scenario 7 makes clear, these interaction effects have a tendency to dampen the 
effects as compared to when these measure are introduced to an isolated sector.  
The last scenario 8 is different from the previous ones in that it takes the EU standard not to 
use the BsT milk yield enhancing hormone as given and simulates the impact when the US 
would apply to a similar standard (which it currently does not). As such it provides some 
insight into the ‘opportunity costs’ to the EU of the US not adopting a similar standard. As 
turns out a hormone ban in the US mainly affects U.S. trade and profits the EU dairy sector 
with an increase of export by 2.4%. 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter the impact of compliance to standards on the cost of production in the Dairy 
sector is estimated, using a farm level analysis and taking into account actual farm 
accountancy data. Representative farm studies were done and used as a basis for the cost 
increase calculations. Best-estimates of compliance are used, but these still contain a certain 
degree of uncertainty. In a number of cases alternative approaches and the different sources 
were used to cross-check both cost of production and degree of compliance estimates in order 
to test for the robustness in terms of order of magnitude.  
As regards the impact of the Nitrate and Identification and registration standards on 
production, clearly the Nitrate standard has the most impact. At farm level, the percentage 
cost increase varies from 0.19% to 6.8% within the selected Member States, from 2% to 4.2% 
for the US farms and is about 2% in New Zealand. Profitability and gross-margin of farms 
with lower degree of compliance (France, for example) is affected substantially. At sector 
level full compliance to the nitrates standard for all affected farmers would involve a 
percentage cost of production increase of 0.1 to 0.6 percent, with rates varying between 
Member States. The estimated percentage cost increase associated with full compliance with 
the Identification and Registration standard for all affected farmers would be less than 0.15 
percent and thus rather marginal. As shown in  Table 4.37 the negative impact of these 
measures (for nitrates, and animal identification and registration) on EU imports and exports 
are less than 3 percent. If a smaller increase in compliance takes place, these already relatively 
small trade impacts will be further diminished. When the standards for nitrate pollution taken 
by the US and New Zealand are taken into account along with full compliance assumption in 
all countries analysed, this would impact the trade balance by 1.07% (the highest rate of all 
the scenarios) and will result in projecting slightly lower decline in EU exports at  0.41%. In 
other words, the international competitiveness of the EU does not win substantially in this 
situation and therefore improvements in the internal farm competitiveness (higher gross 
margin and profitability) should remain under the concern of farm management. The trade 
impacts obtained when no changes are assumed to happen in key competitor countries can 
thus be argued as providing the upper bound of the likely trade impacts.  
As regards the impact of the Nitrate and Identification and registration standards on 
production, clearly the Nitrate standard has the most impact. At sectoral level for nitrate 
percentage cost of production increases of 0.1 till 0.6 percent were found, with rates varying 
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over countries and with respect to variations in the prevailing degree of compliance, as well as 
the assumed improvement in compliance. At farm level the nitrate standard might have even 
much stronger impacts than at sector level. As compared to the Nitrate standard the estimated 
percentage costs increases associated with full compliance to the Identification and 
Registration standard was less than 0.15 percent and thus rather marginal.  
The combined impact of the Nitrate and Identification and Registration standards on EU dairy 
exports and imports is estimated to be -0.87% and +1.01% respectively (given no changes in 
standards or compliance for other trade partners).   
The allowance of bST hormone use affects trade patterns creating currently a relative 
disadvantage for the EU’s dairy export position. A ban on bST hormone use in the US is 
argued to lead to a 5% percentage costs increase for US farmers, which appears to lead to a 
potential improvement of EU dairy exports with nearly 2.5 percent. Alternatively, the EU 
food safety standard prohibiting the use of bST can be stated to have an opportunity cost in 
terms of forgone trade opportunities. 
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5 The impact of standards on the competitiveness of the 
EU with respect to beef 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a comparative overview of the competitive assessment of CC 
requirement in beef production. We will focus here on the EU Member States and the 
US as one of the main key competitors of the EU.  
Not all regulations and directives of Annex III will generate significant cost increases 
as many will exert only marginal constraints on beef farming. Here we will 
concentrate our attention on the Nitrate Directive, Identification and Registration and 
the use of Hormones. As this last item is concerned we will assess the cost advantage 
of US beef producers having the possibility to use growth hormones. In particular of 
interest will be to investigate what effect a prohibition of the use of growth hormones 
in the US might have on the international trade of beef.  
Before presenting the cost analyses and their impact on competitiveness a literature 
review is useful as an introduction on how previous CAP reforms have affected trade 
in beef and to which extent non-tariff trade barriers can have a disruptive effect on 
world trade in beef. This literature review will be used as background material for the 
interpretation of the simulation results to be carried out at the end of this chapter. 
Subsequently a description will be given of the major trade flows of beef in the world 
and their rapid change in direction when non trade barriers interfere. An analysis of 
the sector structure creates basic knowledge for the cost impact of the CC 
requirements, which will be treated in the paragraphs thereafter. The effect of the 
changes in production costs due to the Nitrate Directive, Identification and 
Registration and the prohibition of hormones on the competitiveness of EU beef 
production will be evaluated with the GTAP model.  
5.2 Literature review 
During the last century, agricultural productivity has risen dramatically in several 
areas of the world, however, sometimes partly to the detriment of the environment. 
Governments currently try to limit the negative external environmental effects by 
imposing an extensive set of standards on agricultural production. On the one hand, 
standards create environmental benefits by limiting overexploitation or pollution of 
scarce environmental resources. On the other hand, they may translate into 
opportunity costs for farmers who are forced to switch to suboptimal farming 
practices. At the national level, production costs may rise, affecting external 
competitiveness. Several authors take notice of problems rising with introduction of 
different set of standards, including those on beef.  
Several economic analyses have been carried out to find out the market, environment 
and welfare impact of the recent EU policy reforms. In 2000, Weyerbrock and Xia 
discussed the impact of technical trade barriers on trade in agricultural and food 
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products between US and Europe. Under the technical barrier they imply 
“internationally divergent regulations and standards governing the sale of the sale of 
products in national markets”. Authors discussed several regulations among US and 
Europe which become serious obstacles for international trade. Among other 
regulations (such as GMO regulations, organic foods regulations, veterinary 
regulations) these authors discussed also the impact of hormone regulations on trade 
between US and EU. In 1985, the EU banned the use of three naturally produced 
hormones (estradiol, testosterone, and progesterone) and two synthetically produced 
hormones (trenbolone acetate and melengstrol) in domestic meat production. In 1989, 
EU banned import of the hormone-treated meat from US. Since 1989, this restriction 
hindered US beef exports valued at about $100 million per year. The authors 
concluded that technical trade barriers hamper trade between the USA and EU. Most 
of the technical barriers in US/EU affect trade of animal and meat products. Peterson 
et al. (1988) used partial equilibrium model in studying the price and welfare effect of 
EU ban on hormones on market for edible offal. Authors assumed that domestic 
supply of edible offal is perfectly elastic. They found that the EU’s ban increases the 
EU price for edible offal by 34%-45% and decreases the world price by 35%. 
Because of the lack of alternative markets, US exports of edible offal decrease by 
56%. 
In 2000 Guyomard et al.(2000) expected that the US would attempt to ensure that 
trade barriers with EU and subsidized competition from the EU in third markets 
would be kept to a minimum. This expectation was based on  the new American 
agricultural legislation FAIR (US Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform), 
which according to authors would force the EU to reform its agricultural policy (i.e. 
CAP) so that compensatory payments for support price cuts would be included in the 
green box, or would be much more decoupled than it was at that time. Authors argued 
that the 1999 EU proposals for a new reform of the CAP represent a big step in the 
right direction, but they are likely to be insufficient to comply with future WTO (i.e. 
World Trade Organizations agricultural negotiations) commitments, predominantly 
with regards to the decoupling of direct aid payments. Authors concluded that the 
Agenda 2000 package does not go far enough in terms of achieving greater 
decoupling of internal support measures.  Guyomard et al. proposed that the long-run 
objective of further decoupling EU direct payments from production incentives 
should be pursed in order to promote agricultural trade on a more competitive basis. 
In 2002, van Meijl and van Tongeren examined the compatibility of the Agenda 2000 
reform of the CAP with the EU’s commitments to reduce export subsidies. Authors 
used a multi-region applied general equilibrium model, which includes relevant CAP 
measures (e.g. in beef sector the intervention price for beef and veal was to be 
reduced by 20% in three steps over 2000-2002). The model was used to analyze the 
effect of alternative market price changes on fulfillment of EU commitments. The 
results revealed that Agenda 2000 helps the EU to remain within its export subsidy 
commitments, however successful reduction in export subsidies depends mainly on 
world market and exchange rate development.   
Gohin (2006) has carried out analysis on new 2003 CAP reform. According to Gohin, 
available impact studies found that 2003 CAP reform reduces production incentives 
substantially for beef and to a lesser arable crops. However, these studies assumed 
that the previous reform under Agenda 2000, already decoupled arable crop direct 
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payments, while beef premiums were coupled to the production. Gohin questioned 
the decoupled nature of Agenda 2000 arable crops direct payments and beef 
premiums (premiums were granted to farmers subject to many eligibility rules, which 
reduced their degree of coupling). Gohin used Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) to examine the sensitivity of CAP reform impacts on the modeling of Agenda 
2000 direct payments. This author found that the negative impacts of the CAP reform 
on the arable crop and beef production are not sensitive to the modeling of Agenda 
2000 direct payments, while the positive impact of this reform on extensification of 
beef production found to be robust.  
5.3 Trade patterns and the effect of non-tariff trade barriers 
World trade in beef is representing a significant share of world beef production and 
this share is increasing year by year, mainly due to gradual progress in trade 
liberalisation. The international market relationships for beef remain however very 
much affected by institutional factors and in particular by non-tariff trade barriers 
which create sudden shocks in the trade flows between the different continents. 
Although their use is permitted in some limited circumstances, non-tariff trade 
barriers tend to increase in the last years as the different WTO agreements have 
reduced the use of tariffs. Before entereing into the details of world trade in beef 
some of the origins of non-tariff trade barriers are mentioned here. 
Growth promotants 
Some special regulations are required for meat exported to EU, which interfere in 
particular with the trade relationship between the EU and the US: all bovine meat 
exported to the European Union must originate from animals that have never been 
treated with hormonal growth promotants. There must be assurances (i.e. certificates) 
that there are effective controls in all phases of production, from birth to slaughter, 
and subsequent processing and final packaging activities. Antimicrobial treatments 
(for example, hyperchlorination, organic acids, etc) are not allowed for treatment of 
red meat or poultry carcasses, parts or viscera. Only the application of water or steam 
is permitted. 
Islamic restrictions 
The world meat export can be affected by other factors than general institutional 
regulations. One of this factors is religion. For instance, the United States exports 
cattle beef all over the world. Today, according to USDA (2006), the Federation of 
Malaysia is one of the large importers of the US beef. However, here are strong 
cultural factors affecting the beef trade between these two countries, and they 
function as a kind of regulations against the tendency toward liberalisation. This 
cultural factor is Islam and Islamic restrictions on food in Malaysia. The following 
entails official requirements for cattle beef trade between Malaysia and the US, that is 
the unique relation between the beef trade and Halal-Islamic restrictions on food 
(USDA, 2006). In this case there are special  slaughter requirements. Slaughter must 
be performed without stunning; however, use of mushroom stunning devices is 
acceptable provided the brain is not penetrated. (Animals will be rejected if brain is 
penetrated.)  
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Trade of live animals and risk of diseases 
Since beef sectors entails import and export of not only beef meet, but also live 
animals, it bears the risk of transmitting animal diseases from the country of the 
origin to people or animals in the importing country. There are several regulations 
concerning the import and export of live animals: 1) hygiene of transport (carriers 
must comply with rules regarding hygiene); 2) animal identification and registration 
number (within EU availability of animal passport as a vehicle that allows trace 
animals to their origin), 3) veterinary inspection (checks before transport in the 
country of origin and upon arrival to the country of destination). 
World trade flows in beef 
A first consideration is that the European Union has become a net importer of beef in 
the year 2003, when for decades the EU was able to export significant quantities of 
beef due to the strong and expensive CMO beef which allowed abundant use of 
export restitutions. The gradual break down of this policy has opened the EU market 
for imports, in particular for South America. US beef is however not able to enter the 
European market because of their use of growth hormones, which are forbidden in the 
EU. The EU market still is protected by relevant import tariffs and the outcome of the 
Doha round may cause their further reduction. As a consequence it is possible to 
foresee a further deterioration of the competitive position of the EU beef industry in 
the future, as low cost producers of South America (Brasil, Argentina and Uruguay) 
will gain a larger access to the EU market. 
 
Figure 5.1: Domestic consumption and production of beef and veal in the EU 
(1996 – 2006) 
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As the other continents are concerned important is the strong export potential of 
Australia on the world market with strong exports of beef to the USA and Japan. The 
USA at the same time exports significant quantities of beef to Mexico, Japan and 
China. Major beef exporting countries in South America are Argentina, with 
considerable export quantities in particular to the US and Canada, and Brasil which 
delivers primarily the Russian market and the European Union. Instability in market 
flows are however significant. The market flow pattern of 2003 is completely 
disrupted by the BSE crisis in the US in 2005 which provoked a Japanese import ban 
on US beef. This Japanese import gap has been filled with extra deliveries of 
Australian beef. In the same year Argentinian exports of beef to North America 
stopped due to foot-and-mouth disease. This comparison between 2003 and 2005 
illustrates the very high instability in the world trade of beef, where the sudden break 
out of diseases can change significantly the direction of exports flows between the 
different continents in the world. 
Figure 5.2: Major exports flow of beef on the world market in 2003 
 
Source: Beef Report 2006, Agribenchmark 
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Figure 5.3: Major exports flow of beef on the world market in 2005 
 
 
Source: Beef Report 2006, Agribenchmark 
In the present chapter of this report we will examine the effect of the application of 
some of the 19 directives and regulations of Annex III of Regulation 1782/83 on the 
competitiveness of beef production in the EU. The simulations will be carried out 
using the GTAP model. It should be stressed however that the model does not 
distinguish explicitly beef, but next to beef and veal the product category includes 
also sheep, goats and horse meat. Pigmeat is treated separately in the model. The bias 
is however rather limited knowing that within this composite product category the 
non-beef meats represent only a minor part of the total import and export flows in the 
world. The only country where sheep meat tends to dominate this category of meat 
exports is New Zealand.  
From Table 5.1 derived from the GTAP model it turns out that the major players in 
the export of cattle, sheep, goat and horse meat in the world market are the USA and 
Australia. The major importing country from USA is Japan, where in 2001 the export 
from the USA constitutes about 47%. The greater part of the remaining beef exports 
from USA is directed to the countries in the group “Rest of the World”(ROW). USA 
is not only a major exporter of beef products, but also one of the biggest importers in 
the world market sharing import shares equally with Japan. The key suppliers for 
USA are Canada and Australia. These two countries together supply 68 % of total 
imported beef products in USA.  New Zealand is the third biggest exporter in the 
world market. As has been stated previously the export value of New Zealand is 
constituted primarily of sheep meat and in the present analysis is of minor interest.  
Analysing the single EU countries the role of the Netherlands is remarkable in the 
world exports of this group of meat products. The overwhelming majority of Dutch 
exports concerns veal from veal calves and sheep meat and for the present analysis is 
therefore less comparable to the mature red beef exported by the other major players 
on the world market. The Dutch share in the world market of cattle, sheep, goats and 
horse meat is 10% of the total world export value and 28% of EU-15 export value. 
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The second largest world exporter in the EU-15 is Germany with a share of 7% of 
world exports and 20% of EU-15 export value.  
According to the GTAP data France is a major importer of this composite group of 
meat products. We should remember here that this has primarily to be attributed to 
the imports of sheep meat, as France is a net exporter of beef and bovine live animals. 
Italy instead is of high interest for our analysis, as this EU country imports significant 
quantities of bovine live animals and beef, next to minor quantities of sheep meat. 
 
Table 5.1: Global bilateral exports of cattle, sheep, goat and horse meat at world 
prices in 2001 (million USD) 
VXWD Importers   
Exporters Japan USA FR UK Italy NL ROW Total Export 
share 
Australia 1,050 1,098 20 57 1 1 1,157 3,384 18% 
New 
Zealand 97 602 103 228 26 30 897 1,983 11% 
Canada 147 1,173 21 1 9 5 305 1,661 9% 
USA 1,861 0 26 16 8 33 2,053 3,997 22% 
Brazil 6 100 21 154 84 191 622 1,178 6% 
Germany 2 5 207 30 226 331 568 1,369 7% 
Netherlands 3 4 422 114 456 0 888 1,887 10% 
ROW 102 349 685 677 547 557 0 2,917 16% 
Total 3,268 3,331 1,505 1,277 1,357 1,148 6,490 18,376 100% 
Import 
share 18% 18% 8% 7% 7% 6% 35% 100%  
Notes: Only trade partners that represent at least 5% of global exports or imports are 
tabulated. FR: France, NL: The Netherlands, ROW: rest of the world. The figures of the 
aggregated ROW region have been corrected for internal trade. Source: GTAP calculations 
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Table 5.2: Global bilateral exports of cattle, sheep, goat and horse meat at world 
prices in 2001 (million USD), EU-15 aggregated 
 Importers   
Exporters Japan USA EU-15 ROW Total Export share 
Australia 1,050 1,098 110 1,124 3,382 23% 
New Zealand 97 602 678 605 1,982 14% 
Canada 147 1,173 56 285 1,661 11% 
USA 1,861 0 130 2,006 3,997 28% 
Brazil 6 100 603 469 1,178 8% 
EU-15 32 78 0 933 1,043 7% 
ROW 75 279 732 184 1,270 9% 
Total 3,268 3,330 2,309 5,606 14,513 100% 
Import share 23% 23% 16% 33% 100%  
Notes: Only trade partners that represent at least 5% of global exports or imports are 
tabulated. ROW: rest of the world. The figures of the aggregated EU-15 and ROW regions 
have been corrected for internal trade. Source: GTAP calculations 
 
Table 5.3: EU-15 Member States’ exports of cattle, sheep, goat and horse meat at 
world prices in 2001 (million USD) 
 Importers   
Exporters EU-15 ROW Total Export share 
Austria 138 53 191 3% 
Belgium 449 29 478 7% 
Denmark 223 73 296 4% 
Finland 11 6 18 0% 
France 506 99 606 9% 
Germany 1,060 312 1,369 20% 
UK 296 54 351 5% 
Greece 29 35 65 1% 
Ireland 825 73 898 13% 
Italy 162 92 255 4% 
Luxembourg 9 1 10 0% 
Netherlands 1,793 95 1,887 28% 
Portugal 12 14 26 0% 
Spain 276 94 371 5% 
Sweden 19 14 35 1% 
EU-15 5,808 1,044 6,856 100% 
Notes: Only trade partners that represent at least 5% of EU-15 exports are tabulated. ROW: 
rest of the world. Source: GTAP calculations 
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5.4 Sector structure 
In the EU the beef producing farms represent 7% of all agricultural farms, 18% of the 
Utilised Agricultural Area and 35% of the forage crop area (Chatellier et.al 2005). 
These figures differ substantially from country to country, varying from a share of 
47% of beef farms in the North of the UK down to only a 1% share in Greece. In the 
EU beef is produced in production systems, which differ considerably from country 
to country. A first distinction has to made between countries which rely for their beef 
production primarily on the dairy herd and other EU countries where a strong 
presence of specialised beef breeds allow for the production of beef derived from 
bullocks and heifers. The Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium primarily produce beef based on the dairy herd. As such beef production in 
these countries will heavily depend on EU dairy policy. The UK, France and Spain 
have however very important specialised beef cow herds and in these countries the 
CMO beef of the EU can have a stronger impact on the evolution of beef production. 
Italy is a special case, as in this country more than 50% of beef production is derived 
from the fattening of bullocks imported from France, whereas the other 50% comes 
from cull dairy cows and national bullocks either of the relatively small beef cow 
herd or of the dairy herd. 
This strong differentiation in the origin of beef strongly exerts its effects on the 
production systems to be found in the EU. 
A first classification of beef farms is the following: 
1. Cow calf farms 
2. Finishing farms 
3. Dairy and beef 
4. Small farms 
 
Out of the 491,000 farms engaged in beef production about 50% are cow calf farmers, 
over one quarter (27%) are specialised in fattening and 20% have a coupled 
production of dairy and beef (Sarzeaud et.al, 2007).  
The following Table 5.4 contains a more detailed differentiation of beef farms in beef 
farming systems proposed by Sarzeaud et. al. (2007). 
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Table 5.4: Criteria to differentiate beef farms 
Base Production Farming systems Criteria 
Small 
farms 
 < 5 dairy cows, < 5 suckler cows, < 8 
LU 
  > 5 dairy cows 
Dairy and beef 
(intensive) 
(With bulls, with or without suckler 
cows) 
> 0.2 male (> 1year old)/Dairy cow  
And 
< 1 male (>2 year old) 
Dairy and beef 
(extensive) 
(With steers, with or without suckler 
cows) 
> 0.2 male (> 1year old)/Dairy cow  
And 
> 1 male (>2 year old) 
Dairy 
farms 
Dairy pure Others > 5 dairy cows 
  > 5 suckler cows, < 5 dairy cows, 
LU/(SC+DC)<8 
Cow Calf pure < 0.2 male (1 to 2 year old)/Suckler 
cow 
Cow Calf and 
bull 
> 0.2 male (1 to 2 year old)/Suckler 
cow  
Cow Calf 
farms 
Cow calf and 
sheep (goat) 
> 20% sheep and goat LU 
  Others > 8 LU 
Professional 
Fatteners  
> 50 male or females > 1-2 year old  
Others fatteners < 50 male or females > 1-2 year old 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FADN 
farms 
> 1 LU 
All OTEX 
Fattener 
 Farms 
Fatteners and 
sheep 
> 20% sheep and goat LU 
Source: Sarzeaud et al.2007 
These beef farming systems represent different shares in EU beef production. Striking 
to note is that 44% of beef production originates on farms where dairy is the main 
livestock activity, another 14% is produced in fattening farms and 35% in cow calf 
farms. Extensive production systems tend to predominate in the EU as on 47% of the 
cattle farms the stocking rate does not exceed 1.4 LU per ha. Typically extensive are 
the cow calf farms, whereas the pure fattening farms often exceed a stocking rate of 
1.8 LU per ha.  
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Table 5.5: Breakdown of cattle farms in beef farming systems in the EU 
Production Cow calf (CC) Fattening (F.H) Dairy Small farms Total 
BFS (Beef Farming Systems CC+ 
Sheep 
CC+ 
fatt 
Pure 
CC 
Fatt.+
sheep 
Pure 
fatt 
small fatt. Dairy+ 
Beef 
Pure dairy   
Enterprises (farms) 49,889 65,100171,3889,202 12,656 58,763 123,788 338,725 91,404 920,916 
Acreage (ha) 151.9 73.3 69.7 87.9 94.0 45.9 81.5 56.9 19.8 63 
% grass on total acreage 88% 63% 69% 68% 45% 42% 62% 61% 33% 62% 
Livestock unit 52.5 61.4 47.4 39.5 127.2 31.6 93.6 66.7 3.8 58.1 
% BFS farms 5% 7% 19% 1% 1% 6% 14% 37% 10% 100% 
% Beef Production (in value) 6% 11% 24% 1% 6% 7% 20% 24% 1% 100% 
Stocking rate (LU/ha)           
<1.4 LU/ha 65% 50% 72% 29% 15% 56% 31% 34% 60% 47% 
1.4 – 1.8 LU/ha 23% 27% 15% 48% 28% 19% 32% 29% 13% 25% 
>1.8 LU/ha 12% 23% 13% 23% 57% 25% 34% 37% 27% 28% 
Stocking rate (LU/ha)  Number of farms 
<1.4 LU/ha 32.428 32.550123.3992.669 1.898 32.907 38.374 115.167 54.842 432.831 
1.4 – 1.8 LU/ha 11.474 17.577 25.708 4.417 3.544 11.165 39.612 98.230 11.883 230.229 
>1.8 LU/ha 5.987 14.973 22.280 2.116 7.214 14.691 42.088 125.328 24.679 257.856 
Source: Sarzeaud et al 2007 
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Most of the cow calf farms are in particular concentrated in the UK, France, Spain 
and Ireland, whereas the beef finishing farms are located in majority in Italy, Ireland, 
Germany and the UK. In the other EU member states beef production is a secondary 
branch of the dairy enterprise. We should remember here that in Ireland beef finishers 
are primarily small part time farmers (Keane, 2007), but in Italy it concerns large 
scale operations with full time hired labourers (CRPA, 2007). The Italian beef 
finishers are specialised in the fattening of Charolais and Limousine bullocks 
imported from France. In Germany the majority of beef production takes place on 
dairy farms, although also specialised finishing farms play a significant role. Often 
these farms will be specialised either in the fattening of double purpose Simmenthal 
bullocks or of dairy crossbreds. 
The typical beef breed orientation in the UK is revealed by the high number of cow 
calf farms at one hand and the specialised beef finishers at the other hand. Hereford, 
Aberdeen Angus and Highland Cattle are the main beef breed present in the country. 
Only a limited number of dairy farms in the UK is involved in beef production. 
Table 5.6: Location of the EU BFS per country 
BFS (Beef 
Farming 
Systems
Cow calf (C.C) Finishing (F.H.) Dairy 
Countries CC+ 
Sheep 
CC+ 
Fin. 
Pure 
CC 
Fin.+ 
sheep 
Spec. 
Finish. 
small fin. Dairy+ 
Beef  
Pure 
dairy 
Small 
farms 
Total 
Enterprises 
(farms) 
49,889 65,100 171,388 9,202 12,65
6 
58,763 123,788 338,725 91,404  
Belgium - 4% 3% - - - 5% 3% - 24,375 
Denmark - - 2% - - 3% - 2% 2% 16,509 
Germany - 9% 4% - 31% 21% 21% 21% 4% 131,398 
Greece - - - - - - - - 3% 11,646 
Spain 8% - 19% - - 8% 2% 8% 4% 76,182 
France 16% 20% 33% - 4% 4% 30% 20% 4% 192,326 
Ireland 27% 27% 15% 30% - 20% 12% 3% 4% 103,122 
Italy 11% 12% 8% - 21% 14% 7% 12% 34% 116,931 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - - - 1,400 
Netherlands - - - - - 2% - 7% - 31,567 
Austria - - 2% - - 7% 9% 8% 2% 51,565 
Portugal - - 5% - - 4% - 3% 34% 55,716 
Finland - - - - - 2% - 4% - 21,310 
Sweden - 3% 2% - - 2% 2% 2% - 17,957 
United 
Kingdom 33% 15% 4% 48% 22% 6% 5% 5% - 
68,910 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 920,916 
Source: Sarzeaud et 2007 
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The enormous heterogeneity in beef production systems in the EU is emerging from 
this description and has a decisive impact on the beef production costs. The Spanish 
and Italian beef finishing farms exploit their economies of scale and intensive daily 
gain performance and reach relatively low production costs. The French cow-calf 
farmers and German bullock fatteners are in an intermediate position in the EU, 
whereas the Irish, Austrian and UK beef farmers sustain on average higher production 
costs. 
Compared to the rest of the world, EU producers are high cost producers, when the 
US is able to produce at 35% lower costs and South America has a cost difference 
with the EU equal to 55% (Agribenchmark, 2007). In the US large to very large 
feedlots prevail with daily weight gains similar to the EU beef finishers. These 
systems reaches extremely high levels of labour productivity, which reduces 
production costs significantly. The South American beef production system is based 
on a moderate herd size and a very extensive way of fattening. Here daily weight gain 
oscillate between 300 – 500 grams a day against 1.3 – 1.6 kg per day in the EU and in 
the US. Combined with the low labour costs the South American beef production 
systems are able to produce at the lowest cost in the world. 
5.5 Brief discussion of the regulations analysed 
As have been stated at the beginning of this chapter only some of the CC regulations 
and directives may potentially create costs for the beef farmers in the EU. Among the 
environmental regulations of Annex III only the Nitrate Directive can generate a cost 
burden for some of the beef farmers in the EU. The standards for the identification 
and registration of animals has been primarily set up for the cattle sector and as such 
will of course be treated in this chapter. The same holds for the prohibition of 
hormones in the EU which in comparison to the US creates an extra cost for EU beef 
producers, or in other terms represents a cost advantage for the US beef producers. 
The only disease among the animal health regulation which interferes with cattle is 
the foot and mouth disease, but its prevention does not create significant cost. Finally, 
the animal welfare regulations for calves are in particular relevant for veal calves. 
France, the Netherlands and Italy are the only relevant producers of veal in the EU. 
The standards for the protection of calves impose special requirements for calf 
housing, minimum space allowance and condition for calf feeding. These standards 
may cause substantial cost increases for existing veal calf producers who did not 
comply with the regulation.  
5.5.1 Nitrate Directive 
The main requirements established by the Nitrate directive is the respect of the limit 
of 170 N kg/ha211which may generate extra-costs for a correct manure disposal. In 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) farms exceeding maximum limit have to find extra 
land to spread excess manure, either by buying or renting land or paying a license to 
                                                 
211
  Or 250 kg N/ha on grassland in Germany and the Netherlands. 
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spread manure on land of nearby farmers. Moreover, they are obliged to invest in 
manure storage facilities due to the prohibition to spread manure in winter time. 
The evaluation of the impact deriving from a full application of Nitrate directive 
requires a preliminary analysis of the data of the structure of the prevailing beef 
farming systems in the EU, in order to detect the share of farms and the share of beef 
cattle which may be affected by the Nitrate Directive. 
5.5.1.1 Affected beef production 
From the sector structure description it turns out clear that not all beef production 
systems will be affected by the Nitrate Directive. The beef farms having a stocking 
rate of less than 1.8 LU per ha will have no problems to comply with this directive. In 
terms of farm numbers this means that 72% of the beef farmers in the EU are not 
affected. From the remaining 28% of beef farms part of the beef finishing farms and a 
small minority of cow calf farms will eventually face costs to comply with the Nitrate 
Directive, as these farms exceed 1.8 LU per ha. It should be remembered that not all 
beef farms exceeding the upper limit of 1.8 LU per ha have to transport manure 
outside their farms. In the Table 5.7 below this stocking rate has been compared to 
the maximum stocking rate allowed for beef farms within the Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones. For beef finishing farms the 1.8 LU per hectare underscores the maximum 
stocking rate in NVZ by 13% and in cow calf farms by 38%.  
Table 5.7: Comparison of 1.8 LU per hectare with maximum stocking rate 
allowed in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
 Heads per 
hectare 
N in manure Max. 
stocking rate 
in NVZ 
% 
underscoring 
of 1.8 LU 
limit 
Beef bullocks 1 – 2 
year 
2.6 58 2.93 13% 
Suckler cows  1.8 68.5 2.48 38% 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on ERM/AB-DLO (1999) 
If we presume a proportional distribution of the intensive beef farms above and below 
the maximum allowed stocking rate we can conclude that 87% of the intensive beef 
finishing farms and 62% of the intensive cow calf farms will have to face costs in 
order to comply with the Nitrate Directive. The Table 5.8 below translates these 
figures in number of farms. The outcome of this analysis reveals that in 50,301 beef 
farms (5,4% of the total number of cattle farms) in the EU-15 a cost increase can be 
expected due to the application of the Nitrate Directive. 
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Table 5.8: Number of beef farms affect by the Nitrate Directive 
 Cow calf farms Beef fattening farms 
 N. of 
farms 
% 
affected 
Affected 
farms 
N. of 
farms 
% 
affected 
Affected 
farms 
<1.4 LU/ha 188.377 0% 0 37.474 0% 0 
1.4 – 1.8 
LU/ha 
54.760 0% 0 19.126 0% 0 
>1.8 LU/ha 43.240 68% 29.403 24.021 87% 20.898 
 
However these percentages are still overestimated, because here we presume that the 
whole territory of the EU is declared as a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone. The Table 5.9 
below reports the number of beef cattle in NVZs. In Member States where only part 
of the country is designated as NVZ by means of the REGIO data bank of Eurostat it 
has been possible to estimate the number of heads of beef cattle in NVZs. According 
to this analysis 39% of suckler cows in the EU and 64% of beef fattening calves are 
raised in NVZs. 
Table 5.9: Percentage of suckler cows and of male fattening calves in the NVZs 
of the EU 
Suckler cows Male fattening calves  
Heads % in NVZ Heads % in NVZ 
France 4,148,410 23.5 1,082 53.5 
Spain 1,563,980 25.8 134 16.9 
United Kingdom 1,764,770 20.3 1,120 24.9 
Ireland 1,167,630 100.0 813 100.0 
Germany 746,800 100.0 1,242 100.0 
Belgium 534,080 37.6 175 59.2 
Italy 609,140 25.8 690 53.5 
Other EU countries 1,273,410 47.5 762 58.3 
EU-15 11,808,220 39.1 6,017 64.0 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat- Regio databank 
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Table 5.10: Share of beef farms in the EU affected by the Nitrate Directive 
 Cow calve farms Beef fattening farms EU 
 N. of farms % N. of farms % affected N. of farms 
Farms >1.8 LU/ha 43,240 100.0 24,021 100.0 67,261
Farms exceeding 170 N kg/Ha  29,403 68.0 20,898 87.0 50,301
Exceeding farms in NVZ 11.467 39.1 13.375 64.0 24,842
 Cow calve farms Beef fattening farms EU
Total EU farms 286,377 80,621 366,998
Total farms exceeding 170 N kg/Ha in NVZ 11.467 13.375 24,842
% farms exceeding 170 N kg/Ha in NVZ 4.0 16.5 6.7
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Sarzeaud et al 2007 
The Table 5.10 translates these figures in number of farms. The outcome of this 
analysis reveals that 24,842 beef farms (6.7% of the total number of cattle farms) in 
the EU-15 will face a cost increase due to the application of the Nitrate Directive. 
5.5.1.2 Impact of improved compliance with Nitrate Directive on beef 
farm costs (a case study) 
The calculation of the cost of compliance with the Nitrate Directive was carried out 
considering a typical beef finishing farm producing young bulls. The related technical 
and economic data has been drawn from the sample of beef farms built up by CRPA 
for the yearly monitoring of beef farms production costs in Italy (Ismea/CRPA, 
2006). 
The yearly slurry production of this average beef finishing farm is equal to 15,756 m3 
corresponding to a nitrogen content of 50,904 kg. Currently the farms dispose of 151 
hectares of agricultural land available for cattle slurry spreading. 
Table 5.11: Sample beef finishing farm characteristics 
TECHNICAL DATA ELEMENTS 
Finishing beef farm    
No. of young bulls present no. 1,200 
Starting weight  kg/head 370 
Final weight kg/head 640 
Finishing period days/head 210 
Net production kg 538,000 
Agricultural land at disposal hectares 151 
Source: CRPA  
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Table 5.12: Slurry production and land required for spreading 
TECHNICAL ELEMENTS 
Slurry production after storage m3/year 15,756 
Nitrogen production kg/N 50,904 
Slurry treatment Spreading on land 
UAA available  Hectares 151 
UAA to be reclaimed Hectares 75 
UAA needed for effluents disposal Hectares 226 
Source: CRPA  
Supposing first that this area is recognised as an ordinary zone, the only cost deriving 
from the current situation is given by storage and slurry distribution on own farmland. 
Now the area where the farm is located is declared as a NVZ and therefore it will be 
necessary to add farm land (75 ha) in order to respect the maximum allowed limit of 
170 kg N per hectare. This entails an extra-cost for acquiring the right of spreading on 
lands owned by others and to transport the excess manure to these farmlands that are 
supposed to be situated 15 kilometres from the beef farm. Furthermore, the size of 
basins for storing slurry must be increased up to the minimum capacity required, 
corresponding to 180 storage days. 
Table 5.13: Slurry storage and distribution costs in ordinary Zone and in VNZ 
(increase of land availability) 
COSTS  In Ordinary Zone In Vulnerable Zone
Tank size  m3 5,698  8,547 
Tank cost (31 € for m3) € 199,432  299,148 
Deprec. & Maintenance (5% of tank cost) € 9,972  14,957 
Tank load (0,11 € for m3  of slurry produced) € 1,800  1,800 
Investment interests (3,5% on tank cost) € 6.980  10,470 
Operating interests (2,9%) € 97  133 
Average storage cost  €/kg 0.035  0.051 
Average distance for distribution  m 700  7.800 
Cask wagon (capacity of 15 m3)) € 23,000  23,000 
Deprec.+ maintenance(12% of cask wagon cost) € 2,760  2,760 
Distribution cost in the farm land (0.55 €/m3) € 8,618  4,331 
Distribution cost in land far from the farm (7.00 
€/m3) 
€ _  54,869 
Investment interests (3% on cask wagon cost) € 805  805 
Operating interests (2,9%) € 143  869 
Rights of spreading (130 €/ha) € _  9,731 
Crop yield loss € _  13,718 
Average spreading cost €/kg 0.023  0.162 
TOTAL AVERAGE COST for slurry 
management €/kg 0.058 
 0.213 
Source: CRPA  
Table 5.13 reports the comparison between the slurry management cost in the two 
different situations (in ordinary zone vs. vulnerable zone) and under the hypothesis 
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that compliance with the Nitrate Directive is fulfilled through the increase of land 
availability. The total average cost is expressed per kg of live weight. 
The option to spread manure on neighbouring land may not be feasible when in the 
surrounding area the land supply is scarce and livestock farming density is high. In 
this case manure treatment systems would be needed. The treatment equipment is 
designed for reducing Nitrogen content in animal slurry (centrifuge for the solid 
fraction separation and aerator for the liquid fraction), allowing to reduce the need for 
land outside the farms from 75 to 21 hectares. Contemporarily the sale of compost 
produced through the composting of the solid fraction (separated from the liquid one) 
represents an extra revenue that in part compensates the operating costs of the 
treatment process, as presented in Table 5.14. 
This latter option does not involve significant differences with respect to the first 
(acquire spreading rights from other farmers). The average costs entailed by the two 
solutions can be compared to the total production costs as calculated by CRPA 
(Ismea/CRPA, 2006) based on a samples of typical Italian beef farms. Considering 
that the total cost in 2006 was equal to 2.57 €/kg l.w. (including the purchasing cost 
of weaners), the percentage cost increase entailed by both options can be estimated in 
5.8%. 
Table 5.14: Slurry storage, treatment and distribution costs in NVZ (investment 
in treatment equipment) 
COSTS  In Nitrate Vulnerable Zone 
Tank size  m3 7,265 
Tank cost (31 € for m3) € 254,276 
Deprec. & Maintenance (5% of tank cost) € 12,714 
Tank load (0,11 € for m3  of slurry produced) € 1,740 
Investment interests (3,5% on tank cost) € 8,900 
Operating interests (2,9%) € 116 
Average storage cost  €/kg 0.044 
Centrifuge cost  € 75,000 
Storage platform cost (650 m3 for separated solid 
fraction) 
€ 97,490 
Airing basin cost  € 31,740 
Aerator cost € 16,454 
Shovel tractor cost € 63,000 
Total investment cost for treatment equipment € 283,684 
Deprec.+ maintenance (8% of equipment cost) € 22,695 
Operating costs (composting; electricity, etc.) € 36,239 
Investment interests (3% on cask wagon cost) € 9,929 
Operating interests (2,9%) € 683 
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COSTS  In Nitrate Vulnerable Zone 
Average effluents treatment cost  €/kg 0.129 
Average distance for distribution  m 741 
Cask wagon (capacity of 15 m3)) € 23,000 
Deprec.+ maintenance(12% of cask wagon cost) € 2,760 
Cost for liquid fraction Distribution (0.55 €/m3) € 7,293 
Cost for solid fraction Distribution (1.70 €/m3) € 4,018 
Investment interests (3% on cask wagon cost) € 805 
Operating interests (2,9%) € 182 
Rights of spreading (160 €/ha) € 3,387 
Crop yield loss € 13,718 
Average spreading cost €/kg 0.060 
TOTAL AVERAGE COST for slurry management €/kg 0.233 
Compost sale €/kg 0.018 
Net AVERAGE COST for slurry management €/kg 0.215 
Source: CRPA  
5.5.1.3 Impact of improved compliance with Nitrates Directive on the 
EU beef sector 
According to the analysis of the structure and the regional distribution of cow calf and 
beef fattening farms, 3.0% of beef produced in cow calf farms and 4.2% of beef cattle 
in the finishing farms would be affected by Nitrate Directive and subjected to an 
increase of production costs. If we assume that 50% of the beef farms is already 
complying with the Nitrate Directive 1.49% of beef produced in cow calf farms and 
2.10 % of beef produced in beef fattening farms will effectively face a cost increase 
in order to attain a 100% compliance at EU level (Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.15: Cost increase for EU beef sector due to compliance with Nitrates Directive 
 Cow calf Beef fattening Total 
Total farms exceeding 170 N kg/Ha in NVZ 11.467 13.375 24.842
% of beef value* 74,5 25,5 100
% of farms affected by nitrate directive 4,0 16,5 7,2
% of beef affected 3,0 4,2 3,3
degree of compliance 50,0 50,0 50
% of affected beef 1,49 2,10 1.7
* excluding beef value produced in dairy farms 
Source: CRPA  
The cost increase for these farms  has been estimated in 0.155€ per kg beef. In order 
to estimate the impact on EU beef sector, the production cost analysis of the 
Agribenchmark coordinated by the Federal Institute for Agriculture (FAL) has been 
used. A weighted average of Agribenchmark beef farms network generates an 
average production cost of beef of € 2.67/kg in the EU. The increase for those farms 
located in NVZ which exceed the limit of 170 kg N per hectare would then be equal 
to 5.8%. The Table 5.15 shows that it interests only 1.7% of EU beef production. The 
sector cost increase will then be limited to 0.095%. 
5.5.1.4 Impact of regulations against water pollution (Clean Water 
Act) on the cattle feedlot farming in US 
In the U.S the Clean Water Act (CWA) is the primary law for the protection of the 
surface water quality. Among the other mandatory standards imposed upon US 
farmers, the regulatory tools employed by the CWA can be compared to the 
requirements established by Nitrate Directive in EU. 
Feedlot beef farming has been considered in order to estimate the costs of compliance 
with US regulations concerning water quality. Cost of compliance is related to the 
implementation of the CNMP that is required for all livestock farms recognized as 
CAFO. In case of beef farms, CAFO are feeding operations with more than 1,000 
beef cows.  
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has estimated at $14 per AU 
(Animal Unit) the average costs for developing and implementing a successful 
CNMP in specialised feedlots farms, considering an average size of 1,300 heads per 
operation. These figures are the basis for calculating the average costs of CNMP 
implementation in a typical cattle feedlot in Texas, that is the leading beef producing 
state in the U.S accounting for 27% of total beef production. For this analysis, the 
CNMP compliance costs per AU were constructed for the average size of Texas 
feedlots with more than 1,000 heads, equal to 22,462 head per farm.   
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Initially, the primary focus of CWA was on point sources of pollution from industry 
and wastewater treatment plants, but in recent years it has been expanded to include 
farming activities. Until December 15th, 2002 the federal government issued specific 
rules governing Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), defined as 
animal feeding operations with greater than 1,000 animal units (700 dairy cows, 
1,000 beef cows, 2,500 hogs, or 100,000 chickens). 
Under the recent rule, all farms designated as CAFOs are required to obtain a permit 
under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) that entails the 
implementation of a comprehensive nutrient management plan (CNMP). The 
CNMP must be specific for the operation and detail the proper management of all 
animal manure produced. It must address the assimilative capacity of the farm’s land 
for the manure and other nutrients applied to the land. The implementation of CNMPs 
often result in operations seeking additional land on which to spread manure and/or 
the use of alternative nutrient control strategies for manure. 
 
Table 5.16: Estimated expenses and CWA compliance costs for Texas feedlot, 
2007 
Expenses: $ per head %
750 lb. feeder steer 814.73 72.0
Total feed, handling, and management charge 257.52 22.8
Interest on feeder and 1/2 feed 44.63 3.9
Death loss (1% of purchase) 8.15 0.7
Total Expenses 1,125.03 99.5
CAFO CNMP costs  6.21 0.5
TOTAL COSTS 1,131.24 100.0
 
Because the average CNMP costs decrease as farm size increases, the USDA 
estimated costs per AU (14$) for all U.S. feedlots would overestimate the total costs 
for the larger feedlots. To account for the lower CNMP costs associated with larger 
feedlots, an adjustment factor was calculated. When applied to the $14 per AU cost 
for a typical US fattened cattle operation, the resulting CNMP compliance cost is 
estimated to be $7.53 per AU, or $6.21 per head. Based on the average feeder cattle 
production estimates on Texas feedlot (50,000 heads, assumed 450 pound increase in 
finishing size), the $6.21 CNMP compliance costs per head result in an estimated 
0.55% increase in total feedlot production costs, as compared to a 5.8% cost increase 
in a large feedlot in Italy which has to comply with the Nitrate Directive. 
5.5.2 Identification and Registration Directive 
From the previous research in the project it turns out that identification and 
registration of animals has a significant degree of non-compliance, with 30% non-
compliance not being an exception. A large part of the lack of compliance appeared 
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to be due to the loss of eartags, which are inherent to the EU’s current system. From 
surveys it appeared that identification and registration of animals is one of the most 
frustrating requirements to the farmers. In general non-compliance with the ovine and 
caprine animals identification and registration requirements is much higher than for 
bovine animals (based on information from France, Germany, Italy, and The 
Netherlands). Besides, the inclusion of animal identification and registration results in 
very high effort for controlling agencies (about 36 hours per farm for the RPA in 
England or 40 hours for the AID in the Netherlands, who controls most SMRs and 
soil organic matter). By far most time consuming is the check of animal identification 
especially  in extensive farms or in cattle breeding, as animals are often outside and in 
different fields and sometimes difficult to approach, compared to dairy cows kept 
indoors ( Nietsch and Osterburg, 2007 , D18). 
The SMR standard 
The EU Directives on Identification and Registration of animals (92/102/EEG, and 
Regulations 911/2004, 1760/2000, and 21/2004) imply: 
a. Eartags: 
4. Calves born on the holding (or imported from outside the EC) must be tagged 
with approved eartags with the same unique identification code. 
5. Calves must be tagged within 20 days of birth, or before they leave the 
holding, if this is sooner. Dairy calves must be tagged with one eartag within 
36 hours and the other eartag within 20 days. 
6. Eartags must not be removed or replaced without permission. Illegible or lost 
tags must be replaced within 28 days. 
b. Cattle passports: 
3. An application must be made for a cattle passport within seven days of a calf 
being tagged (that is, no more than 27 days after birth). 
4. When cattle are moved, you must ensure that they are accompanied by their 
cattle passports, which must be completed and signed. 
c. Notification: 
4. Births must be notified to the responsible authorities by an application for a 
cattle passport within seven days of tagging (that is, no more than 27 days 
after birth). 
5. Deaths must be notified to the registration authorities within seven days. 
6. Movements of cattle on and off a holding must be notified within three days. 
d. On-farm registers: 
5. Up-to-date on-farm registers must be kept with the required information 
,including births and deaths of cattle and movements of cattle on and off your 
holding. The dates of these events must also be recorded. 
6. For movements, the details of keepers who sent the cattle and to whom cattle 
are consigned must be recorded. 
7. The register must be completed within 36 hours of a movement, within seven 
days of a death and within seven days of a birth in a dairy herd (or within 30 
days of the birth of any other calf). 
8. The register must be kept for ten years and be available to the authorities on 
request. 
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Identification and registration of animals costs 
For the Council Directives related to the identification of animals the ordinary and 
cross compliance costs will be the same, hence no distinction will be made between 
them here. Essentially a farm in order to comply with the Directives will have to 
update registers and eartags continuously otherwise he will either be fined (ordinary 
compliance) and/or his single farm payment will be cut (cross compliance). The costs 
generated by the mandatory part of these directives have essentially an administrative 
nature. They are related to the time necessary to update the registers and to the 
purchase of eartags for new born calves and imported calves. 
The calculations presented here are performed by Jongeneel (2007) using a bottom-up 
approach. This approach starts at farm level (e.g. farm type, production intensity and 
a list of specific measures with the attached standardized per unit costs. Table 5.17 
provides illustrative example of this approach. The first 5 lines of the table represent 
farms’ classification according to their main conditions. Lines 7-11 identify the 
measures  (which consist of different requirements) included in specification of I&R 
regulation.  
Table 5.17: Bottom-up approach to costing the Identification and Registration of 
animals  
 Costs(€/head. Year or €/farm) 
1. Conditions  
2. Farm type Beef (bovine animals) 
3. Land base 25 ha (fictive) 
4. Number of animals  50 head (fictive) 
5. Cost of production €80000 (fictive) 
6. Specific measures  
7. Registers and eartags €5.00/animal (D 9, T.21, the Netherlands) 
8. Animal passports No information 
9. Administrative costs  
10. Record keeping 60€/farm (fictive) 
11. Strategy  
12. Selection of measures (€5.00*50 heads)+ 60=€310/farm 
13. Cost impact  
14. Estimated degree of compliance 
(before 2005) 
75.2% (D 9, T.20) 
15. Estimated degree of compliance 
(after 2005) 
93.6% (Increase 25%, D.9. T.20) 
16. % production cost increase before 
2005 
0.752(€310/€80000*100%)= +0.29% 
17. % production cost increase after 
2005 
0.25(€310/€80000*100%)=+0.1% 
 
We assume that all costs adjusted for inflation to 2005. Since the animal Registration 
and Identification (R&I) was introduced before 2005, the 2005 data should already 
include the costs impact of the regulation. This can be done in two ways:  
1) By subtracting from 2005 costs of production  the estimated costs for 
the I&R Directive multiplied by the degree of compliance before 2005 
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and from “corrected” costs of production to derive a percentage cost 
increase impact of the standard 
2) By calculating total costs associated with implementation of different 
measures for R&I Directive and based on these costs to derive a 
percentage cost increase impact of the standard before 2005 and after 
2005 ( See Lines 12-17 in Table 5.17) 
 
From Table 5.17 we can see that estimated degree of compliance has increased by 
25% after 2005 compared to before 2005 situation. Therefore, the  costs of production  
after 2005 increased by 0.1%, while in the whole period (before 2005 and after) costs 
increased by 0.39%. 
Extending this methodology to the other member states we obtain the following 
overview. The costs per head of Identification and registration include in all countries 
the time of registration, the costs of lost eartags and the update of animal passports. 
The cost between the countries vary from 1.80€ per head in France up to €5.00 per 
head in the Netherlands. 
In order to estimate the increase in production costs due to the identification and 
registration of beef cattle the production cost analysis of the Agribenchmark 
coordinated by the Federal Institute for Agriculture (FAL) has been used. 212 This 
world network calculates the production costs for beef based on typical farms in each 
of the 36 countries of the world who participate in the network. Using the total 
production costs per farm it is possible to calculate the percentage cost increase per 
kg beef to be attributed I&R of beef cattle. The seven countries listed in the Table 
5.18 represent almost 90% of beef production of the EU-15. 
  
Table 5.18: Production costs increase per kg beef related to the identification 
and registration of beef cattle 
  France Germany Italy Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom Spain Ireland 
Cost I&R per head 1) 1,80 2,92 2,20 5,00 4,20 2,20 4,20 
Production cost US$ per 
kg 2) 6,17 5,59 4,83 6,40 8,54 5,21 6,80 
Production cost € per kg 
slaughterweight 4,47 4,05 3,50 4,64 6,19 3,78 4,93 
Production cost € per kg 
liveweight 2,63 2,27 2,17 2,60 3,40 2,07 2,66 
No. of beef cattle sold per 
year 75 394 1.825 50 48 2.901 80 
Beef production per head 248 263 177 143 143 188 96 
Carcass yield 59% 56% 62% 56% 55% 55% 54% 
Beef production farm 18.500 103.592 323.362 7.150 6.887 545.373 7.690 
                                                 
212
 Within this network two project partners participate: CRPA (Italy) and WUR (Netherlands) 
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  France Germany Italy Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom Spain Ireland 
% loss 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Cost eartags 134,10 1149,02 4013,90 250,00 201,60 6381,47 336,00 
Cost of I&R per kg beef 0,007 0,011 0,012 0,035 0,029 0,012 0,044 
% cost of I&R  0,16% 0,27% 0,35% 0,75% 0,47% 0,31% 0,89% 
Beef cattle (males more 
than 1 year) '000 1.397 1.151 845 93 1.583 340 1.604 
 
Presuming an almost 100% compliance with the regulations which rule the 
identification and registration for bovine animals in the EU we obtain an average 
weighted cost increase of 0.455% for the EU-15. The variation in the cost impact of 
I&R is either due to the cost per head of registration or to the herd size. In countries 
with large herd size some economies of scale can be exploited, whereas small herds 
in Ireland are facing a more significant cost increase. 
5.5.3 Growth promoters use (hormones) 
From the beginning of 1989 the European Union implemented a ban on the imports of 
red meat from animal treated with six growth promotants, natural and synthetic, 
excluding US beef on the EU market. Unlike the continuing efforts of the US to lift 
this ban the EU continued to exclude this possibility stating that economic, 
environment and consumer concerns must be considered in addition to the scientific 
evidence. 
Council Directive 96/22/EC of 1996 is one of the 19 Directives of the CC policy. This 
directive concerns the prohibition on the use in livestockfarming of substances having 
a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of beta-agonists. In a comparative analysis with 
the US beef cattle industry at this point it is interesting to know which cost advantage 
the US beef industry enjoys using these substances, as in this country their use is 
allowed.  
It is quite clear that the use of hormones in beef fattening cattle increases average 
daily gain and improves feed efficiency. There is also evidence of drawbacks which 
hormones may cause to the carcass and eating quality, but there are growth implant 
strategies available which can considerably alleviate these concerns (Montgomery 
T.H. et.al. 2001). Hence, the positive cost decreasing impact of the use of growth 
hormones is overwhelmingly compensating the eventual negative effect on carcass 
quality. 
In a meta analysis combining information from more than 170 research trials carried 
out in the last forty years the economic impacts of pharmaceutical technologies in 
cow-calf and beef fattening farms has been assessed (Lawrence et.al. 2006?). This 
analysis was not limited only to the effect of growth hormones, but extended its 
sphere of interest to parasite control, antibiotics and ionophores. Nevertheless, the 
results of the analysis allows to isolate the effect of growth hormones on feed 
efficiency, average daily gain and production costs. Obviously, the larger the effect of 
growth hormones on production efficiency, the larger will be its effect on cost of 
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production. The effect on technical efficiency has been distinguished separately in 
beef cow herds and beef fattening farms as is shown in the Table 5.19. 
 
Table 5.19: Impact of a ban on the use of growth promotants on the technical 
efficiency in beef cow herds and beef fattening farms 
 Beef cow 
herds 
 Feedlot  
Wean rate 2.54% Average daily gain 14.13% 
Wean weight 3.07% Feed to gain (lbs feed/ lbs weight 
gain) 
-8.79% 
Overall impact on production 
costs 
7.14%   
Source: Lawrence & Ibarburu (2006) 
Taking into account the adoption rate of growth promotants which in the US is high, 
an overall impact on the production costs of a ban on growth promotants has been 
estimated in 7.14%. In other words, a ban would increase the production costs of beef 
in the US by this percentage, as the wean rate would decrease by 2.54%, the average 
daily gain would deteriorate by 14.13% and the feed conversion rate by 8.79%.  
Evidently such an increase of production costs will have severe consequences for the 
competitiveness of US beef production. 
5.6 Simulated impact on competitiveness   
5.6.1 Nitrate Directive 
The impact of full compliance with Nitrate directive have been simulated with the 
GTAP model in order to assess its effect on the competitiveness of EU beef 
production on the world market. The previous analysis has pointed out a quite limited  
impact on EU beef farms ( an increase of costs 0,095%), primarily due to the low 
share of farms that would be affected. The effects on EU beef export could be a 0.7% 
decrease in quantity, while import would raise by 0.5%. The shares on global export 
and import are expected to change respectively at the same extent. Considering the 
indirect effects on beef traded by the other exporting countries, the main advantage 
would be taken by Brazil with an increase of 0.3%. For Australia; the US and Canada 
no significant changes would occur. 
According to the previous calculations the EU-15 is facing a cost increase of 0.455% 
per kg beef for maintaining a system of identification and registration of beef cattle. 
Between EU Member States it varies from 0.16% in France up to 0.89% in Ireland.  
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Table 5.20: Effect of N-Directive on global bilateral beef export (var. % on 
quantities) 
 Importers 
Exporter EU15 Japan USA ROECD ROW Total %X 
Australia 0,53% 0,00% 0,01% 0,03% 0,08% 0,04% 0,03% 
NewZealand 0,51% -0,02% -0,02% -0,01% 0,04% 0,18% 0,16% 
EU-15 0,00% -0,75% -0,77% -0,71% -0,65% -0,67% -0,68% 
Canada 0,61% 0,01% 0,01% 0,02% 0,09% 0,04% 0,02% 
Brazil 0,52% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,09% 0,30% 0,28% 
USA 0,54% 0,01% 0,00% 0,03% 0,06% 0,04% 0,03% 
ROW 0,55% 0,00% 0,01% 0,02% 0,05% 0,30% 0,28% 
Total 0,53% -0,01% -0,03% -0,03% -0,18% 0,01% 0,00% 
%M 0,51% -0,02% -0,04% -0,04% -0,20% 0,00%  
 
5.6.2 I& R regulations 
As it is shown by the Table 5.21, a costs increase due to I&R regulations entails an 
increase of EU trade deficit in quantity: a 2.2% growth of beef imports and a decline 
of the same extent in exports. UE share on world export market would decline by 
2.2%, while a 2% increase of the share on global import is foreseen. Negative impact 
on EU beef competitiveness entails positive changes in the market share by some of 
the main beef exporting competitors.  
In particular Brazil would gain 1.1% expanding its exports by 1.2%. The 
performances of the other competitors on the world market would be affected to a 
smaller extent by the EU decline. The share gains of Canada, theUSand Australia are 
expected to be negligible. The increase of beef traded by this countries should be 
limited to less than 0,2%, due to the fact they compete on different markets than those 
where EU is engaged. Benefits would be higher for the export from the rest of the 
world, that on the whole should raise by 1.2%  
Combining the effects of both standards (Nitrate Directive and I%R) , an overall 
decrease of 3.7% would affect EU export. The loss in quantity on the Japanese market 
would be equal to 2.64% while export towards other OECD would decrease by 
2.54%. On the whole Brazil would gain 1.4% of his global market share, while in 
terms of share gains the advantages for other main world competitors, such as 
Australia, Canada and USA would be negligible.  
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Table 5.21: Effects of I&R of beef cattle on global bilateral beef export (var. % on 
quantities) 
Exporter EU15 Japan USA ROECD ROW Total Export 
Australia 2,44% 0,00% 0,03% 0,06% 0,25% 0,16% 
New Zealand 2,17% -0,11% -0,09% -0,06% 0,11% 0,74% 
EU-15 0,00% -2,00% -2,01% -1,86% -2,15% -2,12% 
Canada 2,28% 0,01% 0,04% 0,07% 0,31% 0,13% 
Brazil 2,18% 0,00% 0,01% 0,04% 0,28% 1,22% 
USA 2,14% 0,02% 0,00% 0,07% 0,21% 0,14% 
ROW 2,25% 0,01% 0,03% 0,05% 0,16% 1,21% 
Total Import 2,21% -0,03% -0,08% -0,07% -0,61% 0,12% 
 
Table 5.22: Effects of Nitrate Directive + I&R of beef cattle on global bilateral 
beef export (var. % on quantities) 
 Importers 
Exporter EU15 Japan USA ROECD ROW Total 
Australia 2,95% 0,01% 0,04% 0,08% 0,33% 0,20% 
New Zealand 2,67% -0,14% -0,11% -0,07% 0,14% 0,91% 
EU-15 0,00% -2,67% -2,73% -2,54% -2,74% -2,73% 
Canada 2,81% 0,02% 0,05% 0,09% 0,39% 0,17% 
Brazil 2,67% -0,02% 0,02% 0,07% 0,36% 1,51% 
USA 2,66% 0,02% 0,00% 0,09% 0,26% 0,18% 
ROW 2,77% 0,01% 0,04% 0,08% 0,20% 1,50% 
Total 2,72% -0,03% -0,10% -0,10% -0,78% 0,13% 
  
5.6.3 Growth promoters use (hormones) 
As has been analysed in the previous paragraph dedicated to the use of growth 
promoters in the US a ban on its use would provoke an increase of production costs of 
7.14%.  Evidently such an increase of production costs will have severe consequences 
for the competitiveness of US beef production on the world market. 
According to the simulations carried out with the GTAP model a ban on growth 
promotants would cause an increase of imports of beef in the US of 32%, whereas 
exports of US beef would decline by 36%. It is important to stress that the production 
of beef in the US would decline by 5%. The gap left by the US on the Japanese 
import market will by filled by primarily by Australia.  
The decline of American beef production will create increased imports from Australia 
and Canada. Also the rest of the OECD countries will import more as the US will 
loose 41% of its exports on these markets. 
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Table 5.23: Effect hormone ban in the US, percentage change 
 EU-15 Japan USA ROECD ROW Total 
Australia -1% 20% 32% 23% 4% 19% 
NewZealand -1% 19% 31% 22% 5% 12% 
EU-15 0% 22% 34% 25% 4% 8% 
Canada 0% 20% 32% 23% 2% 27% 
Brazil 1% 21% 34% 25% 3% 5% 
USA -45% -33% 0% -32% -41% -35% 
ROW 1% 21% 34% 24% 8% 11% 
Total -3% -10% 32% -12% -3% 2% 
 
Focusing the attention only on the EU-15 one notices an increase of exports of the EU 
of 6% on the world market and a decrease of imports of 3%. In this new situation the 
EU-15 will remain a net importer of beef but will slightly improve its competitive 
position. 
5.6.4 Combined effect of standards on external competitiveness  
Four scenarios, all targeting at full compliance, are summarised in Table 5.24. Only 
the effects on EU-15 are emphasised, presenting the total EU import and export, 
which is further detailed by countries receiving imports from the EU-15. (Note that 
the EU-15 impact is based on the costs increases as calculated for the selected 
member states, which comprise the main part of EU dairy production). 
Table 5.24: Percentage changes in trade due to full compliance to various 
standards 
exports of which to…  Scenario EU 
Import 
EU 
Export Japan USA Rest of 
OECD 
Rest of 
World 
Total 
world 
trade 
1 Nitrate EU:  100% 0.53 -0.67 -0.75 -0.77 -0.71 -0.65 0.01
2 I&R EU: 100% 2.21 -2.12 -2.00 -2.01 -1.86 -2.15 0.12
3 Nitrate EU:  100% and I&R EU: 100% 2.72 -2.73 -2.67 -2.73 -2.54 -2.74 0.13
 
The previous analysis on the impact of Nitrate Directive (see scenario 1) has pointed 
out a quite limited  impact on EU beef farms (an increase of costs 0.095%), primarily 
due to the low share of farms that would be affected. The effects on EU beef export 
could be a 0.7% decrease in quantity, while import would raise by 0.5%. The shares 
on global export and import are expected to change respectively at the same extent. 
Considering the indirect effects on beef traded by the other exporting countries, the 
main advantage would be taken by Brazil with an increase of 0.3%. For Australia; the 
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US and Canada no significant changes would occur. According to the previous 
calculations the EU-15 is facing a cost increase of 0.455% per kg beef for 
maintaining a system of identification and registration of beef cattle. Between EU 
Member States it varies from 0.16% in France up to 0.89% in Ireland.  
As it is shown by Scenario 2, costs increase due to I&R regulations entails an increase 
of EU trade deficit in quantity: a 2.2% growth of beef imports and a decline of the 
same extent in exports. EU share on world export market would decline by 2.2%, 
while a 2% increase of the share on global import is foreseen. Negative impact on EU 
beef competitiveness entails positive changes in the market share by some of the main 
beef exporting competitors. Going further into details it can be concluded that in 
particular Brazil would gain 1.1% expanding its exports by 1.2%. The performances 
of the other competitors on the world market would be affected to a smaller extent by 
the EU decline. The share gains of Canada, the US and Australia are expected to be 
negligible. The increase of beef traded by this countries should be limited to less than 
0,2%, due to the fact they compete on different markets than those where EU is 
engaged. Benefits would be higher for the export from the rest of the world, that on 
the whole should raise by 1.2%  
Combining the effects of both standards in Scenario 3 (Nitrate Directive and I&R), an 
overall decrease of 3.7% would affect EU export. The loss in quantity on the Japanese 
market would be equal to 2.64% while export towards other OECD would decrease 
by 2.54%. On the whole Brazil would gain 1.4% of his global market share, while in 
terms of share gains a the advantages for other main world competitors, such as 
Australia, Canada and USA would be negligible.  
As has been analysed in section 5.5.3 dedicated to the use of growth promoters, in the 
US a ban on its use would most likely provoke an increase of production costs. 
Evidently such an increase of production costs will have significant consequences for 
the competitiveness of US beef production on the world market. The work is ongoing 
to simulate this scenario in the GTAP model. Conceptual workaround is needed to 
correctly specify the model parameters. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Within the EU beef is produced in a wide range of farming systems, ranging for the 
extensive cow calf farms in Ireland, the UK and the centre of France down to the very 
intensive beef fattening systems located in Italy and Spain. The Nitrate Directive 
affects 4.2% of beef cattle raised in intensive finishing farms and 3.0% of beef 
produced on cow calf farms. This low percentage of farms affected by the Nitrate 
Directive explains the limited sector cost increase, which has been estimated in 
0.095%. Evidently this relatively low cost impact does not have significant 
consequences for the competitive position of the EU beef production on the world 
market. The actual trade deficit in beef of the EU would increase, as exports would 
fall by 0.68% and imports would rise by 0.51%. The country which would benefit 
most of this situation is Brazil increasing its global exports by 0.28% and in particular 
to the EU (+0.52%). 
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More incisive for the beef farms are the regulations concerning the identification and 
registration of beef cattle. Implemented as a reaction to the BSE crisis the beef 
farmers have to register all cattle movements and make sure that all animals are 
correctly identified form birth up to the slaughterhouse. According to the estimates 
carried out these important measures generate a cost increase for the beef farms of 
0.454% in the EU. Naturally this stronger rise in production costs affects EU trade 
more considerably. Beef imports will grow by 2.2% and exports will decline with the 
same percentage. Again Brazil can exploit most this decline of EU competitiveness 
increasing its exports to the EU with 2.18% and its global exports with 1,1%. The 
other competitors on the world market would benefit much less.  
Finally, a ban on the use of growth hormones in the US can have a very strong effect 
on beef production costs which would rise by 7.14%. Such a production cost increase 
will have a disruptive effect on the competitiveness of US beef production on the 
world market. Its exports would decline by 36% to those countries which already now 
import American beef. 
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6 The impact of standards on the competitiveness of the EU 
with respect to pigs and poultry 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to the pigs and poultry sector and to the impact of those Directives 
and Regulations that, being applicable to pigs and poultry farms, may affect the 
competitiveness of the EU sector with respect to its main competitors in world market. As a 
preliminary remark, it is important to underline that only some pig and poultry farmers are 
involved in the CC policy, because the large majority is not eligible for a single farm 
payment. This is the case of those farms which did not mature any direct payment in the past 
due to the fact that within the poultry and pigmeat Common Market Organisation (CMO), no 
direct/coupled support to income were foreseen. Therefore, for this group of farmers no 
penalties could be imposed in terms of reduction of a single farm payment. In case of no 
compliance they are only subjected to fines provided by the national application of the EU 
directives. Hence, two groups of farms can be distinguished here: 
 A minority of pig and poultry farmers in the EU which grow only forage crops or 
other crops which did not mature any direct farm payment in the past. As these 
farmers do not receive any decoupled payment, they will not be subjected to the 
controls put in place for the cross-compliance policy.  
 The large majority of pig and poultry farmers growing arable crops or raising dairy, 
beef cows or sheep which have matured rights for direct income support in the past 
flowing into the single farm payment. These farmers are fully involved in the cross-
compliance obligations. 
The distinction made here does only hold for the cross compliance policy controls. Obviously 
all pig and poultry farmers have to comply with the regulations and directives of Annex III 
anyhow, as these are mandatory for many years. The only difference is that for the first group 
of farmers no penalty is foreseen in terms of a reduction of the single farm payment, but in 
case of non-compliance these farmers are subjected to national fines put in place by the 
national application of the directives. Therefore in the competitiveness analysis we will take 
account of all farmers, independently of their degree of involvement in cross-compliance. 
All directives and regulations of cross-compliance can generate potentially costs to pig and 
poultry farmers, but compared to other production sectors only very few have significant cost 
implications and then almost exclusively for pig farmers. Poultry farmers are only marginally 
affected by cross compliance. For example the animal welfare regulations mentioned in 
Annex III do only refer to calves and pigs. All the specific animal welfare regulations of the 
EU for broilers and laying hens are outside the framework of cross-compliance. Only the 
Nitrate Directive may have cost implications for poultry farmers. Therefore in the following 
we will concentrate our analysis on pig farms in the EU. 
Overlooking the list of regulations and directives considerable cost implications for pigs are 
foreseen for compliance with the Nitrate Directive and with the standards for Animal Welfare 
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(Table 3.1 of chapter 3). All other regulations have only a minor or negligible cost impact on 
pig farms. Hence, focus in this chapter will be on these two directives and on similar 
legislation in vigour in the USA and Canada.  
Before presenting the cost implications and the consequences for competitiveness of 
compliance with the Nitrate Directive and Animal Welfare legislation, a description will be 
given of the major trade flows of pigmeat in the world and of the pig farm structure in the EU, 
the US and Canada. The analysis of the structure of pig farms already will give an indication 
of how many pig farms will be affected by the Nitrate Directive. After the presentation of the 
cost analysis, simulations will be carried out of the effect of a cost increase on 
competitiveness due to the compliance with the Nitrate Directive and the Animal Welfare 
Directive. 
 
6.1.1 Trade patterns and the effect of non-tariff trade barriers 
World trade in pigmeat is highly developed and increases significantly following the progress 
in trade liberalisation. The major exporting countries on the world market are the USA, 
Canada, the EU and Brazil. A striking feature is the significant export of pork from Canada to 
the US and the strong export flow of the US to Japan. These three countries are heavily 
interdependent on the pigmeat market and the US and Canada are particularly integrated. The 
major world importer of pig meat is Japan, which purchases pig meat in the US, Canada and 
the EU. On this important market the European and North American products compete. 
Russia is ranking second among the importing countries of pig meat in the world. Here the 
interests of the EU clash with the increasing flows of pig meat coming from Brazil. This 
country has a rapid growing pig meat industry and is able to export a significant share of its 
production.  
Within the EU the most important exporter on the world market is Denmark which alone 
accounts for over 40% of EU-15 exports. This country is followed by exporting countries like 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, which primarily are involved in intra-EU trade. Italy is 
a strong pig meat importing country, as its self sufficiency rate is just 60%. 
 
The information on import and export flows does not distinguish between fresh and processed 
meat. For most of the countries trade in pig meat refers to the fresh or refrigerated product, 
but countries as Spain and Italy, although being net importers, contemporarily are relevant 
export countries of processed pig meat products such as cured and cooked hams and salamis.
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 195 
 
 
Figure 6.1: World trade flows in pigmeat 2006 Source: GIRAFOOD, 2006 
 
Red arrow: decrease forecast in n+1 
Black arrow: no significant change 
Blue arrow: increase forecast in n+1 
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Figure 6.2: World pork imports 2004-2007 
Source: GIRAFOOD, 2006 
As the dynamics of world trade is concerned a continuous increase is to be noticed on the 
Russian market with Brazil capturing a growing share in Russian imports. A second growing 
import market is China, although this country represents only 25% of the import quantity of 
Russia. The growing demand for pigmeat in this country is satisfied for a great deal by an rise 
in domestic production. As has already been mentioned Japan ranks first in the world among 
the pig meat importing countries, but in the last two years imports declined slightly. 
Exports of pig meat in 2007 will reach about 5 million tons increasing by about 9% compared 
to 2004. Interesting to note is that in the last four years the US has outstripped the EU in 
export volume, growing from 1 million to 1.4 million tons in 2007. In the same period the EU 
exports of pigmeat remained stable around 1.25 million tons. The increased competitive 
advantage of the American pig meat industry can be attributed to the declining value of the 
dollar with respect to the Euro. Brazilian exports tend to increase year by year. In 2006 the 
growth has been interrupted by an outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease which blocked their 
exports to Russia. In that year the EU took over the Brazilian share on the Russian market 
reducing the exports to Japan leaving more market space for the US and Canada.  
From this overview it becomes clear that although there is an underlying structure in world 
trade of pigmeat trade flows can be redirected as a consequence of the outbreak of diseases in 
some parts of the world. Similar observations have been done when commenting the world 
trade in beef. 
Fig SYN-PK 6  Pork importers 2004-2007 (incl. live, '000 t cwe)  
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Figure 6.3: World pork exports 2004-2007 
 
Source: GIRAFOOD, 2006 
 
Finally of interest is the weight of imports and exports on the total national availability of 
pigmeat in the single competing countries. As the importing countries are concerned in period 
1995 – 2007 the Eastern European countries (CEECs) had to cover their needs with increasing 
imports of pigmeat. A similar development took place in Japan where imports represent 
almost 50% of total consumption. The US is gradually importing more pigmeat and in 
particular from Canada. 
 
For the same period exports shares have been analysed. Striking to this respect is the growing 
exports of Canada which exceeds in 2006 60% of its total availability. EU export demand is 
very small compared to domestic EU demand not accounting for more than 5%, with 
Denmark being in the major exporter. Nevertheless the temporary closure of an export market 
due to non-tariff trade barriers related to diseases or other disrupting factors immediately can 
have severe consequences for the internal EU market as pigmeat prices react very rapidly to 
such an oversupply of pigmeat on the domestic market. 
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Figure 6.4: Supply structure of pigmeat importing countries 
Fig SYN-PK 11:  Supply structure amongst pigmeat importers, 1995-2007
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Source: GIRAFOOD, 2006 
 
Figure 6.5: Demand structure of pigmeat exporting countries 
Fig SYN-PK 12:  Demand structure amongst pigmeat exporters, 1995-2007
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6.1.2 Sector structure 
6.1.2.1 Pig farms in the EU 
A common characteristic of pig production in many countries is its high concentration near 
urban agglomerations and the predominance of medium to large pig farms. Nevertheless 
significant differences among EU countries can be noted, but also between the EU, the US 
and Canada. In some countries medium sized family farms prevail, but in others large highly 
concentrated industry-like enterprises dominate the scene. In the Table 6.1 information is 
provided about pig farm structure of the first eleven pig producing countries in the EU. These 
eleven countries represent 84% of total pig population of the EU-25. 
The strongest farm structure with a high percentage of pigs raised on farms with more than 
1,000 heads is to be found in Italy (75%), Denmark (71%), the United Kingdom (62%), 
Hungary (58%) and Spain (56%). In this first group of countries hired labour will prevail on 
the pig farms and often the farm is run by companies. The large farm structure gives the 
opportunity at one side to exploit economies of scale, but at the other side environmental 
problems may arise which may generate costs for manure disposal. 
A second group is composed of countries having a strong presence of pigs raised in the 
middle size class of 500 – 1,000 pigs per farm. Here the family farm type predominates. The 
reduced presence of scale economies is often compensated in these pig farms by a high 
technical efficiency. Countries belonging to this group are Germany (31%), France (39%), 
Belgium (41%) and the Netherlands (22%). 
At the lower end of the size scale we can find Poland and Austria where the large majority of 
pigs are produced on small farms of 500 pigs and less. This size class has a share on total pig 
population of 84% and 75% respectively. 
Table 6.1: Number of pigs in the first eleven EU countries 
  Heads less than 499  499 to 999  more than 1,000 
1 Germany 26.857.820 9.981.250 8.222.820 8.653.750 
2 Spain 22.776.700 6.585.220 3.357.720 12.833.760 
3 Poland 17.716.940 14.812.200 942.800 1.961.940 
4 France 14.792.820 2.985.200 5.737.100 6.070.520 
5 Denmark 13.466.280 1.080.140 2.843.930 9.542.210 
6 Netherlands 11.311.560 3.947.640 2.498.110 4.865.810 
7 Italy 8.757.640 1.351.920 838.730 6.566.990 
8 Belgium 6.318.210 1.115.680 2.580.930 2.621.600 
9 United Kingdom 4.860.410 941.180 913.540 3.005.690 
10 Hungary 3.859.720 1.462.350 139.640 2.257.730 
11 Austria 3.147.230 2.363.520 695.090 88.620 
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  % % % % 
1 Germany 100 37 31 32 
2 Spain 100 29 15 56 
3 Poland 100 84 5 11 
4 France 100 20 39 41 
5 Denmark 100 8 21 71 
6 Netherlands 100 35 22 43 
7 Italy 100 15 10 75 
8 Belgium 100 18 41 41 
9 United Kingdom 100 19 19 62 
10 Hungary 100 38 4 58 
11 Austria 100 75 22 3 
 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat data – Farm Structure Survey 2005 
 
6.1.2.2 Structure of US pig farms 
The structure of the U.S. pork industry has changed markedly in the last several years. 
Although inventory dropped in the late 1990's, it has risen steadily to its present level of 
almost 63 million head since then. What is most remarkable is the steady decrease in the 
number of farms, which has decreased to roughly one tenth the number of farms twenty-five 
years ago. Compared to pig farm structure in the EU the US has the largest pig farms 
concentrating 90% of pigs on farms having more than 1,000 pigs and 54% of pigs on farms 
with more than 5,000 pigs. These last types of farms account for only 2.5% of the farms. At 
the same time almost 40% of U.S. pig farms have less than 99 pigs, but these farms only 
account for 1% of the pig population.  
Vertical integration is common in the US pig industry, which has had the fastest rate of 
growth of CAFOs.  Graph 5.7 shows that the greatest concentration of pigs exist in the 
Northcentral states, lead by Iowa and Minnesota, as well as in North Carolina, where recent 
breaches of large manure lagoons have caused serious environmental concerns. Air quality 
and odour control have become important issues facing large-scale pig production in many 
regions of the country. The top five pork producing states produce more than 60% of the 
nation's pork supply. Iowa ranks number one in pork production in the United States with a 
total of 17.8 million pigs, or 22% of U.S. production in 2004. In 2005 Iowa's pigmeat 
production represented about $4.3 billion in cash receipts 213. 
                                                 
213
 2005 Livestock Summary, NASS Statistical Bulletin. 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Iowa/Publications/Annual_Statistical_Bulletin/2006/06_7
6.pdf 
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Figure 6.6: Structure of US pig farms 
Source: USDA-NASS 2-2-2007  
 
Table 6.2: Numbers of pigs marketed in the first 10 states of the USA 
State 
Head Marketed 
(1000) % of total 
Iowa 22,223 21.91% 
North Carolina 13,295 13.71% 
Minnesota 9,201 9.49% 
Illinois 8,300 8.56% 
Indiana 6,906 7.12% 
Nebraska 6,397 6.60% 
Missouri 5,934 6.12% 
Ohio 3,238 3.34% 
South Dakota 2,260 2.33% 
Kansas 2,404 2.07% 
Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service database. 
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Figure 6.7: Spatial distribution of pig production in the USA 
 
 
6.2 Nitrate directive 
The main requirements established by the Nitrate directive is the respect of the limit of 170 N 
kg/ha214which may generate extra-costs for a correct manure disposal. In Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones (NVZ) farms exceeding the maximum limit have to find extra land to spread excess 
manure, either by buying or renting land or paying a license to spread manure on land of 
nearby farmers. Moreover, they are obliged to invest in manure storage facilities due to the 
prohibition to spread manure in winter time. 
The evaluation of the impact deriving from a full application of. Nitrate directive requires a 
preliminary analysis of the data of the structure of poultry and pig farming systems in order to 
detect the share of enterprises and the share of pigs and poultry affected by the SMRs, which 
significantly differ among European countries.  
To assess how many pigs farms potentially are affected by the Nitrate Directive the following 
stepwise procedure has been followed: 
1. calculate for the main producing countries the number of farms which have a stocking 
rate per hectare exceeding the limit of 170 kg N per hectare 
2. estimate the number of pigs raised within Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
                                                 
214
  Or 250 kg N/ha on grassland in Germany and the Netherlands. 
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Then, a literature inventory has enabled to establish the cost increase related to compliance 
with the Nitrates Directive for a typical pig farm in each of the selected countries. The degree 
of compliance resulting from the national analyses has permitted to estimate the percentage 
cost increase at sector level. 
6.2.1 Affected farms 
In the following an analysis will be presented containing an estimate of the pig farms in the 
EU which will be affected by the Nitrate Directive. In order to establish this figure we have 
chosen to concentrate our attention on the most important Member States in the EU-15. In the 
new member states the Nitrate Directive will be introduced in the next years, but it is well 
known that the old member states are struggling with its implementation since 1991. 
The countries selected for the present analysis are listed in the Table 6.3  below, which 
demonstrates that together they represent 90.9 % of the pig population in the EU and 90.8% 
of pig production. 
Table 6.3: Share in pig production and pig population of the EU-15 
  % of pig  % of pig 
 t production n. pigs population 
Belgium 1.006.217 5,6 6.147 5,0 
Denmark 1.748.576 9,7 13.613 11,0 
France 2.262.789 12,5 15.009 12,1 
Germany 4.662.221 25,8 26.602 21,5 
Italy 1.556.059 8,6 9.281 7,5 
Netherlands 1.229.813 6,8 11.220 9,1 
Spain 3.229.623 17,9 26.034 21,0 
United Kingdom 696.549 3,9 4.691 3,8 
Other EU 1.658.112 9,2 11.326 9,1 
EU 15 18.049.959 100,0 123.923 100,0 
Source: Eurostat 
In other to assess how many pigs farms potentially are affected by the Nitrate Directive the 
following stepwise procedure has been followed: 
1. calculate for each of the eight countries the number of pigs on farms which have a 
stocking rate per hectare exceeding the limit of 170 kg N per hectare 
2. estimate for each of the eight countries the number of pigs in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
For the first step the single country data have been processed of the Farm Structure Survey 
(FSS), whereas the second step of the analysis has been carried out using the REGIO 
databank. Both the FSS and REGIO databank are made available by Eurostat. The four tables 
below (Table 6.4-6.7) represent the summary table of the eight EU Member States together. 
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Table 6.4: Number of pigs per herd size classes and per UAA classes  in the first 8 EU countries , 
2005 
  Total less than 50 50-99 100-199 more than 200 
0 ha 11.321.500 3.732.870 149.910 534.390 6.904.330 
0-2 ha 4.122.720 1.968.420 127.560 387.210 1.615.440 
2-5 ha 4.638.180 1.980.760 97.120 447.530 2.093.570 
5-10 ha 5.843.730 2.656.510 195.310 793.690 2.235.080 
10-20 ha 9.532.370 4.241.900 575.680 1.299.310 3.398.620 
20-30 ha 8.356.460 3.391.230 743.390 1.522.270 2.722.760 
30-50 ha 14.312.040 5.535.380 1.560.490 3.176.080 4.039.060 
50-100 ha 22.995.020 9.592.570 1.907.890 4.697.640 6.832.340 
More than 100ha 28.019.390 9.450.090 783.000 2.267.640 15.518.660 
Total 109.141.410 42.515.440 6.140.350 15.125.760 45.359.860 
% share 100,0 39,0 5,6 13,9 41,6 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat Farm Structure Survey 2005 
  
From this overview it turns out that in these eight countries 39% of pigs are raised on farms 
with less than 50 sows, 5.6% on farms with 50-99 sows, 13.9% with 100- 199 sows and 
41.6% on large farms having more than 200 sows. In the following Table 6.5 the number of 
farms raising pigs is indicated. 
Table 6.5: Number of farms per herd size and per UAA classes in the first 8 EU 
countries, 2005 
UAA Total less than 50 50-99 100-199 more than 200 
0 ha 7.420 4.620 320 630 1.850 
0-2 ha 52.760 51.460 260 360 680 
2-5 ha 66.770 65.330 210 400 830 
5-10 ha 55.490 53.460 470 750 810 
10-20 ha 59.670 55.670 1.470 1.270 1.260 
20-30 ha 31.810 27.390 1.630 1.700 1.090 
30-50 ha 40.480 32.230 3.220 3.240 1.790 
50-100 ha 44.100 33.670 3.440 4.210 2.780 
more than 100ha 28.370 20.630 1.520 2.180 4.040 
Total 386.870 344.460 12.540 14.740 15.130 
% share 100,0 89,0 3,2 3,8 3,9 
Total 282 123 490 1.026 2.998 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat Farm Structure Survey 2005 
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The EU counts a huge number of farms where pigs are reared, but most of these farms (89.0)  
do not have more than 50 sows, whereas 3.9% of farms account for more than 40% of the pigs 
produced. Obviously the small farms often are mixed livestock farms and the large pig farms 
are specialised professional farms. The average herd size of these large farms reaches almost 
three 3,000 pigs per farm. 
Dividing the average herd size in pigs per farm by the average size in terms of hectares of 
UAA we obtain the stocking rate per hectare in number of pigs per hectare for each of the 
herd size and UAA classes. 
Table 6.6: Average number of pigs per hectare per per herd size and per UAA classes 
Hectares  less than 50 50-99 100-199 
more than 
200 
0,5 3.052 1.616 937 1.696 7.464 
1 78 38 491 1.076 2.376 
2,5 28 12 185 448 1.009 
7,5 14 7 55 141 368 
15 11 5 26 68 180 
25 11 5 18 36 100 
40 9 4 12 25 56 
75 7 4 7 15 33 
200 5 2 3 5 19 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat Farm Structure Survey 2005 
 
According to the nitrate excretion per pig and per sow it follows that the maximum of 170 kg 
N per hectare valid in the Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) corresponds to 17 pigs per hectare. 
In other terms, farms having a stocking rate above 17 pigs/ha and located in NVZs will have 
to find extra land to spread excess manure or pig slurry, either by buying or renting land or 
paying a license to spread manure on land of nearby farmers. Moreover, these farmers will 
have to invest in manure storage facilities as in NVZ there is the prohibition to spread manure 
in winter time. Finally these pig farmers are obliged to present a manure management plan 
which details how and where the manure produced on the farms has been distributed. 
Evidently these obligations for pig farmers in NVZs will generate extra costs which are 
directly to be imputed as an effect of the implementation of the Nitrate Directive. Although 
there are some differences between Member States in application of the Directive, these are 
the three main measures livestock farmers will have to take in order to comply with the 
Nitrate Directive.  
Turning to the tables presented above, it is possible to calculate the number of pigs which are 
raised on farms exceeding the maximum of 17 pigs per hectare by summing up the number of 
pigs reported in Table 6.5 using the grey area of Table 6.6. 
This calculation has been carried out for each of the eight countries listed in Table 6.3 which 
represent more than 90% of pig production in the EU-15. It is interesting to note that in some 
countries a large majority of pigs are raised on farms exceeding the 170 kg N per hectare like 
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the Netherlands (79%), Belgium (60%) and Italy (58%). At the opposite side we find a 
country like Denmark which is characterised by a large pig farm structure, but with a very 
low percentage of pigs (10%) on farms with a stocking rate above the limits indicated by the 
Nitrate Directive. This has certainly to be attributed to the more equal territorial distribution 
of pigs farms in Denmark and to the strict application of the Nitrate Directive which has 
imposed an upper limit of 140 kg N/ha and the obligation for Danish pigs farms to own of 
rent the land on which the slurry is to be spread.  
Table 6.7: Percentage of pigs farms and percentage of pigs affect by the Nitrate 
Directive in case the whole country is defined as a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone,  2005 
  B DK DE ES 
% pigs in NVZ 3.400 600 4.800 29.520 
Total number of farms 7.710 8.890 88.680 115.760 
% of farms affected 44,1 6,7 5,4 25,5 
Number of pigs 3.809.620 1.470.300 4.558.380 7.108.630 
Total number of pigs 6.318.220 13.466.290 26.857.800 22.776.690 
% of pigs affected 60,3 10,9 17,0 31,2 
  FR IT NL UK 
Number of farms 2.060 1.790 5.780 5.860 
Total number of farms 41.890 102.790 9.690 11.460 
% of farms affected 4,9 1,7 59,6 51,1 
Number of pigs 4.663.130 5.084.480 8.978.870 1.751.360 
Total number of pigs 14.792.810 8.757.640 11.311.560 4.860.400 
% of pigs affected 31,5 58,1 79,4 36,0 
  Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat Farm Structure Survey 2005 
 
Up till now we have presumed that the whole country is defined as Nitrate Vulnerable Zone. 
Although this is true for countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, in the other 
five countries only parts of the country are delimited as a NVZ. Therefore, in the second step 
of the calculations it has been necessary to estimate the number of pigs present in the NVZs 
of these five countries. 
In France two departments are for 100% located in an NVZ (Bretagne and Pays de la Loire), 
others are only partially designated as a NVZ (Poitou-Charentes, Basse Normandie). The 
number of pigs present in NVZ in France is therefore estimated in 75%.  
Table 6.8: Estimate of the percentage of pigs in Nitrate Vulnerable Zone in France,  
2005 
  n.pigs % in NVZ n.pigs in NVZ % on total 
France 15.123       
Haute-Normandie 154 80% 123   
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  n.pigs % in NVZ n.pigs in NVZ % on total 
Basse-Normandie 582 80% 466   
Pays de la Loire  1.726 100% 1.726   
Bretagne 8.589 100% 8.589   
Poitou-Charentes 398 90% 358   
Total 11.449   11.262 74,5 
                      Source: REGIO databank Eurostat 
 
In Spain a scattered pattern of NVZs is found where several Comunidads are only partially 
designated as a NVZ. The estimate for this country of pigs in NVZs is 24%. In Italy the most 
recent delimitation of NVZs interests Lombardy, Veneto, Piemonte and Emilia-Romagna, the 
northern regions where most of the pigs are produced of the country. Here about 64% of pigs 
is estimated to be located in NVZs.  
  
For the UK the estimate of pigs in NVZs is 66% and in Belgium 100%. As has already been 
stated the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark are fully designated as Nitrate Vulnerable 
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Zones. Multiplying the previous percentages of affected pigs (under hypothesis whole country 
is an NVZ) with the estimated percentage of pigs in the effective NVZs one obtains the share 
of pigs on the total population which are raised on farms which exceed the limit of 170 kg N 
per hectare.  
Table 6.9: Share of pigs affected by the Nitrate Directive in selected countries (2005) 
  BE DK DE ES 
Total pigs (heads) 6,318,220 13,466,290 26,857,800 22,776,690 
% pigs raised in NVZ 100.0 100.0 100.0 24.3 
% of pigs affected 60.3 10.9 17.0 7,6 
Pigs affected (heads) 3,809,620 1,470,300 4,558,380 1,727,397 
 
    
  FR IT NL UK 
Total pigs (heads) 14,792,810 8,757,640 11,311,560 4,860,400 
% pigs raised in NVZ 74.5 64.2 100.0 66.1 
% of pigs affected 23.5 37.2 79.4 23.8 
Pigs affected (heads) 3,474,032 3,264,236 8,978,870 1,157,649 
Source: Elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat Farm Structure Survey and REGIO databank 2005 
 
6.3 Calculation of impact of improved compliance on costs 
6.3.1 Sector cost increase due to Nitrate Directive in the EU 
In several countries the costs have been calculated of pig farmers which have to face in order 
to comply with the Nitrate Directive. A literature inventory has enabled to establish the cost 
increase related to compliance with the Nitrate Directive in each of the eight countries. 
Aggregating these cost estimates to the pig production cost calculations of Interpig, a network 
of European research institutes coordinated by the Meat and Livestock Commission and the 
British Pig Executive, it is possible to calculate the percentage cost increase per kg pigmeat. 
Table 6.10: Production costs of pigmeat and percentage cost increase 
 BE DK DE ES FR IT NL UK 
Feed 0,685 0,680 0,696 0,852 0,730 0,994 0,693 0,814 
Breeding, vet/med and energy 0,094 0,105 0,159 0,122 0,109 0,115 0,143 0,109 
Labour 0,125 0,165 0,200 0,124 0,177 0,137 0,174 0,199 
Building, finance and misc 0,342 0,468 0,475 0,409 0,397 0,367 0,452 0,617 
Total costs 1,245 1,418 1,530 1,508 1,413 1,613 1,461 1,740 
Compliance costs with Nitrate 
Directive (€/kg) 0,076 0,046 0,059 0,076 0,087 0,134 0,044 0,090 
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 BE DK DE ES FR IT NL UK 
% cost increase 3,500 3,212 3,856 8,871 6,156 8,295 2,981 5,179 
Sources: - total pig production costs: BPEX, Pig Production Costs in Europe, 2005- the compliance 
costs are derived for Denmark: M.G. Christiansen, Danish Meat, 2007 Germany: Landwirtschaftliches 
Wochenblatt 7/2003 France : Gourmelen & Rieu (2006) Italy: De Roest, Montanari & Corradini 
(2007) Netherlands: De Hoop et.al. LEI (2004) UK: Penlington, MLC (2007) 
The presented cost increases are valid for those pig farms which do not yet comply with the 
Nitrate Directive. Of course the degree of compliance among the different Member States 
differ significantly. In Italy where only recently an acceleration of the implementation is 
taking place the degree of compliance can be estimated in only 20%, but in Denmark where 
since a longer time a rather strict application has been imposed on livestock farmers the 
degree of compliance is very high. According to the assessments carried out in the country 
reports other countries reach degrees of compliance in between these two extreme values. In 
the Netherlands f.e. a manure agreement is underway to be implemented (De Hoop et.al., 
2004) 
In order to obtain a percentage cost increase at sector level for each country the percentage 
cost increase of the affected pig farms has been multiplied with: 
1. the degree of compliance with the Nitrate Directive 
2. with the percentage share of affected pigs on the total number of pigs in the country 
This calculation procedures have generated the percentage cost increase at sector level 
indicated in the Table 6.11. It turns out that Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium will still have 
to face a cost increase which varies from 1.1% to 2.5%. Other countries show limited cost 
increases, because of a limited number of affected pigs (Denmark), or a relatively small 
number of pigs present in NVZs (Spain) or a high degree of compliance (United Kingdom). 
Table 6.11: Percentage cost increase on affected pig farms and percentage cost increase 
for the pig sector due to the application of the Nitrate Directive , 2005 
  B DK DE ES 
% of pigs in NVZ 100,0 100,0 100,0 24,3 
% of pigs affected by cost increase 60,3 10,9 17,0 7,6 
% degree of compliance 0,50 0,80 0,85 0,20 
% cost increase per kg meat for affected farms 3,5% 3,2% 3,9% 8,9% 
% cost increase for sector 1,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,5% 
  FR IT NL UK 
% of pigs in NVZ 74,5 64,2 100,0 66,1 
% of pigs affected by cost increase 23,5 37,3 79,4 23,8 
% degree of compliance 0,70 0,20 0,50 0,90 
% cost increase per kg meat for affected farms 6,2% 8,3% 3,0% 5,2% 
% cost increase for sector 0,4% 2,5% 1,2% 0,1% 
 
Finally it is possible to aggregate the country cost increases to EU-15 level, where for the 
other seven Member States a zero cost increase has been hypothesized. According to the 
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calculations pig sector of the EU will have to face an additional cost increase due to the 
compliance with the Nitrate Directive of 0.545%  
6.3.2 Sector cost increase due to Clean Water Act in the US 
 This analysis has estimated the costs of compliance with regulations concerning water quality 
for pig farms typical of Iowa. This state was chosen because it is the leading pig producing 
state in the U.S. Iowa's pig farms represent a more modern, confined feeding operation found 
in increasing numbers in the top pig producing states. The average pig operation size in this 
region of the country is approximately 4,300 head. This is well above the threshold size to be 
considered a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) according to the Clean Water 
Act.    
The primary manifestation of environmental regulations for livestock agriculture in the U.S. is 
the requirement to develop and follow a Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan (CNMP) 
in order to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Water Act regulatory 
requirements.  The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has estimated the costs 
for developing and implementing a successful CNMP. Documentation of these costs is shown 
in Table 6.12.  
The CNMP costs associated with swine operations, presented in Table 6.12, are an average 
cost of all swine farms in the U.S. and are presented per animal unit (AU), which is equivalent 
to 454 kgs of live weight. Because many of the costs associated with CNMP compliance 
require capital investments in farm infrastructure (e.g. manure storage facilities), the number 
of AUs over which such investment costs can be spread will have an important impact the 
compliance costs incurred by individual farms.   
This analysis attempted to secure actual CNMP cost data specific to Iowa, but this was not 
available. Therefore, the national estimates for the CNMP cost for swine operations  were 
adjusted from a per AU basis (US$44) to a per 45.4 kg of gain basis (US$1.57) to be 
consistent with the available financial data for swine operations.  
A typical Iowa swine operation produces two cycles of market pigs, or 'turns', per year.  This 
implies that, on average, it takes 6 months to raise a typical market pig from feeder pig to 
market. Therefore, at any one time there is only half the number of a farm's total marketed pig 
capacity on the farm. Feeder pigs generally enter the operation at 50 pounds in weight and 
leave the operation at 250 pounds. Therefore, over the life of the pig the average weight is 
150 pounds and 1 AU equals 6.67 pigs.   
Using the national average cost per AU for CNMP implementation of US$44, the average 
cost per 45.4 kgs of gain is estimated to be US$1.65.  This is calculated by multiplying the 
average weight gain per pig of 90.9 kgs by 6.67 pigs by 2 turns per year, which results in a 
weight gain of 1,210 kgs (or 2,666 lbs) of gain per AU.  This cost of compliance translates 
into a 3.54% increase in total production costs or a 4.23% increase in direct costs. 
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Table 6.12: Production costs for a swine operation typical of the Heartland region, 2005 
Direct operating costs US $ per 45.4 kg of gain 
  Grain 1,73 
  Protein sources 1,34 
  Complete mixes 10,8 
  Other feed items 0,07 
  Feeder Pigs 21,32 
  Hired labour 0,52 
  Vet and Med 0,58 
  Bedding and litter 0,01 
  Marketing 0,47 
  Custom services 0,25 
  Fule, lube and electricity 0,82 
  Repairs 0,48 
  Interest on operating capital 0,64 
    Total operating costs 39,03 
  
Allocated overhead costs  
  Opportunity cost of unpaid labour 2,19 
  Capital recovery of machinery and equipment 4,27 
  Opportunity cost of land (rental rate) 0,02 
  Taxes and insurances 0,38 
  General farm overhead 0,78 
    Total overhead costs 7,64 
Total costs 46,67 
  
Annual CNMP cost 1,65 
  Percentage of direct costs 4,23% 
  Percentage of total costs  3,54% 
Source: USDA – ARMS 
As 54% of the US pig population are raised in farms with more than 5,000 pigs and the 
degree of compliance equals 43.6% the total sector cost increase for pigs in the USA to be 
attributed to the Clean Water Act is 1.08%. If we compare this to the cost increase of full 
compliance with the Nitrate Directive in the EU which has been calculated in 0.454%, we 
notice that the CWA obligations in the US have a stronger economic impact on the pig sector. 
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6.3.3 Impact of Nitrates Directive on EU laying hen farms costs 
On the majority of the laying hen farms in the EU the manure production exceeds the limit of 
170 kg per hectare and has to sustain costs to get rid of the excess manure. As the dry matter 
content of the hen manure is significantly higher than pig or cattle slurry it is possible to carry 
out transport at long distances. The areas of the EU with the highest concentration of laying 
hen farms (Netherlands, Belgium and Bretagne) contemporarily are characterised by a high 
density of pig and cattle farms. The consequence is that pig and cattle manure will be spread 
locally, but hen and broiler manure will have to be placed at longer distance. As the Nitrates 
Directive is reaching higher degrees of compliance the cost of placing poultry manure 
increases considerably. 
In the following an analysis will be presented containing an estimate of the number of laying 
hens in the most producers States in the EU which will be affected by the Nitrate Directive 
(Table 6.13). The countries selected represent 86.5 % of the laying hen population in the EU-
15. 
Table 6.13: Share of laying hens affected by the Nitrates Directive in selected countries 
 
Laying hen 
population 
Laying hens 
on farms 
exceeding 170 
kg/ha 
% laying hens 
exceeding 170 
kg N/ha in 
VNZ 
% Laying hens 
in NVZs 
Laying hens in 
NVZs 
France 77.210 54.380 70,4 63,4 24.272 
Spain 59.980 55.040 91,8 24,8 12.531 
Germany 50.500 39.260 77,7 100,0 30.505 
United Kingdom 49.010 39.700 81,0 59,5 19.133 
Netherlands 48.420 45.040 93,0 100,0 41.887 
Italy 36.120 32.810 90,8 50,2 14.955 
Other EU 
countries 45.290 38.104 84,1 66,3 21.251 
Total population 366.530 304.334 83,0 44,9 164.535 
Source: elaborated by CRPA on Eurostat data 
Considering an nitrogen excretion figure of 0.56 kg per animal place per year (ERM/AB-
DLO, 1999) the maximum allowed density of laying hens is 303 animals per hectare. 
Comparing the farm structure of laying hen farms both by flock size and by acreage size it is 
possible to estimate the percentage of laying hens which exceed the limit of 170 kg N /ha. As 
in several member states only part of the territory has been declared as nitrate vulnerable 
zone, we have to adjust the figures and estimate the hen population in NVZs using the 
Eurostat REGIO databank. The result of these calculations are presented in the Table 6.13 
above, indicating that 44.9% of laying hen in the EU are raising on farms exceeding the 
maximum limit of 170 kg N/ha.  
In order to comply with the Nitrate directive hen farms pay companies specialised in long 
distance transport. These expenses include the costs of spreading hen manure on distant farm 
land. The differences between EU member states regarding the costs of manure disposal are 
significant as presented in Table 6.14. In 2004 these costs were equal to 17 € per ton in the 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 213 
Netherlands, 6 € per ton in Germany and 9 € per ton in Italy, but were negligible in France 
and Spain (Van Horne & Bondt, 2006).  
Table 6.14: Production costs of shell eggs in 2004 
 DE NL FR ES IT 
Hen 16.1 15.6 17.2 15.2 15.3
Feed 36.7 36.2 39.0 40.3 40.2
Labour 5.3 5.1 4.4 3.6 4.2
Energy costs 1.0 1.4 0.5 0.5 0.6
Manure disposal costs 0.9 2.5 - - 2.3
Other direct costs 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.2
Depr.+interests 6.7 7.1 5.7 5.7 6.3
Total costs 70.5 72.0 70.4 68.5 72.1
Source: Van Horne & Bondt (2006)  
From Table 6.14 it becomes clear that manure disposal costs vary between zero in France and 
Spain up to 3.5% of production costs in the Netherlands. 
As have been already stated, only the Nitrate Directive may create cost implications for the 
laying hen farms, as the animal welfare directives mentioned in Annex III are specifically 
focused on calves and pigs. Of course this does not mean that the laying hen sector is not 
affected by EU animal welfare regulations. As this is going beyond the scope of this study 
mention should be made only of the regulations which impose the use of enriched cages for 
laying hens before 2012. This change over will generate considerable costs for the egg 
production sector in the EU and may affect significantly the competitive position of EU egg 
production on the world market (Van Horne & Bondt, 2006). It should however be stated that 
world trade in eggs and egg products is still very limited and has been estimated in 1.8% 
(Windhorst, 2006). The large majority of eggs are traded between EU countries and among 
some Asian countries, but very small to negligible quantities of eggs are traded between 
continents. The only relevant trade which may increase in the future is the trade in egg 
powder, where countries like Ukraine, Brazil and India may create a competitive advantage in 
future. 
6.3.4 Animal Welfare: evaluated standards and cost implications  
Actually, the pig sector is completely ruled at EU by the directives 91/630/CEE, 2001/88/CE 
and 2001/93/CE, which are part of the Cross-Compliance policy being inserted in Annex III 
of Regulation 1782/03.  
The main aspects of these directives are: prohibition to (a) tie sows and gilts; (b) use a 
complete slatted floor for sows and gilts; (c) isolate the sow during the period between 4 
weeks after insemination and the week before farrowing with a minimum space allowance of 
2.25 per m2 for sows and 1.64 m2 for gilt; (d) maximum stocking rates for different pig 
categories and (e) minimum standards for slatted floors. Of all above mentioned measures the 
most incisive cost increase may be caused by the obligatory group housing of sows. The 
reason is that all other measures already have a high rate of compliance in the EU (Enting, 
2006).  
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Therefore, in the following an analysis will be presented of the possible cost increase per kg 
pig meat of the switch over of individual crates of sows to the group housing, taking also into 
account the minimum space per head required by the EU regulation. 
Two practical examples below illustrate the consequences for a closed cycle pig farm. First, a 
comparison between the old conventional housing system with sows housed in individual 
crates with an investment in a new pig farm where pigs are housed in groups 4 weeks after 
insemination. Second, an adjustment of an existing pig farm to the new housing requirements 
for sows.  
Technical details are presented in Table 6.15 and the economic effects are seen in Table 6.16. 
The new requirements would cause an increase of the investments in the two pregnancy 
phases of the sows of 12% per sow place, but as these two phases are representing only 10.8% 
of the total investment of a new closed cycle pig farm the total investments rise by only 1.3%. 
The expected increase in total production costs (per kg pig meat) is limited to 0.1%. 
Table 6.15: Investments cost for close cycle pig housing 
 
Housing system with individual 
crates for sows 
Group housing of sows after four 
weeks of insemination 
 n. places €/place Investment € €/place Investment € 
Insemination 1st phase 46 1,884 86,664 2,025 93,150
Pregnancy 2nd phase 61 1,027 62,647 1,257 76,677
Farrowing 30 3,684 110,520 3,684 110,520
Weaning 285 259 73,815 259 73,815
Gilts in first phase 24 600 14,400 600 14,400
Growing up to 50 kg 368 320 117,760 320 117,760
1st  phase fattening 450 480 216,000 480 216,000
2nd phase fattening 720 700 504,000 700 504,000
Other investments 370,862 370,862
Total investment 1,556,668 1,577,184
Source: CRPA 
Table 6.16: Difference in production costs by two adjustment strategies 
 
(1) Investment in a new pig farm 
which comply with the group 
housing requirements for sows 
(2) Adjustment of an existing pig 
farm to the new animal welfare 
requirements of sows 
 Before After Before After 
 €/kg €/kg €/kg €/kg 
Feed  0.687 0.687 0.687 0.687
Labour 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.217
Other variable costs 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.254
Total monetary costs 1.158 1.158 1.158 1.158
Interests on ant. Capital 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 215 
 
(1) Investment in a new pig farm 
which comply with the group 
housing requirements for sows 
(2) Adjustment of an existing pig 
farm to the new animal welfare 
requirements of sows 
 Before After Before After 
 €/kg €/kg €/kg €/kg 
Interests and depreciation, 0.162 0.164 0.162 0.172
Total costs of production 1.335 1.337 1.335 1.344
Source: CRPA 
An adjustment of an existing pig farm to the new requirements has a more incisive impact on 
the economy of the farm, as the end solution is not as optimal compared to a new building. 
The production capacity has been presumed to be unchanged and the pig farmer is only 
adjusting the pregnancy parts of the farm building. Although the cost increase is higher, the 
cost impact also in this remains rather limited and well below 1%. The animal welfare 
directives which are an integral part of the cross-compliance policy does not have a 
significant impact on production costs. 
Considering the pig production cost calculations carried out by Interpig, and the different 
degrees of compliance among the main EU producing countries, a 0.11% increase has been 
estimated for the EU pig sector (Table 6.17). 
 
Table 6.17: Production costs of pigmeat and percentage cost increase due to compliance 
with Animal Welfare Directive 
 BE DK DE ES FR IT NL UK 
Feed 0,685 0,680 0,696 0,852 0,730 0,994 0,693 0,814
Breeding, vet/med and 
energy 0,094 0,105 0,159 0,122 0,109 0,115 0,143 0,109
Labour 0,125 0,165 0,200 0,124 0,177 0,137 0,174 0,199
Building, finance and 
misc 0,342 0,468 0,475 0,409 0,397 0,367 0,452 0,617
6.3.5 Total costs 1,245 1,418 1,530 1,508 1,413 1,613 1,461 1,740
cost increase €/kg 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011
Cost increase 0,90% 0,79% 0,74% 0,75% 0,80% 0,70% 0,77% 0,65%
degree of compliance 80% 90% 80% 50% 50% 50% 50% 95%
% cost increase sector 0,09% 0,04% 0,07% 0,19% 0,20% 0,17% 0,19% 0,02%
Source: Elaborated by CRPA, own calculations and Interpig data 
 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 216 
6.4 Simulated impact on competitiveness 
This section summarises the trade effects simulated along four scenarios by the GTAP model 
in response to full compliance in the EU to Nitrate Directive, Animal Welfare and a combined 
effect of these (scenario 1-3), as well as the effect of compliance to the Clear Water Act in the 
US (Scenario 4). As the Nitrate Directive is concerned the results are summarised in Table 
6.18, whereas the combined effects are reported in Table 6.19. 
Increasing costs induced by a full Nitrate Directive compliance in the EU, certainly may 
affect international trade flows in pig meat and the market shares held by the main exporter 
countries. These effects have been simulated with the GTAP model.  
Table 6.18: Effect of N-Directive on the competitiveness of the pigsector of the EU 
 USA EU15 Japan ROECD ROW Total Export 
Canada 0,41% 5,06% 0,27% 0,98% 0,64% 0,46% 
USA 0,00% 4,14% 0,27% 0,99% 0,52% 0,69% 
Brazil 0,35% 4,34% 0,25% 1,00% 0,63% 1,03% 
EU15 -3,10% 0,00% -1,15% -3,83% -3,64% -3,03% 
ROECD 0,39% 4,65% 0,25% 0,00% 0,62% 2,25% 
ROW 0,40% 4,25% 0,26% 0,97% 0,57% 1,90% 
Total Import -0,40% 4,37% -0,05% -0,71% -0,86% 0,14% 
 
Table 6.19: Percentage changes in pig meat sector trade due to full compliance to 
various standards 
exports of which to…   Scenario EU 
Import 
EU 
Export USA Japan Rest of 
OECD 
Rest of 
World 
Total world 
trade 
1 Nitrate EU:  100% 4,37 -3,03 -3,10 -1,15 -3,83 -3,64 0,14 
2 Animal Welfare EU: 100% 0,83 -0,69 -0,60 -0,38 -0,71 -0,83 0,01 
3 Nitrate EU:  100% and Animal 
Welfare EU: 100% 5,24 -3,70 -3,66 -1,53 -4,51 -4,44 0,16 
4 Clear Water Act in US: 100% -0,69 1,85 4,47 2,12 2,06 1,25 -0,65 
 
As follows from the results of Scenario 1, a full compliance with the Nitrate Directive leads to 
a 3% decrease of both market share and exported volumes of the EU, while the effect on the 
level of production could feed a 4.4% higher demand for imported pigmeat. In the Japanese 
market, which is the first world export market, the loss of about 1.15% in the quantities traded 
by EU would stimulate a increase of the demand for pigmeat coming from Brazil, the US, 
Canada and other countries at a rate of 0.27% each. In the other OECD countries the decrease 
of UE export has been estimated in 3.8%, which favours the competitive position of Brazil, 
Canada and the USA in these countries by about 1% each. 
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On the whole Brazil’s export share gain would be higher than those of the other two main 
competitors. The gains of the three top exporters range from a maximum of 1% in the case of 
Brazil to a minimum of 0.3% of Canada. Increases in volume traded by these countries range 
within the same limits.  
Following the results of Scenario 2, Animal Welfare regulations should affect EU 
competitiveness at a lower extent since its effect on pig farms production cost has been 
estimated to be limited to only a 0.1% increase. This would entail a 0.8% growth of EU 
imports and a decrease of exports equal to 0.7%. 
Summing up the effects of both standards requirements (Scenario 3), an overall decrease of 
3.7% would affect EU export. The loss in quantity on the Japanese market would be equal to 
1.5% while export towards other OECD would decrease by 4.5%. As imports are concerned, a 
5.24% growth of import is expected in large part due to the higher import flows coming from 
Brazil (+5.2%). On the whole Brazil would gain 1.2% of his global market share, while a 0.4 
and 0.8% increase have been respectively estimated in favour of Canada and the USA.  
The previous analysis in paragraph in 5.2.3 has pointed out that the full implementation of the 
Clear Water Act requirements by the US pig sector would produce higher impacts than those 
expected in EU due to full compliance with the standards with the Nitrate directive. The 
different effects are due first to the high share of the US pig herd raised in farms that are 
eligible to be classified as CAFOs and secondly by the rather new implementation of the 
CWA which generates a relatively low degree of compliance. The simulation results are 
presented under Scenario 4. The highest costs of full compliance with CWA regulations by 
most intensive pig farms, would affect the competitiveness of US on the beef world market 
entailing a 7.3% decreases of  its pig meat exports. This gap left will be covered by the EU 
(+1.85%) and Brazil (+1.18%), which both would gain market share in particular on the 
Japanese market. Higher gains in market share are foreseen in the case of Canada, whose 
export would be stimulated by the increasing demand coming from USA. 
6.5 Conclusions 
As the pig and poultry sector are most intensive livestock activities in the EU it is quite 
comprehensible that these sectors are the most affected by the Nitrate Directive. In the present 
analysis the effects have been quantified only for the pig sector, as poultry farms are very 
marginally touched by cross-compliance.  
The extent to which the Nitrate Directive may create extra costs to the pig sector depends on 
the pig density per hectare in each Member State, on the percentage of pigs present in Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones and on the degree of compliance of pig farmers to the Nitrate Directive. 
These three data differ very much from country to country and explain primarily the very 
different sector cost increases for the pig sectors of EU Member States. The overall EU cost 
increase to be attributed to the pig sector due to attain full compliance with the Nitrate 
Directive has been estimated at 0.55%. 
Such a cost increase has a significant impact on the EU trade balance of pigmeat. Total EU 
exports will decline by 3% and imports will increase by 4.4 %. This decline of EU 
competitiveness will favour the exports of Brazil (1%), the US (0.7%) and Canada (0.3%) on 
the world market. EU imports will increase in particular from Brazil (+4,3%), Canada 
(+4.1%) and the US (4,1%).  
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From a comparison with the impact of the Clean Water Act in the US it turns out that this act 
raises the cost for the American pig sector with 1.08%, an almost double cost effect compared 
to the impact of the Nitrate Directive in the EU. The reason for this substantial rise of costs 
has to be attributed to the large percentage of pig affected by this measure and its rather recent 
application to US pig farms, which still implies a rather low degree of compliance. This rise 
of costs will cause a fall in US exports of pigmeat of 7.3% and a decline of exports of 4.5%. 
Canada would gain the most of this situation increasing its exports by 4% on the world 
market, of which 4.5% more to the US and a 2.1% increase on the Japanese market. 
A calculation of the animal welfare regulations for pig farmers in the EU shows, that the cost 
increase is very limited. The reasons for this minor cost impact are a high degree of 
compliance with the standards and the limited rise of costs for farmers which still have to 
adapt their farm to the new legislation. At farm level the cost increase is well below 1% and 
this generates a rise of costs at sector level of 0.11%. This cost impact evidently causes a 
growth of imports of only 0.8% and a decline of exports of 0,7%.  
As has been expected the Nitrate Directive for the pig farms creates the most substantial 
burden of costs, in particular in EU Member States with a high pig density and a low degree 
of compliance. 
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7 The impact of cross compliance on the competitiveness of 
the EU with respect to cereals 
7.1 Introduction  
When considering the relative share of production traded on the world’s market, the cereals 
sector — namely, for the EU27 mainly wheat and corn as will be discussed below — is one of 
the most open markets. This implies that the competitiveness issue is particularly crucial in 
this sector. 
Cereals are the basis of the human diet in many ways: directly consumed (e.g. through 
products cereals based such as bread, pastas and processed food based on starch) or indirectly 
consumed through animal food (i.e. humans eating animals fed under a cereal diet i.e. 
granivorous animals such as pigs, poultry). For such reasons, the cereals are recognised as 
being a “strategic” commodity. Their price is an upstream driver for other products which are 
in competition with them (i.e. potatoes for starch or the tubers produced by farmers in the 
Third World). 
In this context, this chapter is devoted to the question of the potential impacts on 
competitiveness of the cereals sector caused by the standards related to cross-compliance 
since 2005. Whereas a lot of these standards were already pre-existing legal requirement, this 
was less so for the GAEC requirements, which were part of the cross compliance package as 
introduced in 2005. Whereas in the previous chapters (which focused on animal productions) 
the focus was on the impact of the pre-existing SMRs, in this chapter the focus is in particular 
on the newly introduced GAECs.  
As regards competitiveness, the main focus will be on the EU’s external competitiveness. 
Although this is mainly about a comparative analysis between the EU and its key trading 
partners, within the project also attention is paid to differences between EU member states 
and differences between farms within member states. Also in this chapter therefore some 
background information about the heterogeneity in member states and farm types will be 
given. Moreover, it will be described how the representative farm case for the EU is 
constructed. 
In the trade simulation analysis a host of countries will be considered (often in an implicit 
way as they are aggregated or covered in the GTAP trade model). This chapter starts with a 
general description of the main trade patterns in the world cereals market as well as providing 
an overview of the key countries involved. From the perspective of this project special 
attention will be given on Canada as a non-EU country for which an extended comparative 
analysis was made. A detailed annex on Canadian cereals production and the impact of 
different types of standards on production, revenues, costs, the environment and biodiversity 
is included in this report (see Part II in Annex) Some insights about the benefits of the 
changes in standards introduced, or resulting from (improved) compliance to these standards 
will also be discussed.  
This chapter is strongly based on Poux (2007). It is organised as follows: Section 7.2 provides 
a general description of the world situation for cereals. It also discusses the functioning of the 
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price mechanism and the observed recent price increase (shock). Section 7.3 focuses on 
worldwide production of cereals and its evolution in the past, with a focus on the EU. Section 
7.4 proposes a survey of the CC requirements with regards to their potential impacts on the 
competitiveness of the sector, applying a broad framework for analyzing competitiveness. 
Section 5.5 focuses on competitiveness indicators for primary production both for the EU in 
comparison with its main competitors as well as differences in competitiveness between 
specialized cereal producing farms in EU-15 member states. Sections 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 identify 
and discuss the costs of cross compliance standards (both the SMRs as well as the GEACs) 
for different farm types in France. Section 7.9 provides the best-estimates of the percentage 
costs increases in the EU cereals sector, taking into account the specific characteristics of 
selected main EU cereal producing member states. This section also provides a summary of a 
more detailed analysis of costs and other impacts of standards similar to the EU’s GAEC for 
Canada. Section 7.10 represents the EU’s external competitiveness assessment and reports on 
three scenario’s analysed with the GTAP trade impact simulation model. Section 7.11 closes 
this chapter with summarizing the main conclusions and implications from the analysis. It 
also mentions some qualifications to the analysis. 
 
7.2 Description of the cereals sector at World level 
7.2.1 The World production of cereals 
The word “cereals” comprises a large set of products. The following Table 7.1 indicates the 
world production for the main grains produced. 
In 2003, the overall production of cereals was 2,068 M tons ; Maize, wheat and rice between 
them, accounted for 87% of all grain production, and 43% of all food calories. While, in 1961 
rice was the first cereal cultivated – due to its importance in the Asian diet. But since 1994, 
the overall consumption of rice remains stable in China, reflecting a qualitative change in the 
Chinese diet to the benefit of wheat, thus affecting the overall production (source 
CNUCED)215. Maize became the first one in 2005 mainly due to its industrial uses in both 
animal food (including silage) and plastic. Recently, the US strategy of ethanol produced 
from maize boosted the uses of this cereal. 
 
                                                 
215
 — http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/francais/riz/marche.htm 
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Table 7.1: World cereals production (1961 and 2005 – source FAO) 
Grain 2005 (Mt) 1961 (Mt) 
Maize  711,762,871 205,004,683 
Wheat  630,556,602 222,357,231 
Rice (paddy) 621,588,528 284,654,697 
Barley  139,220,431 72,411,104 
Sorghums  59,722,088 40,931,625 
Millets  30,302,450 25,703,968 
Oats  24,032,521 49,588,769 
Rye 15,202,142 35,109,990 
Triticale 12,962,777 0 
Buckwheat 2,127,823 2,478,596 
Fonio 284,578 178,483 
Quinoa 58,443 32,435 
 
The following Table 7.2 indicates the main producing countries, in value and M tons, for the 
three main cereals: wheat, maize and rice. From the EU member states France has a 
prominent position as a wheat and maize producer. To a lesser extent also Germany and Italy 
play a role. With respect to rice neither EU member states nor the EU as a whole plays a 
significant role.  
Table 7.2: Main cereals producers in the World (source FAO, 2005 data - FAOSTAT)  
Wheat : Top 10 World producers 
 (Int $1000) Production (MT) 
China 15 027 110 96 340 250 
India  11 230 560 72 000 000 
USA 8 907 323 57 105 550 
Russia  7 425 896 47 608 000 
France  5 759 093 36 922 000 
Canada   3 984 806 25 546 900 
Australia   3 753 970 24 067 000 
Germany 3 677 696 23 578 000 
Pakistan 3 367 826 21 591 400 
Turkey 3 275 580 21 000 000 
Maize: Top 10 World producers 
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 (Int $1000) Production (MT) 
USA   32 562 540 280 228 400 
China 15 396 500 132 645 000 
Brazil  4 050 686 34 859 600 
Mexico 2 382 100 20 500 000 
Argentina 2 265 900 19 500 000 
India 1 684 900 14 500 000 
France 1 536 861 13 226 000 
Indonesia 1 395 993 12 013 710 
South Africa  1 393 935 11 996 000 
Italy 1 234 276 10 622 000 
Rice : Top 10 World producers 
 (Int $1000) Production (MT) 
China 39 193 840 185 454 000 
India 27 478 290 129 000 000 
Indonesia  11 499 260 53 984 590 
Bengladesh  8 531 902 40 054 000 
Vietnam 7 740 996 36 341 000 
Thailand 5 751 270 27 000 000 
Myanmar 5 218 745 24 500 000 
Filipino 3 152 548 14 800 000 
Brazil 2 799 143 13 140 900 
Japan 2 340 767 10 989 000 
 
China is the first World producing country, mainly on rice but also on wheat (1st producer, 
before India and the USA) in clear relationship with its share in the World’s population. India 
adopted the same strategy. 
 
7.2.2 The World market of cereals 
7.2.2.1 General view 
At World level, around 277 MT of cereals are traded out of 2,068 MT produced, meaning a 
share of 13% of the production sold/purchased on the World market (2002/2003 data). In 
general terms, this means a 87% rate of domestic level production of cereals (i.e. non traded 
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on international markets), corresponding to an overall strategy of self autonomy on this 
critical commodity. 
The following Table 7.3: Top 10 players on the cereals World market (FAO 2002 data) shows 
the main exporters and importers, all cereals aggregated (in MT). The member states of the 
EU are considered as autonomous countries (i.e. the EU is not one producing area). 
 
Table 7.3: Top 10 players on the cereals World market (FAO 2002 data):  
Top 10 importers (MT) Top 10 exporters (MT) 
Japan 26 605,4 USA 82 204,1 
Mexico 14 092,1 France 27 937,0 
South Korea 13 388,8 Argentina 19 583,6 
Spain 12 299,7 Australia 19 343,6 
Egypt 10 322,3 China 15 014,5 
Italy 9 803,1 Canada 14 665,8 
China 9 430,9 Russia 13 532,0 
Algeria 8 610,9 Ukraine 12 175,2 
Indonesia 7 927,2 Germany 10 959,3 
Brazil 7 809,2 India 9 569,9 
 
Note that China is the only country which is at the same time exporting and importing (though 
being a net exporter). EU member states show up as exporters as well as importers. Italy and 
Spain are significant importers. France and Germany are important exporters. On the export 
side the US (by far the main exporter), Argentina, Canada and Australia are significant 
players. 
The exporting countries are logically characterized by the presence of large amount of arable 
and productive land on the one hand and are all situated in the temperate area on the other 
hand. It means that the natural assets are prior with regards to the commodity production. The 
population density is also a factor affecting the capacity to export, though India and Germany 
are also exporting cereals. In any case, the technological level in the agricultural sector is 
fairly advanced, meaning that there is no exporting country with manual agriculture.  
 
The main importers falls in three categories:   
Developed countries with a relative low share of arable land on their territory (e.g. Japan, 
South Korea, Spain, Italy). For such countries, the rationale of importing is simply to 
compensate an absence of natural asset with other traded products outside the agricultural 
sector. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages can fully be applied in this case, across 
sectors (agriculture vs. industry/services). 
Developing countries for which the population density is simply too high compared to the 
producing capacity. Egypt is the most obvious example in this case, with only 3% of its 
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territory being arable. Algeria also falls in this category. In this case, the issue is not of 
comparative advantages but more of structural disadvantages. 
Intermediate countries, under the process of development, are adopting a comparative 
advantage strategy, though the would be able to produce cereals on their land (i.e. they would 
have enough land for such purpose); they prefer to allocate their agricultural production 
factors to other commodities, adopting an entire Ricardo’s market strategy in the agricultural 
sector.  
Going into further detail, one should distinguish the rationales underlying the rice market on 
the one hand and the wheat and corn markets on the other hand. 
 
7.2.2.2 The rice market 
The rice (paddy) market is rather limited in rough terms, as only 25-27 MT are traded in 
average, thus representing around 5-7% of the overall production. Note that as the rice market 
is mainly directly devoted to human consumption, with a high cultural value, it is not directly 
competing with other cereals. This characteristic differs from cereals used for animal food for 
which industries can jump from wheat to corn or barley or even “cereals substitutes” (e.g. 
manioc, dry sugar-beet by-products) with regards to the best price. It means that a Chinese or 
a Japanese does not really choose between rice and, say, wheat with regards to price issues 
(the quality of the product can be much more a driver). This being said, on the longer term, 
shifts on cultural diets can be observed (from rice to wheat in Asia, from tubers to wheat in 
tropical Africa). It does also not preclude rice and other cereals markets to indirectly interact: 
the products are substitutes although the degree of substitutability is depending on all kind of 
factors like (strong shifts in) relative scarcity, trade distortions, and cultural consumption 
preferences. 
75% of the exporters are found in the Asian countries (Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, India and 
China). The USA are the other competitor on the World market. The importers are more 
displayed in the World, with three main types: 
The Asian countries (representing 35% of the whole imports, i.e. a regional market), the 
exchanges allowing to stabilise the high level of consumptions (above 80 kg/head/year in 
average).  
The sub-tropical countries (in Africa or South America e.g. Brazil), which are net importers at 
relatively high levels (40-60 kg/head/year) 
The developed countries, for which rice is a complementary cereal (below 10 kg/head/year). 
 
7.2.2.3 Wheat and maize : production and markets 
The following Table 7.4 shows the share of these two cereal commodities in the whole cereal 
production and trade; excluding rice (i.e. mainly barley and sorghums in addition to wheat 
and maize). 
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Table 7.4: Production, trade and stocks for wheat and maize (2005-2007)  
Crop year  2005/06 % all cereals (exc. Rice) [I]  2006/07
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
 Forecast 
2007/08
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
Production 1601 100% 1567 100% 1666 100%
Traded 213 13% 215 14% 217 13%
Uses 1612 101% 1631 104% 1674 100%
Stock 313 20% 249 16% 242 15%
Crop year  2005/06
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice) 
[II/I]
 2006/07 % all cereals (exc. Rice)
 Forecast 
2007/08
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
Production 620 39% 591 38% 623 37%
Traded 109 7% 107 7% 107 6%
% wheat on traded cereals 51% 50% 49%
Uses 623 39% 609 39% 622 37%
Stock 134 8% 115 7% 117 7%
Crop year  2005/06 % all cereals (exc. Rice)  2006/07
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
 Forecast 
2007/08
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
Production 695 43% 694 44% 746 45%
Traded 78 5% 85 5% 84 5%
% maize on traded cereals 37% 40% 39%
Uses 700 44% 726 46% 755 45%
Stock 125 8% 94 6% 85 5%
Crop year  2005/06 % all cereals (exc. Rice)  2006/07
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
 Forecast 
2007/08
% all cereals 
(exc. Rice)
Production 1315 82% 1285 82% 1369 82%
Traded 187 12% 192 12% 191 11%
% wheat+maize traded cereals 88% 89% 88%
Uses 1323 83% 1335 85% 1377 83%
Stock 259 16% 209 13% 202 12%
All figures in MT (million tons)
Source : Conseil International des Cˇrˇales (figures on 26/04/2007)
I. Whole cereals (excluding rice)
II. Wheat
III. Maize
IV. Wheat+Maize (II+III)
 
All together, wheat and maize represent 82% of the cereals produced without rice (60% if rice 
is counted). Out of the 1,600 MT produced on the period studied, only 13% is traded (around 
215 MT); wheat and maize represent a bit less than 90% of the traded cereals (80% if traded 
rice is counted), wheat being more traded than maize (respectively 50% and 40%). As a 
conclusion, we can consider that focusing on wheat and maize is relevant for the purpose of 
or analysis, as they are the key cereals traded on the world market. 
 
The following Table 7.5 shows the main exporting countries for these two commodities. The 
EU-15 is now for convenience sake considered as one single entity. 
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Table 7.5: Main exporters for wheat and maize 
(MT) 2004 2005 2006(*)
USA 28,2 26,9 26,2
Australia 15,8 15,2 12,9
Canada 15,4 15,5 20
European Union 13,6 14,2 15,8
Argentina 13,1 8 8,7
Total top 5 86,1 79,8 83,6
Total World 109,8 107,7 108,6
% Top 5/World 78% 74% 77%
(MT) 2004 2005 2006(*)
USA 46,8 51,1 55,5
Argentina 12,4 11,4 11
China 5,6 5,9 4
Brazil 2,7 1,2 3
Ukraine 2,2 2,6 2,1
South Africa 1 1,8 1
Canada 0,3 0,3 0,3
European Union 0,2 0,2 0,1
Total top 5 69,7 72,2 75,6
Total World 75,8 78,5 81,5
% Top 5/World 92% 92% 93%
(*) forecast
Source : Conseil International des Cˇrˇales, figures on 24/11/06
Maize
Wheat
 
 
The Table 7.5 shows that the USA dominates the market for both wheat and maize (for the 
latter, their share is more than 50% of the overall production). The EU is a key player only for 
the wheat market while it is quite marginal for the maize market (it is even a net importer). In 
general terms, the two markets are concentrated, the top 5 exporting countries counting for 
80% for wheat and more than 90% for maize. 
When comparing this Table 7.5 with the one of the main producers (see Table 7.2, one 
conclusion is that the main exporters are not necessarily the main producers, with the 
exception of the USA. For example, for wheat Australia has 12% share of the world export 
market but only 3% of the world production. This country exports more than 60% of its 
production. It means that the cereal market in a sense can be interpreted as a ‘marginal’ 
market rather than a ‘structural’ market: it would be generally difficult to feed the world 
relying only on trade (or production surpluses): the exporting countries can not supply the 
whole potential demand and, in any case, a more open market would not probably mean a 
significantly different share of traded cereals at the world level as the physical limits should 
be reminded. 
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For economic assessment, this has importance since the marginal costs might not be mixed up 
with the opportunity costs. As the marginal costs are dealing with those of the last producer 
playing on the market (for wheat, the one contributing to the most efficient 13% in terms of 
production cost/ton), the opportunity costs are, theoretically, those meeting a potentially 
increased demand at the world level, are likely to be significantly higher than the present 
marginal costs driving the market. Moreover, these marginal costs are may significantly 
change (due to for example supply, weather and demand shocks), whereas average costs of 
cereals production are likely to behave in a more stable way. This has led several authors to 
criticise the use of the world market price as an indicator of competitiveness for the whole set 
of farms in the world: assuming that these (marginal) farms would play a dominant role on the 
world market, then the world price would be much higher (e.g. the economic concept of an 
upward sloping aggregate supply or marginal cost curve). 
As regards the price evolution of cereals recently some significant changes took place, which 
can be partly, but not solely explained by the strongly increased use of cereals for biofuels 
production. After a stabilisation following the wide price fluctuations of 2003/2004 recently 
the short-term developments have been marked by significant price increases. Also over the 
medium-term, world agricultural markets are projected to be essentially supported by rising 
food demand driven by an improved macro-economic environment, higher population, 
urbanisation and changes in dietary patterns. Combined these factors set the stage for a 
strengthening of world demand and maintaining a low stock-to-use ratio. Cereals trade is 
likely to expand, particularly in developing economies, driven by rising income, diet 
diversification and higher demand for livestock products and feeds, allowing for a gradual, 
albeit moderate, price increase over the medium term.  
 
7.3 The EU production of cereals and market 
7.3.1 Production 
The production of cereals differs amongst EU country, as shown in the following Figure 7.1. 
Within the EU four countries dominate the production – France, Germany, Poland and Italy – 
representing all together 54% of the EU27 production. France alone is 22% of the production. 
Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the evolution of cereals production at member state level. 
The Figure 7.1 not only emphasises the role of France as a dominant producer, but also shows 
the still increasing productions in France and Germany, whereas for most other member states 
production seems to be roughly stable. On the long term, this share of production has been 
reached through a relative specialisation of producing countries (notably France). 
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France Allemagne Pologne
Italie Royaume-Uni Roumanie
Hongrie Espagne Danemark
RÈpublique tchËque Bulgarie SuËde
Autriche GrËce Finlande
Slovaquie Croatie Belgique
Lituanie Irlande Pays-Bas
Lettonie Portugal Estonie
SlovÈnie Luxembourg (Grand-DuchÈ) Chypre
 
Figure 7.1: Breakdown of cereals production across EU MS in 2005  
Eurostat data, no data for Malta 
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Figure 7.2: Cereal production for the main EU producers (Eurostat) 
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7.3.2 Uses and export/import balance 
In Europe as a whole, about 60% of the cereals it produces are used for animal feeding. 
Figure 7.3 shows the balance of export/import of cereals as a whole: 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Export - import balance for EU27 x1000 tons - 2004 (2003 data for Spain 
and Belgium)  
Source: Eurostat 
 
The market is dominated from far by France, which represents alone 70% of all exports. 
Germany is the second significant player with only 13% of exports. On the other side, the 
importers are Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal. 
 
7.4 Interpretation of the EU cereal sector accordingly to the conceptual 
competitiveness framework 
The project designed a common analytical framework216 for the sectors analysed in the study. 
The following lines apply this framework to the cereals, with regards to the general overview 
presented in the above section. We propose a discussion briefly going through the items listed 
in the Figure 7.4. For practical and fundamental reasons, some items are clustered in the 
analysis proposed. 
 
                                                 
216
  Mathijs E. et al. (2007) Framework to analyse the impact of standards on external competitiveness of 
European agriculture, D12. 
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Figure 7.4: General framework for analyzing competitivenes 
 
7.4.1.1 Initial conditions 
The agronomical conditions are prior in the production of cereals. Logically, the production is 
concentrated in the most favoured areas of Europe, i.e. those suitable for mechanisation and 
with favourable climate (not too dry neither too humid). The rich plains of continental and 
central Europe are the typical cereals basins. 
Alongside with the natural conditions, the socio-economic legacy is quite influent as the 
cereal production requires large land and mechanisation, generally associated to anciently 
specialised agrarian systems. 
The following Map 7.1 from Institut de l’élevage shows that the distribution of specialised 
cereal systems is quite concentrated in Europe (EU 15 only available). 
 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 231 
Nordic
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Map 7.1: Distribution of farm types across EU 15 
Specialised cereals-crops systems are in the yellow areas 
 
The Map 7.1 shows how France is the country with the largest areas of specialised crops 
systems, notably in Bassin Parisien and South-West. Eastern Anglia, central Germany and Po 
Plain in Italy are the other main cereals areas in EU. 
 
7.4.1.2 Industry conditions 
In Europe as a whole, 62% of the cereals is used for animal food. As cereals are a dry 
commodity, it is rather easily transported across Europe under the frame of coarse grains. 
Thus, the industries of cereals are frequently distributed near the main consumptions areas, 
which are the industrialised livestock areas in Europe. This explains why the main importers 
are also large livestock producers (i.e. Spain, Italy and the Netherlands). 
This is reflected in the following Map 7.2. 
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Map 7.2: Map of export flows intra EU for wheat (2005-2006) 
 Source: stratégie grain 
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Map 7.3: Map of export flows intra EU for corn (2005-2006)  
Source: stratégie grain 
 
In the recent period, the rising issue undoubtedly is the one of biofuels, which is expected to 
cover 10-15% of the crop growing area. 
 
7.4.1.3 Institutional conditions 
The dominant role of France in the EU cereal market stands on strong institutional 
organisations such as Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé (AGPB) or Association 
Générale des Producteurs de Maïs (AGPM) which lobbying towards farming unions, ministry 
of agriculture and Europe is well organised. 
The French cereal sector has strong research and technical institutes which are involved in the 
minimisation of production costs mainly based on the still intensive patterns, while the 
extensive ones can be competitive at the micro-economic level (i.e. one individual farm might 
favour the minimisation of production costs per ha), but not at the scale of the production 
basin at a whole, while a certain density of production is still looked after in order to reach 
scale economy. Thus, it is paramount to have in mind that the cereal competitiveness still is 
based on increased yields in Europe rather than on expanded surfaces. 
This institutional condition is important to keep in mind in order to understand that the cereal 
sector in France is quite influent on the one hand and is active in maintaining the role of main 
producing country in Europe. 
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7.4.1.4 Macro-economic conditions, Internal and external market effect 
It is paramount to keep in mind that the EU market is organised under the rule of the 
Community preference. It means that any country in European Union is obliged to buy its 
wheat or maize in priority to another EU member state, even if it could find cheaper 
commodity on the World market. This tends to consider the EU as a single market, in which 
the internal demand is firstly met by internal supply. This has an important consequence for 
our analysis, as the competition on the World market will mainly involve surplus supply.  
With regards to the structure of importers / exporters EU as a whole exports around 15 MT 
cereals, mainly wheat (see Table 7.5). Meanwhile, the overall imports intra Europe represent 
around 30 MT. This correspond to an extra EU export mainly fed by the main EU producers 
of which is France representing alone around 35 MT exported. This can be interpreted as 
main EU exporters (i.e. France, Germany, Hungary – see Map 7.3) firstly supplying the EU 
market while the external market is fed by the last player able to feed it, i.e. France. This 
analysis supports an analysis of external EU competitiveness with a strong focus on France. 
Of course, this does not mean that France is the only exporter outside the EU, while the most 
competitive producers will be displayed in other areas in Europe (e.g. East England), but it 
can be assumed for the support of the analysis that the market functions ‘as if’ France was the 
last player on the external market. 
 
7.4.1.5 Standards 
Compared to other commodities, cereals are not consumed directly by humans, but are 
processed. 
The standards should be examined in relationship to the main uses: 
for bakery and pastry industry, the main standards are related to the protein rate (suitability 
for making bread), which is directly related to the fertilisation strategy (higher protein rates 
require sustained N fertilisation) 
for animal food industry, which is dominant, the energy content is the most important 
standard. 
The risks of mycotoxins and plant protection products residues are the main ones associated 
to cereals. Nevertheless, compared to other products, sanitary requirements can be interpreted 
as being less constraining as the dry character of the product limit the sanitary risks compared 
to dairy, meat or fruit and vegetable products which are much more subject to decay.  
 
7.4.1.6 Farm behaviour, private benefits and supply response 
The farm behaviour will mainly be influenced (i) by its ability to play on the EU market and 
(ii) the opportunity to supply on the market. On this ground, three main situations can be 
described: 
• Competitive and specialised farms will maximise their share on the EU market, by 
maximising the production per labour unit. The combination of land enlargement per 
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farm and intensification leading to increased yields seems the dominant strategy. The 
private benefits of these farms will be relatively dependant on the trade of cereals.  
• Mixed farms might still produce cereals for self use and agronomic reasons, with 
regards not only to price signals, but also to the overall balance of the farm and 
notably its autonomy. The private benefit of such farms does not primarily rely on 
cereals but mainly on livestock productions (and the derived shadow price value of 
cereals production this generates). 
• Farms ‘opting out’ for cereals production, because they are not able to compete on the 
market. Livestock farms in grassland regions for example and/or outdoor systems 
typically fall in this category. For such farms, the private benefit is maximised with 
low price for cereals. 
The supply response is mainly driven by the specialised systems. The CAP reform of 2003, 
while introducing decoupled payments is likely to have further strengthened the supply 
response from specialised systems. 
Private compliance costs will be analysed in the following section. 
 
7.4.1.7 Social benefits and costs (qualitative analysis) 
As stated in the introduction, the cereal price is an upstream driver for several socially 
sensitive products. Even if their share in the EU diet is decreasing, cereals based products 
such as bread, pasta or polenta will have a direct impact on the retail price index (‘food 
basket’). In addition, while the cereals are one major cost in animal food (up to 70% in 
outdoor systems), they also indirectly influence the price of the animal products displayed on 
the market. 
Nevertheless, the social benefit for the consumer is not directly linked to the production price 
received by cereal farmers, as it has been shown that the intermediary agents might capture 
part of the added value. Indeed, the decrease of producers’ price on the long term is going 
along with an increase of the consumers’ price at end, due to extra costs / benefits in the food 
chain. 
This statement illustrates the difficulty to simply analyse the costs / benefits independently 
from the agent considered: the gap between low cereals price and high price for the consumer 
will be a cost for this latter, but certainly a benefit for the stock holder of agri-food industries. 
 
7.5 Farm level competitiveness: comparative analysis of cereals 
production costs between the EU and some selected key competitors 
Trade and competitiveness are driven by differences in relative costs of production or 
profitability (see Jongeneel et al, 2006, Deliverable 11 of this project). Although the main 
focus is on the EU’s external competitiveness with key trading partners, in this section 
information will be provided both about competitiveness within the EU (internal 
competitiveness)  as well as competitiveness of the EU externally. The first step is helpful in 
better accounting for the heterogeneity within the EU between member states as well as 
different farm types and farm structures (farm scale). The EU is not a monolithic whole, but 
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comprises different member states. Even when a kind of representative country or firm 
approach will be used, it is recognized that this needs motivation and being put in a wider 
perspective in order to appropriately grasp the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions 
made. 
In their paper Thorne (2005) examined the competitiveness of cereal production in selected 
EU member states, during the period 1996 – 2000. Since they mainly focused at farms their 
selected competitiveness indicators were profitability and costs of production. Their analysis 
is based on data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). More in particular they 
focused on Farm Type 4310 – specialist cereal, oilseed and protein (COP) producers. 
According to their results productivity levels in the UK, Ireland and France were consistently 
higher than in competing countries Denmark, Germany and Italy. 
Non-surprisingly, the opportunity cost of owned resources has a major impact on the 
competitiveness of cereal production within the EU217. Cash costs as a percentage of total 
output were lowest in Italy but in terms of total economic costs, including an opportunity cost 
for all owned resources, Italy had the highest cost structure amongst the countries examined. 
These findings of Thorne imply that the competitiveness is sensitive to the time horizon 
chosen. Long term competitiveness scores (including the impact of imputed costs on farm 
profitability) might be different from short-term indicators (where profitability and cost of 
production only are based on variable costs and exclude fixed costs and the included imputed 
costs (see also Jongeneel et al 2006, Deliverable 12 of this project). Moreover it makes clear 
that in general it is difficult to measure crop specific competitiveness with great precision. 
Year to year weather fluctuations and differences in plant stress due to diseases will affect 
competitiveness indicators. One way to avoid or at least minimize these impacts is to 
normalize over years as was done in the Thorne (2005) analysis. However this does not solve 
for all things. Even in case of using specialized farms (as was done here), for example, there 
still remains the task to allocate some costs (and benefits) to a specific crop or activity, which 
always include some arbitrariness.  
Figure 7.5 presents the comparative costs of production and returns for cereal farms measured 
in terms of costs as a percentage of total cereal production output and allocated direct 
payments. The Figure 7.5 shows the five-year (1996-2000) average cost shares for specialized 
cereals enterprises for six selected EU member states. The individual cost components for 
each of the countries is outlined in Thorne (2005). Cereal producers in Italy had the lowest 
cash costs as a per cent of output (Ireland is the second lowest) cash costs. Note that cash 
costs in France, Germany, the UK and Ireland are rather similar to each other, whereas cash 
costs in Denmark are higher. 
When accounting also for imputed costs France appears to be the most competitive country as 
compared to the other member states presented. Note that in the latter case all selected 
member states have costs exceeding revenues from cereal production (implying a negative 
profitability). The specific imputed charges for owned labour and land are significantly 
variable between countries and alter the longer term  competitive outlook.   
 
 
                                                 
217
 This phenomenon was also recognized and more extensively discussed in Deliverable 11 resulting from this 
project, which explored and devloped a general framework for competitiveness analysis. 
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Figure 7.5: Costs as a percentage of output for selected cereals farms in six EU member 
states (source Thorne, 2005, 9) 
As noted before France is a key surplus production area in the EU. Moreover, from the 
analysis of Thorne (2005) it follows that France is comparable to other key EU cereal 
producing member states when focusing on cash costs of production, while it has the lowest 
total costs (cash costs and imputed costs). For this reason it was decided in the subsequent 
analysis to focus on France as the representative case for the competitiveness analysis of the 
cross compliance standards.  
Comparing the EU with its key external trade partners a comparative study on costs of cereals 
production by the French Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé is informative. The 
main producing and exporting countries have quite different yields, due to natural and socio-
economic conditions (among which population density). Europe on the one hand and the 
“new” countries – including the USA – on the other hand show opposite strategies. While 
Europe competitiveness is tending to maximise the production per hectare – due to a relative 
scarcity of agricultural land per inhabitant – the Australian, Argentine, US and Canadian 
competitiveness is based on minimising the (labor) costs per hectare. The following table 
derived from the French study illustrates this fact (see ). Yields are relatively high in France, 
costs per hectare are relatively low in the non-EU countries presented. The numbers in this 
table give an indication of cost of production differentials but that in the simulation analysis 
the costs of production as present in the model structure of GTAP is used, which is much 
more detailed.  
Since in the end these countries compete on the same market, the ultimately relevant data is 
not the cost/ha but the costs per unit of output (costs/quintal), which are analysed in the 
following Figure 7.6 
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Table 7.6: Comparison of yields and costs/ha for the main exporting countries  
 
Source: AGPB 1998-1999 crop year 
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Figure 7.6: Costs structure of the cereals production 
Source AGPB, 1998-19999 data 
 
At the lower end, Australia is the most competitive country (on the year studied), with 10.6 
€/q while the other countries range between 13 and 15 €/q. The Figure 7.6 shows that the 
relatively similar costs are reached through different costs structures. In the USA, for 
example, the land costs are relatively high (circa 25% of all costs), due to a high 
‘consumption’ of land per quintal produced (another way to label the low yields) while, 
symmetrically, they are relatively low in France (12%). Reciprocally, the operational costs are 
higher in France (±30% of all costs) than in the USA (< 20%).  
Meanwhile, the machinery and labour costs levels are rather similar across the countries 
studied, expressed in €/q. While the breakdown between the two items is not available, one 
can only make assumptions on how this result is obtained. While the French cereals will stand 
on more intensified cropping patterns (i.e. more agricultural operations and labour/ha), the 
higher costs are completely compensated by the higher yield. Said in other words, the 
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machinery and labour costs are more or less fully proportionate to the yield, with linear 
relation. 
This costs structure makes the different systems differently sensitive to variations in yields 
and prices. While the French (European) cereals need to cover the high costs with a high 
production, the new countries systems might be economically more resilient. Moreover the 
variation in the mix of imputed costs over countries might lead to differences in competitive 
behaviour over time. For example, assuming that land markets (land prices) more easily 
adjust than labor costs, land intensive production systems might have a higher competitive 
potential in the longer run. 
 
7.6 Review of SMRs and GAECs potentially impacting the EU cereal 
sector: the case for France 
All the previous section leads to two key conclusions for the purpose of our analysis:  
- while Europe still is a market ruled by the Community preference (see Macro-economic 
conditions, Internal and external market effect), the internal competitiveness is influenced by 
the relative production costs of different farms, leading to contrasted strategies (see Farm 
behaviour, private benefits and supply response above) 
- the external competitiveness can be analysed as a surplus market, determined by the last 
player, being France in that case (see Macro-economic conditions, Internal and external 
market effect). 
These statements justify an analysis focused on the potential impact of cross-compliance 
related standards on the French cereal sector. Moreover, the allow an in depth discussion on 
how standards might affect production. This is in particular relevant since standards are 
imposed on farmers rather than countries and therefore the first are the proper entities of 
analysis. The impact of standards will differ depending on farm heterogeneity, as will also be 
made clear below218. The analysis and material provided in this chapter are based on those 
available in Deliverable 5 (Country report: France), selected, amended and organised for the 
cereals sector. 
7.6.1 The cereal sector: a concentrated and specialised sector in France 
While some directive applies to regions (e.g. nitrate or bird and habitat directives) and sectors, 
it is important to have a survey of the production of cereals in France in order to understand 
which farms will mostly be relevant for our analysis. 
Since most of the French farms produce some cereals, the production is, indeed, concentrated 
in some specific farm types and regions. According to the results of French National 
                                                 
218
 For example, where the previously presented member state’s costs of production indicators relied on 
specialized cereal farms, this farm type is not the only category to be considered when analysing a 
member state’s cereal sector. A cereals sector comprises various farm types and farm scales, which 
should be accounted for in the determination of the final percentage costs increase estimates associated 
with the considered standards. 
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Agricultural Census 2000, more than 80% of the area devoted to cereals is found in 4 main 
farm types: 
 48% of UAA in cereals are run by “specialist cereals” farms; 
 14,6% of UAA in cereals are run by “field crops-grazing livestock combined” farms; 
 12,5% of UAA in cereals are run by “general field crops” farms; 
 6,6% of UAA in cereals are run by “specialist dairy” farms.  
 
As shown on the following Map 7.4, cereal production is localised in some regions.  
 
Map 7.4: Repartition of dominant EC farm types on the French territory 2000)  
(Specialised cereals/crops farms are represented in yellow) 
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In terms of volume, the production is logically concentrated in the most favourable zones. In 
1999, 10 departements (Nuts 3 division) out of 90, representing around 15% of UAA 
represented 37% of the whole wheat production and 43% of the maize production. 
About three-fourth of Ile de France’s UAA and two-third of Centre’s one are occupied by 
“specialist cereals” farms. Generally speaking these farms are mainly present in the 
regions constituting the “Bassin Parisien” and in the Southwest of the country.  
The type “general field cropping” is predominant in north-eastern regions of the country. 
 
7.7 Identification and analysis of the SMR potentially impacting the cereal 
farms 
 
SMRs can be classified in three types: 
- “general” SMRs, affecting all farm, regardless of their type or location; 
- “zoned” SMRs only affecting some farms in one zone, i.e. associated to a “zoned” 
directive (e.g. nitrate directive); 
- “sectoral” SMRs only affecting one sector. This is the case for directives and 
regulations which, by nature, apply to animals, such as animal identification.  
 
Table 7.7: Identification of Costs of Compliance for the selected farm types (source: 
Deliverable 7) 
Directive 
Ha of Utilised 
Agricultural Area 
(UAA) affected 
Farm type affected 
(in general) 
Farm type 
involved in cereal 
production 
affected? 
Bird directive 
Habitat directive 
UAA hectares in SPA 
UAA hectares in SCI 
Farms with area in 
SPA  
Farms with area in SCI 
areas  
Yes 
Ground water 100% UAA  All farm types Yes 
Sewage sludge  Estimated UAA hectares All farm types 
Yes 
Nitrate directive UAA hectares in Vulnerable zones 
Intensive pigs, beef, 
dairy and  poultry 
farms, specialised 
cereal farms 
No 
Identification and 
registration of animals 
 
Whole cattle 
population 
Beef and dairy cattle 
 
No 
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Directive 
Ha of Utilised 
Agricultural Area 
(UAA) affected 
Farm type affected 
(in general) 
Farm type 
involved in cereal 
production 
affected? 
Identification and 
registration of ovine 
and caprine animals 
Whole sheep and 
goats population Sheep and goats 
No 
Placing of plant 
protection products 100% of UAA All farm types 
Yes 
Prohibition of 
hormonal substances 
100% cattle and pig 
population Beef, pigs, poultry 
No 
Food law, & 
procedures in matters 
of food safety 
100% of UAA All farm types 
Yes 
Spread of diseases 
Foot & mouth ,Swine 
vesicular disease 
Bluetongue  
 Beef, pigs 
No 
Housing of calves Calf population Calves No 
Housing of pigs Pig population Pigs No 
Protection of animals 
kept for farming 
purpose 
 All livestock farms 
No 
 
The farms involved in cereal production will be potentially affected by the following directive 
- “general” : ground water, sewage sludge, placing of plant protection products, food 
law, & procedures in matters of food safety 
- “zoned” : nitrate directive (VZ), bird directive (SPA), habitat directive (SCI); the two 
latest are now in the N2000 network 
- “sectoral” : none for the cereal sector.  
 
In general terms, the livestock sectors are much more affected by SMRs than the cereal sector. 
It must be noted that, as analysed in D5 for France, the Bird and Habitat directives hardly 
affect the cereal systems and sector as most rich habitats and IBAs are outside the main 
cereals producing areas, in which habitats have been destroyed for decades. It is in extensive 
livestock systems areas that N2000 will be active. For this reason, the N2000 directives can 
be taken out of the analysis. 
 
Identification of GAEC potentially impacting the cereal farms 
The French GAECs are summarised in the following Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8: French GAECs  
Issue Standards: GAEC 
1. Soil erosion: protection soil 
through appropriate measures 
Set-aside of farmland (3%) = buffer strips 
Obligation of land maintenance (set-aside land, 
grassland, non productive land) 
2. Soil organic matter: 
maintain soil organic matter 
levels through appropriate 
practices 
Interdiction of burning straw  
Diversity of cropping pattern 
3. Soil structure: maintain soil 
structure through appropriate 
measures 
Regulation of irrigation 
Diversity of cropping pattern 
4. Minimum level of 
maintenance: ensure a 
minimum level of 
maintenance and avoid 
deterioration of habitats 
Set-aside of farmland = buffer strips 
General regulations of land maintenance 
Maintenance regulations of cultivated land  
Maintenance regulations of set-aside land  
Maintenance regulations of grassland  
Maintenance regulations of non productive land 
Permanent pasture 
maintenance 
No obligation at farm level until now 
GAECs defined by France principally concern limitation of soil erosion, buffer strips, 
diversity of cropping pattern, interdiction of burning straw, regulation of irrigation.  
Cereals and crop systems are, in principle, largely affected by the GAECs, but some 
dispensations weaken the requirements (see details below).  
 
Buffer strips 
It affects all types of farming systems having less than 3 % of permanent pastures, i.e. 
principally types “specialist cereals” and “general field cropping”.  
 
Diversity of cropping pattern 
It affects in principle all types of farming systems. But dispensations exist for those with 
monocropping maize due to expected disproportionate economic impacts expected.  
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Interdiction of burning straw  
It principally affects crop production, so farm types “specialist cereals” and “general field 
cropping”, situated in NUTS 3 Indre, Cher and Yonne, in north of the Massif Central (cf. 
enquête pratique 2002). Local dispensations are provided till now. 
 
Regulation of irrigation 
58% of national irrigated UAA are situated in regions (NUTS2) Aquitaine (17,7%), Midi-
Pyrénées (17,1%), Centre (12,7%) and Poitou-Charentes (10,7%). It principally deals with 
some filed crops. GAECs means provision of authorisation and existence of water meters. 
 
7.8 Cost analysis 
Deliverable 5 for France has extensively described and analysed which farm types should be 
included in the analysis of the cereal sector. These are: 
• Farming systems specialised in cereals and protein-oil crops production with no livestock 
(n°11) and general field cropping (cereals or other) (n°12). Localisation: Parisian basin, 
Pays de la Loire, Alsace 
• Farming systems specialised in cereals and protein-oil crops irrigated production with no 
livestock (n°11). As we saw, irrigated production is almost maize. Localisation: 
Southwest.  
• Farming systems combining cereals and protein-oil crops production with livestock 
production (cattle, sheep or goat farming) (n°81= field crops-grazing livestock combined). 
Localisation: margin of Bassin parisien and Bassin aquitain, Rhône-Alpes, Alsace.  
 
Table 7.9 below summarizes which GAECs and general SMRs need consideration, 
accounting for the diversity in farm types described above. 
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Table 7.9: Identification of relevant SMRs and GAECs to be analysed per farm type 
Farm type Number of the farm type Regions (NUTS2) 
Specific SMRs 
concerned General SMRs 
Specialist cereals 
and general field 
crops 
11 and 12 
Ile de France, 
Champagne 
Ardennes, Picardie 
Pays de la Loire 
Alsace 
GAECs (mainly buffer 
strips, diversity of 
cropping pattern) 
Specialist cereals 
(irrigated maize) 11 
Aquitaine, Midi-
Pyrénées 
GAECs (mainly buffer 
strips, GAEC4 for 
maize monocropping) 
Field crops- 
grazing livestock 
combined 
81 
Haute-Normandie, 
Nord Pas de Calais, 
Lorraine 
Aquitaine, Rhône-
Alpes, Alsace 
GAECs (mainly buffer 
strips, diversity of 
cropping pattern)  
Permanent pastures 
maintenance 
all SMRs affecting 
grazing livestock 
farming 
Nitrate directive 
Sewage sludge  
Ground water 
Placing of plant 
protection products 
Food law 
Obligation of land 
maintenance 
 
The following pages display the costs analysis undertaken for the systems involved in cereal 
production. In accordance with the methodology designed in Deliverable D7 (see De Roest et 
al, 2006 for details), costs of complying with regulations are distinguished from costs of 
complying with SMRs. Subsequently representative farm cases for the specialised cereals and 
general field cropping farm type, the specialized cereals producing farm type  and the 
combined field crop grazing and livestock farm type will be discussed. 
7.8.1 Specialised cereals and general field cropping systems 
For the following calculations it is assumed that the representative  or average specialist crop 
farm produces 6,104 quintal of wheat 219 (95 ha average producing 71.4 q/ha/year in average 
[source: SAA 2001 and SCEES, average yield 2001-2004]). 
7.8.1.1 Nitrate directive 
Cost of compliance 
Such systems are not concerned with the maximum threshold of 170kg N/ha and manure 
storage. Thus, the cost of compliance will potentially deal with the following items: 
• times of spreading 
• minimal distance from watercourses 
• covering of soils during winter 
                                                 
219
 For reasons of comparison, it is assumed that the farm will produce 100 % wheat. 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 246 
• presence and compliance of documents (fertilisation plan, recording book…) 
 
The first item has no clear economic impact.  
• The minimal distance from watercourses will have a little potential impact as the mandatory 
set aside of 10% will be used  for this purpose. 
• Covering soils is generally expressed as a minimum % of soils to be covered during winter 
[around 2/3]. It is decided at departemental level. In most of the cereal regions, the 2/3 of 
surfaces are covered with winter-crops. The items for calculation are the following: 
• seeds (mustard,…): 24 €/ha 
• seeding and tillage: 30 €/ha 
• destruction of cover: 36 €/ha 
• TOTAL: 90 €/ha (source: MAP, MEDD, CNASEA, 2001b) 
With an average uncovered soils of 30% in such systems on 90% of UAA (10% for set-aside) 
the cost can be estimated at: 
30%*95*90%*90 € = 2,308 €/farm 
• Time for registration is negligible, for the reasons developed above. 
TOTAL cost of compliance: winter cover  0.37 €/quintal of wheat 
In 2003, 58% of the départements did not made the covering of soils mandatory under the 
nitrate directive (MEDD, 2004). 
 
Cost of cross-compliance 
SMRs for cropping systems mainly imply registration (covering of soils during winter is a 
SMR only in most intensive livestock areas). 
TOTAL cost of cross compliance: 0 
 
7.8.1.2 Sewage sludge 
Cost of compliance 
Sludge is mainly spread on cropping systems in France. Considering the different items of the 
sewage sludge: 
• Purchase of sludge implies no cost for farmer in France, as the local authorities are happy 
to get rid of such products (60% of sludge are spread on agricultural land; the limiting 
factor is the acceptance by farmers [IFEN, 2001]) 
• Transport and spreading costs are also paid by sludge producers, for the same reason. 
Nevertheless, the fertilisation value of such sludge can be estimated at 0,9 €/m3 (4.2 kgN/m3, 
6% of dry matter, 40% of available N) [source: ACTA, undated]. With 37 m3/ha, the gain for 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 247 
the farmer is 33.3 €/ha. Considering that such sludge are only spread one year out of 4, this 
makes 8.32 €/ha/year. 
TOTAL cost of compliance for farmer receiving sludge: -8,32 €/ha. 
As only 2% of national UAA get sludge, the macro-economic impact of the sewage sludge 
directive can be counted as negligible. 
 
Cost of cross-compliance 
Farmer does not support any constraint from SMR (he has to produce a contract prepared by 
the producer of sludge). 
TOTAL cost of cross compliance: 0 
 
7.8.1.3 Ground water 
Costs of compliance 
Same reasoning can be made as for livestock systems described above, noting the cost is 
doubled at farm level when reaching a threshold of 100 ha. 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 60 €/farm ; thus 0,01 €/quintal wheat 
 
Costs of cross compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 € (see above) 
 
7.8.1.4 Placing of plant protection products and food law 
Cost of compliance 
The costs are related to inexpensive storage facilities and time recording, thus: 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 0 
 
Cost of cross-compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 
 
7.8.1.5 GAECs 
Cost of compliance and cross compliance 
Since the GAECs are considered to be newly introduced restrictions together with cross 
compliance, no distinction is made between costs of compliance and costs of crross 
compliance. 
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The main constraint from GAEC in such systems will deal with the requirement of 3% 
uncultivated land nearby the watercourses (buffer strip). As these 3% are part of the 10% of 
mandatory set-aside, the economic impact will be none. Actually the buffer zone constraint 
can be interpreted as not effectively binding, because another more binding constraint (set-
aside) takes over its role. When the set-aside requirement will change this result of a zero 
economic impact might no longer be valid. (Since 2008 the set-aside rate is put to zero 
implying that farmers now face a binding constraint form the buffer zone requirements. 
Diversity of cropping pattern does not affect such systems, which diversity already comply 
with the existing standards of the SMR (source: AScA, 2003). 
 
7.8.2 Specialised cereals with irrigated maize 
For all the following calculation it has been assumed that the representative or average 
specialist crop farm with irrigated maize produces 3,505 quintal of maize 220 (41 ha average 
producing 95 q/ha/year in average [source: SAA 2001 and SCEES, average yield 2001-
2004]). 
7.8.2.1 Nitrate directive 
Cost of compliance 
Same general reasoning as for above, except that the cover of soils affects 100% of the 
surface. 
Thus, the costs are: 41 ha*90 €/ha*90% cultivated land (10% set aside) = 3,321 € 
TOTAL cost of compliance: winter cover 0.95 €/quintal of maize 
In 2003, the Map 7.4 showing the distribution of départements in which covering of soil is 
mandatory, allows to classify the degree of compliance with this measure as “medium” (30-
60%) [see D4] (MEDD, 2004). 
 
Cost of cross-compliance 
Same as above. 
TOTAL cost of cross compliance: 0 
7.8.2.2 Sewage sludge 
Costs of compliance 
Cost for sewage sludge follow the same reasoning as followed above. 
TOTAL cost of compliance for farmer receiving sludge: -8,32 €/ha. 
As only 2% of national UAA get sludge, the macro-economic impact of the sewage sludge 
directive can be counted as negligible. 
                                                 
220
 For reasons of comparison, it is assumed that such farms will produce 100 % maize. 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 249 
 
Costs of cross compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross compliance: 0 
 
7.8.2.3 Ground water 
Costs of compliance 
A similar reasoning as for livestock systems described above can be made, noting the cost is 
under the threshold of 50 ha. 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 30 €/farm ; thus 0,009 €/quintal maize 
 
Costs of cross compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 € (see above) 
 
7.8.2.4 Placing of plant protection products and food law 
Costs of compliance 
Same reasoning can be made as above: 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 0 
 
Costs of cross compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 
7.8.2.5 GAECs 
Costs of compliance and cross compliance 
As regards the costs of the GAECs the following observations can be made : 
• GAEC on diversity of cropping pattern affects such monocropping systems. Nevertheless, a 
derogatory regime does not imply a diversity of rotation but: 
• the covering of soils (see above) 
• the obligation to have soil analysis. 
The cost for the first item has been calculated above. 
The cost of soil analysis can be calculated as follows (source: MAP, MEDD, CNASEA, 
2001b). We assume 2 soil analysis/farm and/year (for a 50 ha farm) 
• two analysis 26 € each * 2 = 52 €/farm 
• technical advice = 170 €/farm 
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TOTAL cost of compliance at farm level: 222 €/farm 
    winter cover 0.95 €/quintal of maize (already counted) 
    Soil analysis 0.07 €/quintal of maize 
• GAEC on irrigation implies a cost on water meter: 550 €/farm, which amortisation can be 
estimated on 20 years [source: interview with Chambre d’Agriculture de l’Isère], thus 27 
€/farm/year (negligible). 
 
7.8.3 Field crops-grazing livestock combined 
For all the following calculation, the representative or average field crops-grazing livestock 
combined farm produces 3,000 quintal of wheat and 224 tons of milk (50 ha average for crops 
producing 60 q/ha/year and 40 cows producing 5,600 kg in average [source: SAA 2001 and 
SCEES]). 
7.8.3.1 Nitrate directive 
Dairy production in such systems is, in average, moderately intensive (combining grassland 
and crops in the forage system). The stocking density will be around 1,5-1,8 LU/ha (Institut 
de l’élevage, 2000) and, in any case, the amount of organic nitrogen produced/ha will be over 
170 kg/ha. The dairy farms in such regions are, in average, large ones (they are deriving from 
the restructuring of former small-medium farms that gave up with milk in the 80’s). Thus, 
they can be assumed as complying with the nitrate directive requirements for livestock 
production due to the PMPOA (see above). (Le Gall, 2005). 
Costs of compliance 
The costs due to cropping activity will be comparable as for cereals producers, with a highest 
rate of spring crops in the cropping pattern, due to presence of silage maize. Uncovered soils 
are covering, thus, 40% of UAA. The calculation will then be: 
40% [uncovered soils]*50 ha [crops] *90% [set aside factor]*90 € = 1,620 €/farm 
This cost can logically be affected to crop production (and not to dairy production) 
- TOTAL cost of compliance for cropping activity estimated at: 0,54 €/ quintal of wheat. 
 
Costs of cross-compliance 
The issue to deal with the compliance will be registration time, which can be assumed as 
negligible. 
7.8.3.2 Sewage sludge 
Costs of compliance and cross compliance 
It is unlikely that such systems will accept sewage sludge, due to the fact that they already 
produce organic fertilisers. 
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7.8.3.3 Ground water 
Costs of compliance 
Same reasoning as above is followed. 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 30 €/farm ; thus 0,01 €/quintal wheat 
 
Costs of cross compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 € (see above) 
 
7.8.3.4 Placing of plant protection products and food law 
Costs of compliance 
Same reasoning can be made as for systems described above: 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 0 
 
Costs of cross compliance 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 
 
7.8.3.5 Identification of cattle 
Costs of compliance 
Every animal is meant to have its eartag. 
The calculation per farm is, annually: 9,70 € + nb cows and other animals [40 cows * 1 
birth/cow * 1,8 €/animal] + 28 €/15 =  109 €/farm 
TOTAL cost of compliance: 
109 €/farm 0,0004 €/kg milk 
 
Costs of cross-compliance 
Most farmers in such large farms are identified as complying with the legislation today 
[Source: interviews with MoA]. 
TOTAL cost of cross-compliance: 0 
 
7.8.3.6 GAECs 
Cost of compliance and cross compliance 
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The mixed character of such systems (presence of grassland) results in absence of any 
constraint from the GAECs. 
 
7.9 External competitiveness assessment 
7.9.1 Best estimates of percentage cost increases for select EU member 
states 
In order to evaluate the impact on competitiveness an estimate was made about the sectoral 
percentage cost increase of the GAEC regulations on cereals. Based on previous country 
studies the costs of the GAECs for cereals are estimated to be €35/ha, which includes the 
estimated revenue-reduction due to the need to retain more straw on the fields (organic 
matter) and the additional costs (tillage, ploughing, etc.). A much higher cost is taken into 
account for the proper management of idled land, which is estimated to create a cost of 
€400/ha. This latter estimate includes the costs of adequate soil cover, tillage, fuel and labor 
costs.  
Since the estimated costs associated with the GAECs for cultivated and idled land are 
different, the use of set-aside land (e.g. idled or used for energy crops) and the rate of set-
aside (10% for year 2005, but currently reduced to 0%) are likely to affect the cost increase 
associated with the GAEC standard. For this reason it was decided to simulate two scenario’s: 
One scenario assumes the set-aside rate to be 10% and all set-aside land to be used as idled 
land. This scenario can be considered to be a worst case scenario with relatively high costs. 
The alternative scenario assumes either a 0% set-aside rate, or a situation in which all set 
aside land is cultivated with specific crops rather than left idled. Since the relative costs for 
cultivated land are lower than for idled land, this scenario leads to a relatively low cost of 
GAEC standard estimate. Together these scenario’s provide an idea of the upper and lower 
bound of GAEC costs for cereals. 
Table 7.3 provides a brief overview of the results, with GAEC-1 the cost increase associated 
with a 10% set-aside rate in place, whereas GAEC-2 accounts for the case the set-aside rate is 
set to zero. As the cost per hectare of land cropped with cereals are much lower than those per 
hectare of set-aside or idled land, the cost increase for GAEC-2 is much (almost 50%) lower 
than in GAEC-1. For France the buffer strips, which were previously ‘included’ in the set-
aside requirement, in GAEC-2 become and explicit constraint, precluding the French effective 
set-aside to go to zero, although the formal rate would allow for this. 
The final sectoral (additional) costs estimates as presented in Table 7.3 are dependent on the 
best estimates of compliance, which are given in the upper row of the Table 7.3 These 
estimated compliance rates were based on previous research (Jongeneel et al, 2007 and 
country reports as cited therein) and also takes into account the extent to which GAEC 
requirements reflect pre-existing national legislation (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
Moreover the calculation of cost follows the French example, using the same costs 
percentages over EU member states, but corrected these for country-specific characteristics, 
such as member state specific compliance and (total) costs of cereals production levels. 
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Table 7.10: Best-estimates of percentage cost increases for GAECs in cereals 
 BE DK FR DE IT NL SP UK 
Best-estimate of degree of 
compliance 
0.90 0.95 0.80 0.95 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
GAEC-1  (10% set-aside) 0.43 0.18 0.74 0.15 0.68 0.33 0.82 0.18 
GAEC-2  (0% set-aside) 0.21 0.09 0.48 0.07 0.33 0.16 0.40 0.09 
 
Underlying Table 7.3 are calculations using the 2004 FADN data taking into account several 
farm types (such as general field cropping, mixed crops, etc.). The differences in cost increase 
percentages partly reflect differences in farm structure (different farm type mixes over 
countries). Whereas at sectoral level the calculated cost increases always less than 1 percent, 
for individual farms cost increase estimates could go up to as high as 4%, depending on their 
degree of compliance.  
As regards the new member states who adopted the Single Area Payment scheme, the also 
have to follow the GAEC rules, especially when land is not used for production purposes. 
Research done within the project on Poland suggests that the level of implementation of the 
GAEC standards there may be high, whereas the impact on costs is limited (although reliable 
estimates are currently lacking). As compared to the old member states, in Poland the distance 
of the ‘new’ GAEC requirements and pre-existing national legislation of farming practices 
(e.g. regular stubble and grass burning practices) seems to be relatively large. 
7.9.2 Non-EU countries: the example of Canada 
Alongside the EU special attention was paid to Canada as an EU competitor221. The 
compliance strategy in Canada differs from that in the EU. A general illustration of the 
provincial compliance strategy in Canada is given in Figure 7.7. It are the provinces who are 
the lead jurisdiction on  environmental issues such as nutrient management, water resources 
protection, wildlife and habitat protection, land use and planning, soil quality, agricultural 
waste product management. Agriculture, including issues of plant and animal health, as well 
as food safety issues is a shared federal/provincial jurisdiction. The shading on the triangle 
(see Figure 7.7) represents how well operations are managing environment issues on-farm. 
The light area represents operations that are in compliance but which may benefit from 
additional best management practices. The grey section represents operations with relatively 
minor violations. The compliance program is designed to move the operations from the grey 
area into the lighter area (or into compliance) using a problem-solving approach. Using this 
approach, Agricultural Environmental Officers (AEOs)  will work with farmers to achieve 
compliance with the legislation. The dark area represents those very few operations that 
refuse to comply with the law. For these operations enforcement action is an option; however, 
the intent of the compliance program is still to help operations move into the lighter area 
through a problem-solving approach. 
 
 
                                                 
221
 Much more detail can be found in Part II of the Annex to this report entitled “Costs of compliance to 
environmental regulations in CANADA; Case study on cereals”. 
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Figure 7.7: The Canadian compliance triangle-model 
In Canada, management practices similar to the GAEC standards in the EU are implemented 
through various cost share programs. These agricultural practices are known as Beneficial 
Management Practices or BMPs. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) (2006) defines 
Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs) as “farm management practices that: minimize and 
mitigate impacts and risks to the environment, by maintaining or improving the quality of 
soil, water, air and biodiversity; ensure the long term health and sustainability of natural 
resources used for agricultural production; and, support the long-term economic and 
environmental viability of the agriculture industry. 
In order to help agricultural producers develop and implement Beneficial Management 
Practices, the Government of Canada initiated Canada's National Environmental Farm 
Planning Initiative through provincially delivered Environmental Farm Plan (EFP) programs. 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2006) states that the objectives of the National 
Environmental Farm Plan Initiative include helping the agriculture sector better identify its 
impacts on the environment; and promoting the growth of stewardship activities within the 
agriculture industry. At this point the program is scheduled to end with the expiration of the 
current Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) in 2008, but it is likely that it will be continued 
in a similar form in the new Agricultural Policy Framework. 
As part of the program, farmers attend an Environmental Farm Plan workshop and complete a 
workbook designed to assess the current state of the farm and identify areas of concern. Then 
farmers develop an action plan for addressing the areas of concern. The action plan is 
confidentially reviewed by a group of locally appointed farmers. Once the Peer Review 
Committee approves the Action Plan, a farmer can participate in the EFP Cost-Share Program 
that helps cover a portion of the costs of implementing eligible projects from the action plan 
(Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, 2006). Producers are eligible to 
apply for cost-share incentives through the Canada Farm Stewardship Program, Greencover 
Canada, and the Canada Water Supply Expansion Program. 
There are 36 Best Management Practice categories, each containing several practices eligible 
for funding. Federal government covers up to 60% of the cost of implementing eligible 
practices. Many practices covered through federal cost share programs are also eligible for 
funding under different provincial cost share programs. As a result up to 90% of the total 
project cost can be covered by combining federal and provincial funds. However, the 
coverage varies depending on farmer eligibility, provinces and type of Best Management 
Practices. In Ontario, funding is available through the Nutrient Management Financial 
Assistance Program Wetland Farm Stewardship Incentive Program, Oak Ridges Moraine 
Environmental Enhancement Program and Greenbelt Farm Stewardship Program.  
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Despite the fact that the implementation of Best Management Practices is not mandatory, 
there has been a relatively high degree of participation. For example, between 2005 and 2007, 
more than 11,000 of 57,211 Ontario farmers implemented or were in the process of 
implementation of BMPs. Even though the implementation of Beneficial Management 
Practices is partly subsidized by the federal and provincial governments, it is not costless to 
the farmers. As an example, Ontario farmers bore about a third of the cost of implementation 
of the management practices eligible for funding. Net costs for participating farmers could 
amount to about €1000 per farm. Because participation is voluntary, it is assumed that farmers 
will only participate if the net costs they have to make are offset by gains achieved elsewhere 
in the farm operation. For this reason the estimated percentage cost increase is assumed to be 
zero. 
A detailed comparative standards analysis of Canada and the EU was done. Although the 
Ontario region was studied in depth also a more general analyses were made for Canada as a 
whole, taking into account other regions and a comparative analysis at the level of the 
provinces. Moreover a lot of specific studies have been reviewed and sometimes been 
reconstructed to take advantage from them for this project. Based on that analysis the 
following summary Table 7.11 was made (Details can be found in the Annex to this report, 
Part II). It should be noted that the numbers presented in the Table 7.11 below are not yet 
appropriate as estimator for the costs increases at sector level. In order to obtain these a 
further aggregation of the results is necessary, for which more detailed information about 
participation rates and country coverage are necessary. 
Table 7.11: Compliance costs for GAEC-equivalent measures in Canadian cereals 
production (measured at farm level)  
EU Standard 
Comparable standard (or 
recommended practice) in 
Canada 
Compliance cost 
(% of total cost of production) 
  Low end Most likely High end 
Conservation of Natural 
Habitats, wild flora and fauna 
Canada Wildlife Act; Species 
at Risk Act 0 0.3 1.9 
GAECs Best Management Practices    
  Variable rate fertilization 0 0 1.1 
  Buffer strips 0.2 0.3 0.9 
  Other BMP's 0 1.5 3.1 
Total Cost   0.2 2.1 7.1 
 
Summarizing, the main conclusions from the comparative EU-Canada analysis are that, by 
international standards, Canada has a low-intensity agriculture. Nevertheless, most EU 
environmental regulations that apply to agriculture have a counterpart in Canada. At one or 
more of the federal, provincial or municipal levels compliance is promoted through a range of 
measures. Compliance costs are quite low for cereals, may be somewhat higher for hogs 
(which is often a production combined with cereals). Since the Best Management Practices 
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are voluntary programs participation rates rather than compliance rates are the relevant 
concept to translate and aggregate costs of affected farms to cost at sector level222. 
7.10 Standards and external competitiveness  
For the GAECs, only scenarios where the EU imposes standards are evaluated. In the project 
an extensive analysis was made about the impact of similar standards in Canada, but for 
reason explained above it was estimated that the net implications on costs are effectively zero, 
or very close to zero. Three scenario’s are considered: 
1. The EU imposes the GAECs and has a set-aside rate of 10% applying to cereal 
producers; 
2. The EU imposes the GAECs and has a set-aside rate of 0% applying to cereal 
producers; 
3. The EU imposes the GAECs and has a set-aside rate of 10% applying to cereal 
producers. At the same the selected standards (nitrate directive, identification and 
registration directive, animal welfare directive) are imposed on other sectors (dairy, 
beef, pigs and poultry) and fully complied with and might cause spill-over effects 
between sectors 
Note that scenario 2 is equivalent to scenario 1, but takes into account the impacts of the 
standards imposed in other sectors. As such it provides a more integral analysis of the 
trade impacts. It should also be noted that for all scneario’s it is assumed that the imposed 
standards are fully complied with. This could be interpreted as the leverage effect 
introduced by cross compliance to be maximally effective, and inducing full compliance. 
In reality the finally achieved degree of compliance is likely to end somewhere below 100 
percent compliance (although hig degrees of compliance are expected for various 
countries).223  
The GTAP trade simulations used the percentage cost increases for the EU as explained in 
Table 7.10 above. With respect to the non-EU countries only the Canada case was considered 
in detail and to be open to attach non-zero cost increases to. However, based on the analysis 
previously discussed (and further motivated in Annex part II) no positive cost increases have 
been taken into account.  
As the Table 7.12 below shows the impact of the GAEC standards (assuming the EU’s set-
aside rate for cereal producers is set at 10%) leads to an increase of the EU-15s imports by 
about 2.23 percent, whereas its exports decline with 1.82 percent224. The EU’s import increase 
                                                 
222
 A difference with the EU’s (obligatory) cross-compliance system is that this has full coverage (cross 
compliance extends to all farms eligible for direct payments, and the legal standards even apply to all 
farms irrespective of their eligibility to direct payments. Although in Canada with voluntary 
participation, participation might be still high, although no precise estimates could be made. Non-
affected farms might not participate in BMP-schemes, but be still implicitly compliant to the level 
specified in the used standards. As explained in the previous section the Canadian philosophy targets 
primarily at the farms causing externalities. An open question is how many farms are in the pinnacle of 
the reversed triangle (in need of compliance enforcement and not sufficiently sensitive to the 
dominating voluntary approach. 
223
 See Jongeneel et al (2008). 
224
 Since the GTAP model presents a lot of detailed output some aggregations have been made to avoid an 
overload of information. More detailed Tables are available from the authors upon request. 
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is rather evenly spread over the countries exporting to the EU. As regards the EU’s export 
decline there is more variation over the countries importing from the EU. However, the 
results, which are all in percentage changes (to the baseline of having no GAEC standards) 
have to be linked to volumes to understand the absolute changes. Moreover, the GTAP trade 
model allows taking into account all kind of interactions between trading partners, both 
importers as well as exporters. It can be seen when aggregating impacts (see bottom line of 
the Table 7.12) the impacts of the export decline will mainly come down to the rest of the 
OECD and to a lesser extent to the rest of the world. The total world trade in cereals will only 
be marginally affected (an increase of 0.47%). 
Table 7.13 below has a similar structure as Table 7.12 above, but shows the impact assuming 
that the initial rate of set-aside is 0 percent rather that 10 percent. The lower set aside rate 
reduces the trade impacts of the GAEC standards roughly with 40%. In this case the EU-15s 
imports are expected to increase by 1.26 percent (rather than 2.23 percent, whereas its exports 
are expected to decline by 1.10% (rather than by 1.82 percent as in the case of 10% set-aside). 
The main reason for this is that a lower rate of set-aside is estimated to reduce the compliance 
costs. The key variable explaining this is the average compliance cost per hectare of arable 
land which might be freely cropped as compared to a hectare of land subject to set-aside. In 
the later case the compliance costs are estimated to be higher, which cause the percentage cost 
increase in the 10 percent set-aside rate case to be higher than in the 0 percent set-aside rate 
case225. The impact on total world trade in cereals is negligible. 
Table 7.12: The trade impacts of the GAEC standards on cereals for some selected 
countries (assuming a 10 percent set-aside rate in the EU) (Scenario 1)   
 EU15 Japan Korea Mexico ROECD ROW Total Export 
USA 2.32% 0.00% -0.02% -0.02% 0.21% 0.12% 0.17% 
Argentina 2.01% -0.07% -0.09% -0.08% 0.15% 0.05% 0.17% 
EU15 0.00% -1.26% -1.31% -0.30% -1.40% -2.12% -1.82% 
ROECD 2.21% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% 0.00% 0.08% 0.30% 
ROW 2.27% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.27% 0.09% 0.47% 
Total Import 2.23% -0.01% 0.00% -0.02% -0.22% -0.21% 0.02% 
Source: own calculations 
Table 7.13: The trade impacts of  the GAEC standards on cereals (assuming a 0 percent 
set-aside rate in the EU) (Scenario 2) 
 EU15 Japan Korea Mexico ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
USA 1.30% 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% 0.13% 0.07% 0.10% 
Argentina 1.15% -0.04% -0.05% -0.05% 0.09% 0.03% 0.10% 
EU15 0.00% -0.68% -0.72% -0.18% -0.82% -1.30% -1.10% 
ROECD 1.25% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% 0.00% 0.05% 0.17% 
                                                 
225
 Of course not all set-aside land is really put set-aside, but may be used for growing non-food or feed crops 
(i.e. energy crops). In the latter case there is not much difference to be expected bwteen set-aside land 
and crop land. So the assumed degree to which set-aside land is used to produce alternative crops is 
crucial here. 
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 EU15 Japan Korea Mexico ROECD ROW 
Total 
Export 
ROW 1.28% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.16% 0.06% 0.27% 
Total Import 1.26% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.13% -0.13% 0.01% 
Source: own calculations 
Table 7.14 below represents the trade impact for a simultaneous imposition of the selected 
standards in all selected sectors analysed in this research (Scenario 3). EU imports increase in 
this scenario by 1.34 percent while its cereals exports decline by 1.19 percent. When 
comparing scenario 1 with scenario 3, it is clear that the spill over effects from other sectors 
and markets tend to make the trade impacts smaller. 
The simulated trade impacts for both GAEC scenarios are summarised in Table 7.15 below. 
For both scenario’s 1 and 2 it is assumed that compliance with the regulation improves from 
the level as estimated to prevail early 2005 to full compliance. For the GAEC 1 scenario EU 
exports decline with about 2 percent whereas its imports increase with a similar percentage. In 
terms of volume (assuming the EU wheat exports are about 16 million tons) this implies a 
reduction in EU exports of about 300 thousand tons for scenario 1. For scenario GAEC-2, 
which has no set-aside obligation, EU exports decline and import increase are respectively 
about 30% and 40% lower as compared to scenario 1. The impact on total world cereals trade 
is negligible. Scenario 3 is similar to scenario 2, but presents the impacts, taking into account 
that in all other sectors (dairy, beef, pigs and poultry) considered, simultaneously the analysed 
selected standards are fully complied with. As can be seen in this case nearly all impacts 
completely vanish.  
Table 7.14: The trade impacts of  the GAEC standards on cereals (assuming a 10 
percent set-aside rate in the EU) and a simultaneous full compliance to selected 
standards in other selected sectors (Scenario 3)   
 EU15 Japan Korea Mexico ROECD ROW 
TOTAL 
Export 
USA 1.37 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.25 0.10 0.12 
ARG 1.26 -0.07 -0.07 -0.40 0.15 0.03 0.10 
EU15 0.00 -0.77 -1.96 -0.19 -0.82 -1.52 -1.19 
ROECD 1.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.41 
ROW 1.36 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.22 
TOTAL Import 1.34 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.32 -0.09 0.02 
Source: own calculations 
Table 7.15: Percentage change in trade due to compliance to GAECs 
exports of which to…  Scenario EU 
Import 
EU 
Export 
 
Japan 
South 
Korea 
Rest of 
OECD 
Total 
world 
trade 
1 GAEC-1 (10% set-aside) 2.2 -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -1.4 0.02 
2 GAEC-2 (0% set-aside) 1.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 0.01 
3 Like scenario 2 but also 
full compliance to 
selected standards in all 
other analyzed sectors 
1.3 -1.2 -0.01 -0.00 -0.32 0.02 
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When looking to more detailed background tables (as presented above), it becomes clear that 
it are the USA, Argentina and Australia who fill the gap caused by the reduction in the EU’s 
net exports. The impact of the evaluated GAEC constraints on cereal prices is very small 
(negligible). As such other ‘shocks’ to the sector (like for example the price increases caused 
by the new demands for bio-fuels) easily outpace and dominate the impact of the GAEC 
standard, irrespective of whether one uses conservative or progressive estimates of the 
standard impacts. 
7.11 Conclusions 
Concluding it can be noted that the percentage cost increases associated with the GAECs for 
the cereals sector are in all cases less than 1 percent of total production costs. Several factors 
explain this result. The additional costs per hectare are generally low, with an exception of the 
costs for idled land. The best estimates of the current degree of compliance are rather high. 
Partly this is due to the fact that farmers have, for several reasons, already included a number 
of GAEC requirements into their existing farming practices. These reasons include the role of 
pre-existing national legislation and the internal benefits generated from preventing soil 
erosion and keeping up the soil condition. 
This latter factor explains why farmers following their own interest may participate 
voluntarily in programmes reducing soil erosion and are prepared to accept some costs. The 
case of Canada also illustrates this. It also makes clear that rather than following a command 
and control approach a voluntary or self-regulation approach might be effective in particular 
when the government is prepared to provide education and trainings, technical assistance and 
cost-offsets. Since in Canada participation is voluntary farmers are not likely to be faced with 
net costs increases affecting their competitive position. 
The use of set-aside land and/or the rate of set-aside will affect the estimated percentage costs 
increases (see differences between GAEC-1 and GAEC-2 scenarios): using more set-aside 
land for cultivating special crops or lower set-aside rates lead to lower costs. With the set-
aside rate currently set to zero, the calculated percentage cost increases more or less halved as 
compared to the 10 percent set-aside scenario (GAEC-1). The  3% buffer strip requirement in 
France, whereas previously accounted for within the 10% set-aside requirement, can be 
interpreted as an 3% minimum effective set-aside requirement (which holds even when the 
formal rate goes down to zero). 
The impact of the GAECs on the EU’s external competitiveness varies from a 1.8 percent 
reduction in exports in GAEC-1 (set-aside rate 10%) to a reduction of 1.1 percent (set-aside 
rate 0%). EU imports increase with approximately a similar percentage as exports decline. 
Total world trade is hardly affected by the impact of the GAEC standard. (However, trade is 
likely to be affected by changes in the set-aside policy (changes in land base) that are not 
separately evaluated).  
If a scenario is considered in which standards in other sectors (dairy, beef, pigs and poultry) 
are simultaneous complied with (and set-aside rate equal to 10 percent), the trade impacts on 
the cereals market due to the introduction (and full compliance with) the GAEC standards 
diminish. EU imports then increase by 1.34 percent while its cereals exports decline by 1.19 
percent. When comparing scenario 1 with scenario 3, it is clear that the spill over effects from 
other sectors and markets tend to make the trade impacts smaller. 
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In broad terms, this limited impacts on the EU’s external competitiveness is due to the nature 
of the regulations which are, in general, predominantly directed towards livestock issues per 
nature or de facto226. Secondly, it is due to the fact that the implementation rules are not 
constraining at end, but are more playing as a safeguard or stand on derogation which weaken 
them (see the crop rotation GAEC).  
The buffer strip is a kind of requirement that in principle impact the cereals farm economy, 
but when coupled with a set-aside regime imposing set aside rates of 3 percent or higher, it 
does not imply any extra-cost. It’s kind of win-win – or better said win-no loss – situation as 
this buffer strip might bring further benefits for biodiversity, soil erosion and water quality 
with hardly no costs (or limited ones). This shows that benefits are not necessarily associated 
to costs but more to better use of existing knowledge and regulations. 
In terms of geographical coverage, if the above analysis clearly does not cover the whole set 
of cereal systems in Europe, it can be assumed that the weight of France in this sector and the 
approximations made to determine the cost impacts in a number of other important cereal 
producing EU-15 member states are such that the other not analysed member states are not 
able to significantly change the conclusions from this research.  
It must be reminded that the analysis undertaken here is subject to be outweighed by the 
biofuels strategy, which impact on the cereal market is paramount. The case for US corn 
price, boosted by the government strategy on ethanol clearly illustrates this issue on the recent 
period. For Europe, while we are the edge of this biofuels development, the magnitude of the 
effects is still open, but there are little doubts that it will change the whole sector significantly. 
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226
 — As evoked above, the cereal areas in France are not those in which one can find most birds or interesting 
habitats; thus the bird and habitat directives are not playing strongly in such zones. 
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8 The impact of standards on the competitiveness of the EU 
with respect to fruits and vegetables 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Scope and Contents 
This report focuses on the analysis and assessment of the effects that cross compliance 
programs have on the fruits and vegetables (F&V) sector.  The analysis is centered on Spain’s 
agriculture as the main producer and exporter of the EU of fruits and vegetables. This sector 
is a key agricultural production sector in the Mediterranean region and complements the 
analysis carried out for other farm and livestock productions, such as the olive sector, cereals, 
dairy, beef, pigs and poultry in other member states.  However, as the F&V sector is 
considered subject to different agricultural policy regulations, the analysis is mainly related to 
the assessment of the effects of compliance in its broad sense. In fact, fruits and vegetables 
are not fully under the CAP cross compliance regulations and only specific crops intended to 
industrial transformation are included in a direct payment scheme. In consequence, this report 
includes different methodologies to evaluate the cost of compliance in selected regions and 
products. 
The report is divided into three parts. The first part includes an introduction with a brief 
summary of the methodology used and the selection of regions, products and policy measures 
that have been analyzed. This introduction follows with the two main parts dedicated, 
respectively, to the fruits and vegetables sector its structure and main characteristics, and to 
the assessment of the cost of compliance and its impact on competitiveness.  
The review of the fruits and vegetables sector begins with a general overview of the fruits and 
vegetables production and trade and focuses on Spain’s position in the sector’s trading and 
international markets, main products and regional distribution. The selection of regions, types 
of products and policy measures (SMR and GAECs) that will be the basis of the analysis, is 
followed by the selection of representative farms in the two study regions (Valencia in the 
Mediterranean littoral and Castilla-La Mancha in the inland southern plateau). The next 
sections are devoted, to the cost structure and assessment of the cost of compliance in the 
region of Valencia (for citrus production) and the region of Castilla-La Mancha (for 
vegetables). In this latter region, a specific model-based methodology has been used and it is 
explained in detail. The following section intends to provide some insights into the links 
between cross compliance measures and competitiveness in the fruits and vegetable sector, 
following the framework developed in D12. Last section gives a brief comparative overview 
with the United States fruits and vegetable sector and the last two sections are devoted, 
respectively, to some concluding reflections and bibliographical references.  
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8.1.2 Compliance and competitiveness 
The analysis in this chapter is ultimately intended to link the costs of compliance with 
competitiveness of the fruits and vegetables sector on the world market. Different 
methodological approaches have been used to address this issue across the various production 
sectors considered in this research (see D12). The selection of methods has been determined 
by the type of product and hence by the type and volume traded in the world markets, as in 
the case of cereals and dairy. These products represent a large share of agricultural trade 
worldwide and are, consequently, basic commodities in aggregated world trade models (such 
as GTAP) and competitiveness can then be assessed in an integrated international trade 
perspective. However, other productions, such as fruits and vegetables, have time and space 
commercial constraints and the overall volume traded is more limited to region specific sites. 
These characteristics and the wide range of products included in this sector make the fruits 
and vegetables sector not appropriated to be analyzed with GTAP, which in addition, is not 
specifically adapted or designed for analyzing the fruits and vegetables market. In 
consequence, other methodological approaches that are closer to the farm-level structure have 
been used to address competitiveness issues. 
As a reference baseline, competitiveness has been analyzed in D12 underlying its different 
aspects and methodologies. Following this report, the sets of conditions that are key to 
address competitiveness are, namely, initial, industry, institutional and macroeconomic 
conditions. The analysis of the fruits and vegetables sector has been based mainly on the two 
following conditions:    
• Initial conditions: farm type, farm size, farming intensity, farm localization, (field 
topology, soil, agro-climatic conditions, proximity to water sources, local environment 
pressure, etc.). 
• Institutional conditions: implementation and enforcement of legislation 
 
8.1.3 General Methodological Framework 
The basic methodology developed in this study can be summarized as follows:  
 
(i) Selection of the regions, sub-regions, agronomic areas and municipalities 
(counties) that represent the agricultural production systems of the products 
considered among the fruits and vegetables sector. 
(ii) Selection of the most relevant cross-compliance policy measures, SMR and 
GAECs, in each of the regions and products considered. 
(iii) Selection of representative farms within the study regions that will allow the 
analysis of cost structure at farm level 
(iv) Assessment of compliance costs in the pre- and post establishment of the selected 
SMR and GAECs regulations 
(v) Development of a model-based analysis integrating an economic (mathematical 
programming model) and agronomic model (Cropsyst) for policy simulations and 
assessment of the cost of selected cross compliance measures (nitrates directive 
and water use) 
(vi) Analysis of competitiveness and policy standards at farm level 
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Following the criteria exposed in D5 on the selection of representative regions, sub-regions, 
municipalities and farm-types, the regions and products selected are:  the region of Valencia 
for citrus productions and the region of Castilla-La Mancha that features a mixed vegetable-
cereal-vine production system characteristic of many inland regions in southern EU countries, 
different from the highly specialized farming system of the latter regions. In this case we have 
used a model-based approach developed in the area for policy simulations that provides a 
deeper insight of the cost of compliance with SMR (nitrates directive) and GAECs (water use 
in Spain’s transposition of the cross compliance basic regulations).  
The following Table 8.1 summarizes the regions selected, products and policy measures as 
well as the methodology considered in the analysis:  
Table 8.1: Selection of regions, products, Cross Compliance policy issues and 
methodology 
REGION PRODUCT CC POLICY ISSUE METHODOLOGY 
Region of 
Valencia Citrus 
SMR 
Nitrates Directive 
Pesticides Use 
Representative farms 
Cost structure 
Region of 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
Vegetables: 
 melon, potato, 
pepper, garlic 
SMR 
Nitrates Directive 
GAECs 
water control 
measures for 
 overexploit
ed aquifers 
Representative farms 
Cost structure 
+ 
Economic and 
Agronomic Model 
Policy simulations 
 
The detailed description of the selection of representative farms, the different levels of 
aggregation and the data and information base used in the analysis is shown in Figure 8.1 
below.   
The assessment of the cost of compliance in the citrus fruit farms in the region of Valencia is 
based on evaluating, at farm level, the costs derived from compliance with policy measures 
(such as pesticide regulations) and its impact on the farm’s gross margin. Data and 
information were obtained from interviews with experts and data from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Regional Government of Valencia as well as various available studies and 
literature review. 
The analysis of the cost of compliance in the mixed farms of the region of Castilla-La Mancha 
has been carried out using the simulations results of the integrated economic-agronomic mode 
developed in this area. The selected policy measures for this area are, for the SMR, the 
Nitrates Directive, considering that this area is a nitrate vulnerable zone. For the GAECs we 
have selected a specific measure that Spain has introduced in the national legislation that 
refers to water use limitations in areas of overexploited aquifers, such as the area considered 
in this study (the upper Guadiana basin of the region of Castilla-La Mancha). Both measures 
are of major importance in Mediterranean countries and regions where ground water is the 
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major source of water for irrigation agriculture. It is also worth noting that water is a limiting 
factor in the production horticulture crops and thus water use limitations affect farm 
productivity and competitiveness.  
The approach taken in this chapter differs from the others, as for crops, some measures such 
as the Nitrates Directive, do not produces any extra administrative or input cost. In this case, 
the cost of compliance with the Nitrates Directive and with the GAECs water use control, is 
not a direct cost to farmers but rather a reduction in yields (due to a limitation in the use of 
nitrate fertilizers and water) and consequently a reduction in the farm gross margin. 
Therefore, the cost of compliance analyzed for this area refers to the foregone income faced 
by farmers when complying with the required standards.  
 
8.1.4 United States F&V approach compared to the Spanish case studies  
In Annex (Part I), the US case studies on F&V describe regulations affecting citrus in 
southern Florida and tomatoes in California. While Spain has used a methodology based on 
the selection of representative farms of selected regions, subregions and municipalities, the 
US study used a different approach. In the case of tomatoes, the study was based on a single 
farm budget of the cooperative extension service of the University of California227, and the 
cost of compliance was calculated for related environmental measures. In the case of Florida 
citrus, the estimation of compliance was based on a panel of growers in the region using also 
secondary information. However, it is possible to do a brief comparison of both US and 
Spanish F&V sectors in order to understand the main differences and effects of compliance 
between them. We will integrate this information along this report. 
                                                 
227
 University of California Cooperative Extension 2000 Sample Costs to Producer Fresh Tomatoes, San Joaquin 
Valley.  http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/outreach/crop/cost-studies/2000FreshToms.pdf 
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Figure 8.1: General methodology used to determine representative farm types  
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8.2 The Fruits and vegetables sector  
8.2.1 The world market 
World production of fruit and vegetables was just over 1 230 million tons (2002) with fruit 
amounting to 470 million tons and vegetables to 760 million tons. Asia is the leading 
production region with a share of 61 %, followed by the EU (9 %), North and Central 
America (9 %), Africa (8 %) and South America (7 %). 
The international trade in fresh fruits and vegetables is a multibillion-dollar business. It 
provides vital export revenues for many countries. 
The main competitor for the EU fruits and vegetables productions in terms of export values is 
the USA Mexico is 2nd, having overtaken EU in the past decade. Other big exporters are 
China, Chile, Ecuador and South Africa. In total, the top 10 exporters account for 2/3 of the 
world's fresh F&V exports. 
 
Figure 8.2: Fruits and Vegetables main producers in the world (2005) 
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Source: FAOSTAT (2007) 
 
On the import side, the EU is the world's biggest importer. The US follows closely behind, 
while other countries, like Canada, Japan and China have significantly smaller imports. The 
top 2 importers (EU and USA) take in 50%. 
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In general, world trade in F&V is getting more concentrated. If in 1982-84 the top 10 
importers had a market share of 73% of the world's imports, it reached 80% in 2002-2004. On 
the export side, the top 10 exporters gained from 51% to 67% of the world F&V export 
market. 
Regarding potential competitors for Spanish vegetables and fruits production, it is clear that 
even when China is largely the most important producer of F&V in the world (Figure 8.2), it 
is not exported oriented as Spain or US (Figure 8.3). United States is the second F&V 
exporter in the world and is the biggest competitor for Spain. Inside Europe, Italy and The 
Netherlands are important suppliers as well (Figure 8.3). Nevertheless, China, India, 
Indonesia and Turkey are huge potential competitors for the EU, especially considering that 
are all developing countries that would improve their technology and efficiency while having 
lesser costs at the farm level. Spanish and Italian competitiveness should increase during the 
next years to face this threat. 
Figure 8.3: Fruits and Vegetables main suppliers: Export values (millions US $) in the 
world market in 2005 
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Source: own elaboration from FAOSTAT (2007) 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 268 
Figure 8.4: Fruits and Vegetables Import Values (millions US $) in the world market in 
2005 
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Source: own elaboration from FAOSTAT (2007) 
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Figure 8.5: Destinations for Spanish fruits and vegetable exports, 2004 (% of exported 
value) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
 
o
f E
x
po
rt
s
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce UK Ita
ly
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Ot
he
rs
Po
lan
d
Po
rtu
ga
l
Be
lgi
um
Sw
ed
en
Cz
ec
h R
ep
u
bli
c
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
Ru
ss
ian
 
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
Au
st
ria
De
nm
ar
k
No
rw
ay
Vegetables
Fruits
 
Source: MAPA, 2006  
 
Main exports of fruits and vegetables from Spain are exported to EU countries as shown in 
Figure 8.5. The Spanish exports are mainly for EU member countries. Only less than 7% (of 
vegetables and 5% of fruits is exported to the rest of the world. Exports to the United States 
represents 1,4%. 
 
8.2.2 The European F&V sector 
Fruits and vegetables account for about a sixth of the value of EU agricultural production, 
making the EU the second largest producer in the world and the second largest exporter; 
despite this it is also the largest importer. The common market organization for fruit and 
vegetables was established in 1962, instituting a minimum grower price amongst several other 
interventions. Reform of the regime began in 1996 and in 2001 the minimum price was 
abandoned. Nevertheless, total support in 2004 for the EU15 was hardly changed from that in 
1996 at about €1.6 billion. Although, most by then was in the category of ‘other 
interventions’; the total rose to €1.8 billion in 2005 as a result of enlargement of the 
community to 25 members. In January 2008 decoupling in subsidies for processing fruit and 
vegetables will start and this sector will be incorporated in the wider single farm payment 
system for agriculture (see below “F&V reform”).  
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Total vegetable production in the EU-15 was about 55 million tonnes in 2001/02. The leading 
vegetable producing Member States were Italy, Spain and France (with 15, 12 and 8 million 
tonnes respectively). Fresh fruit production was 57 million tonnes. Again, Italy was the 
leading Member State (18 million tonnes), followed by Spain (15 million tonnes) and France 
(11 million tonnes). The 10 Accession States together produced 9 million tonnes of vegetables 
and 6 million tonnes of fruit (in 2005). Poland is the main producer (5 million tonnes of 
vegetables and 3 million tonnes of fruit). Production of 15 million tonnes makes tomatoes the 
most produced vegetable. Of this volume, 7 million tonnes are produced in Italy, almost 4 
million tonnes in Spain, 2 million tonnes in Greece and over 1 million tonnes in Portugal. 
Apples are the leading fruit in the EU-15 with production of just over 9 million tonnes. 
Production takes place primarily in France (2.5 million tonnes), Italy (2.3 million tonnes) and 
Germany (1.8 million tonnes)228. 
The leading products traded are citrus fruit (oranges, tangerines and clementines) with 7 
million tonnes, apples (5 million tonnes), tomatoes (4 million tonnes) and onions (3.7 million 
tonnes). 
Latin American countries are the main suppliers for Europe. From total imports 27,4% coming 
from these countries, and 20,1% are only from MERCOSUR countries where most important 
products are Chilean apples and Argentinean lemons. Secondly, Mediterranean countries supply 
14,7% of total vegetable and fruits imports to the EU (Turkey, 30,7% and Morocco 27,6%). Main 
products imported from Morocco are citrus and tomatoes which are the 70% of total vegetable 
and fruits supply from this country to Europe. Turkey offers mainly citrus and dry fruits which 
totalize a 30% of total Turkish exports in this sector. 
European liberalization and the addition of new countries or new bilateral or multilateral trade 
agreements are important sources of new markets, threats and opportunities for Spanish 
horticulture and fruit productions. Since vegetable and fruits consumption into those new 
markets is relatively low but an increment in demand is probably taking place, exports from 
Spain might have few competitors and a potential expansion in nearest markets. Nevertheless, 
other products, like potatoes in Poland, are increasing their importance and might be 
considered during the following years (Pérez and De Pablo, 2003). 
Consumption of fresh fruit and vegetables is generally stable with 43 million tonnes and 46 
million tonnes (respectively) consumed within the EU.  
Within total citrus fruit production of 10 million tonnes, oranges account for 6 million tonnes 
and small citrus fruits (tangerines, mandarins and clementines) for 2.6 million tonnes. Spain is 
the main producer of citrus fruit (5.6 million tonnes), followed by Italy (3 million tonnes) and 
Greece (1.3 million tonnes). Peaches and nectarines (4.2 million tonnes), dry onions (3.9 
million tonnes), carrots (3.7 million tonnes), lettuce (3.2 million tonnes), cabbages (3 million 
tonnes) and pears (2.9 million tonnes) are also widely produced within the EU.  
                                                 
228
 EC Directorate-General for Agriculture (2003). 
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8.2.3 Economic relevance of F&V sector in Spain  
8.2.3.1 Sector importance in Spain 
Horticultural and fruit production has a main role in Spanish economy and agricultural 
production. Its participation on the final value of agricultural production is 32% which is 
largely higher than in most countries in the EU (except Italy and Greece). 
The vegetable and fruit production is mainly not dependant on public funds because it has 
been traditionally market oriented (both for internal consumption and exporting destinations). 
In 2000 only 6,7% of the final value of total production was represented by public funds, 
which is an obvious indicator of the exporting capacity.  
 
The fruits and vegetables sector in Spain contributed in 2006 with (FEPEX, 2006): 
• 13.681 million of € (38% value of total agricultural production)  
• 550.000 jobs (60% of total agrarian employment) 
• 7388 millions of € in exports (only fresh F&V), which represents 42,7% of total 
Spanish agrarian exports, including fish and all primary products. 
 
Table 8.2: Shares of production values for fruits and vegetables in Spain (2005) 
 
Product Shares - Prod.value (%)
Citrus 1 44,65
Tomatoes 15,49
Chillies and peppers 4,87
Peaches and nectarines 4,23
Lettuce and chicory 3,35
Beans 2,41
Strawberries 2,28
Other melons (incl. cantaloupes) 1,84
Pears and quinces 1,79
Cucumbers and gherkins 1,55
Apples 1,40
Onions (inc. shallots) 1,30
Bananas 1,27
Cauliflowers and broccoli 1,25
Mushrooms and truffles 1,24
Others 11,10
 
Source: Own elaboration from MAPA (2006) 
1: Category “Citrus” includes tangerines, lemons and limes, oranges, and grapefruits  
 
As can be seen in Table 8.2, Spanish citrus are the most relevant products followed firstly by 
tomatoes. Other significant products are lettuce, sweet peppers, peaches, melons, strawberries 
and cucumbers.  
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Figure 8.6: Relative weight of each product in the total Spanish exports of fruits and 
vegetables in 2006 
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Source: Own elaboration from FEPEX, 2006 
Following Spain’s incorporation into the EU, its fruits and vegetables exports grown from 3,5 
to 9 million tons. The main destinations of these exports are among European countries 
(90%), where Germany and France are the most important buyers (25 and 20% respectively). 
UK (13%) and Netherlands (11%) are the next importers for Spanish fruits and vegetables. 
(FEPEX, 2006) 
Considering products, citrus is the most important goal exported by Spain contributing up to 
39,4% of all exports in this sector (see Figure 8.6). Other products in this sector are: tomatoes 
(900.000 t and 11% total exports), lettuce (420.000 t), peppers (425.000 t), zucchini (370.000 
t), melons (375.000 t) and watermelons (320.000 t). All exports together reach a 35% of total 
fruits and vegetable crops. (FEPEX, 2006) 
 
8.2.3.2 Main export-oriented regions 
The region of Valencia was the most important area of citrus production. As shown in Figure 
8.7 and Figure 8.8, Valencia, Murcia and Castellón provinces have been exporting the main 
fraction of Spanish citrus production. 
These citrus exports are mostly oranges and tangerines and they are mainly exported from the 
Autonomous Region of Valencia (Table 8.3 and Figure 8.7). This is a remarkable aspect that 
even when the region of Andalusia produces around 1 million tons of oranges it only exports 
a small fraction (239.661). The region of Valencia is producing about 1.7 millions annually 
and is ranked clearly as the main exported oriented region of the main product of the sector 
we are analyzing in this report. 
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Table 8.3: Citrus exports from main regions by product in 2004 (tons) 
Product Valencia Andalusia Murcia 
Orange 1.159.714 172.849 103.463 
Tangerine 1.263.938 29.869 69.344 
Lemon 280.365 31.877 734.910 
Grapefruit 15.241 5.066 13.693 
      
TOTAL 2.719.258 239.661 921.410 
Source: Asociafruit (http://www.asociafruit.com/) 
 
Figure 8.7: Total exports of Spanish citrus by province (tons and percentage of total 
exported in 2004) 
Valencia; 1777192; 
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Source: Own elaboration from Asociafruit, 2006 
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Figure 8.8: Evolution of Orange Exports in Spain from 1996 to 2004 (by provinces) 
Source:Own elaboration from  Asociafruit, 2006 
 
8.2.4 Relevant regions for fruits and vegetables in Spain 
As followed in this section, the study of the fruits sector will focus on citrus and the region 
selected for this analysis is the province of Valencia (Autonomous Region of Valencia).  The 
study of the vegetables sector and of how compliance affects costs of production and 
consequently competitiveness will focus mainly in the region of Castilla-La Mancha. 
In order to characterize the F&V production sector in Spain, we briefly described main 
products and regions. Table 8.4 shows the vegetable and fruits production, excluding flowers 
and ornamental plants is about 24,7 million tons and 7518 million euros. The vegetable crops 
like tomatoes, peppers, melons and lettuce are 56,7% of total value and 48,8% of total 
volume. Citrus production represents 22,1% of total volume and 15,9% of value, specially 
oranges and tangerines that are more than 80% of total production and value of this group. 
Followed by potatoes production, non-citrus fruits are respectively 12,6%  and 5,9% of 
volume and value. 
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Table 8.4: Vegetable and Fruits production and value by crop groups (average 
1997/1998) 
Group  Production   Value 
  ‘000 tons %   Millions of € % 
Vegetables 12075,00 48,80   4260,00 56,70 
Citrus trees 5462,00 22,10   1192,00 15,90 
Fruits (not citrus) 3123,00 12,60   1125,00 15,00 
Dry Fruits* 452,00 1,80   305,00 4,10 
Potatoes 3191,00 12,90   504,00 6,70 
Bananas 422,00 1,70   131,00 1,70 
        
TOTAL 24.725 100,00   7518,00 100,00 
        
Flowers and ornamental plants 419.405 100,00   568,00 100,00 
(thousands of dozens)*           
    Flowers 275.597 66   391 69 
    Ornamental Plants 143.708 34   177 31 
Source: MAPA 2003 
* Production in thousands of plants and surface 
** Including hazelnuts, walnuts and prosopis 
trees  
 
Among a variety of more than 80 products from oranges to potatoes or cabbage, it is possible 
to identify several markets and productive scenarios since this sector is wide and diverse due 
to its production characteristics and complexity (Junta de Andalucía, 2004). 
Regarding the regional distribution in the national territory, vegetable and fruit productions 
(both in total area and production value) areas are concentrated in provinces closed to the 
Mediterranean coast. Thus, a 64,4% of total production quantity is located mainly in the 
Autonomous Regions of Andalusia, Murcia and Valencia  while other inland areas in the 
country account for the rest of the nation’s production specially in the regions of  
Extremadura in the Eastern central part and Castilla La Mancha in the Southern central 
plateau of Spain (see Table 8.5). 
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Table 8.5: Total production by regions and crops / 97-98 / (thousands of tons) 
Regions 
  
Vegetable 
crops 
Citrus 
 
Fruits (non 
citrus) 
Dry 
fruits 
Potatoes 
 
Bananas 
 
Fruits and 
Vegetables (total) 
Andalusia 4710 846 282 85 489 0 6412 
Aragon  218 0 549 58 57  0 882 
Balears (islands) 206 46 52 30 79  0 412 
C. Valenciana  836 3825 256 123 153  0 5192 
Canarias  491 22 18 1 90 422 1044 
Cantabria  17 0 4 0 36  0 56 
Castilla-La Mancha 1191 0 60 20 233  0 1504 
Castilla y León  373 0 63 5 875  0 1316 
Cataluña  508 89 1037 84 130  0 1849 
Extremadura  1033 1 178 2 39  0 1253 
Galicia  264 8 78 3 524  0 876 
La Rioja  267  0 91 7 193  0 558 
Madrid  137 0 4 0 36  0 177 
Navarra  344  0 33 3 25  0 405 
P. De Asturias  23  0 34 0 71  0 128 
País Vasco  48  0 13 1 115  0 177 
R. De Murcia  1408 625 371 31 48  0 2484 
ESPAÑA  12075 5462 3123 452 3191   24726 
Value Millions €  4260 1192 1125 305 504 131 7517 
% Value 57 16 15 4 7 2 100 
Source: MAPA, 2003 
Summing, main products produced and exported in Spanish horticulture and fruit sectors are 
citrus, tomatoes and some other vegetable crops like strawberries, peppers, melons and 
lettuce. Altogether, those products are mainly exported from few regions as has been 
mentioned before.   
 
8.3 Agricultural and environmental policies 
8.3.1 The F&V Common Market Organization and the CAP reform 
The Common Market Organization (CMO) for F&V differs from other CAP regulations 
applied to other agricultural products. The basic regulations covering fresh F&V, processed 
F&V, and a system of Community aids granted to certain citrus fruits were laid down in 1996, 
although the basic regulation has been subjected to a number of amendments since 2000. For 
fresh products, the system is characterized by support to Producer Organizations (POs) under 
Operational funds as well as and intervention measures through market withdrawals 
compensated with Community funds. Processed products are guided by a system based on 
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direct aids to producers according to national thresholds with penalties if processed volumes 
increase beyond fixed limits. 
A Community production aid scheme for tomatoes, peaches and pears intended for processing 
has been established. All products, whether raw material or finished products, have to meet 
minimum quality requirements. The aid is granted to producer organizations recognized under 
Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and 
vegetables. 
On January 24, 2007, the European Commission presented the Proposal of the reform for the 
fruit and vegetable sector229. The reform brings the fruit and vegetable sector closer to the rest 
of the reformed Common Agricultural Policy guidelines. The European Union aims to 
address the following concerns: improve the competitiveness and market orientation, reduce 
fluctuations in producers' income, increase fruit and vegetable consumption, and endeavor to 
protect the environment, and simplify and reduce the administrative burden for all concerned. 
The production and marketing of fruit and vegetables should take full account of 
environmental concerns, including cultivation practices, the management of waste materials 
and the disposal of products withdrawn from the market, in particular as regards the 
protection of water quality, the maintenance of biodiversity and the upkeep of the 
countryside. 
In order to achieve this, the Commission proposes: 
• the introduction of fruit and vegetables areas in the Single Payment Scheme means 
that the cross compliance rules will be compulsory for all fruit and vegetables 
producers receiving direct payments; 
• an enhanced approach to operational programs: Currently there are no limits in the 
operational programs for environmental measures expenditures: The reform proposal 
introduces a minimum of 20% of expenditure in each operational program; 
• an enhanced approach to organic production: During the last years, an increasing 
demand for organic vegetables, largely being met by innovative, medium scale 
producers has occurred. The proposal introduces a Community co-financing rate of 
60% for organic production in each operational program. 
 
All fruit and vegetable areas will be eligible under the Single Payment scheme. Subsequently, 
Member States will consider excemptions to receive entitlements and determine the period of 
reference and the payment amount for each product (vegetable or fruit). Also a transitional 
stage is considered in order to facilitate growers’ adaptation to the new scheme. Moreover, 
Member States have the faculty to encourage farmers to be part of producer’s organizations 
through a conditional requirement in order to obtain the payments. 
With this reform, all agricultural area that had fruit & vegetables during the reference period, 
including permanent crops and land under table potatoes, is eligible in all 27 Member States. 
The major difference is that now payments to processors are decoupled and the Single Farm 
Payment budget is increased to offset the additional enrollment that including fruit and 
vegetable production in all 27 Member States will bring. 
                                                 
229
 For Commission proposals (January ’07) see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/75&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en  
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Producing Member States have concerns with the decoupling of aid, mainly for flexible crops 
(those that can be eaten fresh or processed) like oranges and tomatoes. Moreover, the new 
possibility to produce fruit and vegetables on areas eligible to Single Farm Payments has 
raised serious concerns of competitiveness for traditional producers corresponding to the 
entitlements. 
Regarding the trade with third countries, the main measure outlined in the reform proposal 
was the abolition of export refunds. The rest of the provisions related to trade with third 
countries remain unchanged until the outcome of the WTO negotiations (entry prices, special 
safeguard clause, and general safeguard clause) (USDA, 2007). 
 
8.3.2 Reaction in Spain 
Immediate reaction to the reform from both Spain’s major Producer Organizations (PO) and 
Spanish Export Federation has been negative. The Small Farmer’s Union (UPA), The Young 
Farmer’s Association (ASAJA), Agricultural Cooperatives (CCAE) and the Federation of 
exporters of Fruits and Vegetables (FEPEX) have all raised their concerns with the EC 
proposal.  
They argue that decoupling will severely destabilize the market and will not alleviate the 
current structural issues like those facing citrus producers. Spanish Ministry of Agriculture 
agreed mostly with the EC proposal but argued that transformed citrus quantity would be 
affected negatively, perturbing fresh markets as well.  The Spanish exporters question the 
future competitiveness of the sector given that some producers will be eligible for Single 
Farm Payments and others will not be. Others cite the failure of the proposal to address 
regulation of distribution practices. 
Farmers lobbies are pushing for keeping the status quo, but its position will have little 
influence over the Commission final proposal to the Council. The compromise agreements 
will probably focus on (i) the maintenance of support on Producer Organizations through 
Operational Funds (ii) the flexibilization of the use of the funds originating in the decoupling 
of processing aids, through national envelopes. A significant part of the reform’s success 
depends on the effectiveness of the POs in concentrating supply and on the right use of 
committed funds, which requires a closer monitoring and assessment of the operational 
programs. 
García Alvarez-Coque et al (2007), argued that …”Nevertheless, the new CMO approved by 
the Council will not be effective to correct the most important weaknesses affecting the F&V 
market. These mainly refer to (i) the lack of market transparency across the supply chain, 
which limits the ability of farmers to successfully negotiate with retailers, and to (ii) the 
decreasing demand trend, which has to do with a major change in the food habits of young 
people, and calls for a decisive a persistent public action on promotion of human 
consumption”.  
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8.3.3 Environmental concerns on the F&V sector: a comparison between 
Spain and the US 
As mentioned before, the EU environmental policy that affects directly to the F&V sector is 
strictly linked to the CAP and its reforms. The implementation of pesticides and nitrogen 
regulations started decades ago, for instance the Plant Protection Products Directive 
(91/414/EEC). The EU also applies regulations to protect water quality in respect of 
pesticides, which affect importantly the use of agrochemicals, especially in horticulture were 
inputs are high. The Water Framework Directive demands for measures to reduce or eliminate 
discharges and losses of hazardous substances, for the protection of surface waters. By 2001, 
33 priority substances had been listed, out of which 13 substances were used in plant 
protection products. 
Agri-environmental measures imply the obligation of keeping records of actual use of 
pesticides, lower use of pesticides to protect soil, water, air and biodiversity, the use of 
integrated pest management techniques and the conversion to organic farming. The EU's 
Sixth Environment Action Programme addresses the need to encourage farmers to change 
their use of plant protection products. In this line, the reinforced cross-compliance established 
by the 2003 CAP reform includes the respect of statutory requirements arising from the 
implementation of EU regulation covering the placing of plant protection products on the 
market. 
The environmental policies and payments in the US differ importantly from those in the EU 
and this has an important impact in the fruits and vegetable sector. The European Union (EU) 
adresses ‚green payments more broadly than does the United States, using them to achieve 
socioeconomic and rural development goals as well as environmental goals. The EU offers 
agri-environmental payments to farmers within the framework of its rural development 
policy, which encompasses not only environmental activities but also investments in farm 
renovation, programs to help young farmers get established or to promote early retirement, 
assistance with processing and marketing farm products, and programs to promote the non-
farm rural economy such as agri-tourism or preservation of cultural heritage (Hanrahan and 
Zinn, 2005).  
In the US there are also programs which encourage the implementation of conservation 
practices by farmers in the F&V sector.  The Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP) was reauthorized in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (Farm Bill) 
as a voluntary conservation program for farmers and ranchers that promotes agricultural 
production and environmental quality as compatible national goals. The EQIP offers financial 
and technical help to participants for the implementation of structural and management 
practices on eligible agricultural land. This program may cost-share up to 75 percent of the 
costs of certain conservation practices. Incentive payments may be provided for up to three 
years to encourage producers to join the program. However, limited resource producers and 
beginning farmers and ranchers may be eligible for cost-shares up to 90 percent. Farmers and 
ranchers may decide to use a certified third-party provider for technical assistance. An 
individual or entity may not receive, directly or indirectly, cost-share or incentive payments 
that, in the aggregate, exceed $450,000 for all EQIP contracts entered during the term of the 
Farm Bill (USDA, 2007). 
In vegetable crops, the Pest Management incentive payment offers an Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) base payment ($20-30/acre) and a record keeping ($10/acre) incentive 
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rate, with additional money for add-on components for activities such as: pest monitoring 
systems, weather monitoring and disease forecasting, predator and parasitoid augmentation 
and conservation, crop rotation, utilizing less hazardous chemicals, adhering storage 
guidelines, improving coverage at the target zone, applying pesticides with retrofitted 
sprayers, perimeter trapping systems, and spot treatment.  
Another example regarding environmental concerns and producers’ organizations is the 
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association. This organization collaborates with state, regional 
and federal regulatory agencies, with stakeholders, with other grower organizations, with the 
crop protection registrant community and with University extension specialists on an 
extensive array of actions designed to advance the implementation and embracement of 
integrated pest management practices for achieving meaningful crop protection chemical risk 
reductions230. 
 
8.4 Selection of the case study regions 
 
The approach chosen for the analysis of the impact of standards and GAECs on farm income 
is based on the selection of case studies. The criteria for the selection of the case study areas 
are three: 
- Main products within the sector (in terms of production) 
- Importance of the sector in the region 
- Importance of the standard in the region 
- Availability of data and tools for the analysis 
 
For the analysis of the fruits sector, the study focuses in citrus farms, because of the main role 
of citrus both in production and in exports value. According to Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8, and 
Table 8.5 the main Spanish region in citrus production and exports is the Region of Valencia, 
so that the case study area for the citrus farms analysis will be the Region of Valencia. 
For the analysis of the vegetables sector, the region selected for the case study is the Region 
of Castilla La Mancha. The reasons for the selection of this area are the following: 
- Availability of an agronomic model calibrated for the area (Azaña, 2007). 
- Availability of the economic model SIWAP (System for Integration of Water and 
Agricultural Policies) specially designed for the farm systems place in this region 
(Newater Project, Varela et al, 2006). 
- This region is one of the most important nitrates vulnerable area in Spain. 
- Aquifer overexploitation is a main issue in the area, so that GAECs requirements for 
overexploited aquifers are relevant here. 
 
                                                 
230
 Source: http://www.epa.gov/oppbppd1/pesp/strategies/2005/ffva05.htm  
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Figure 8.9: Nitrates Vulnerable areas in Spain 
 
Source: MMA, 2005 
The study will focus on the farm systems placed on the Western La Mancha Aquifer, in the 
Upper Guadiana river basin, which combine problems of nitrates pollution and 
overexploitation, where the Water Abstraction Plan (WAP) establishes water quotas for the 
farms in the aquifer. The surface of the aquifer is 5500 km2 and irrigated agriculture in the 
aquifer represents a surface of 140000 hectares.  
The products selected for the study are the main vegetable crops cultivated in the area: potato, 
melon, pepper and garlic. 
 
8.4.1 Fruits in the region of Valencia 
As seen in the first section, citrus and tomatoes are the most important products in order to 
analyze trading and competitiveness due to their total value in money units and in the volume 
of exports.  
The analysis of the distribution of surface by strata of citrus orchards in Valencia, shows that 
71.166 farms from a total of 92.117 (77,2%), concentrate their production on oranges. 
Secondly, farms that grow tangerines are 40% of total farms. 
Around 66% of orchards in Valencia uses irrigation (92117 farms from 138.901, see Table 
8.6) and most growers occupy the 1-5ha rank. The farm type that characterizes citrus 
production in the Valencia region grows mainly oranges and tangerines as it is shown in 
Table 8.7.  
Region of Castilla 
La Mancha 
Nitrates Vulnerable Areas 
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Table 8.6: Irrigated and rain fed fruit farms in Valencia: number of farms and surface 
by strata 
TOTAL Raifed (%) Irrigated (%)   
  Num.Farms Ha. Num.Farms Ha. Num.Farms Ha. 
Farm 
Strata 138901 304424 26,90% 34,35% 73,10% 65,65% 
< 1  40304 20864 1,49% 0,28% 28,97% 6,57% 
1  a < 2 30332 34511 5,56% 1,70% 17,20% 9,64% 
2 a < 5 30217 67421 8,47% 6,08% 16,58% 16,07% 
5 a <  10 15976 71286 7,24% 11,23% 6,92% 12,18% 
10 a < 20 5637 43512 2,60% 5,91% 2,51% 8,38% 
20 a < 30 1359 15498 0,73% 2,67% 0,34% 2,43% 
30 a < 50 979 19192 0,41% 2,48% 0,36% 3,82% 
50 a < 100 503 14423 0,25% 1,74% 0,15% 3,00% 
>=100 277 17718 0,15% 2,26% 0,06% 3,56% 
Source: Own Elaboration from INE 1999 
Table 8.7: Number of farms and surface by products and by strata in the province of 
Valencia 
CITRUS ORANGE TANGERINES LEMONS OTHERS 
  
  
  
Number of 
Farms 
Surface 
(ha) 
Number of 
Farms 
Surface 
(ha) 
Number of 
Farms 
Surface 
(ha) 
Number of 
Farms 
Surface 
(ha) 
Number of 
Farms 
Surface 
(ha) 
Farm 
Strata(ha) 92117 173899 71166 98986 36870 64299 7451 10439 78 175 
< 1  38070 18511 26522 11783 12607 5859 2409 869 .. .. 
1  a < 2 22317 26505 18414 16607 9297 8402 2104 1496 .. .. 
2 a < 5 19754 43146 16172 24834 9519 17184 1763 1127 .. .. 
5 a <  10 8275 31146 6997 17590 3500 11035 796 2513 53 8 
10 a < 20 2741 21682 2256 12311 1306 8166 247 1198 10 6 
20 a < 30 393 6164 313 2686 268 3333 29 145 .. .. 
30 a < 50 365 10066 314 4784 226 4445 50 751 10 87 
50 a < 100 136 7746 118 4178 97 2978 21 589 1 0 
>=100 67 8933 59 4211 50 2896 32 1752 5 74 
Source: Own Elaboration from INE1999 
In the province of Valencia, rain fed agriculture for citrus production is about 30% and the 
association with other fruits is not very usual.  Based on the data of farm size, surface, number 
of farms and crop association, we can select an orchard farm type for the province of Valencia 
that characterizes the citrus production in the Region.  
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8.4.2 Selection of a representative farm in the region of Valencia 
Regarding representative regions and municipalities among the Autonomous Region of 
Valencia, this study has selected some specific locations. The Valencia province is the most 
important province regarding the fruit production area231. Inside the Region of Valencia, some 
specific locations might be selected to describe a typical and representative farm of citrus 
production. Among agronomic zones, the subregion Riberas del Jucar is the most important 
area for citrus production, and Alzira is the municipality which represent the most important 
production area. This region is also designated as a nitrates vulnerable area and there are 
several reports of water contamination from horticulture and rice on the Júcar river basin. 
In the municipality of Alzira, most farms (96%) are 5 hectares at most, covering about 72% of 
the land used for fruits (Figure 8.10). Thus, according with our analysis we have outlined the 
following farm type for Valencian citrus as follows: 
- F&V_F1: denotes an irrigated orange grove in the province of Valencia, 
municipality of Alzira. The average size for this farm type is 2-2,5 hectares 
and it is irrigated using groundwater sources mainly232.  
 
Figure 8.10:  Number of farms and surface by farm size strata (hectares) in the 
municipality of Alzira  
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Source: own elaboration from INE 1999 
                                                 
231
 Valencia province accounts 79,000 orchards and 104,000 hectares and it is followed by Castellón (25,000 
orchards, 40,000 hectares) and Alicante (19,000 orchards, 34,000 hectares). Source: INE, 1999. www.ine.es   
232
 Irrigation using groundwater in the municipality of Alzira (sub-region of Riberas del Júcar) is about 60% and 
orchards using surface water for irrigation are 35%. This is an important fact because a nitrogen reduction in 
order to comply the legal framework, might have less effect. Contamination with nitrates using groundwater has 
been reported to cause more nitrate contamination than irrigated orchards that used surface water sources; this 
fact has been attributed to the more important content of nitrates in ground waters (De Paz Becares and 
R.Mompó, 1998). 
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8.4.3 Vegetables in the region of Castilla La Mancha  
Data from the Agrarian Census of 1999, (INE, 1999) show that the fruits and vegetables 
sector covers 9.1% of the total cultivated area in Spain, distributed in 1,216,653 farms with an 
average farm size of 1,26 hectares. Since 1989, the surface and number of the farms have 
decreased (4.7% and 25%) and the average size of the farm has increased in 27%.  
Coupled to the importance of the sector in terms of production and exports, it is important to 
highlight the social relevance of this sector due to its high labor requirements. Horticultural 
crops are called “social crops”, and most regional governments are promoting this type of 
crops. 
In The region of Castilla-La Mancha monoculture is not very common and farms are mainly 
oriented to mixed productions. Vegetables are profitable crops in this area and yields tend to 
be high. However, water scarcity in the area is the limiting factor for expanding production of 
vegetables and therefore most farms have to rely on mixed cropping patterns combining 
vegetable production with less water intensive crops like winter cereals. Vineyard is the main 
crop in terms of area and very often it is combined with vegetables as well. Table 8.8 shows 
the land distribution in the region of Castilla-La Mancha. 
Just a 10% of the vegetables surface in the region of Castilla-La Mancha is rain fed and 
therefore our study will focus on irrigated farms. The major environmental problems in the 
region of Castilla-La Mancha related to agriculture are the depletion of aquifers due to over 
pumping for irrigation water and nitrates pollution. For this reason, our study will focus on 
the area covered by the Western-La Mancha aquifer that is currently overexploited and 
therefore subject to water use restrictions and situated in a nitrates vulnerable zone. This area 
is situated in the provinces of Ciudad Real, Albacete and Cuenca.  
Table 8.8: Land distribution in CLM and Spain 
 
Castilla La Mancha Spain % CLM/Spain 
Number of farms 197.668 1.790.162 11,0 
Total Area (TA) 6.869.606 42.180.950 16,3 
Used Agricultural Area (UAA) 4.581.592 26.316.787 17,4 
Total Cultivated Lands (ha) 3.763.479 16.920.360 22,2 
Irrigated Agricultural Area (ha) 462.964 3.289.021 14,1 
Permanent pasture (ha) 818.113 9.396.427 8,7 
Category of crops 
      
Annual species 
      
Farms 92.535 890.094 10,4 
Area (ha) 2.864.902 12.399.723 23,1 
ha/Farm 31,0 13,9 223,0 
     Vegetables 
      
Farms 14.439 274.077 5,3 
Area (ha) 34.975,2 288.843,0 12,1 
ha/Farm 2,4 1,1 218,2 
     Fruit trees 
      
Farms 22.711 565.018 4,0 
Area (ha) 58.158 1.151.968 5,0 
ha/Farm 2,6 2,0 130,0 
     Olive groves 
      
Farms 111.010 602.249 18,4 
Area (ha) 312.971 2.273.589 13,8 
ha/Farm 2,8 3,8 73,7 
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Castilla La Mancha Spain % CLM/Spain 
     Vineyards 
      
Farms 81.452 342.096 23,8 
Area (ha) 526.727 1.035.347 50,9 
ha/Farm 6,5 3,0 216,7 
     Others   
      
Farms 396 40.155 1,0 
Area (ha) 721 59.733 1,2 
ha/Farm 1,8 1,5 120,0 
Source: Junta de Castilla la Mancha, 2004 
 
8.4.4 Selection of Representative Farms in the region of Castilla La 
Mancha 
The municipalities selected for the study are located in the province of Ciudad Real and their 
farm structure, cropping pattern and input use characterize largely the farming sector of the 
whole region. Specifically, the municipalities selected are: Daimiel, Alcázar de San Juan, 
Herencia and Manzanares where an ample field work has already been carried out by Varela-
Ortega et al. (2007). The next Table 8.9 shows the farm size strata in the region of Castilla-La 
Mancha and the number of farms and surface included in each stratum. 
Land distribution in the province of Ciudad Real is similar to the distribution in the Region of 
Castilla La Mancha (Table 8.9 and The next level of desegregation is the study of the 
agronomic zone. The four municipalities selected for the study belong to the agronomic zone 
of “Mancha” and its surface distribution has been considered for the definition of the farm 
types. Several municipalities have been selected since there are different kinds of associations 
among a variety of vegetable crops. Then these locations will be listed below when describing 
main areas production and crops in order of importance.  
Table 8.10). 
Table 8.9: Number of farms and surface by farm strata in the Region of Castilla-La 
Mancha 
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 
 
Number of 
farms 
Number of 
farms % % Accumulated Surface (Ha) Surface % 
Farms with land 194842 100,00   4581592 100 
0,1 a < 1 27087 13,90 13,90 12326 0,27 
1 a < 5 69512 35,68 49,58 147605 3,22 
5 a < 10 30316 15,56 65,14 181513 3,96 
10 a < 20 24464 12,56 77,69 296790 6,48 
20 a < 50 21894 11,24 88,93 601970 13,14 
50 a < 100 10135 5,20 94,13 635147 13,86 
100 a < 200 5944 3,05 97,18 718904 15,69 
>=200 5490 2,82 100,00 1987337 43,38 
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Source: Own elaboration from INE 1999 
The next level of desegregation is the study of the agronomic zone. The four municipalities 
selected for the study belong to the agronomic zone of “Mancha” and its surface distribution 
has been considered for the definition of the farm types. Several municipalities have been 
selected since there are different kinds of associations among a variety of vegetable crops. 
Then these locations will be listed below when describing main areas production and crops in 
order of importance.  
Table 8.10: Number of farms and surface by farm strata in the Province of Ciudad Real 
CIUDAD REAL 
Farm size strata Number of farms 
Number of 
farms % % Accumulated 
Surface 
(Ha) Surface % 
Farms with land 55435 100,00  -   1229573 100 
0,1 a < 1 6497 11,72 11,72 3402 0,28 
1 a < 5 20592 37,15 48,87 46786 3,81 
5 a < 10 9450 17,05 65,91 60201 4,90 
10 a < 20 7521 13,57 79,48 96320 7,83 
20 a < 50 6602 11,91 91,39 189619 15,42 
50 a < 100 2382 4,30 95,69 149786 12,18 
100 a < 200 1138 2,05 97,74 140446 11,42 
>= 200 1253 2,26 100,00 543012 44,16 
Source: Own elaboration from INE 1999 
 
Table 8.11: Number of farms and surface by farm strata in the agronomic zone 
“Mancha” 
Agronomic zone: "Mancha" 
Farm size Farm No. % Farms Surface (ha) % Surface 
Average surface 
(ha) 
< 5 ha 9697 44,16 21156 5,43 2,18 
5 a < 10 ha 4247 19,34 29416 7,55 6,93 
10 a < 20 ha 3470 15,80 47556 12,21 13,70 
20 a < 50 ha 3028 13,79 90966 23,36 30,04 
>= 50 ha 1515 6,90 200373 51,45 132,26 
Total 21957 100 389467 100 17,74 
Source: Own elaboration from INE 1999 
For the selected municipalities (that correspond to the water user associations, namely 
Daimiel, Alcázar de San Juan, Herencia and Manzanares) we have carried out the 
correspondent analysis of surface and number of farms by farm strata to select the statistically 
representative farm types for the province of Ciudad Real in the Region of Castilla-La 
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Mancha. Figure 8.11-8.14 summarize the statistical analysis carried out for the selection of 
farm types. 
The farms in Western La Mancha Aquifer are mainly mixed production oriented, combining 
cereals with permanent crops and other more water demanding crops such as vegetables. 
According to statistical data from the regional government of Castilla-La Mancha (2005) the 
main crops in the area are winter cereals (mainly barley and wheat), horticultural crops such 
as melon, pepper and garlic, and vineyard, which accounts for a large surface and is a major 
social crop as it is a highly labour demanding crop. 
The farm types selected for the study are: 
- F&V_F2: 150 hectares, medium soil quality with the crop mix of winter cereals, 
garlic, melon and set-aside. Municipality of Alcázar de San Juan. 
- F&V_F3: denotes a farm of 70 hectares, medium and low soil quality with the crop 
mix of winter cereals, melon, potato, and set-aside. Municipality of Daimiel. 
- F&V_F4: 19 hectares, medium soil quality. The crops are winter cereals melon and 
set-aside. Municipality of Herencia. 
- F&V_F5: 40 hectares, 85% good quality soil and 15% low quality soil. Crop mix of 
winter cereals, vine, potato, green pepper and set-aside. Municipality of Manzanares. 
Figure 8.11: Distribution of farms and surface in farm size strata in the municipality of 
Alcázar de San Juan 
Alcázar de San Juan
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Source: own elaboration from INE 1999 
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Figure 8.12: Distribution of farms and surface by farm size strata in the municipality of 
Daimiel 
Daimiel
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Source: own elaboration from INE 1999 
Figure 8.13: Distribution of farms and surface by farm size strata in the municipality of 
Herencia 
Herencia
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Source: own elaboration from INE 1999 
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Figure 8.14: Distribution of farms and surface by farm size strata in the municipality of 
Manzanares 
Manzanares
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 Source: own elaboration from INE 1999 
 
8.5 Costs of compliance for fruits in the region of Valencia  
8.5.1 Costs structure in a Citrus Orchard in Valencia 
As seen in Table 8.12, all fertilizers and pesticides, and its- applications might represent about 
30% of costs. Irrigation in a flood irrigation scheme (which is 60% of orchards in Valencia), 
is about 3 times more expensive than a dripping irrigation scheme.  
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Table 8.12: Cost structure at a citrus orchard level in Valencia (data from 1997, values 
in €/ha)  
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 
 
ORANGES CLEMENTINES ORANGES CLEMENTINES 
Yield (Kg/ha) 30000 26500 30000 26500 
1. Variable costs 
€ % € % € % € % 
Water for irrigation 668,48 17,58 668,48 16,23 565,25 17,08 565,25 15,28 
Fertilizers 438,74 11,54 138,74 3,37 468,79 14,17 468,79 12,67 
Pesticides and foliar fertilizers 453,27 11,92 677,56 16,45 302,25 9,14 432,18 11,68 
Others chemical products 60,85 1,60 60,85 1,48 60,85 1,84 60,85 1,64 
Variable costs of own machines 58,74 1,55 58,74 1,43 181,92 5,50 189,64 5,12 
Hand work 
        
* Irrigation 159,87 4,21 159,87 3,88 52,89 1,60 52,89 1,43 
* prunning 495,83 13,04 743,75 18,06 447,75 13,53 646,09 17,46 
* Product applications 318,54 8,38 383,45 9,31 191,72 5,79 206,15 5,57 
* Other manual operations         
and transport works 190,14 5,00 212,96 5,17 66,11 2,00 66,11 1,79 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS 2844,46 74,82 3104,4 75,38 2337,53 70,65 2687,95 72,64 
2. Fixed Costs 
        
Machinery 262,94 6,92 262,94 6,39 159,27 4,81 159,27 4,30 
Plantation Amortization 346,42 9,11 365,49 8,88 224,33 6,78 243,41 6,58 
Trees reposition 56,86 1,50 56,86 1,38 56,86 1,72 56,86 1,54 
Irrigation equipment amortization     295,7 8,94 295,7 7,99 
Taxes and Insurance 291,16 7,66 328,39 7,97 234,88 7,10 257,23 6,95 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS 957,38 25,18 1013,68 24,62 971,03 29,35 1012,46 27,36 
TOTAL 3801,84 100 4118,08 100 3308,56 100 3700,41 100 
TOTAL per Kg 0,127  0,155  0,11  0,14  
Source: Caballero and De Miguel (2002b). Option 1 and 2 are two levels of intensification in 
Valencia: level 1 is a single unit with similar characteristics than the farm type selected in this 
analysis (flood irrigation, 2has unit) and option 2 is 25has farm that result of a cooperative unit 
formed by several growers or a single association of small growers (1 or 2 has) where a more 
mechanized scheme is used. Values in € per hectare. 
Other important issues affecting the fruits sector are food safety, and the use of pesticides. 
This analysis is very difficult to have at the farm level in citrus production; since pesticides 
are broadly diverse and agricultural practices and technology have improved extensively 
during the last years. Even if it seems a contradiction, using fewer pesticides has been always 
correlated with higher control efficiency at the farm level because new methods consider 
monitoring of insects and fungus, symptoms studies, and new products that are not 
necessarily more expensive. These issues might eventually produce an increase in costs of 
protection in some cases and also some crop costs at the far level might be changed since 
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cropping patterns or agricultural practices (calendar, irrigation, fertilization, etc.) could be 
others. Yields and costs are balanced at the farm level depending on farmer’s strategies every 
year. These strategies are correlated with pest populations and expected damages they do. In 
the following pages, we analyze diverse combinations in order to improve our understanding 
about cost increases on pesticides at the farm level when complying new measures.  
8.5.2 The legal framework 
 Table 8.13: Legal framework and expected costs 
Standard Operations requirements 
description 
Comment  on costs 
*Nitrate Directive in 
vulnerable areas  
Dosages allowed for Citrus orchards 
 
Dripping irrigation: 200 Kg N / ha.Year 
Flood irrigation: 240 Kg N / ha.year 
 
Assessment is needed: 
An expenditure reduction on 
fertilizers or pesticides is 
expected  
 
New yields need to be assessed. 
*Pesticides 
commercialization 
 
* Water sources 
contamination from 
dangerous substances 
(biocides, phosphates. 
Nitrates and pesticides). 
 
Chemical products used in both, fruits 
and vegetables, have presented the 
following (now not-allowed) 
compounds in the past (National 
decrees: 849/1986, 1315/1992 and 
606/2003): 
 
* organophosphorades  
* organoclorades 
* Metyhil bromide  and others biocides 
* others organic active principles 
Assessment is needed: 
Cost might change in pesticides 
uses and potential yield losses 
should be investigated. 
A comparison between different 
management alternatives (and 
its costs) is required. 
Source: own elaboration  
 
8.5.2.1 The Nitrates Directive 
The directive 91/676/CEE, referred to the water contamination with nitrates from agriculture, 
has been transposed to the Spanish legislation requiring to the autonomous regions to 
establish GAECs for farmers in order to reduce contamination with nitrogen from agricultural 
uses (Royal Decree 261/1996, art 5).  
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Regarding nitrogen applications, good agricultural practices for citrus production in Valencia 
have been distributed among farmers in the region of Valencia. These measures specify 
clearly application schedules and dosages as follows233: 
• Nitrogen fertilizers are recommended to be applied in spring and summer (not in 
autumn or winter) 
• In flood irrigation orchards, nitrogen applications must be fractioned in at least 2 times 
(spring and summer)234. 
• In drip irrigation dosages must be fractioned weekly. 
• Nitrogen forms recommended are nitro ammoniac and ammonia  
• Ammonia: first application should be 15 to 30 days before blossom (half of total N 
dosage). 
• N nitric-ammonia, urea (solutions): Second application should be on spring, at the set 
of fruits (second half of total N dosage). 
• Ureic N: foliar applications should be before flowering but should respect the 
maximum content in biuret (0, 3%). 
• Organic N, organic-mineral, manures, composts, etc.: must be fractioned as other 
fertilizers. 
The compliance with the nitrates directive might determine lesser costs since there are 
maximum restrictions (e.g. 240 Kg N / ha in citrus production as shown in Table 8.13). Thus, 
some dosage recommended by local farmer associations, experts and published fact-sheets are 
used to assess the potential reduction on costs. In addition, yields losses might happen in 
many crops as a consequence of compliance with the regulations mentioned above. In the 
following sections, the gross margin reduction and the potential yield reduction for the main 
crops involved is calculated and discussed. 
8.5.2.2 Plant protection products 
In order to minimize the detrimental environmental impact of pesticides the EU seeks to 
ensure their correct use and informs the public about their use and any residue issues. Soil and 
water may be polluted via spray drift, dispersal of pesticides into the soil, and run-off during 
or after cleaning of equipment, or via uncontrolled disposal. 
There are EU regulations covering the placing of plant protection products on the market, the 
placing of biocide products on the market and fixing maximum residue levels in food. The 
Plant Protection Products Directive (91/414/EEC), 'The Authorizations Directive', was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers on 15 July 1991 and published on 19 August 1991. The 
EU also regulates to protect water quality in respect of pesticides. The Water Framework 
Directive provides an integrated framework for assessment, monitoring and management of 
all surface waters and groundwater based on their ecological and chemical status. The 
directive requires measures be taken to reduce or eliminate discharges and losses of hazardous 
substances, for the protection of surface waters. By 2001 33 priority substances had been 
listed, out of which 13 substances were used in plant protection products. 
                                                 
233
 Extracted from the local legislation (autonomous region of Comunidad Valenciana) regarding GAECs for 
citrus production. Source: DOGV (2000) 
234
 In sandy or very permeable soils nitrogen applications should be fractioned in 3 times, establishing the second 
time between spring and summer. 
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Agri-environmental measures offer support for commitments on keeping records of actual use 
of pesticides, lower use of pesticides to protect soil, water, air and biodiversity, the use of 
integrated pest management techniques and conversion to organic farming. The EU's sixth 
environment action programme addresses the need to encourage farmers to change their use 
of plant protection products.  
The reinforced cross-compliance established by the 2003 CAP reform includes the respect of 
statutory requirements arising from the implementation of EU regulation covering the placing 
of plant protection products on the market. 
The directive 91/414/CEE, about pesticides commercialization in the union is excluding the 
following products (banned) that had been used on fruits and vegetables in Spain: 
- Fention (organophosphate) 
- Triclorfon (organophosphate) 
- Malathion (organophosphate) 
- Metil-Anzifos (organophosphate) 
- Carbofuran (carbamate) 
- Carbosulfan (carbamate) 
- Dicofol (organoclorade) 
- Yellow Oil (DNOC or 4,6-Dinitro-o-cresol): 2-methyl-4,6-dinitrophenol 
- Bromopropilate  
This products control insects, mainly aphids and trips on oranges and lemons productions. 
Their exclusion, mean surely a reduction in possibilities for controls, but there are many other 
products available that control almost all pests. The local government in Valencia has 
promoted the integrated crop management techniques and GAECs that include citrus 
production (DOGV 2000). 
Four Council Directives regulate pesticides residues in food: 76/895/EEC, 86/362/EEC, 
86/363/EEC and 90/642/EC. Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 consolidates and amends these. 
The legislation covers the setting, monitoring and control of pesticides residues in products of 
plant and animal origin that may arise from their use in plant protection. The European 
directives established the limits for pesticides contents allowed in cereals and vegetables 
including fruits as well. In Spain the MRLs (maximum residue levels) where established by 
the national law 280/1994 which has given to the autonomous regions the control and 
surveillance responsibility on chemical products allowed. 
8.5.3 Assessment of the costs of compliance in citrus production in the 
region of Valencia 
8.5.3.1 Impact on costs 
The assessment of the cost of compliance in the region of Valencia requires a special 
consideration and a different analytical approach. Fruits’ growing has a larger range of farm 
practices and input types than other crops, like cereals. The approach used for the fruit sector 
in Valencia considered a cost/benefit analysis and the estimation of expected variations in 
gross margins due to the compliance with the legal framework. 
Schemes of production selected by the farmer affect considerably the farms’ cost-benefit 
results. These schemes are different options that growers may choose depending on finantial 
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availability, soil and wheather conditions, prices or premiums if quality differentiation exists, 
or just depending on specific features from their region (e.g. distance to markets or prices paid 
by cooperatives may allow different techniques or costs). Thus, a grower may prefer a more 
intensive cultivation method, or an organic production, or just a less intensive use of 
fertilizers and water with a lower yield per hectare. Additionally, because fruits are perennial 
crops, the behaviour of growers face to risks might be different from gowers of other 
commodities. Annual crops like wheat or oats have a simpler, more specific scheme for 
production, with lower inputs per hectare, lower labor requirements, and a more stable and 
predictable market (e.g. cereals may be stored for months by brokers, and markets are affected 
in a completely different way when cost changes take place because of new policies). The 
amount of money that growers use for fruits production is also larger than in other 
commodities (annual crops). This is a remarkable consideration, because supervision, pests 
control and monitoring by farmers may cause a considerable change in input use efficiency.  
In our specific area of study, citrus orchards have a high variety of cultural practices. 
Fertilizers and pesticides doses vary from one region to other.  In order to calculate a possible 
reduction in costs caused by reductions in nitrogen doses used in orchards, we have estimated 
a nitrogen rate based on the mostly used by growers in the past. We used local information 
and recommendations from local entities during the last years. Regarding the pesticides cost 
assessment when complying new legal framework, our approach takes into account the 
EUREPGAP scheme, that complies with all requirements and is well documented for this 
study region. 
8.5.3.2 Nitrogen application costs 
Citrus orchards in Valencia have nitrogen dosages that hardly exceed annually 280 kgN / ha 
(MAPA, 2000), and dosages allowed are 240Kg N / ha. A reduction of 40 Kg N / ha might be 
the maximum amount of N that growers should decrease in order to comply with the nitrate 
directive. Considering that the number of applications should not have a variation since only 
the dosage should be different (growers do only 2 o 3 applications usually), and we have 
calculated the lesser cost of N in fertilizers they use as follows: 
Ammonia nitrate price: 0,1564 €/kg  
N content: 33,5 % 
280 Kg N / ha = 836 Kg Ammonia Nitrate 
240 Kg N / ha = 716 Kg Ammonia Nitrate 
Difference in cost: 18.76 € / ha 
Other cost analysis suggests that lesser costs for fertilizer reductions might occur to comply 
with the European new legal framework. Peris Moll and Juliá Igual (2005) have made a cost 
analysis in the Valencia province for a cooperative with 450 farmers. This cooperative has 
agreed with farmers to do a certification applying for EUREPGAP cultivation methods, which 
means an important reduction in inputs. Fertilizers are reduced in 118 € / ha and this cost 
includes phosphorus, potassium, magnesium, calcium and many other microelements in 
addition to nitrogen. Thus, assuming that element nitrogen inside all elements represent 
around 20% of the cost, and that the reduction is equal for all elements, then a reduction 
would result in about 23 €/ha which is consistent with our own estimations.  
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8.5.3.3 Costs of pesticides 
The legal framework determines an “a-priori” reduction in pesticides doses in fruits. 
Regulations allow maximum limits for certain products in fruits (quality controls). There are 
no limitations in the application doses and this is consistent with the fact that horticultural and 
fruit production have several applications during the year and it would be very difficult to 
control or register all of them. Nevertheless, products commercialization is regulated and 
growers have been encouraged during the last decades to reduce the amounts applied to their 
products and to improve the application efficiency. 
Changes in costs for pesticides use are not easy to estimate for different reasons. The most 
important changes on pesticides use during the last year took place on insecticides because 
their active substances had become more dangerous for living organisms and human health. 
Thus, a variety of alternative products has been developped during the last years. Since 
organophosphorades and other pesticides used for aphis and trips were banned, no alternative 
active principles have been suggested. Additionally, new controlling and monitoring 
techniques determine changes in application efficiencies. These new practices are already 
used by many growers in certified schemes like EUREPGAP. Our approach, as mentioned, 
considers a complete list of activities and costs in a certified scheme that complies with all 
cross-compliance measures. The clearest example to clarify how compliance could affect 
costs is the EUREPGAP scheme. Pesticides suggested for EUREPGAP conditions show an 
important reduction as shown in Table 8.14.  
All farmers, retailers or trade operators who join the EUREPGAP protocol are committed to 
five main principles (EUREPGAP, 2001): 
• To maintain consumer’s confidence in the quality and safety of the EUREP certified 
food. 
• Compliance with good agricultural practices. 
• To minimize the use of pesticides and other chemical inputs as much as possible. 
• To use non renewable resources (as soil, water, etc.) efficiently. 
• To be responsible for the occupational health and safety of their workers. 
Unfortunately, there is little information about real applications in the farm since the total 
variation of practices among growers is very large. Some of them split applications in many 
times during the year (as recommended by producers organizations) and the number of 
products they use for pest controls is diverse and large235. Also they need other applications 
for improving quality in fruits (like microelements as cupper or nitrogen as well). As shown 
in the Table 8.14, a completely different scheme for production is available to growers. Costs 
and yields are reduced and premium prices may take place. 
 
                                                 
235
 There about 2500 authorized pesticides and herbicides registered at the Ministry of Agriculture since 2003 
new national legislation took place and they could be revised in www.mapa.es .  
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Table 8.14: Production costs of certified (Eurepgap) and conventional oranges   
Variable costs EUREPGAP Conventional Conventional
2003 (€/ha) % 2002 (€/ha) 2003(€/ha)
Irrigation water 259,91 10,88 668,48 685,19 17,48
Fertilizers 319,5 13,38 319,5 449,71 11,47
Pesticides and herbicides 220,95 9,25 453,27 464,6 11,85
Other inputs 0 0 60,85 62,37 1,59
Equipment operating costs 93,67 3,92 58,74 60,21 1,54
Labor costs 734,12 30,74 1187,67 1217,36 31,05
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS 1628,15 68,18 2748,51 2939,44 74,97
FIXED COSTS
Equipment ownership costs 336,74 14,1 262,94 269,51 6,87
Crop depreciation 360,79 15,11 346,42 355,08 9,06
Taxes & insurances 62,5 2,62 291,16 298,44 7,61
TOTAL FIX COSTS 760,03 31,82 957,38 981,31 25,03
EUREPGAP certification and analysis costs (€/ha) 205,4
TOTAL COSTS 2593,58 3705,89 3920,75
Average production (Kg/ha) 23000 33000
Price (€per Kg) 0,13 0,12
Average costs (€/kg) 0,11 0,13
 
Source: Peris Moll and Juliá Igual (2005)
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8.5.3.4 Integrated Crop Management in Valencia  
In 2002, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) regulated the Integrated Crop Management for 
Citrus production (Royal Decree 1201/2002, (BOE, 2002)). Later, in 2004, the MAPA also 
regulated the technical norms for the “Identification of National Warrantee for Integrated crop 
Management in Citrus” (BOE 2004b). Thus, pest management has changed during the last 
decade and biologic controls have increased (as insect usage to control other insects like 
spiders for mite and aphids controls).  The Integrated Production of citrus is quite advanced in 
Spain, citrus being one of the key crops and one of the first sectors to adopt these approaches. 
Valencia has pioneered work in this field. Current Integrated Production of citrus in Valencia 
is in its fourth marketing year with almost 16,000 hectares under production.  
The costs and production impact of Integrated Crop Management (ICM) were analyzed for 
several cases (Box 1; source: AGRACEAS, 2002). Nitrates and pesticides protocols for 
Integrated Crop Management in citrus production almost produced any impact on yields or 
costs. There was a reduction on pesticide and fertilizer costs, and an increment in other costs 
such as pest monitoring and soil, foliar and residual analysis. Although growers often do not 
consider their own time as a cost, they are aware that ICM requires more management time to 
undertake some tasks such as pest and natural enemies population monitoring. Overall costs 
are felt by growers and advisors to be higher under ICM, however a full economic study has 
not been undertaken. Nevertheless, it does make it easier to sell to multiple retailers and there 
is therefore a marketing advantage. This situation is especially important for Spanish citrus 
exports. 
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Box 1: ICMs Protocol  
Water 
• Leaching of pesticides. Although this is not perceived as a problem, the guidelines include measures 
for reducing pesticide input. Coupled with the reduction in irrigation water of 20%, this is likely to 
reduce the risk of nitrate leaching. 
• Leaching of nitrates. Maximum nitrogen doses are established under the guidelines and these result 
in a reduction in the amount of nitrogen applied of between 15% and 35%. As above, the reduction in 
irrigation water is likely to reduce the risk of nitrate leaching. 
• Irrigation. There is a 20% reduction in the use of irrigation water based on adherence to the 
guidelines. 
Soil 
• Soil nutrient balance. This is done every five years and the results relating to the nitrate concentration 
will be used to adjust the recommended nitrogen doses. 
• Soil erosion. Cultivation equipment that destroys soil structure is banned. It is obligatory to allow a 
spontaneous green cover to develop from mid-autumn to the end of winter to anchor the soil thus 
reducing the risk of erosion. 
Source: (AGRACEAS236, 2002) 
8.5.3.5 Soil disinfection without methyl bromide 
Improvements on technology had brought a repetition of horticultural production cycles 
resulting in a more demanding use of lands and products as disinfections of soils. During the 
last 20 years Methyl Bromide was the most important product for this purpose but it became 
forbidden in 2005   and new alternatives are being used by growers in Valencia (Caballero et 
al. 2002a). These authors have been suggesting that there are many other activities possible 
for a successful disinfection of soils in horticulture and fruits production. Thus a product 
named “Telone” (1,3-dicloropropene) with Cloropicrine is suggested to have the same impact 
and costs that Methyl Bromide had before. In addition they suggest solarization237 combined 
with some chemical controls (in low dosages) might have same costs and a very good 
performance in disinfection.   In this context, Caballero and De Miguel (2002b) have 
suggested that the integrated pest management practices for fruits and vegetables as a 
potential way for reduction on costs with low impact on yields. 
8.5.3.6 Impact on Yields  
As much as local experts concern, at present there is no evidence of yields decreases as a 
consequence of dosages recommendations and regulations about food safety or the Nitrates 
                                                 
236
 Agra CEAS Consulting is a joint venture between Imperial College London (University of London) and Agra 
Informa ltd (part of T&F Informa plc), and was established at the Bureau Européen de Recherches in Brussels in 
1973 and at Imperial College London’s Centre for European Agricultural Studies in Wye in 1986. 
http://www.ceasc.com/  
237
 The term solarization is used to describe sterilisation of soil or plant material by cooking the material in a 
plastic bag. In this case the sun's radiation is converted to heat by absorption, heating the material above 60 C, 
which kills off most harmful pathogens. The UV in the light may also have a germicidal effect on the surface 
material. 
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directive. Nitrogen doses recommended during the last years in Valencia, were about 200 and 
240 Kg N/ha as required by the legal framework. There is not evidence of yield reductions in 
the field (Ferrer, 2007238).  
Citrus species, especially oranges, in Valencia have been showing different results depending 
on irrigation methods when nitrogen fertilizers are used. Thus, several workshops and 
scientific reports have been reporting a lack of evidence of yields change when nitrogen 
dosages are above 250Kg N / ha, in particular for flood irrigation methods (Legaz and Millo, 
1988). Some experiments showed that the use of fertilizer additives as DMPP might increase 
the nitrogen efficiency and avoid yield decreases when using nitrogen dosages below 
300Kg/ha and it its costs per ha is barely not appreciable in total costs (Legaz and Millo, 
2000). These authors have reported an incremental efficiency of nitrogen absorption when 
using dripping irrigation methods that suggest that the new legal framework could not have a 
clear effect on yields expressed as Kg of fruits per plant and year.  
Even when Integrated Crop Management methods present greater input reductions, citrus 
orchards in Valencia239 using ICM protocols have been mentioned as preventing better from 
pests without yield losses or additional cost (Beitiam, 2005). These practices reduce the use of 
pesticides in about 50% through monitoring pests using tramps and periodical surveillance 
and insect attacks alarms. Accounts of insects or fungus are carried out at farm level in order 
to compare with threshold levels. Their symptoms on vegetative or reproductive organs as 
leaves or fruits are monitored in order to prevent pathologies240. These methods usually 
determine lesser and more effective pesticides applications without any additional cost. 
Choosing right moments for applications and using those authorized products that are 
commercialized for citrus productions might determine good performances and yields in 
citrus orchards.  
The yields under ICM are comparable to those under conventional production. Thus, revenue 
is approximately the same as yields are comparable and there is no premium. However, the 
increased certainty of sale is likely to reduce revenue risk (AGRACEAS, 2002). With similar 
revenue, but higher production costs, it is likely that profitability is slightly reduced for the 
ICM system. However, the risk of not finding a marketing channel for perishable goods is 
reduced which could, in certain circumstances, increase overall returns. Several evidences 
have been reported about nitrogen absorbance efficiency in different scenarios and for a 
variety of fertilization dosages (Serna et al., 1992).  
In addition to this, some authors have reported a threshold level or dosage for Nitrogen 
fertilizers in Oranges. Bañuls Gil et al. (1997) studied orchards in a 4 year experiment in 
Valencia and found dosages above 250 Kg N / ha determined little or no yield responses. This 
results have revealed that the new legal framework imposed by the European Nitrates 
Directive (a maximum dosage of 240 Kg N / ha in citrus) is quite reasonable and would not 
necessarily produce a lower revenue because of yield reductions. In Figure 8.15, these results 
are synthesized showing the maximum nitrogen doses allowed in the Region of Valencia in 
accordance to the Nitrates Directive 
                                                 
238
 Local citrus expert at the Agricultural Research Institute of Valencia (personal communication).   
239
 Described and legislated by the national government: Royal Decree 1201/2002 - Nov. 20th, regarding 
Integrated management for agricultural products (BOE 2002).. 
240
 Recommendations refer to accounts made at the farm in order to make decisions. For example, more than 
30% of leaves with one or more holes; or aphids accounts in stems during early flowering. 
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Nitrogen use efficiency might be higher in the following years since the use of dripping 
irrigation methods in Spain. Dripping irrigation uses considerably less water and its use 
derives in an increment on application efficiency (40 to 90% increments are known to occur 
in most cases when changing from flood irrigation(Legaz et al., 1994)), and increasing water 
costs and constraints in the coming years might conduct into new investments on irrigation 
technologies.    
Figure 8.15: Fruit yield responses to different nitrogen dosages 
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Source: Data extracted from Bañuls Gil et al. (1997), and Molina and Morales (1998) 
8.5.3.7 Effects of compliance 
Summing, the effects of compliance on citrus production cannot be defined as a cost of 
compliance since a reduction in inputs could not have been associated to a yield decrease in a 
clear manner. There is not evidence of yield decrease because of reductions in the average 
amounts of pestices used or nitrogen dosages. Pesticides regulations and nitrogen dosage 
reductions do not clearly modify revenue in citrus production.  
According to information of local experts, nitrates and erosion measures are not very much 
controlled in Valencia at farm level and even if the main citrus production areas belong to the 
nitrates vulnerable zone in the region of Valencia, GAECs and N directive seem to be easy to 
comply for most citrus farmers and local experts. Therefore, the introduction of Cross-
compliance measures in the context of the F&Vs’ CMO of F&V reform is not suspected to 
introduce a clear change in the costs at the farm level. 
The Spanish transposition of the Nitrate Directive (Royal Decree 261/96), through giving the 
authority for control and supervision of nitrates to the autonomous governments in Spain does 
not specify control measures at the farm level241. The elaboration of a GAEC code, a study of 
nitrates vulnerable zones and a specific executive program for these areas had to be completed 
by each autonomous region (in the case of Valencia this has been approved in 2000 (DOGV 
                                                 
241
 See Nitrates Directive transposition: BOE (1996), Royal Decree 261/1996, (art.8) and Official Newspapers of 
Valencian “Generalitat“ (DOGV): DOGV 3677 (2000), DOGV 4683 (Fab-2004),  4710 (March-2004) and 3727 
(April 2004) that especify nitrates vulnerable zones, GAEC codes, sample measures and executive programs on 
environment, damns, rivers, basins, etc. 
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2000). Thus, each region has the control and supervision and must inform to the Spanish 
Ministry of Environment, which elaborates a report to the EU Commission every 4 years. 
Because of these aspects, specific controls such as fertilizer application periods or dosages at 
the farm level are not expected to happen at least immediately and cross-compliance local 
legislation will probably take place after the approval of the F&Vs’ CMO reform (starting in 
2008).  
The effect of changes on nitrate dosages or pesticides application in different farming 
methods, would not necessarily determine increment on costs or yield loses that could derive 
into income loses.  
Pesticide regulations and pest management in the US citrus are analyzed and the results are 
presented in Annex (Part I, section 6) with a different perspective.  The effects of water 
regulations (environmental resource permits, ERP) and Best Management practices on costs 
determine an increase on marginal costs (about 2.12% of total grove care expenses of the 
Florida growers’ budget). Nevertheless, there is no information about yield losses or a 
detailed production scheme that would allow a better understanding of the effect of 
complying with those measures.  
Additionally, Citrus canker and hurricane spreading are mentioned in Annex as considerable 
limiting factors for the citrus industry in Florida. A calculation from literature reported slight 
costs (0, 87% of total expenses) of preventive measures against this disease. However, this 
should be considered as a production cost in the budget entitled as “pest management”, rather 
than a cost of compliance of environmental regulations. Citrus greening (a very important 
disease in Florida citrus industry) does not represent a significant cost. 
When comparing farm performance and production schemes in Valencia and Florida, is not 
possible to outline any decrease in productivity or losses in the gross margin due to 
compliance. This is mainly because growers are already using nitrate dosages that comply 
with GAECs in this region or because the costs of compliance with regulations (as in the case 
of Florida) are not considerable high in the growers’ budget. Production schemes compatible 
with most regulations on pesticides, are disseminated by extension services in the region of 
Valencia and well known by growers. These schemes determine a reduction of costs rather 
than an increase on care expenses.  
 
8.6 Cost of compliance for vegetables in the region of Castilla La Mancha  
8.6.1 Costs structure in a mixed production farm in Castilla-La Mancha 
This Table 8.15 shows the cost structure of a mixed farm whose main technical orientation is 
horticultural crop and the weight of each fraction over the total costs. 
Table 8.15: Cost structure at farm level 
     COSTS (€/ha) % 
     Seeds and plants 245,74 19,14 
     Fertilizers 112,44 8,76 
     Crop protection 62,44 4,86 
     Other crop specific costs 12,59 0,98 
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     COSTS (€/ha) % 
     Contract work 34,42 2,68 
     Machinery & building current costs 38,68 3,01 
     Energy 85,63 6,67 
     Water for irrigation 27,82 2,17 
     Other non crop specific costs 18,98 1,48 
     Depreciation 122,59 9,55 
     Wages paid 332,18 25,87 
     Rent paid 114,42 8,91 
     Interest paid 11,78 0,92 
     Capital Investments 64,52 5,02 
Source: Source: MAPA 2004 
A cost structure by crops has been studied with data from the fieldwork, statistics of the 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and the department of agriculture of the Regional 
Government of Castilla-La Mancha, and literature: 
Table 8.16: Cost structure at crop level 
CROP POTATO1 MELON2 PEPPER2 GARLIC3 
Seed (€/ha) 1190 704,99 865,46 1230,57 
Fertilizer (€/ha) 455,32 650,53 836,69 161,42 
Pesticides (€/ha) 301,8 262,82 412,39 142,21 
Tilling (€/ha) 64,97 108,48 90,34 64,99 
Sowing (€/ha) 53,32 130,64 61,51 117,54 
Pruning (€/ha) 0 0 0 0 
Harvest (€/ha) 82,52 507,53 119,52 80,74 
Labor (€/ha) 668,05 3435,7 4726,9 3257,2 
Water (€/ha) 420 300 450 180 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS (€/ha) 3235,98 6100,69 7562,81 5234,67 
Yield (kg/ha) 57000 49000 40000 8000 
Price (€/kg) 0,105 0,19 0,26 0,72 
TOTAL REVENUE (€/ha) 5985 9310 10400 5760 
GROSS MARGIN (€/ha) 2749,02 3209,31 2837,19 525,33 
Number above mean irrigation methods: 1: Sprinkler irrigation (Intensive) ; 2:Drip Irrigation ;  3 
Sprinkler irrigation (extensive).  
Source: Own elaboration from De Juan Valero et al.(2003), SIAR 2006, and surveys to farmers 
(Varela et al. 2007) 
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The main cost for those products will be the ones coming from labors as all vegetables are 
very hand work intensive (this is why they are called “social crops”). 
The analysis of the increase of costs due to cross compliance will focus on the Nitrates 
Directive and in the water conservation requirements included in the GAECs, as these are the 
main environmental problems associated to the vegetables crops in Castilla-La Mancha, as 
this is a nitrate vulnerable area and a region of overexploited aquifers.  
8.6.2 The legal framework 
Since the study area is the main vulnerable area in Spain, our analysis focuses on the impacts 
of the Nitrates Directive, as well as on the impacts of ground water use related GAECs. This 
is an issue of special importance in Spain as it is the only country, together with France, in 
which ground water affairs are considered in the GAECs. The area under study is a nitrate 
vulnerable area and it is known as a significant example of aquifer overexploitation. 
8.6.2.1 The Nitrates Directive 
As seen in section 8.5.2 the Nitrates Directive was transposed to the Spanish legislation by the 
Royal Decree 261/1996, in which it is stated that regional governments must establish action 
programs for vulnerable areas. In the region of Castilla La Mancha there are six nitrate 
vulnerable zones, whose action program is defined by the Order 15/06/2001 (DOCM, 2001) 
(revised in 2007) of the department of environment and rural development of the regional 
government of Castilla La Macha. 
The action program establishes the maximum nitrogen application allowed in these vulnerable 
zones (Table 8.17) and the agricultural practices required in order to minimize nitrogen 
leaching. Next table shows the nitrogen limitations for the main crops included in this study. 
Table 8.17: Maximum nitrogen dosages in the nitrogen vulnerable zones of Castilla La 
Mancha (DOCM, 2001) 
CROP IRRIGATED N (Kg/ha) RAIN FED N (Kg/ha) 
Wheat 110 55 
Barley 110 55 
Maize 200 -- 
Sunflower 80 40 
Leguminous crops 30 20 
Sugarbeet 200 -- 
Alfalfa 30 -- 
Melon 135 -- 
Garlic 80 -- 
Onion 160 -- 
Other horticultural crops 160 -- 
Potato 120 -- 
Vine 70 50 
Olive 70 50 
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8.6.2.2 The Water Conservation Policy 
The Spanish GAECs include groundwater conservation measures for overexploited aquifers, 
being the only country together with France which introduces water conservation 
requirements among the GAECs. The Upper Guadiana river basin’s main characteristic 
(Region of Castilla La Mancha) is the important natural interaction between surface and 
groundwater. The ground water system is composed by five main aquifers, linked to a group 
of highly valuable wetlands included in the RAMSAR list. 
The use of groundwater in Western La Mancha aquifer allowed, during the 60’s and 70’s 
decades, a large development of the irrigated agriculture which implied an important 
economic growth in the area. The joint effect of the CAP and the Spanish rural development 
policies, which encouraged irrigation and intensification, together with the technological 
development, which reduced water pumping and abstraction costs, produced a huge increase 
of water abstraction from the aquifer, which led to a provisional declaration of 
overexploitation in 1987 and a permanent declaration in 1991. 
According to the article 54 of the Spanish Water Law of 1985, the river basin authority 
established a water quotas policy (Water Abstraction Plan). The Water Abstraction Plan is 
updated every year and stratification has been introduced, setting higher restrictions for large 
farms. The Water Abstraction Plan is espicified in the next Table 8.18. 
Table 8.18: Water Abstraction Plan quotas (2006) 
Farm size (ha) Water quota (m3/ha) 
0-30 2640 
30-80 2000 
> 80 1200 
Vineyards 1000 
This water conservation policy produced important social and economic impacts, but has not 
succeeded to achieve the aquifer recovery. Agriculture is the main responsible of the aquifer 
overexploitation and wetland degradation and, therefore, its inclusion among the GAECs is 
highly relevant. In accordance to the GAEC’s water conservation requirements, in one hand, 
farms with irrigated area in overexploited aquifers zones have to credit their legal water 
abstraction permits; on the other hand, the installation of water flow meters is compulsory to 
all farmers in every well in the farm. 
 
8.6.3 Assessment of the costs of compliance in vegetables in the region of 
Castilla La Mancha 
8.6.3.1 Methodological framework: integration of economic and agronomic 
models 
As we have mentioned in the section 8.1.3, our methodological approach for the region of 
Castilla La Mancha involves a case study, with representative farms and the integration of the 
economic model SIWAP and an agronomic model for the designated areas.  
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The economic model is a mathematical programming model of constrained optimization that 
includes a risk component that takes into account climate as well as market variability. 
Constraints in the model include land, water, labor and policy constraints. The technical 
parameters of the model are based on an ample field work conducted in the area of study as 
well as on interviews from experts and data from the regional and national administration 
departments (see Figure 8.16). 
The model used is a farm-based non-linear single-period mathematical programming model 
of constrained optimization, developed by Varela-Ortega et al. (2006a). The model describes 
the behavior of the representative farmers selected confronted by different policy scenarios. 
Following previous work in the area of study (Varela-Ortega et al 1998, Varela-Ortega et al. 
2002) the model incorporates new risk parameters and maximizes a utility function (U) 
subject to technical, economic and policy constraints (g). The utility function is defined by a 
gross margin (Z) and a risk vector (R) that takes into account climate as well as market prices 
variability. The model can be summarized as follows:  
Maximize U = )(xf , )(xf  = Z - R  
Subject to the following constraints  1)( Sxg ∈  , 
     
2Sx ∈
 
Where “x” is the vector of the decision-making variables or vector of the activities defined by 
a given crop-growing area and by an associated production technique, irrigation method and 
soil type (S). The problem-solving instrument used is GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling 
System). The technical coefficients and parameters of the model were obtained from field 
work carried out during 2006 and 2007 (Varela et al., 2007) in the study area, consisting of 
surveys and interviews with farmers, irrigation community representatives, technical experts, 
river basin managers, and regional government officials. The model was duly calibrated and 
validated, using the risk aversion coefficient as calibration parameter and the comparative 
data on crop distribution, land and labor parameters in the study area (Varela, 2007 (in 
press)). 
The water policy constraints limit the water availability by imposing to farmers a water 
abstraction plan (quotas system) (CHG, 2006).  
 
In the case of the evaluation of the impact of the Nitrates Directive on these types of farms it 
has to be taken into consideration that nitrates are used as mineral fertilizers and are thus 
subject to quantity limitations. Therefore, main effect of the application of the Nitrates 
Directive is that it affects yield and thus farm revenue that is translated into a foregone 
income rather than into a direct increment of costs. This extra-income can be considered as 
the cost to comply with the directive and it can be expressed as a percentage of the total costs.  
For this analysis, the agronomic model Cropsyst has been calibrated for the region and for the 
main crops. This model provides data about the yield and water use decrease when complying 
with the Nitrates Directive. The amounts of nitrogen used for the analysis are the traditionally 
used quantities in this area for each crop, based on the study done by De Juan Valero et al. 
(2003). In order to simulate the Nitrates Directive impact, the amount of nitrogen used refers 
to the maximum amount of nitrogen allowed by the Directive and specially by the special 
program of the region of Castilla La Mancha for fertilizer application (Orden 15-06-2001 de 
la Consejería de Agricultura y Medio Ambiente, DOCM 2001). 
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Figure 8.16: Methodological approach for cost / benefit of Compliance assessments  
 
 
Source: based on Varela et al. 2006a 
 
The two scenarios simulated with the agronomic model are the reference situation, which 
represents the traditional use of nitrogen fertilizers, and the Nitrates Directive, which 
corresponds to the full compliance with the directive. The following Table 8.19 shows the 
results of the simulations for two scenarios by crop and by technique. 
Among the horticultural crops, potato and garlic are the most sensitive crops to nitrogen 
restrictions in terms of yield (Table 8.19). Sunflower and sugar beet are also very sensitive, 
and cereals in intensive irrigation are highly affected by changes in nitrogen dosage applied. 
These results fit with the farmers’ perceptions (see Deliverable 5, Varela-Ortega et al., 2006) 
and with the expert consultations (INAGRO, S.A.). 
Depending on the crop, these reductions in fertilizer costs, water cost and yields will have 
different impact on the gross margin.  
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Table 8.19: Effects of the Nitrates Directive on nitrogen application, water consumption and yield 
Nitrogen amount (kg/ha) Water Consumption (m3/ha) Yield (kg/ha) 
Crop Techn. 
Reference  Nit. Directive Reduction (%) Reference Nit. Directive Reduction (%) Reference  Nit. Directive Reduction (%) 
RF 49,4 55 0 0 0 0,00 1520 1530 -0,69 
SP1 105,3 110 0 1520 1430 5,92 3402 3191 6,22 BARLEY 
SP2 127,4 110 13,66 1560 1430 8,33 3943 3191 19,08 
RF 59,5 55 7,56 0 0 0 2177 2027 6,89 
SP1 126,2 110 12,84 1730 1670 3,47 4985 4479 10,15 WHEAT 
SP2 159,5 110 31,03 1740 1670 4,02 5273 4479 15,06 
SP1 275,5 200 27,40 3420 3370 1,46 10866 9877 9,10 
MAIZE 
SP2 348 200 42,53 3450 3370 2,32 11022 9877 10,39 
RF 39,4 40 0 0 0 0 638 652 -2,19 
SP1 117 80 31,62 2520 2530 -0,40 3102 2522 18,70 SUNFLOWER 
SP2 135 80 40,74 2550 2530 0,78 3159 2522 20,17 
SP1 213,8 200 6,45 6340 6140 3,15 49402 42646 13,68 
SUGARBEET 
SP2 270 200 25,93 6450 6140 4,81 56100 42646 23,98 
PEAS RF 56,5 20 64,60 0 0 0 980 878 10,44 
POTATO SP2 313,5 120 61,72 3540 3410 3,67 56000 50400 10,00 
MELON DR 188,7 135 28,46 3010 2960 1,66 40000 38600 3,50 
PEPPER DR 202,5 160 20,99 4140 4075 1,57 35220 34060 3,29 
GARLIC SP2 80 80 0 1610 1610 0 7138 6673 6,51 
RF 26,3 50 0 0 0 0 10927 10600 2,99 
VINE 
DR 158,2 70 55,75 2190 1970 10 25007 23427 6,31 
Source: Own elaboration from Azaña, 2007. 
RF: rain fed - SP1: extensive sprinkler irrigation - SP2: intensive sprinkler irrigation -    
* Maize water requirements are daily ET requirements at maximum water use efficiency, therefore lower than on-field actual irrigation applications.
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8.6.3.2 Effects of the Nitrates Directive without adaptation 
Since in this region, farms are mixed and production oriented, then the real impact of 
compliance with the Nitrates Directive must be analyzed at the farm level. If changes in the 
cropping patterns do not take place and adaptation does not occur, income losses may be 
significant. The next Table 8.20 shows the farm income among the different scenarios without 
changes in the cropping patterns in the four representative farms of the area under study 
(farms’ characteristics in section 8.4.4). 
Table 8.20: Farm income and income losses among different scenarios without changes 
in cropping patterns 
Farm Income (€) Farm Income per hectare (€/ha) Income Index (%) 
Farm Type 
Farm 
Size 
(ha) Reference 
situation 
Nitrates 
Directive 
Reference 
situation 
Nitrates 
Directive 
Reference 
situation 
Nitrates 
Directive 
Income 
Loss 
(%) 
F&V_F2 150 93798 77499,13 625,32 516,66 100 82,62 17,38 
F&V_F3 70 51760,8 40056,17 739,44 572,23 100 77,39 22,61 
F&V_F4 19 14318,21 12513,59 753,59 658,61 100 87,40 12,60 
F&V_F5 40 41561,6 32156,99 1039,04 803,92 100 77,37 22,63 
 
The impact of nitrogen reductions at farm level varies a lot depending on cropping patterns. In 
the four farm types, income losses varies from 12% to 23%, which is similar to the farmer’s 
perception obtained in the field work (Varela et al. 2007) (see Deliverable 5 from Spain). 
Figure 8.17 summarizes the income loss in the different farm types selected. 
Figure 8.17: Farm income index in the different scenarios with no changes in the 
cropping patterns 
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8.6.3.3 Effect of the Nitrates Directive and the Water Abstraction Plan 
(groundwater conservation measure included in GAECs) with 
adaptation 
For a better analysis of the real impact of compliance with the Nitrates Directive it has been 
used the economic model, which allows us to simulate farmers’ strategies for adaptation to 
these policy constraints. The requirements of compliance are not constraints inside the model, 
but they have been simulated as different scenarios where farmers comply or not with the 
requirements under study, the Nitrates Directive and the GAEC requirement on ground water 
abstraction legal concessions and water meters installation. Table 8.21 shows the results of 
the model for four scenarios simulated, which are: 
- Reference situation 
- Nitrates Directive 
- Water abstraction Plan (with no compliance with the Nitrates Directive) 
- Water Abstraction Plan + Nitrates Directive  
 
Table 8.21: Effect of the Nitrates Directive and the Water Abstraction Plan on farm 
income at farm level (from the economic model) 
Farm Income per hectare (€/ha) Income Index (%) 
 Farm 
Type Reference 
situation  
Nitrates 
Directive 
Water 
Abstraction 
Plan 
Water 
Abstraction Plan 
+ Nitrates 
Directive 
Reference 
situation  
Nitrates 
Directive 
Water 
Abstraction 
Plan 
Water 
Abstraction Plan 
+ Nitrates 
Directive 
F&V_F2 625,32 695,74 573,04 606,89 100 111,26 91,64 97,05 
F&V_F3 739,44 712,72 447,43 453,63 100 96,39 60,51 61,35 
F&V_F4 753,59 781,27 753,59 781,27 100 103,67 100 103,67 
F&V_F5 1039,04 877,59 718,64 676,34 100 84,46 69,16 65,09 
Source: Own elaboration 
The impact of nitrogen reductions at the farm level change dramatically depending on the 
cropping pattern. The results of the model show that given the farmer’s capacity to adapt them 
selves to the legislation (switching from one crop to another), changes in the cropping 
patterns would increase their income. Therefore, farms F2, F3 and F4 do not suffer any 
income loss because of Nitrates Directive compliance. Just farm F5 has a relevant income loss 
due to the lower adaptation ability because of the permanent crops (vines). Figure 8.18 
summarizes the income variation in the different farm types selected for the different 
scenarios. 
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Figure 8.18: Effect of the Nitrates Directive on farm income 
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Source: Own elaboration 
The results of the model show that farm income is more vulnerable to reductions in water 
availability than to nitrogen doses limitations. The income losses coming from the compliance 
with the Water Abstraction Plan are very relevant, especially to farms F3 and F5. Farms F2 
and F4 are more extensive farms with less horticultural crops surface. However, F3 and F5 
are farms that are more intensive and their profitability decreases seriously when water 
restrictions take place. 
It is important to remark that new cropping patterns are very similar between the four farms 
when they comply with the Nitrates Directive. Melon is the vegetable crop chosen in the four 
farms; therefore, a dynamic analysis would be necessary to assess the effect of this in the 
following years when melon prices would probably be lower. 
It is not correct to assume that income losses produced by the Water Abstraction Plan are 
directly a cost of compliance from GAEC requirements on legal permissions for water 
abstractions. The GAEC requirement requires a water meter installation and the possession of 
water abstraction legal concessions, but it does not punish the “not compliance” with the 
water quota in the water concession. Therefore, we cannot consider that there is a direct cost 
coming from this GAEC requirement (apart from the water meter installation). However, the 
River Basin Authority considers that there is already a benefit of compliance with the GAECs 
requirement, as it is increasing compliance with the Water Abstraction Plan and reducing 
illegal water abstractions. 
 
8.7 Competitiveness assessment for the Spanish F&V sector 
 
Following D12 approach for competitiveness assessment, Cross-Compliance standards 
“trigger a supply response under the influence of various external conditions. This supply 
response interacts with the supply response of competitors and with demand to produce 
certain market effects” (Page 8). 
These conditions are the following: 
- Initial conditions: farm type, farm size, farming intensity, farm localization (field 
topology, soil, agro-climatic conditions, proximity to water sources, local 
environmental pressure …) 
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- Industry conditions: industry competences (e.g., logistics), rivalry, supplier relations, 
customer relations, substitutes, voluntary standards 
- Institutional conditions: implementation and enforcement of legislation 
- Macro-economic conditions: interest rate, exchange rate 
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the analysis for the fruits and vegetables 
sector is based mainly on the initial conditions and on the institutional conditions. Among 
these conditions, already studied, the analysis on Fruits and Vegetables focuses mainly on all 
the indicators included in the initial conditions, namely, farm types, size, farming operations 
and techniques, agronomic conditions, situation of the farms in the region and irrigation 
districts. These structural conditions will determine the different levels of competitiveness 
across farm types. 
Table 8.22: Competitiveness and standards at farm level (Table 2 of D12) 
 
Source: Cross-Compliance Project, Deliverable 12, table 2 
 
8.7.1 Effects of the Nitrates Directive on competitiveness 
The analysis is carried out for short-term competitiveness, as effects on costs in the long run 
have not been analyzed. The analysis follows the farm-level index approach, by comparing 
the gross margin obtained in the different farm types before and after the application of the 
policy standard. The analysis is, therefore, a farm level analysis linking production costs, 
gross product and competitiveness, following table 2 of D12 “Competitiveness and standards 
at farm level”. Comparisons on profitability between pre and post standard situations and 
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across farm types have been done using the gross margin indicator, as data on fixed costs 
were not obtained in the field work analysis. Although fixed costs are not considered, we will 
refer to these comparisons with the term “profitability”.   
The farm types selected to assess the effect of the ND on competitiveness at farm level are the 
farm types selected in previous sections. In the case of citrus orchards in the region of 
Valencia, F&V_1 is a similar farm that reflects costs comparisons taken from the literature 
review (see section 8.5 and Caballero and DeMiguel, 2002b). Similarly, for the vegetable-
mixed farms of Castilla-La Mancha, we have used the selected farm types of the previous 
section and the modeling results. Table 8.23 shows the results of gross margin estimates in 
each of the selected farm types for the pre and post establishment of the ND. 
Table 8.23: Effects of the Nitrates Directive on competitiveness 
  
Pre-Nitrates Directive situation Post-Nitrates Directive situation 
GPF1 = 4200 €/ha GPF1’ = 4200 €/ha 
VF1 = 2337,53 €/ha VF1’ = 2318.77  €/ha 
C
itr
u
s 
o
rc
ha
rd
 
F&V_F1 
GMF1 = 1862,47 €/ha GMF1’ = 1881,23 €/ha 
GPF2 = 2072,07  €/ha GPF2’ =2915,79 €/ha 
VF2 = 1446,75 €/ha VF2’ = 2220,04 €/ha F&V_F2 
GMF2 = 625,32 €/ha GMF2’ = 695,74 €/ha 
GPF3 =2745,72 €/ha GPF3’ =3401,46 €/ha 
VF3 = 2006,29 €/ha VF3’ = 2688,74 €/ha F&V_F3 
GMF3 = 739,44 €/ha GMF3’ =712,72 €/ha 
GPF4 =1852,46 €/ha GPF4’ =2910,31 €/ha 
VF4 = 1098,87 €/ha VF4’ =2129,04 €/ha F&V_F4 
GMF4 = 753,59 €/ha GMF4’ =781,27 €/ha 
GPF5 =4272,9 €/ha GPF5’ = 4423,53 €/ha 
VF5 = 3233,85 €/ha VF5’ = 3545,93 €/ha 
M
ix
ed
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
fa
rm
s 
F&V_F5 
GMF5 = 1039,04 €/ha GMF5’ = 877,58 €/ha 
Note: V: variable costs; GP: gross product; GM: Gross Margin 
 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 313 
Following the methodology of D12, the assessment of short-run competitiveness at farm level 
is based on the relative changes in gross margin GMi. The impact on gross margin may be 
defined as  ∆iGM∆GMi’ GMi 
∆F1GM = GMF1’-GMF1= 18,76 €/ha 
∆F2GM = GMF2’-GMF2= 70,42 €/ha 
∆F3GM =GMF3’-GMF3= -26,72 €/ha 
∆F4GM =GMF4’-GMF4= 27,68 €/ha 
∆F5GM =GMF5’-GMF5= -161,45 €/ha 
 
Table 8.23 and equations above show the variation on gross margin for the different farms 
between the pre and post application of the Nitrates Directive. Results show the differential 
effect of the Nitrates Directive across farm types and regions. 
The analysis above outlines the effects on farm revenue of the application of the Nitrates 
Directive. The farms F3 and F5 have losses about 5% and 15 % respectively. The farm F5 
presents the highest losses because of its lowest capacity to adapt considering its high 
proportion of permanent crops (16 hectares of vineyard out of 40). However, farm F1 that 
grows only permanent crops (citrus in Valencia) shows a higher farm income after the 
application of the ND, due to the lesser dependence of citrus productions of nitrate 
fertilization as compared to horticulture crops and also due to the high level of adaptation of 
these types of specialized farms on the region of Valencia. In the vegetable farms of Castilla-
La Mancha, we can see that farm income increases in farms F2 and F4 under the Nitrates 
Directive regime, evidencing their higher adaptation capacity due to a more flexible cropping 
pattern with less proportion of permanent crops. These results show that compliance with the 
Nitrates Directive can have beneficial economic effects on certain types of farms in Spain. 
To explain the differential effects on farm income (gross margin) of the application of the 
ND, it is worth noting the following distinctions across regions and crop types (citrus vs. 
horticulture): In the citrus orchards, the gross margin is mostly affected by a reduction in 
costs. In the mixed farms in the region of Castilla La Mancha, farm income depends on the 
capacity to adapt to a new regulation by choosing different crop patterns that affect costs and 
yields242. The biggest farm (F2, 150 ha.) presents the best capacity to adapt (GMF2’/GMF2= 
1,113), and consequently profitability is higher with the application of the nitrates directive in 
comparison with the other farms. Bigger farms cultivating annual cash crops have a clear 
comparative advantage to absorb the impact of the application of an environmental regulation 
(nitrate fertilizer or water quotas) due to their flexible cropping pattern and their capacity to 
adjust it. Choosing different crops in a larger surface, selecting and adapting to changes in 
                                                 
242
 Results of the model in the region of Castilla La Mancha, has shown that changes from cereals or other 
vegetables (lesser profitable crops) into melons (higher income and costs) implied an increment in the use of 
hired labor but not necessarely an increment in nitrates dosages.  More details about changes in crop patterns and 
model results are explained in previous sections of this report (see “Assessment of the costs of compliance in 
vegetables in the region of Castilla La Mancha”). 
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resources restrictions (e.g. water, fertilizers or even financial availability), may determine a 
better resource allocation.  
GMF1’/ GMF1 = 1,010  
GMF2’/GMF2= 1,113 
GMF3’/GMF3= 0,964 
GMF4’/GMF4= 1,037  
GMF5’/GMF5= 0,845 
 
2
2 '
F
F
GM
GM
> 
4
4 '
F
F
GM
GM
 > 
1
1 '
F
F
GM
GM
 > 
3
3 '
F
F
GM
GM
 > 
5
5 '
F
F
GM
GM
 
 
The comparison of the farm profitability in the pre-standard and post-standard situation for 
each farm (GMFi’/ GMFi), allow us to compare different farms. This, in positive effect cases, 
shows the effect of the Nitrates Directive on competitiveness (F2 lower than F4, F4 lower 
than F1, etc). 
 
In order to get a better perspective on the effect on competitiveness of the application of the 
Nitrates Directive in the region of Castilla-La Mancha, we have aggregated the results to the 
irrigation zone that we have studied, that corresponds to one of the most important nitrate 
vulnerable areas in the region. This zone, located in the sub-region of La Mancha and along 
the Western La Mancha aquifer,  is one of the most relevant irrigation areas of the region, 
covering 20 irrigation communities and a total surface of 140.000 ha (mostly from 
groundwater sources), one third of the region’s total irrigation lands.  
Aggregate results are calculated as a weighted average considering the relative weight of each 
farm type in the area (sub-region of “La Mancha”): 
 
∑∑=
i j
FijAv GMGM *α   , 
i= 2 to 5 
j= 1 to 5 
 
Where jα  is the surface weight of the farm size stratum j, to which each farm Fi belongs in 
the area studied (La Mancha sub-region) 
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Table 8.24: Average Aggregated effects of the Nitrates Directive in the study area 
(Irrigation zone of the Western La Mancha aquifer) 
 Pre-Nitrates Directive situation Post-Nitrates Directive situation 
GPAv = 2820,41€/ha GPAv’ = 3493,54 €/ha 
VAv = 2016,37€/ha VAv’ = 2710,95(€/ha 
Average 
Aggregated results 
in the  irrigation 
zone of the 
Western-La Mancha 
aquifer GMAv =804,05€/ha GMAv’ = 782,58 €/ha 
 
∆AvGM =GMAv’- GMAv= -21,47 €/ha 
GMAv’/GMAv= 0,973 
The aggregate results for the irrigation zone of the Western La Mancha aquifer (main nitrates 
vulnerable area in the region of Castilla La Mancha) show an average gross margin loss of 
21,47  €/ha and a decrease of profitability of about 3%.  
8.7.2 Effects of the water conservation measures (GAEC) on 
competitiveness 
For the analysis of the effect of compliance with the water policy measures, the same 
approach has been used. The next Table 8.25 shows the comparison between the pre and post 
situation of the Water Abstraction Plan (WAP), for each farm type in the region of Castilla La 
Mancha. 
Table 8.25: Effect of the GAECs ground water policy measures at farm level 
 Pre-WAP situation Post-WAP situation 
GPF2 = 2072,07  (€/ha) GPF2’ = 1858,24 (€/ha) 
VF2 = 1446,75 (€/ha) VF2’ = 1285,20 (€/ha) F&V_F2 
GMF2 = 625,32 (€/ha) GMF2’ = 573,04 (€/ha) 
GPF3 =2745,72 (€/ha) GPF3’ = 1234,07 (€/ha) 
VF3 = 2006,29 (€/ha) VF3’ = 786,64 (€/ha) F&V_F3 
GMF3 = 739,44 (€/ha) GMF3’ = 447,43 (€/ha) 
GPF4 =1852,46 (€/ha) GPF4’ = 1852,46 (€/ha) 
VF4 = 1098,87 (€/ha) VF4’ = 1098,87 (€/ha) 
M
ix
ed
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
fa
rm
s 
F&V_F4 
GMF4 = 753,59 (€/ha) GMF4’ = 753,59 (€/ha) 
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 Pre-WAP situation Post-WAP situation 
GPF5 =4272,9 (€/ha) GPF5’ = 2566,95 (€/ha) 
VF5 = 3233,85 (€/ha) VF5’ = 1848,31 (€/ha) F&V_F5 
GMF5 = 1039,04 (€/ha) GMF5’ = 718,64 (€/ha) 
 
∆F2GM = GMF2’-GMF2= -58,28 €/ha 
∆F3GM =GMF3’-GMF3= -292,01 €/ha 
∆F4GM =GMF4’-GMF4= 0 €/ha 
∆F5GM =GMF5’-GMF5= -320,4 €/ha 
In section 8.6.3 of this chapter it was already observed that the Water Abstraction Plan 
produces a more significant effect on gross margins than the Nitrates Directive. In this case 
we can see an important impact of this measure for farms F5, F3 and also for farm F2. This 
decrease in gross margin is due first to the structure of the farm, which allows different 
degrees of adaptation, and second to the current water consumption in the farm. Some farms, 
like F4, are already complying with the WAP and therefore the measure will not have any 
impact. 
GMF2’/GMF2= 0,916 
GMF3’/GMF3= 0,605 
GMF4’/GMF4= 1 
GMF5’/GMF5= 0,692 
4
4 '
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The comparison of the farm profitability in the pre-standard and post-GAEC situation for 
each farm (GMFi’/ GMFi), shows that under the Water Abstraction Plan the effect on 
competitiveness is lower (in this case is a positive effect) for F4 than for F2, for F2 than for 
F5, and for F5 lower than for F3. Competitiveness for farm F4 does not change as this farm is 
already adapted to a lesser water consumption. In farms F3 and F5 competitiveness is 
seriously affected by this measure. These farms have a high proportion of horticultural crops, 
which are highly dependent on water, and farm F5 additionally presents a 40% surface 
cultivated with vineyards, whose profitability decreases enormously when switching from 
irrigation to rain fed conditions. 
In the same way that the results of the Nitrates Directive analysis were aggregated, the results 
for the water policy application analysis have been aggregated as well in order to get a better 
view of the global effect of the GAEC measure impact on competitiveness. 
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Table 8.26: Effects of the Water Abstraction Plan (WAP) (GAEC requirement) at farm 
level: average effects on the Western La Mancha Aquifer 
 Pre-WAP situation Post-WAP situation 
GPAv = 2820,41 €/ha GPAv’ = 1977,41 €/ha 
VAv = 2016,37 €/ha VAv’ = 1337,30 €/ha 
Average values 
for the Western 
La Mancha 
aquifer irrigated 
farms GMAv =804,05 €/ha GMAv’ = 640,11 €/ha 
 
∆AvGM =GMAv’- GMAv= -163,94 €/ha 
GMAv’/GMAv= 0,796 
 
The results for the Western La Mancha aquifer show an average gross margin loss of 163,94 
€/ha and a decrease of profitability of 20%, which must seriously decrease competitiveness 
for the mixed production farms of the region. However, as explained in section 8.6.3, these 
costs are not actually a consequence of the GAECs because it is not the GAEc which makes it 
compulsory, but the river basin´s water policy. On contrary, this GAEC requirement increases 
compliance with this water policy which is considered as a benefit of compliance. 
8.7.3 Effects of the plant protection products and food safety regulations 
on competitiveness  
Following the same methodology described in the past section, we outlined changes in 
variable costs, gross product (through yield losses) or gross margin, at the farm level in those 
type farms for which we had enough detailed information.  
As seen in previous section, regulation about pesticides is complex. Regulations affect 
pesticides commercialization and consequently plant protection products available for 
growers in the local market. Maximum residues allowed and GAECs about products 
application techniques determine some restrictions imposed to farmers. In the region of 
Valencia, voluntary certification schemes like ICM and EUREPGAP (see previous sections) 
have been used extensively during last decades. These certification systems include 
cultivation methods that are compatible with GAECs and all European directives related with 
farming methods and food production.  
In order to assess competitiveness in citrus production in Valencia, two farm types are used as 
described in costs assessment in previous sections. Then, we used EUREPGAP cultivation 
methods to describe a situation in which all GAECs about pesticides regulations and cross-
compliance restrictions are covered. Analysis for F&V_1 has been done by using information 
from Table 8.14 in previous sections (Peris Moll and Juliá Igual, 2005). 
Following the example used in Table 8.14, about costs comparison between EUREPGAP 
certified orange orchards and a conventional orange grove in the region of Valencia, Table 
8.27 shows a pre-standard situation as the conventional cultivation methods, and a post-
standard situation as the certified EUREPGAP orchard. 
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Table 8.27: Selection of regions, products, Cross Compliance policy issues and 
methodology 
 Pre-standards situation Post-standards situation 
GPF1 = 3960 (€/ha) 
 
GPF1’ = 2990 (€/ha) 
 
VF1 = 2748,51 VF1’ = 1628,15 (€/ha) F&V_F1 
GMF1 = 1211,49 (€/ha) GMF1’ = 1361,85 (€/ha) 
 
∆F1GM = GMF1’-GMF1= 150,36 (€/ha) 
GMF1’/ GMF1 = 1,124  
As shown in Table 8.14 (see previous sections), the certified production scheme, implies less 
yield, less costs and premium prices as well. Differences found in Table 8.27 in gross 
products (more than 150€ in gross margin in the certified scheme) are smaller than the 
differences in variable costs between years.  
Although there are no premium prices for cross compliance measures, differences in variable 
costs, yields and price per kg are clear evidence that alternative cultivation methods are 
available for growers and might be used successfully. Additionally, it could be expected that a 
considerable number of farmers would be encouraged to change towards integrated pest 
management certification schemes, such as EUREPGAP, for citrus orchards in the future243. 
In this regard, it could be expected that cross compliance might induce an increase in 
competitiveness not only due to an increment in gross margin, but also to positive potential 
changes towards a better quality certified product.  
 
8.8 Comparative overview with the United States F&V sector 
The following section includes a brief overview comparison of the US and EU F&V sectors. 
Discussion follows on the US environmental regulations that affect the F&V sector in 
comparison with the Spanish F&V sector. Focus is on tomatoes and citrus production.  
In Annex,  section 6, the US report on F&V sector, the case studies of citrus and tomato 
industries consider state assessments and permits that determine low effects on the growers’ 
budget (in some cases 3%). The approach used in the Spanish case studies for the assessment 
of the costs of compliance, is focused on pesticides, nitrates and water directives. 
8.8.1 Tomatoes production and Methyl bromide  
Methyl bromide is a very toxic biocide extensively used in agriculture and food storage. Its 
main compounds affect severely the ozone layer. World-wide consumption of methyl bromide 
grew from 16,000 tons in 1975 to 42,000 tons in 1984 and 73,000 tons in 1993 (Miller 1996).  
                                                 
243
 Compliance with Nitrogen directive or more controls on pesticides in order to attain to GAECs and SMR 
might induce famers to consider ICMs Protocol and its benefits. 
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The US and European horticulture used this product during last decades. In 1995, developed 
countries froze their consumption of methyl bromide at 1991 levels and have agreed to a 
schedule of a reduction of 100% by 2005 (US Federal Register, 2000). In Europe, legislation 
on Methyl Bromide began with CEC 2037/2000 as a consequence of the Montreal agreement 
in 1997. These regulations act on trading, pre-shipping and commercialization standards 
defining quarantine treatments, defining periods for pest treatments on products, categorizing 
and enlisting pests and products and citing exceptions.  
Spanish MeBr consumption was important in horticulture (around 4,000tns in 1996) but only 
5% of this product was used for pest control in tomatoes. (875 hectares were fumigated with 
215 tns on 9000 hectares of this crop by 1998).  In Spain other crops such as strawberries or 
peppers used to be more important consumers of BrMt, accounting for about 60% of total 
BrMt consumption by 1997 (Bello et al., 2001). In the regions of Canarias, Murcia, Valencia 
and Andalusia several alternatives in tomatoes have been successfullyused used during the 
last decade. For instance, in the region of Canarias (1446 hectares with tomatoes in 1998) and 
Extremadura (16327 hectares the same year) bromide methyl phaseout was 100% with high 
yields (63MT/ha under normal cropping conditions and 96MT/ha in glasshouses). In Murcia 
and Andalusia, the use of bromide methyl was less than 3% and only the Baleares islands 
used bromide methyl in about 11% of tomato surface.  
Three explanations have been given as reasons why MB is not used for tomato production in 
Spain (Tello, 2002): 
• Small number of pathogens causes relevant losses in Spanish tomato crops.  
• Stability of the genes resistant to the fungus “Fusarium sp.”  
• Alternative control techniques based on bio-spraying, alone or combined with 
solarization, as the use of nematicides developed in Spain, have demonstrated their 
utility and cost effectiveness when correctly applied.  
 
Section 7 in Annex, suggests that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates 
about 56$/acre (97.21€/ha) as the extra costs of Californian tomatoes growers for replacing 
this method with other same effective methods for pest controls. Spanish growers have 
alternative methods that have not evidenced negative effects on yields.  In the US study of the 
vegetable sector, this would be probably the most important environmental regulation 
affecting costs (total expenses are about 4,852 U$D per acre then environmental regulations -
56$/acre in this case- would represent about 1,2% of total operational costs). It is remarkable 
that the EPA calculation on Bromide Methyl, is 4% losses (10-20% in strawberries), for the 
same effect with an alternative method (fumigation, other pesticide, etc.). EPA does not 
inform about yield losses or changes in gross margins.  
Several projects were undertaken in the Mediterranean coast of Spain (Valencia and Murcia) 
to evaluate the cost of products and alternatives to methyl bromide on crops such as citrus, 
open-air horticulture, strawberry, and greenhouse-grown pepper. Telone (1,3-dichloropropene 
with chloropicrin) gave the most consistent and reliable results (Caballero et al., 2002a). 
There is an important developing interest in solarization, particularly when combined with 
chemical or bio-spraying at low dose (Caballero et al., 2002b) that result in similar costs and 
gross margin. 
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8.8.2 Citrus in Southern Florida  and in the region of Valencia 
According to the US contribution (in section 7 of Annex), citrus production in Florida is more 
affected by diseases and climate conditions than in the region of Valencia in Spain. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, there are slight or null changes in variable costs or 
competitiveness in citrus orchards in the latter region. When applying certified schemes, such 
as integrated pest management or EUREPGAP, incidence on costs remained constant or 
decreased.  
Regulatory costs, citrus canker protocols and other expenses, represent 32,74U$ for citrus 
growers in Florida (US). This is about 4% of total expenses in groves calculated by the 
Florida Cooperative Extension Service (Muraro et al., 2004). Nevertheless, this approach 
should be considered carefully because fruit production has an enourmous variation within 
practices. Weed and pest management might determine variations in costs and margins of 
about 100 U$/acre, which is more expensive than regulatory costs. Other methods, using farm 
level analysis and statistical data, should be added in further studies in order to determine the 
exact benefits or costs that this regulatory context produce on Flordia growers’ productivity 
and competitiveness. 
Spanish citrus problems are quite different from those affecting productivity in Southwestern 
Florida. In the EU, the F&V CMO is being reformed and cooperative and producers 
organizations are being encouraged to change into a more competitive performance. However, 
policy measures tending to enhance farmers are required in order to improve managerial skills 
and the efficiency of external service firms and co-operatives (Picazo and Reig, 2006).  
In the context of the CMO reform of F&V, the importance of implementing new protocols 
like Integrated Crop Management, and expanding new markets seems to be the key issue for 
citrus production. New markets, traceability and a more efficient use of resources seem to be 
acting together in these new integrated pest management visions.  
 
8.9 Concluding reflections for the Fruits and Vegetables sector  
  
Overall remarks: The results of this study suggest that, in general terms, the cost of 
compliance with the environmental regulations for the fruits and vegetables sector in 
Spain would be probably slight (or even none or beneficial in some specific cases).  It has 
to be noted, however, that due to the limitations of the study, not all the fruits and 
vegetables production regions have been considered and, therefore, these general 
conclusions may differ across regions, farming systems and types of farms. 
 
Cost of compliance in Citrus productions: In highly productive areas of single-crop 
productions, such as the citrus groves of the region of Valencia, the assessment of the cost 
of compliance for pesticides and nitrates show that benefits of compliance might be 
possible. In these farms, most products banned by European legislations or its Spanish 
transpositions have an alternative method that is not necessarily associated to a higher cost 
at farm level. Special cultivation methods applied during the last years for pest 
management have a clear improvement in pest control efficiency without almost any extra 
cost, even if products have evolved into solutions that are more specific.   
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In the case of the cost of compliance of GAECs related to pesticides and food safety at 
farm level, certified schemes like EUREPGAP could have a potential increase in the 
farms’ gross margin. The application of this farming methods derive into lesser costs, 
lesser yields and slight increments in gross product since premium prices take place. 
 
Cost of compliance in Horticulture production : The analysis of the impact of 
compliance with the Nitrates Directive on vegetable crops in the region of Castilla La 
Mancha showed that the cost of compliance (measured as income loss) at farm level 
varies depending on farm types ad adaptive capacity of farmers to face the regulations. 
When farmer’s adaptation ability is low (i.e. changes in cropping patterns are not easily 
preformed) the most vulnerable farmers account for income losses around 15%. These 
results were validated by fieldwork data and interviews to farmers and experts in the area 
of study. Nevertheless, when farmers adjust the cropping pattern to comply with the ND 
(by changing to less nitrate-demanding crops and reducing the extended over-fertilizations 
practices) income loss is low and, in some cases, it may even increase, evidencing a clear 
benefit of the compliance measure.  
 
Competitiveness at farm level: Our analysis of short-term competitiveness at farm level 
indicates that the effects of the nitrate directive on competitiveness of citrus production 
might be null or even positive. In this regard, nitrogen changes due to legislation 
determine on citrus orchards in Valencia result in the same yields with lower dosages 
(according to literature and experts consulted); this is in fact a benefit of cross compliance 
(cost reduction). Growers tend to use nitrate fertilizers exceeding the maximum permitted 
dosage. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in yield decreases when fertilization is reduced 
to the directive’s limits. In consequence, production costs decrease and gross margins in 
citrus production might increase slightly. 
 
In the case of the mixed vegetable farms of the region of Castilla-La Mancha, the effects 
of the application of the Nitrates Directive on the overall competitiveness of the region’s 
farms varies across farm types. Farms with a fixed cropping pattern have a lower capacity 
to adjust and therefore competitiveness is lower when the ND is enforced (85%). 
Conversely, larger farms cultivating annual cash crops have a clear comparative 
advantage to absorb the impact of the application of an environmental regulation (nitrate 
fertilizer or water quotas) due to their capacity to adjust their cropping mix. Therefore 
profitability can be higher when complying with the Nitrates Directive and in turn 
competitiveness increases (up to 111 %) , evidencing that compliance can have beneficial  
effects on certain types of farms in Spain. 
Regarding the effects of the water conservation measures (GAEC) on competitiveness, 
results indicate that the water quotas established by the region’s Water Abstraction Plan 
have a significantly larger impact on farm profitability than the Nitrates Directive. 
Aggregate average loss in profitability is 20% as compared to a 3% in the case of the ND. 
Consequently, the average competitiveness in the case of compliance with the water 
conservation measure is 79% and for the Nitrates Directive is 97%. 
Policy synergies: GAECs related to water use: In relation to compliance with the water 
use limitations (GAECs in the Spanish legislation) the results of the analysis show that 
farm income is much more sensitive to water restrictions than to nitrogen restrictions, 
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being water the most limiting factor for horticulture production in this regions as well as 
in other Mediterranean regions. However, it is important to emphasize the important role 
of the synergies between water and agricultural policies. In this area of Spain, water use 
limitations is promoting the substitution of water demanding crops with less water 
intensive crops which require also lower nitrogen dosages. 
 
Policy reform: Cross Compliance effects and the reform of the F&V CMO: In the 
context of the new F&V CMO reform, cross compliance will be a crucial research and it 
will be required to conduct further analysis for assessing the cost of compliance on the 
F&V sector. In this changing scenario, implications on the fruit and vegetable market are 
presumed to be considerably important. 
As the land cropped under fruits and vegetables will be eligible for the Single Farm 
Payment, it is expected that mixed-production farms that combine vegetable productions 
with COP products (as in the region of Castilla-La Mancha), will increase the surface 
dedicated to vegetables. In consequence, increased supply may induce a product price 
reduction and a derived fall in farm profitability and competitiveness. 
In the areas of specialized-production farms (such as the orange groves of Valencia, the 
open-air vegetable productions of Murcia or the extended greenhouse and plastic-covered 
productions of Almeria), the effect will be very different as these farms are not subject to 
the SFP structure. Alongside, new protocols and regulations as the Integrated Crop 
Management practices would determine higher profitability in the medium and long run 
because there would probably be important effects on risk reductions on revenue and 
possibly new marketing advantages under price premium. 
Additionally, producers’ organizations in Spain have complained about the CMO reform 
affecting processed F&V (especially citrus in the region of Valencia) claiming that the 
application of the single farm payment will destabilize fresh fruits and vegetables markets. 
 
Cross Compliance and world market competitiveness: Regarding the F&V sector, US 
and Europe have important challenges due to changes in the international scenario (new 
market agreements, environmental restrictions, farm policies, etc.).  
Input use ruled by European environmental policies like the Nitrates Directive and 
pesticides authorization measures, would probably determine improvements and quality 
differentiation for Spanish F&V products in the world market.  In addition, an 
improvement on competitiveness of F&V in Spain in more standardized production 
patterns might be expected soon.  
EUREPGAP and other certification schemes which consider new technologies and 
improved knowledge on integrated pest management would increase their relevance 
because of new environmental restrictions, reinforcing the competitiveness of this sector 
without clear decreases in operational costs, and even premium prices in some cases. 
Citrus and tomatoes are both main products in the Spanish and US F&V sectors and might 
have changes in competitiveness as new restrictions are taking place. In the context of 
OCM of F&V sector in Spain, and considering the potential markets represented by US 
(and Japan), exported tomatoes and citrus might have gains in profitability for growers. 
The comparative analysis between the US and the Spanish F&V sectors, has given an idea 
about the total costs of compliance with regulations in both case studies (citrus and 
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tomatoes). Thus, regulations concerning methyl bromide phaseout in the citrus industry in 
US seem to represent less than 2% of total operational costs. In the case of tomatoes, 
regulations, environmental assessments and other costs of compliance represent about 
0,27% of total costs (see section 6.3 in Annex to this report in a separate document). Other 
regulatory costs, state assessments and environmental permits for citrus, account for about 
4% of total farm expenses in Florida citrus industry, but yearly variations on cultivation 
methods and practices among growers are considerably higher, determining that these 
regulatory costs might be marginal as well.  
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9  The olive sector  
9.1 Introduction 
9.1.1 Scope and Contents 
This chapter focuses on the analysis and assessment of the effects that cross compliance 
programs have on the olive sector.  The analysis is focused on Spanish agriculture as the main 
producer and exporter of olive oil in the world. The olive sector in Spain is characterized by a 
large surface with small units and mainly rain fed conditions. The main production area is 
located in the region of Andalusia, where the most important environmental concern is 
erosion. This report includes different methodologies to evaluate the cost of compliance with 
the legal framework in the selected region. 
The chapter has a similar structure than the previous one on fruits and vegetables. The first 
part includes an introduction with a brief summary of the methodology used and the selection 
of regions and policy measures that have been analyzed. Focus is on the impacts at farm level 
of GAECs, specifically of the requirements on erosion control and soil maintenance.  
9.1.2 Compliance and competitiveness 
Different methodological approaches have been used to address the link of the costs of 
compliance with the competitiveness of the olive oil sector on the world market. As in the 
case of the fruits and vegetables sector, the olive sector characteristics make it innadequate to 
be analyzed with GTAP. In consequence, other methodological approaches that are closer to 
the farm-level structure have been used to address competitiveness issues. 
Following the analysis of competitiveness of D12, the sets of key conditions to address 
competitiveness are, namely, initial, industry, institutional and macroeconomic conditions. 
The analysis of the olive oil sector has been based mainly on the two following conditions:    
• Initial conditions: farm type, farm size, farming intensity, farm localization, (field 
topology, soil, agro-climatic conditions, proximity to water sources, local environment 
pressure, etc.). 
• Institutional conditions: implementation and enforcement of legislation 
9.1.3 General Methodological Framework 
Following the same criteria described in the chapter of fruits and vegetables, the general 
methodology developed in this study was: 
 
(i) Selection of the regions, sub-regions, agronomic areas and municipalities 
(counties) that represent the agricultural production systems of the Spanish olive 
sector. 
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(ii) Selection of the most relevant cross-compliance policy measures, SMR and 
GAECs. 
(iii) Selection of representative farms within the study regions that will allow the 
analysis of cost structure at farm level 
(iv) Assessment of compliance costs in the pre- and post establishment of the selected 
SMR and GAECs regulations 
(v) Analysis of competitiveness and policy standards at farm level 
 
The analysis focuses on GAECs regulations related to erosion and soil management 
requirements in slope agriculture, which is mentioned as 70% (Pastor et al., 1997) of olive 
farms in Spain. Compliance with these regulations can have an effect on farm income 
(through lower yields) and also an increase on specific farm costs when adapting agricultural 
practices and tillage operations, such as pesticides, fertilization applications or soil 
maintenance (terraces, grass strips, etc) is needed. These changes are evaluated to assess their 
effects on farm costs and on the overall farm income.  
Other studies should also consider flat areas and compliance with the nitrates directive, but 
we have not considered it in this chapter, since there are not strong evidences of nitrate 
pollution or exceeding the nitrate directive dosages when consulting literature and experts on 
the Spanish olive sector. 
Table 9.1: Selection of regions, products, Cross Compliance policy issues and 
methodology 
REGION PRODUCT CC POLICY ISSUE METHODOLOGY 
Region of 
Andalusia Olive oil 
GAECs:  
• Erosion 
• Soil organic 
matter 
• Soil structure 
• Representative farms 
• Cost structure 
 
9.2 The Olive sector: market and trade  
9.2.1 Olives in Europe and the world 
Olive oil is a very versatile product. Long known to many generations in the Mediterranean 
world as essential to their health and diet, it is now widely appreciated in Europe and around 
the world for its nutritional, health and sensory properties. The European Union is the leading 
world producer, accounting for 80 % and consuming 70 % of the world’s olive oil. Given its 
importance to the economies of many regions, demand is steadily increasing both in the EU 
and in third countries, helped by information and promotional campaigns supported by the 
Union and others. The main aim of the EU olive oil policy is to maintain and strengthen its 
position in world markets by encouraging production of a high-quality product for the benefit 
of growers, processors, traders and consumers. 
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Olive cultivation is widespread throughout the Mediterranean region and it is important for 
the rural economy, local heritage and the environment. In 2000, the area under olive groves in 
the EU was approximately 5 163 000 hectares (EC, 2003), roughly 4% of the utilizable 
agricultural area, of which 48 % were in Spain and 22.5 % were in Italy. Approximately 2.5 
million producers — about one third of all EU farmers — are involved, with 1 160 000 in 
Italy, 840 000 in Greece, 380 000 in Spain, and 130 000 in Portugal. France, the fifth 
producing country in the EU, has a much smaller number of growers. Olive production is the 
main source of employment and economic activity in many producing regions, and it has 
shaped the landscape in these countries over many centuries. 
The fact that the EU is self-sufficient does not preclude it from trading olive oil. Imports in 
2000/01 from third countries (mostly in bulk) were 127 000 tonnes, while EU exports reached 
290 000 tonnes, the main destinations being the United States of America, Japan, Canada and 
Australia. EU olive oil exports tend to be in bottled form. 
The sector consists of growers, cooperatives, pressing mills, refiners, blenders, and companies 
involved in various aspects of marketing. Three broad types of production can be 
distinguished: traditional groves, often of ancient olive trees; more intensive traditional groves 
involving a higher use of inputs; and intensive, modern, farms using more mechanisation and 
other technologies including irrigation. This mix of ancient and modern explains the differing 
farm sizes, ownership characteristics and processing structures that exist within the EU. 
Likewise, large differences in production systems occur within each producing region. The 
average holding size is as low as 1 hectare in, for example, Italy, though olive holdings in 
Spain are larger (6 hectares on average). 
9.2.2 Olive production in Spain 
Spain has 2,4 million hectares of olive trees under cultivation, which ranks it as the top 
producer and exporter of olive oil in the world (around 30%). By comparison, Italy, the 
second ranked producer has about 0,8 - 1 million hectares. Although Spanish olive area has 
been steadily declining since 1960’s, new plantings in recent years have altered the trend, 
particularly in Andalusia region, which produces approximately 75% of Spain’s olive oil. Due 
to the gradual replacement of older low-producing orchards with higher density and higher 
productivity orchards, average production per hectare has been rising. 
Oil production has also risen during the same period to just over 655,000 metric tons in 
1996/1997. Production is highly influenced by seasonal rainfall (most orchards are not 
irrigated) and alternate bearing (low yields followed by higher yields due to the influence of 
crop on the next year’s production). World production is approximately 2,000,000 tons per 
year, valued at 1,7 billion (US$). 
Spanish exports are 40% of total production but depending on years, exports might vary 
between 30% and 50%. European countries are main destination for this production: for 
example in 1997/1998 429.000 t where produced and 352.800 t where exported to the EU and 
76.200 to third countries. Third countries exports are about 50.000 and 100.000 tons in the 
best cases. Main export destinations in 2001/02 were United States (32.677 t), Australia 
(13.304 t), Japan (11.803 t), Mexico (5.332), Brazil (4.729 t), Russia (3.106 t) and Canada 
(2.397 t).  
Inside the European Union, main destinations in 2001/02 were Italy (328.083 t), France 
(71.524 t), Portugal (54.047 t), UK (18.733 t), Belgium (5.617 t) and Germany (3.774 t). 
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Main competitors of Spanish production are mainly in the pan-European zones. Thus, the rest 
of oil production in the world is produced by Italy (21%), Greece (12,8%), Tunisia (6,3%), 
Syria (3,8%), Morocco (2,8%), Turkey (2,1%), Portugal (1,3) and Argentina (0,8%). 
The olive sector has two different sub-sectors highly differentiated in its uses. However both 
uses are together in many farms, and this is why for many aspects of this analysis both uses 
will be treated together. 
In 2003 the surface of Olive trees in Spain was 2.439.582 hectares being widely spread in 
most of the national territory. However, as it is shown in the Table 9.2 below, the olive area is 
mainly concentrated in the region of Andalusia (61,4% of total olive area), and the second 
most important area is the region of Castilla La Mancha. In terms of production, the region of 
Andalusia is again the most important area with a 82,9% of the total Spanish production (of 
olives), followed by The region of Castilla-La Mancha (6,43). 
Table 9.2: Olive surface and production by Autonomous Regions, 2003  
Autonomous Regions Surface (ha) Surface % Production (t) Production % 
 GALICIA 10 0,00 0 0,00 
 PAÍS VASCO 92 0,00 642 0,01 
 NAVARRA 4790 0,20 11166 0,15 
 LA RIOJA 3827 0,16 7281 0,10 
 ARAGÓN 52936 2,17 72397 0,96 
 CATALUÑA 122531 5,02 141797 1,88 
 BALEARES 8200 0,34 594 0,01 
 CASTILLA Y LEÓN 7052 0,29 15618 0,21 
 MADRID 25414 1,04 26009 0,34 
 CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 335698 13,76 485900 6,43 
 C. VALENCIANA 100951 4,14 123741 1,64 
 R. DE MURCIA 22821 0,94 27318 0,36 
 EXTREMADURA 261200 10,71 378997 5,02 
 ANDALUSIA 1.494.048 61,24 6261780 82,90 
 CANARIAS 12 0,00 326 0,00 
 SPAIN 2.439.582 100,00 7553566 100 
Source: MAPA, 2003 
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Figure 9.1: Relative weight (%) of each Autonomous Region for the Olive sector in Spain 
 
Source: MAPA, 2003 
In the graph above the difference between importance in olive area and olive production 
highlights the difference in agriculture orientations in the different regions. The autonomous 
region of Andalusia has a more business-oriented agriculture while the region of Castilla-La 
Mancha has more family farm oriented agriculture. 
The study of the olive sector and of how cross-compliance affects costs of production and 
consequently competitiveness will focus mainly in the region of Andalusia. 
9.2.3 Single Farm Payment in the Spanish Olive sector 
The 2003 reform of the CAP has introduced a new system of single farm payments244 (income 
support, SFP) and interrupted the link between support and production (decoupling). Most 
Common Market organisations (OCMs) became subject to this system in 2005 and 2006 (with 
the exception of the new Member States). Existing direct aids may be continued until 2012, 
subject to cross-compliance conditions, but they will be gradually reduced. 
Olive production has been regulated in order to have a partial decoupling application of aids 
(minimum decoupling rate of 60%). 
During 2006, Olive farmers in Spain have started to apply for the Single Farm Payment and 
the local governments begun to designate rights for olive areas under certain conditions. The 
following section considers some issues and features of the SFP in Spain in the Olive sector, 
using current legislation. 
9.2.3.1 Structure of Coupled/decoupled payments in Olive  
Aids have been changed from a coupled form into a decoupled form. 2006 has been the first 
year for the application of single farm payments (SFP) in Spanish olive production.  The 
                                                 
244
 CEE 1782/2003 
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application and aids distribution is being carried out on each regional government 
(autonomous regions) by the local administration: e.g. “Junta de Andalusia” (Andalusia 
regional government) and it is regulated as follows: 
• 95% of the aids have been decoupled in a SFP (100% when farm total surface is lesser 
than 0,3 hectares) 
• The other 5% of amounts are applied as a coupled aid by surface. This amount 
depends on olive categories established. The average value is 52,8 € per hectare and 
might be increased applying a factor of 1,5 when farms are located in municipalities 
with more than 80% of olives in the total agrarian surface.   
 
SFP happen after the period considered. For example, 2006 payments have taken place from 
1st January to June 30th 2007; delays in payments cannot occur after September of 2007. 
The autonomous regions designate and distribute coupled payments in Olive production in 
about 103 millions of €. Five categories of Olive production schemes and features are 
defined: 
a) Olive orchards in main production areas, where the zone is absolutely dependent on 
this crop (80 % or more surface of the total ploughed surface). These cases receive 1.5 
more of aids applied to the rest of the territory. 
b) Old olive orchards with cultural or landscape value or on terraces 
c) Olive orchards in highly constraint areas such as strong slopes, low rain, etc. 
d) Olive with high risk of abandonment. 
e) Ecologic olive orchards and those integrated in quality as “Protected designation of 
origin245” 
 
Modulation 
In Spain, the modulation of aids started in 2005. The modulation is obligatory from 2005 until 
2012. In 2005 this value is 3% of total aids, and in 2006 is 4%. From 2007 until 2012 this 
retention will be 5%. The amount retained in the first 5000 euros is going to be refunded to 
farmers as an additional aid amount, linked to rural development or agri-environmental 
programmes.  
9.2.3.2 Reference period, amounts and calculations 
In olive production, the historical procedures for calculation of farmer’s rights had been 
taking into account 1999/2000, 2000/2001, 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 campaigns with some 
exemptions246.  
In olive production, the reference amount is the average calculated from the past 4 year’s 
payments received by farmers. The next Table 9.3 considers an olive farm in Andalusia for 
SFP calculation from a 4 year’s reference period: 
                                                 
245
 For more details see: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/foodqual/quali1_en.htm  
246
 When farmers had initiated their farming activities during the years happened on the reference period, and 
then the reference becomes dependent only on the years or years they had started. Also some considerations had 
been done when extraordinary events taken place during the years of the reference period. 
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Table 9.3: Single Farm Payment calculation for olive farms in Spain 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average 
Surface (has) 5 5,2 5,1 5,3 5,15 
Oil Production (kg) 2500 2600 3060 2915 2769 
Aid Amount (€/kg) 1,3040 0,9391 0,6375 0,9192 
 
Amounts (€) 3260 2442 1951 1679 2583 
Reference Amount (€): 2583 x 0,95 2454 
Source: Junta de Andalucía, 2006. 
The number of rights is defined using the average number of hectares that have been receiving 
payments during the reference period. The value of these rights is equal to the reference 
amount divided by the number of hectares. For the previous example the number of rights is 
equal to 5.15 (equal to the average number of hectares during the reference period), and the 
value of each right will be the result of dividing the reference amount (2454) by the number 
of rights (5.15):  476.47 €/right 
9.2.3.3 Rights  
For the use of rights in order to obtain the SFP, all farmers should: 
• Activate the rights through sending a proper payment application 
• Declare the number of admissible hectares as rights 
• Comply with Cross Compliance regulations 
Olive farms surface planted before May 1st 1998 are admissible for the Single Farm Payments 
as new substituted olive plantations registered in the geographical information system. 
Those areas designated for other purposes are not admissible surfaces (e.g.: Horticulture, 
other permanent crops, forests and not agrarian activities). 
Rights might be administrated as they can be lost when not using them in a period of 3 years 
after received or those rights obtained from the national reserve that have not been used in 5 
years. 
Rights trade is allowed and administrated by each autonomous region in Spain.  
9.2.3.4 Cross compliance controls and non-fulfilment 
In Spain, the Royal Decree 1617/2005 established the terms for rights and concessions for 
farmers in the Single Payment Scheme. Additionally, in 2004 the Royal Decree 2128/2004 
established a geographical information system for agricultural surface identification 
(SIGPAC247). The last decree has: a) defined the national and local authorities for its 
administration, b) established its application from Jan 1st 2005, c) set the complete 
information for parcels identification and d) give competence to autonomous regional 
governments to regulate its application with farmers. The use of SIGPAC in Andalusia started 
in 2005 and single farm payment applications have started during 2006. Thus, the Agriculture 
                                                 
247
 SIGPAC: Sistema de informacion geografica de parcelas agrícolas (geographical information system for 
agricultural plot). 
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Ministry has developed a Cross-Compliance Control Plan for the surveillance measures 
concerning SMR and GAECs.  
The national authority responsible for the implementation of controls is FEGA (Spanish Fund 
for Agrarian Guarantee). In the region of Andalusia, the “Dirección General del Fondo 
Andaluz de Garantía Agraria” is the competent autorithy for farmers identification, aid 
applications, control surveillance and their resolution and aprovement (BOJA, 2005). 
Controls must be done in a 1% of total growers in Andalucia and legislation considers non-
fulfilment procedures for those growers that asked for the payments but do not comply with 
cross-compliance measures. In the case on the region of Andalucia, two different institutions 
designated by the autonomic government carry out controls and apply reductions on aids 
depending on compliance. 
The Autonomic legislation on aids and SFP, estipulate all procedures for the farmers’ request 
of payments and also establishes controls that must be done to olive growers (BOJA, 2005). 
In this regard, local institutions, associations or companies designated by the regional 
administration and FEGA must regulate controls to farmers that are eligible for the SFP and 
outline a complete report to the national authority. The legislation also details all the 
documentation needed by farmers in order to declare surface under olive production, 
production quantities to be delivered to the cooperatives, etc. (MAPA, 2007) 
There is also a score system obtained from compliance and severity of non-fulfilment forseen 
by the legislation. Different degrees of severeness are calculated from compliance levels 
(ranked as A, B or C). Multiplying by a coefficient (A (slight)=1, B (severe)=1.2 and C 
(highly severe)=1.5) aids reduction are calculated. These degrees depend on the persistence of 
the non-fulfillment, the number of regulations that the owner has not complied and the 
possible damages of non-fulfilment for other properties (CEC 796/2004248).  
For instance, in the case of olive groves in Andalucia and soil erosion measures, non 
compliance with GAECs on soil covers might be C if non-fulfilment takes place in a 
designated highly erodable area. The same is in the case of lands that are not allowed to be 
ploughed because of having more than 15% of slope. With a complete report and information 
regarding all measures fulfillment in the property (including other regulations as proper 
documentations), aid reduction is calculated. This may result in 1, 3 or 5% (BOJA 115, 2005) 
reduction. 
9.3 Generalities about farm typologies in Spanish olive farms 
The main characteristics of the Spanish olive sector are its traditional features and the very 
large size of the production area. It is located in 34 provinces from different autonomous 
regions (e.g. Andalusia region). Thus, there are diverse farming typologies with different farm 
practices and methods. During the last years, intensification is increasing through the 
introduction of technology and irrigation in the olive groves, however the rain fed olive grove 
is the most representative farm typology.  
                                                 
248
 Commission Regulation 796/2004 establishes the application provisions of cross compliance, modulation and 
an integrated system of management and control 
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9.3.1 Regions  
The Spanish olive sector has in most of its area a traditional character. Olive farms are very 
heterogeneous as it is common in most of the Spanish territory, but extensive farming prevails 
over the intensive one. However, in terms of production, it is mainly concentrated in the 
region of Andalusia where farming is more intensive. 
Table 9.4: Spanish olive farms and surface under production: rain fed and irrigated 
types.  
Total Rain fed Irrigated
Numer of Farms Has Numer of Farms Has Numer of Farms Has
Andalucía 243867 1426505 203563 1110039 69555 316466
Balears (Illes) 2520 8371 2417 8255 110 117
Canarias 202 23 66 6 137 17
Castilla y León 9710 6536 9570 6423 240 113
Castilla-La Mancha 111010 312971 107507 292035 7355 20935
Cataluña 34040 102781 28230 88866 8565 13915
Comunidad Valenciana 72821 89636 63614 80673 15169 8963
Extremadura 70283 223123 69173 212370 2122 10753
Galicia 236 23 229 21 7 1
Autonomous region of Madrid 8021 23103 7970 22719 88 384
Region of Murcia 14662 22691 8020 14523 7731 8169
País Vasco 414 195 381 182 37 13
Rioja (La) 3828 2488 2966 1598 1131 890
Ceuta .. .. .. .. .. ..
Melilla 6 11 5 11 2 0
 
Source: INE, 1999 
Regarding farm typologies, Andalusian olive groves should be considered as most 
representative because of its proportional production inside the national territory.  
Table 9.5: Irrigation methods for olive groves in Spain by regions (2005) 
CC.AA Gravity Sprinkler Dripping Others TOTAL
Pais Vasco 0 42 39 0 81
Navarra 1829 0 144 0 1973
La Rioja 228 35 992 10 1265
Aragon 4963 6 3123 0 8092
Cataluña 1156 20 14123 0 15299
Baleares 5 0 551 0 556
Castilla y Leon 125 0 671 0 796
Madrid 31 0 0 0 31
Castilla La Mancha 481 1768 37058 0 39306
C.valenciana 3598 221 5464 13 9295
R. de Murcia 1441 0 4728 30 6200
Extremadura 422 42 13110 0 13574
Andalucia 26114 2104 385932 4851 419001
SPAIN 40393 4237 465933 4904 515467
 
Source: ESYRCE (2005) 
 
In the next Table 9.6, some economic features and farm typologies in different regions of 
Spain are described. 
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Table 9.6: 1999-2001 Average results from Farm Accountancy Data Network in Spanish 
Olive groves by main production regions 
1999-2001 average Results (€/ha) Andalucia Aragon Castilla La Mancha Extremadura
Average area by farm (ha) 34,29 4,58 2,67 14,13
Production (Kg/ha) 3.460 1.124 1.069 1.374
Product value 1.907 747 644 714
Income 1.215 459 416 427
Subsidies 692 288 228 288
Direct costs 181 60 53 26
Gross Standarized Margin 1.726 687 591 688
Machinery and labor costs 440 91 100 240
Gross Margin 1.286 596 491 448
Indirect costs paid 119 48 53 82
Revenue 1.167 548 438 366
Amortizations 121 86 50 64
Net Margin 1.046 462 388 302
 
Source: Data from “Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN)”, cited at Libro Blanco de la 
Agricultura (available at: www.libroblancoagricultura.com).  
The analysis of the distribution of surface and number of farms by farm strata in the olive 
farms in Spain shows that 85% of farms are smaller than 5 hectares and olive trees are grown 
in farms smaller than 2 hectares. Rain fed average farms are bigger (3,58 has) than irrigated 
farms (3,16 has). In the region of Andalusia the average rain fed olive farm has 5,22 has (data 
from the last Agrarian Census in 1999). Although rain fed olive groves are more 
representative, irrigated olive groves are increasing in number, shifting from a 5% in 1989 to 
a 22% in 1999. 
Next Table 9.7 shows the number of farms and surface by farm size strata in the region of 
Andalusia. 
Table 9.7: Olive farms and surface by farm size strata in the region of Andalusia 
  
Number of 
farms 
Number of 
farms  % 
Accumulated % 
(number farms) Surface (ha) Surface % 
Farm strata (ha) 171149    100,00 - 1377382 100,00 
< 1  1419 0,83 0,83 397 0,03 
1  a < 2 40475 23,65 24,48 49456 3,59 
2 a < 5 58409 34,13 58,61 163651 11,88 
5 a <  10 31052 18,14 76,75 175768 12,76 
10 a < 20 19257 11,25 88,00 201377 14,62 
20 a < 30 6537 3,82 91,82 112124 8,14 
30 a < 50 6017 3,52 95,34 159111 11,55 
50 a < 100 4310 2,52 97,85 164132 11,92 
>=100 3671 2,14 100,00 351366 25,51 
Source: INE, 1999 
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Table 9.8: Analysis of olive surface and production by province in Andalusia region 
 Area in production 
Province Rain fed (ha) Irrigated (ha) Total (ha) 
Total 
Production 
(olives) (Tm) 
Almería 5925 9575 15500 52865 
Cádiz 18100 1275 19375 35498 
Córdoba 318376 21689 340065 1540185 
Granada 126384 38863 165247 513964 
Huelva 24831 3821 28652 30270 
Jaén 389698 173977 563675 2920492 
Málaga 111166 7490 118656 434781 
Sevilla 137433 50641 188074 734525 
ANDALUSIA 1131913 307331 1439244 6262580 
Source: INE1999 
 
The Table 9.8 above shows the surface of olive trees in the different provinces in the region of 
Andalusia. Jaén is the most important province in terms of both surface and production, and 
Cordoba is the second one. Although irrigated olive groves are less important, its worth to see 
the impacts of cross compliance in this type of farms as water saving can be one of its major 
impacts. 
 
Table 9.9: Surface of olive groves by province and importance of irrigated olive groves 
 Province Total Area (%) Irrigated area in the province (%) 
Irrigated area in the 
Region of Andalusia (%) Production (%) 
Almería 1,08 61,77 3,12 0,84 
Cádiz 1,35 6,58 0,41 0,57 
Córdoba 23,63 6,38 7,06 24,59 
Granada 11,48 23,52 12,65 8,21 
Huelva 1,99 13,34 1,24 0,48 
Jaén 39,16 30,86 56,61 46,63 
Málaga 8,24 6,31 2,44 6,94 
Sevilla 13,07 26,93 16,48 11,73 
ANDALUSIA 100,00 21,35 100,00 100,00 
 Source: Own elaboration from Junta de Andalusia 2003 
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9.3.2 Characterization of farm types 
Based on the statistical analysis, and following the scheme “Region/Province/ Sub-
region/Municipality”, we have selected the provinces of Jaén and Cordoba as major olive oil 
producers in the region of Andalusia. For the selection of the most important areas of 
production and for the selection of representative farms types in those locations we 
considered the total production area. The farms described in our analysis are typical Spanish 
olive groves and can be considered as representatives for the cost of compliance assessment 
(Gallardo and Ceña 2006). 
The graphs below show the distribution of surface and number of farms in percentage terms 
of olive groves per farm strata in two of the most important municipalities from each of the 
selected provinces. Regarding sub regions, there are 5 in Jaen Province that totalizes 571.772 
farms and we selected the subregion of “Campiña Sur” which is the most important in area of 
production (105.165 farms). 
 
Figure 9.2: Number of farms and surface on each size strata in rainfed olive in the 
Municipality of Martos, sub region Campiña Sur, Province of Jaen 
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Source: INE, 1999 
In the province of Jaén 70% of farms are under rain fed conditions and 30% are irrigated 
farms. In the subregion of Campiña Del Sur, this is kept and about 20% of production area 
(17% of farms) is irrigated orchards. In Martos, there are 23,000has with Olives in about 5500 
orchards and 80% of them have an average size of 1,73has.  
In the province of Córdoba, irrigated olive groves are less common (just a 6,38% of the 
surface in production), and association of olive trees with other crops is not very usual. In this 
province, 86,20% of the olive farms are smaller than 20 hectares but farms are bigger than in 
Jaén, with high importance and similar distribution in the strata under 20 hectares. The 
subregion Campiña Alta (in Cordoba province) is characterized by a high irrigation use (96% 
of cultivated surface). 
 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 340 
Figure 9.3: Number of farms and surface on each size stratus in irrigated olive in 
Lucena, sub-region of Campiña Alta, province of Córdoba 
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Source: INE, 1999 
 
Based on the statistical analysis, we have selected two farm types that are denoted as follows:  
- O_F1: denotes a rain fed Olive grove (approximately 2 hectares) in Martos, 
province of Jaén,  
- O_F2: An Olive grove (approximately 10 hectares) with 90% irrigated trees in 
the Municipality of Lucena, province of Córdoba.  
 
9.4 Assessments of the costs of compliance 
9.4.1 Cost structure in Spanish Olive production 
The methodology proposed will analyze costs of compliance at the farm level. Thus, the next 
section focus on cost structures for Olive groves both on irrigated and rain fed schemes for 
plantations in the region of Andalusia and specifically in identical or very similar conditions 
to the regions that we had previously selected as representative farm types.. 
The most common soil management practice among olive farmers in Spain over the past few 
decades has been to maintain bare soil year-round, underneath and between olive trees, by 
means of frequent tillage. Traditional practices in the region of Andalusia were very diverse 
and have broad rank of cultivation methods. Those methods depend especially from soil 
characteristics, like depth, structure and texture, slopes, customs or habits in each area, 
farming implements and its availability, etc.  
Farming implements are usually used in spring and winter for weeds control. Chisel plows 
and rotovators (for rotary tillage) are usually applied in a cross way in each labor (double pass 
in both cases). In summer, a superficial ploughing works take place two times separated in 20 
or 30 days. After those summer works an implement to compact the soil (roll bars) is used to 
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allow olive harvest later. Some growers use in summer a disk plow but nowadays it is not as 
frequent as it was before.  In October residual herbicides are used in the space under trees 
canopies. 
Table 9.10: Frequent farming operations and costs for Olive conventional management 
at the sub-region of “Campiña Sur”  
Work Cost
(€/ha)
Pruning and cleaning with axe and Power saw1  (1,5 day's wage on 36,61€ each): 59,41
Burning and collecting rests (2 working days) 71,36
Branches and rests transportation from groves to burning place 56,49
Cross pass with chisel plows (tillage) 19,15
Fertilization in Spring 82,00
Fertilization with spreader 12,78
First fungicide treatments (Spanish "repilo" fungus: Cycloconium oleaginum) 51,02
Insecticide treatments (Spanish "prays" moth) 56,46
Two passes with rotovator (rotary tillage on surface) 19,12
Shoots removal and burning (1,25 day's wage) 44,60
Soil compaction with roll bars 9,63
Weed chemical control in September  27,38
Terrestrial Application 24,35
Second fungicide treatment 51,02
Harvest for 4000Kg/ha, 12,16 €/100Kg taxes included 486,40
Cleaning and washing: for 4000Kg - 0,90 €/100kg including taxes 36,00
Transport to press: 4000Kg. - 0,84€/100kg taxes included 33,60
Interests rate 3,25% on capital (1140,77) 37,08
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS 1177,85
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS 39,74
Administration and supervision 80,00
TOTAL 1297,59
 
1: Including amortization 
Source: Guerrero Garcia, 2005. 
In the Table 9.10 above, we have selected an intensive grove as example in order to show 
detailed information about the habitual practices in the region of Andalusia. Nevertheless, 
costs varies from 900 to 1400 €/ha in rain fed olive groves in the area of this study (Martos in 
Jaen province for example). This variation depends on farming methods, zones, soil 
conditions, slopes and even yields (since harvests affect costs depending on how much olives 
it has). Irrigated groves yield about 7000kg/ha with considerably higher costs and are more 
profitable. 
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Table 9.11: Cost structure for an irrigated and a rain fed Olive grove in the autonomous 
region of Andalusia  
Concept 
Irrigated Orchard 
 Cost (€/ha) 
Rainfed Orchard 
Cost (€/ha) 
Fertilizers 104,80 51,65 
Pruning  326,15 174,30 
Soil Maintenance 302,58 162,10 
Pesticides treatments 171,80 127,87 
Olive harvest 831,52 471,12 
Commercialization and transformation 233,62 92,12 
Direct Costs 1970,47 1079,16 
Energetic pumping* costs 270,00 0,00 
Installation, maintenance and repairs 73,62 0,00 
Water fees 60,00 0,00 
Water costs 403,62 0,00 
Non direct Costs 197,05 107,92 
TOTAL COSTS 2571,14 1187,08 
* Considering an energetic cost of 0.18 €/m3  
Source: Pastor Muñoz-Cobo, 2005. 
 
We will firstly consider the new legal framework for the evaluation that is required for cost of 
compliance calculation. Many practices like pruning, harvest and fertilizations or pesticides 
treatments change depending on yields. Then we are going to detail these aspects in order to 
make a better assessment for cost of compliance calculation. Statistical data, local information 
and previous studies are being considered. 
The analysis of the increment of costs due to cross compliance require to focus on the 
requirements to avoid erosion, as this is the main environmental problem associated to the 
olive groves in the region of Andalusia. These practices derive into a non tillage system that is 
already adopted by many farmers in the region of Andalusia. This possibility with or without 
irrigation might determine different costs and yields that are detailed in the next sections. 
9.4.2 The Legal Framework 
The following Table 9.12 synthesizes the legal conditions required to prevent from erosion 
that might be considered for costs of compliance in the region of Andalusia due to agronomic 
practices and topography and soil conditions: 
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Table 9.12: Olive legal framework and expected costs for assessments  
Standard Operations requirements 
description 
Comment  on costs 
Farming operations in Hillslopes 
on parcels higher than 1 hectare 
depending on the slope angle 
Ploughing in olive groves is 
forbidden when slopes are higher 
than 15% except when special 
conservation practices like no-
tilling, grass strips, benches or 
total vegetal covers are done. 
 
GAECs establish that olive groves 
above 8% should use certain 
specific implements 
Assessment is needed: 
A complete cost analysis 
should be carried on in 
order to quantify and 
compare alternative costs 
with historically happened 
in those olive groves 
slopes  
Minimum vegetal cover: When slopes are higher than 10%:  
Covers strips should take place in 
roads that are perpendicular to the 
maximum slope  
When olive groves have ploughed 
spaces  
green covers (like grass stripes or 
pruning rests) should be kept. 
The cost of planting grass 
stripes and use vegetal 
covers like  native or 
cultivated grasses or 
pruning  rests should be 
assessed 
Trees removal In rain fed olive groves a slope 
higher than 15% it is allowed to 
remove trees only when other trees 
are going to be planted 
Not necessarily a cost. 
Terraces and contour bunds Those terraces or bunds that 
already exist must have 
maintenance operations in order to 
avoid breakdowns and eventual 
gully erosion 
Cost of maintenance  
Organic matter maintenance:  Harvest rests should be removed 
following local norms 
Not necessarily a cost. 
Maintenance of a minimum 
agrarian surface 
Prohibition for cutting olive trees;  
if it is done, then norms for new 
plantations, new varieties  usage 
and a good vegetative condition 
surveillance  should be taken into 
account 
Not necessarily a cost. 
Source: BOE, 2004a (transposition of the EU reg. 1782/2004 to the Spanish legislation). 
Olive production is characterized by small rain fed units, a familiar type of management and 
low inputs. Nevertheless, olive growing produces an important impact on soils, because a 
historical process of mechanized cultivation methods. These methods are changing from 70s 
into a more intensive use of chemicals that replace mechanical pest and weeds controls. 
Secondly, olive trees require less nitrogen inputs than other perennial trees like citrus or 
pommes. Pesticides are not as necessary as in citrus production because the climate, water and 
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soil nutrients requirements determine drier locations as optimal rather than humid areas where 
development is limited by nematodes or other pests. Citrus and horticultural products usually 
have higher inputs requirements and elevated costs per hectare. Thus, olive oil production 
mostly occurs in semiarid environments, inner lands and extensive rain fed conditions, hills 
and locations where pests (fungus or insect diseases) and other cropping options are not so 
frequent (Guerrero Garcia, 2005).  
In our analysis, GAECS and SMRs measures regarding prevention from erosion are the main 
constraint and could introduce additional costs. The assessment will involve the terrace 
maintenance, gree covers and grass stripes in slope agriculture. 
9.4.3 Assessment of the costs of compliance in the Olive Sector 
9.4.3.1 General procedures for land conservation schemes  
No till farming in olive groves started two decades ago with a simple practice that consisted 
on doing weed controls without any soil preparation or cultivation and replacing mechanical 
methods for chemical ones. Many farmers used to pass implements for deep ploughing in 
order to obtain a better drainage. This method was criticized and changed since raindrops in 
intense storms produced more erosion, particularly in hill-slopes. Drops from strong storms 
might dislodge tons of soil per hectare which is carried away by surface runoff.  During the 
last years land conservation practices started to avoid this methods since covers and no tillage 
systems improve water infiltration reducing evaporation rates and decreasing splash erosion.  
Traditional growers in Spain have been thinking that controlling weeds and cleaning the 
surface with tillage practices would determine higher yields as a consequence of lesser insects 
or fungus populations on weeds, changes in soil porosity and improvements in water 
infiltration or just because they preferred how it looks.  There are different “land conservation 
methods” that should be considered since they are largely used in the region of Andalusia:  
A. Minimum tillage (weeds are let in surface up to a limit and then 
incorporated into the ground through disks ploughing) 
B. Non tillage and bare soil (less recommended since storms affect soil 
erosion, especially when slopes are higher than 4%) 
C. Non tillage with vegetal covers (cultivated, native grasses and 
spontaneous vegetation, chipped pruning rests, etc.) 
D. Mixed systems 
E. Grass Strips 
F. Terrace Maintenance 
We are considering different options regarding cultivation techniques. For costs calculations 
and yields estimations, legal framework application and usual local practices were taken into 
account. 
9.4.3.2 Costs of land conservation methods for Olive groves  
Cost assessment for conservational practices as green covers on the ground, grass strips, 
benches and terraces maintenance is not an easy task since soil conditions and cultivation 
techniques might present broad and diverse situations even in the same region. In order to 
establish the degree of compliance of the new legal framework, cost calculations and 
implications on yields we are considering those practices of an olive grove under rain fed 
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conditions in the Jaen province separately from irrigated farms. The following Table 9.13s 
have detailed information about the costs for those practices that will change as a result of 
GAECs and cross compliance legislations. We have included two levels of green covertures 
and the conventional olive grove for the mentioned area: 
Table 9.13: costs details in conventional and non-tillage systems  
Non tillage method with green covers No till method with bare soil 
  
Works 
Cost 
(€/ha) Works 
Cost 
(€/ha) 
 
 Basic herbicide treatments 27,96 
1 hour application (21,25€/hr) 21,25 
Basic herbicide treatment (autumn) 
2,4Kg/ha diuron x 40% ground considering  
cleaning areas under treetops for harvest 
11,18 
Round up herbicide 7,2 
Application (0,75 hours with tractor x 
21,25€/h) 15,94 
Herbicides for all ground surfaces1 94,5 
 
 
 
 
Backpack sprayer application of herbicide 
(0,5 day wage x 35,68 €/day's wage) 
 
17,84 
Application (1 hour with tractor x 21,25€/h) 21,25 
Proportional part for soil preparation in the  
beggining  (1/5) 2hours x 19,15 €/h + 
2h works for levelling and compacting the 
soil 
15,48 
 
 
 
 
Proportional part for soil preparation in the 
beggining  (1/5) 2hours x 19,15 €/h + 
2h works for levelling and compacting the 
soil 
15,48 
Cleaning for harvest without ploughing 
(with roads for sweeping leaves in ground) 
18,84  
Cleaning for harvest without ploughing 
(with roads for sweeping leaves in ground) 18,84 
TOTAL  177,19  TOTAL 108,57 
1
 Spring treatment: 7Kg of commercial product (Diuron 20% + Aminotriazol40%, 13,5€/kg) 
Source: Guerrero García (/2005) 
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Table 9.14: Costs details in a conventional system in the region of Andalusia  
Conventional method (bare soil) 
and covering  only under the treetop  
Works Cost €/ha 
Ploughing (5hours x 19,15/h) 95,8 
Herbicides treatments (Diuron x 40% ground surface x 11,65€/kg) 28 
Herbicide application with tractor and bars (0,75h x 21,25€/h) 15,9 
Round up herbicide to complement treatments1 36,2 
Proportional part for soil preparation in the beggining (1/5 x 40%)  6,2 
Backpack sprayer application of herbicide (0,25 day's wage x 35,68 €/day's wage) 8,9 
Cleaning for harvest without ploughing (with roads for sweeping leaves in ground) 18,8 
TOTAL  209,8 
1
 Some weeds are Diuron resistant and should be treated complementarily in some areas (usually 
circles) using 8lts/ha with backpack sprayer (0,25 Day’s Wage/ha x 35.68 €/day) 
Source: (Guerrero García, 2005) 
As shown in the tables above, conventional systems have important costs on ploughing labors 
(which represent around 45% of all costs).  
Some other practices are taking place for vegetal covers in the region of Andalusia but we 
have not considered them for cost of compliance calculations since its application is not 
obligatory but recommended.  
• Cultivated species instead of spontaneous vegetation (seeding using no till or 
conventional methods) 
• Vegetation maintenance in different situations (fertilizing with 50KgN/ha, 
some P and K on corridors to maintain vegetation). 
• Mulching with pruning wastes (typical recommendations) 
• Tools and equipment acquisition. 
In our study we are assuming that irrigated farms have similar implications for no tillage 
cultivation methods. In general, there is an accepted idea that irrigated orchards improve its 
water use efficiency when leaving vegetal covers. In addition, irrigated orchards present a 
complete different scheme that might have less influence on costs and yields (1 irrigated 
hectare in Cordoba might produce 7000kg of olives and have a cost/ha around 2200€/ha).  
 
Grass Strips and terrace Maintenance 
Olive groves above 8% are oblied to maintain green covers like grass strips or contour lines 
with native or spontaneous vegetation. Its application on roads or spaces between parcels is 
very frequent in the region of Andalusia on slope agriculture.  
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The cost of land conservation practices varies largely depending on how much leveling or soil 
movements are required. In the case of Grass Strips, costs are not high since only a 
proportional part of the surface is cultivated (see Table 9.15). When growers do not plow and 
only herbicides for the maintenance of natural vegetation is practiced in contour line on hill-
slopes, costs might be reduced considerably249.  
Table 9.15: Grass strips cultivation costs  
Grass Strips: 100mts line for 3,5mts wide in one hectare: 350m2 
Costs 
(€/ha) 
Proportional part of soil preparation (3,5m x 100m) (19,15€/hour) x 5km/hour velocity 3,83 
Seeder 28 lines (3,5mts wide) x 100mts (proportional part of 1ha) 0,41 
Seeds Barley (30kg/ha)  0,84 
Seeds Undergrounf Vetch (80kg/ha) 1  0,19 
Fertilizer 8-24-16 (complex) x 300units/ha x 0,1803€/u for 350m2 1,89 
Application costs for fertilizer (spreader for 350m2)  0,07 
Other practices (cutters, pesticide applications, compacting passes, etc.) 1,56 
TOTAL 8,81 
Source: data collected from Guerrero García (2005) and De Juan Valero et al., (2003)  
 
Terrace Maintenance 
Annual terrace maintenance is necessary in some situations, although less frequent 
maintenance is adequate in others. Typically, more frequent maintenance is required for steep 
slopes and/or highly erodable soils. Intense tillage operations and intense rainfall runoff also 
increase maintenance needs. 
Terrace maintenance can be done with virtually any equipment that will move soil. The main 
idea is to plow the ground using levels curves on landsides. Thus, rains and sediments 
produce a slight and deeper level curve that derives into a better shape and improvement of 
the old terrace.  Some commonly used tools include moldboard plow, disk plow, one-way, 
belt terracer, bulldozer, front blade, three-point blade, towed straight-wheeled blade, towed 
terracing blade (pull-type grader), scraper, motor grader (road-grader), three-point ridging 
disk (terracing disk) and whirlwind terracer. 
The most common farm implement used for terrace maintenance is the plow or one-way. The 
number of passes required for maintenance depends on the size of the tool, the depth of 
operation, travel speed (which controls distance of throw), and the amount of soil to be 
moved. The plow or one-way throws soil further at higher speeds, so a minimum ground 
speed of 5 mph is suggested, but 6 mph or more is better. This speed should be achieved as 
the equipment moves through loose soil. 
In Andalusia, terraces have almost not maintenance by growers or at least no controls are 
mentioned by local entities or experts. For calculations for 100mts of reshaping terraces, 
                                                 
249
 Leaving a line for 350m2 (100mts by 3,5mts Wide) for every hectare might cost from 3 to 4 €/ha (herbicides 
+ application, cutting and other works but without expenditures on seeds or fertilizers/pesticides for 
cultivated species). 
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guidelines from Kansas University (Powel and McVay, 2004) and local costs collected from 
Guerrero Garcia (2005) and Valero et al., 2003 were used. Thus, costs include plowing 100 
meters deeply with traditional implements available in Andalusia (traditional large plows). 
These practices requires from several passes in both directions in order to move the soil in 
order to build a channel. We have considered 5hs for all passes and 5km/h as tractor velocity 
when plowing the ridge.  Table 9.16 shows the costs calculations for terrace maintenance in 
100 meters contour lines on slopes in Andalusia (15%). Calculations for higher slopes would 
increase considerably since other methods like tree barriers, stones and benches might 
determine higher costs. Although no information is available about how frequent terraces on 
slopes of 25 o 35% are in Spain. 
Table 9.16: Calculations for terrace maintenance in Andalusia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1: Plowing costs consider a higher value since this is a deeper labor from usual plowing costs  
Source: own elaboration taking data from Kansas University Guidelines (Powel and McVay, 2004) 
and local costs (Guerrero García, 2005) 
9.4.3.3 Variation in costs for rain fed olive groves 
The following Table 9.17 shows the potential variation in costs because of compliance 
considering changes from conventional techniques to no till management with green covers 
(see tables above), and practicing grass strips and terrace maintenance for one hectare. 
Table 9.17: Variation in costs for all GAEC measures  
 Cost (€/ha) 
Conventional management costs (a) 209,76 
No tillage system cost (b) 177,19 
1: Difference (a minus b) -32,57 
Cost of grass strip x 100mts 8,81 
Annual cost for terrace maintenance 25,15 
2: Sum 33,96 
Total Variation (between 1 and 2) 1,39 
Source: own elaboration 
Items Details for estimations 
Plowing (19,15€/hour) 40cm deep 
Number of passes 5 times 
Velocity 500mts/hour 
Contour line length 100 m 
Labor total longitude 500 m (both directions) 
Cost per hour 1 25,15€/h 
TOTAL Cost calculation In 1 hour 500mts are made with 19,15€/h 
COST of Terrace maintenance: 25,15 € 
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Variation in costs should be considered unappreciable as costs and yield variations might 
produce more important differences between years or among the different management used 
for each method. 
9.4.3.4 Cultivation methods and olive yields  
Yield in Oil Kg/ha is complex to evaluate and depend on many factors including soil types, 
water availability, weather conditions, cultivation techniques and varieties used. Sometimes 
growers decide to apply a cultivation protocol that is lower in expenditures and yield but 
result more profitable, easier to achieve or in lower risks.  
Olive groves yields in Andalusia have been evaluated largely for different conditions and 
situations. As erosion was always found as one of the most important environmental problems 
in this region, the use of vegetal covers to improve water infiltration and reduce soil losses 
(and organic matter losses) have been proved as incrementing yields per hectare.  Measures 
that reduce erosion like most alternatives to conventional tillage (cover crops and minimum 
and no-tillage techniques) increase rainfall infiltration and decrease runoff and soil losses 
obtaining more stable or even higher yields per ha (Gomez et al., 1999).  
Thus, non yield losses can be expected from the implementation of non-tillage cultivation or 
the practices mentioned above (grass stripes or terraces maintenance).  
9.5 Competitiveness assessment in olive groves  
Considering D12 highlights about measuring production costs and competitiveness as a 
consequence of cross-compliance restrictions, this section focuses on the assessment and 
comparative analysis of production costs and gross margins at farm-level.  Based in an 
analysis that considered initial conditions and institutional conditions, as the case of the F&V 
sector chapter, we followed the farm-level index approach, by comparing the gross margin 
obtained in the different farm types analyzed before and after the standard application. 
In above sections, this report included a clarification about costs and yields changes as a 
consequence of the compliance with GAECs for erosion in Olive groves for the region of 
Andalusia.  Irrigated olive groves have been mentioned in literature as less affected by 
erosion and not to be as representative as rain fed orchards are in Spain. Among rain fed 
cultivation methods a variety of farm types and cultivation methods might be found. Thus, 
low-income and high performance olive groves have been described (Brenes 2005 and 2006).  
Yields, costs and margins were taken from the following literature review: “Pastor et.al.“ 
(1997), “Hurtado Ruiz and A. Jurado“ (2002), “Pastor Muñoz-Cobo“, (2005) and “Alonso 
and Guzman“ (2007); Variable costs were taken from “Guerrero Garcia“ (2005). O_F1A and 
O_F1B are two variants from F1 described for Jaen in previous section. Both are rain fed 
olive groves cultivated in more than 10% slope lands. F1A is low cost olive groves (low 
inputs) that present relatively low yields;   Comparatively with F1A, F1B is a more intensive 
rain fed orchard (higher inputs and yields) with higher costs. Olives price considered is 0,87 
€/kg. Pre and Post standards values shown (variable costs, gross products and gross margin) 
include calculations made in tables Table 9.13 to Table 9.17 of this chapter. 
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In Table 9.18, we have included farm variable costs, gross product and gross margins (in 
€/ha) for two farm types. Farms “O_F1A” and “O_F1B”, represent two farm types in the 
region of this study. First, GAECs introduce an improvement in yields of 100kg/ha in the 
O_F1A farm type. This results in am increased gross product: 1218€/ha250 
Table 9.18: Effects of GAECs for erosion at the farm level 
 Pre-standards situation Post-standards situation 
Gross product (GPF2)  = 1131 (€/ha) Gross product (GPF2’) = 1218 (€/ha) 
Variable Costs (VF2) =  687,08251 (€/ha) Variable Costs (VF2’) =  688,47 (€/ha) O_F1A 
Gross Margin (GMF2) = 443,92 (€/ha) Gross Margin (GMF2’) =529,53 (€/ha) 
Gross product (GPF3) = 2436 (€/ha) Gross product (GPF3’) = 2436 (€/ha) 
Variable Costs (VF3) = 1187,08252 (€/ha) 
Variable Costs (VF3’) = 
1187,08 – 32,57 + 33,96253 = 1188,47 
(€/ha) 
O_F1B 
Gross Margin (GMF3) = 1248,92 (€/ha) Gross Margin (GMF3’) =1247,53 (€/ha) 
Source: own elaboration based on table 2 D12 
 
∆F1AGM = GMF1A’-GMF1A = 85,61 (€/ha) 
GMF1A’/ GMF1A = 1,19 
∆F1B GM = GMF1B’-GMF1B = - 1,39 (€/ha) 
GM1B’/ GM1B = 0,9988 
As can be inferred from the above Table 9.18, the effect of standards considered in this report 
on olive sector result in a non-effect or positive response depending of the type farm 
considered. Thus, a low income farm type as F1A may determine an increment in GMF1A’/ 
GMF1A of 1,19 which implies a higher margin of 185,39€/ha. The F1B has remained without 
almost any change.  
The explanation of this effect is related to the fact that some low-income olive orchards may 
present either lower costs and/or increments in productivity when adopting the non-tillage 
system that comply with GAECs standards. There are no changes in variable costs but a clear 
increment in yields per ha. Using own machinery and herbicides treatments instead of the 
conventional ploughing practices (see previous sections) might not only save up to 90€/ha but 
                                                 
250
 O_F1A PRE standard: Yield (Kg/per ha) = 1400 kg / ha; O_F1A POST standard: Yield (Kg/per ha) = 1300 
kg / ha. It is considered an olive oil price of 0,87€/kg. Source: Alonso and Guzman (2007). 
251
 Source: Guerrero Garcia“ (2005) 
252
 See Table 10 
253
 Correspond to calculations in previous section about grass stripes and terrace maintenance (see table 16) 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 351 
also increase productivity through improvements in several important agronomic parameters. 
Green covers, terrace maintenance, grass strips or benches, as mentioned in previous sections, 
cause increments in yield/ha through an improvement in biomass production, radiation 
interception, infiltration rates and water use efficiency (Gomez et al., 1999, 2000 and 2001; 
Villalobos et al., 2000; Villalobos et al., 2005). Erosion effects on conventional olive groves 
grown on slopes will increase during years as a consequence of gradual soil losses (and 
organic matter losses or nutrients as well), lower infiltration rates and water runoffs. These 
changes affected yields and costs in the long term (Gomez et al, 1999, 2000 and 2001; Raya 
et al., 2005) 
Gallardo and Ceña (2006) detail farm characteristics and the evolution of olive sector in the 
region of Andalusia during the last decade. In a costs and net margins comparison between 
non tillage-conventional schemes for rain fed and irrigated systems, the authors concluded 
that there are slight or null impact on margins using different farming methods. Other authors 
have reported little differences in yields when comparing conventional and non-tillage 
cultivation methods. In four year studies in the same region Alonso and Guzman (2007) have 
mentioned differences between both schemes of 89Kg/ha that cannot be considered 
statistically different (p value < 0,05). This is the case of F1B: has higher yields and may 
comply with standards without significant changes in variable costs or gross margins.  
Erosion and olive production should be evaluated also in a long period. Erosion is a very long 
and slow process that depends on a complex system as it happens in the region of Andalusia. 
Costs and yield evaluations in the long term presume to be importantly different from those 
calculated in the short term. For instance in conventional olive groves on land-hills, costs of 
erosion should consider gully eroded caverns and soil movements (land leveling) in the field 
as a consequence of important soil losses. Additionally, yields reductions caused by organic 
matter and soil losses in conventional agriculture in Andalusia, must be assessed carefully 
since yields might decrease considerably in the long term. If non tillage systems might have 
an increment in yields and lower operational costs in the long term, cross compliance 
measures will increment profitability since variable and some fixed costs might decrease (e.g. 
permanent works against erosion when conventional tillage determine gully eroded caverns or 
other damages in the farm). 
Ecologic olive groves present in some cases premium prices as voluntary certification 
schemes take place. This may represent an interaction with the cross compliance benefits in 
the case: the ecologic olive system consider 1,13 instead of 0.87€/kg of olive oil. Even when 
some cultivation areas present lower yields in the non-tillage system (sometimes in the first 
years), revenues are always higher because of the premium prices in the ecological olive 
grove mentioned in previous sections of this report. 
Finally, from Gallardo and Ceña (2006) some remarkable points in the context of CAP reform 
affecting competitiveness during the last decade should be outlined as follows: 
• Costs reductions in hand labor through mentioned for olive groves in the region of 
Andalusia through: 
 - Increments in machinery for chemical treatments  
 - Improvements in pruning rest recollection after harvest equipment 
 - Cheaper and more efficient harvest equipment  
 - Immigrant population derives into important costs reductions  
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- More effective herbicides controls with lesser costs (post emergence selective 
products) 
• Expansion in the olive surface and production in Andalusia attracting new 
investments.  
• Increments on farm size.  
• Improved productivity (new varieties, irrigation, more efficient practices regarding 
non-tillage cultivation methods, green covers, soil maintenance, etc). 
• Better quality products 
• increment in olive oil consumption and markets evolution. 
•  
9.6 Concluding remarks for the Olive Sector 
Overall conclusions: Our results of the olive production analysis indicate that compliance 
might not have a clear effect on costs. Even a possible benefit on compliance in Spanish olive 
groves is suggested as a consequence of the application of GAECs requirements regarding 
prevention from erosion (section 9.4.2). 
 
GAECs for preventing erosion in slope agriculture for olives in the region of Andalusia, are 
determining an obligation for rain fed olives growers that should take into account new 
techniques for slope agriculture. Most important tasks involve the maintenance of vegetable 
covers and no tillage practices in order to avoid erosion produced by runoffs and soil losses. 
All these practices imply a completely different production scheme for growers. This scheme 
is very well known since the 70s but it is not always preferred by traditional growers.   
 
Costs and benefits of erosion control measures (no tillage operations): These cultivation 
methods presume not to plough and avoid a bare soil using herbicides and cutters or just 
leaving native grass to grow under the treetop or in roads.  
Since the cost of plowing is considerably higher than the cost of extra herbicide treatments 
and other measures like cleaning under trees before harvesting, total costs are equal or rather 
lower in the no tillage system. The cost of maintenance for terraces and the obligatory grass 
strips that many growers should practice in slopes represent an extra cost that might be equal 
to the possible reduction in costs when not plowing or using no till cultivation methods.  
Regarding yields for these schemes, many evaluations during the last decades have been 
indicating that untilled orchards improve the water use efficiency and increase infiltration 
rates determining lower runoffs and organic matter losses, improve water use efficiency and 
productivity (Raya et al., 2005).   
 
Soil protection and competitiveness: In the assessment of the effect of erosion and soil 
regulations on competitiveness for the Spanish Olive sector, our results showed that there is 
not evidence on negative effect on profitability.  
Two farm sizes were evaluated for the assessment of competitiveness. In the case of low 
cost/income rain fed olive groves, the use of green covers, grass strips and terrace 
maintenance imply an increment in yields without changes in variable costs. Changes in 
productivity through a better water use efficiency (improved infiltration rates, less run offs, 
etc.) are a possible explanation of this increment in yields and gross margins. Larger rain fed 
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farms, with higher productivities, are other important farm type in the region. Costs 
assessments and changes in yields reported when using non-tillage cultivation methods, 
determine slight or null changes in competitiveness. 
Irrigated olive orchards are presumed to have slight or null effect when complying new legal 
framework.  
Further yield assessments should be considered when studying the cost of compliance in olive 
production on hill slopes. Long-term assessments might be the most important analysis 
required to study competitiveness in Spanish olive oil on international markets because the 
erosion effect and the production itself both require to be evaluated in the long run. Practices 
like covers and reduced or non tillage cultivation techniques change soil characteristics such 
as the content of organic matter, nitrogen and other microelements, texture and structure, 
porosity and many other agronomic variables that influence infiltration rates, water use 
efficiency, and productivity (Gómez et al., 2001 and 2002).  
 
Complementary Cross compliance measures: Our study focused on slope olive groves since 
erosion is the main environmental problem in the region of Andalusia and about 70% of farms 
are above 7% slope. Further analysis for cross compliance effects on costs of olive groves 
cultivated in flat areas could complement this study as these types of olive farms might be 
subject to other regulations like the Nitrates Directive in nitrate vulnerable zones. 
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10 Assessing the Benefits of Cross Compliance 
10.1 Introduction: The Costs and Benefits of Policy Intervention 
This study has focused on the economic impact of cross compliance on farmers and farm 
sectors and the implications this impact has had on the external competitiveness of EU 
agriculture. Two sets of costs were examined: the cost to farmers of complying with EU 
legislation, and the additional cost of complying with any new requirements introduced by 
cross compliance254. This chapter seeks to contextualise the identified costs, reported by the 
lead authors of this Deliverable as minimal, by examining the benefits cross compliance is 
likely to provide. As argued in this chapter, the policy has the potential to provide a range of 
benefits: in relation to helping to encourage compliance with EU legislation at the farm level, 
to improving environmental standards at the farm level though the establishment of GAEC 
standards, with encouraging a minimum level of land maintenance in order to avoid land 
abandonment, and with maintaining the area of permanent pasture. The evidence of the actual 
benefits cross compliance has provided is, however, very limited at this stage. This is largely 
because of the absence of a system to monitor the impact of cross compliance at the EU and 
Member State levels255 and the time lag between the date of policy introduction and the point 
at which the impacts become observable256. 
The benefits provided by a policy can be expected to stem from its objectives. Therefore, if 
the objectives are met, then benefits are provided and the policy can be considered effective. 
Outputs, results and impacts may result in benefits to an actor and/or a range of actors at one 
or more spatial scales. An inappropriately designed policy at the EU level or inadequately 
implemented policy at the Member State or regional level may mean the objectives are not 
realised and inadvertently result in negative outputs, results and impacts. The objectives of 
cross compliance, along with the potential benefits, are set out further in Section 10.2. An 
analysis of the extent to which the identified objectives are likely to be met is presented in 
Section 10.3. 
Achieving compliance with legislation or new standards is rarely a cost free exercise. In many 
cases, the farmer is expected to absorb the necessary cost in order to become compliant with 
baseline regulatory standards. In many cases, the cost private individuals or businesses need 
to incur in order to meet legal standards is deemed necessary in order to meet the desired 
political objective257. There is, however, a rationale for public money to be provided to those 
                                                 
254
 This study has not examined the cost to Member State administrations of introducing a system to implement 
cross compliance. The focus has been on the costs at the farm level. 
255
 There are some exceptions, such as the CAP Observatory set up by Defra in England to monitor the impacts 
of the 2003 CAP reform on the environment. See: http://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/ace/index.htm 
256
 Evaluators of agricultural and rural development policy often highlight the difficulty of attributing impacts to 
a policy shortly after its introduction. Environmental impacts, in particular, may take several years to 
become apparent. See: EPEC (2004) Impact assessment of rural development programmes in view of 
post 2006 rural development policy, for DG Agriculture; and Agra-CEAS (2005) Synthesis of Rural 
Development Mid-Term Evaluations Lot I EAGGF Guarantee, Final Report for the European 
Commission. 
257
 See, for example: Defra (2007) Administrative Burdens in EU Agriculture: An Evidence Base. 
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who meet standards that both exceed this baseline and provide broader public benefit. This is 
largely the purpose of CAP Pillar II expenditure.  
Benefits are sometimes assessed alongside the cost of achieving those benefits as part of 
formal evaluation procedures258. This is necessary to understand the cost-effectiveness of a 
policy measure, its inherent efficiency259 or the value for money provided by the policy. This 
project does not attempt to perform an evaluation of the costs of delivering the potential 
benefits, although some general remarks are made in Section 10.4. The conclusions, in 
Section 10.5, frame the benefits provided by cross compliance in the context of the policy 
debate surrounding the future development of the CAP. 
The costs attributed to cross compliance are sometimes portrayed in a negative light by some 
stakeholders. Farming unions, for example, often argue that cross compliance results in extra 
bureaucracy, a burden of extra costs and competitive distortions260. The value placed on the 
different benefits that may be provided are therefore likely to vary between different actors. 
There are likely to be benefits for wider society in terms of the contribution cross compliance 
makes to re-enforcing compliance with mandatory standards that have been established to 
serve the wider public interest. Benefits may also accumulate for the farmer, since in many 
respects cross compliance simply underpins good agricultural practices, may improve 
operational efficiencies and therefore help reduce costs. Benefits may also arise for 
government, particularly if cross compliance is a relatively low cost policy option to help 
enforce a large swathe of legislation. Despite this, the actual benefits may differ from the 
perceived benefits. These benefits may be outweighed by any real or perceived problems, 
such as the practical administrative difficulties faced by the relevant authorities when 
introducing cross compliance and applying the control system. 
Sometimes, an attempt is made to assess whether the benefits may have arisen in the absence 
of the policy, a situation often referred to as ‘the counterfactual’. If the benefits would have 
been provided without the policy, then the policy is considered ‘deadweight’. In addition, 
attributing benefits to a specific policy is problematic as the chain of causality is not always 
clear. These issues should be kept in mind when reading the text below. 
10.2 Cross Compliance – The Potential Range and Level of Benefit 
As with any policy intervention, cross compliance is most likely to tackle the issues it is 
designed to address, although there may be additional, indirect impacts which result in further 
benefits. The benefits of cross compliance must therefore be considered in terms of the 
objectives set for the policy. A certain amount of interpretation of the various legislative and 
non-legislative texts, alongside informed critical judgement, is required in order to understand 
the objectives of cross compliance. 
                                                 
258
 See for example Pearce, D (2005) ‘What constitutes a good agri-environmental policy evaluation?’ In 
Evaluating Agri-Environmental Policies: Design, Practice and Results, OECD, Paris. 
259
 Efficiency means ‘the extent to which the desired effects are achieved at a reasonable cost’. See: DG Budget 
(2004) Evaluating EU Activities: A Practical Guide for the Commission Services. 
260
 See, for example, The National Farmers’ Union of England & Wales Preliminary Submission to the European 
Commission on Cross Compliance and the Single Payment Scheme (November 2006). Such arguments 
are often confused given that farms are subject to EU legislation even if cross compliance is not in place 
and that the additional farm level costs imposed by cross compliance are minimal as concluded 
elsewhere in this report. 
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According to the European Commission’s Communication regarding the Mid Term Review 
of the CAP261 (text in italics reflects emphasis added by the author): 
• ‘the main purpose of cross-compliance [is to] to support the implementation of 
environmental, food safety and animal health and welfare legislation’. 
• cross compliance is ‘a whole-farm approach with conditions attached to both used and 
unused agricultural land’.  
 
The preamble to Regulation 1782/2003262 reveals the following objectives for cross 
compliance:  
• ‘to incorporate in the common market organisations basic standards for the 
environment, food safety, animal health and welfare and good agricultural and 
environmental condition’ and thus make receipt of direct aid conditional on meeting 
certain standards. The Regulation outlines the scope of cross compliance, with Annex 
III listing a compulsory list of Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs) for the 
environment, food safety, animal health and welfare, and Annex IV providing a 
framework of standards for Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC). 
• ‘to avoid the abandonment of agricultural land and ensure that it is maintained in good 
agricultural and environmental condition’ whilst taking into account the specific 
characteristics of the areas concerned (e.g. soil types and  farming systems). 
• ‘to avoid a massive conversion into arable land’ by encouraging ‘the maintenance of 
existing permanent pasture’ since ‘permanent pasture has a positive environmental 
effect’. 
• In overarching terms, ‘to promote more market oriented and sustainable agriculture’. 
Cross compliance is presented in Commission texts as a tool to contribute to the enforcement 
of compliance with pre-existing legal requirements. It has a wide policy reach in that it 
applies to all those farms on which the Single Payment is claimed. It therefore embraces a 
large area of land, as cross compliance applies to all land on the farm holding and not just the 
utilised agricultural area. The intention is to incorporate basic standards. The use of the term 
‘basic’ suggests that the implemented standards should be undemanding to comply with and 
means they may be relatively untargeted in terms of seeking specific outcomes. The policy 
also seeks to avoid land abandonment and to maintain, as opposed to enhance, good 
agricultural and environmental condition. Overall, and alongside the decoupling of direct 
payments, cross compliance should contribute to market oriented and sustainable agriculture.  
If the policy is well designed at the EU level and implemented appropriately at the Member 
State and regional levels, it would be reasonable to assume that cross compliance could 
provide the following five benefits: 
1. Cross compliance will encourage compliance with EU legislation at the farm level. 
2. Cross compliance will improve environmental standards at the farm level though the 
establishment of standards to achieve good agricultural and environmental condition. 
                                                 
261
 COM(2002)394 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Mid-
Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy 10.07.02. 
262
 Council Regulation 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes 
for farmers, OJ L 270, 21.10.2003. 
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3. Cross compliance will encourage a minimum level of land maintenance in order to 
avoid land abandonment. 
4. Cross compliance will maintain the existing area of permanent pasture and thereby the 
associated environment values. 
5. And, as a result, cross compliance will contribute to sustainable agriculture. 
 
This study and a number of others have assembled both quantitative and qualitative evidence 
that allows an assessment of the extent to which the above benefits have been delivered263. 
The available evidence is utilised in order to make an assessment of the extent to which each 
benefit is likely to be provided. The outcomes of this exercise are presented in the next 
section. 
There are two main drawbacks to performing a fully informed evaluation. The first, is that 
there is no formal procedure in place to monitor the impacts of cross compliance. Whilst the 
studies examined do provide some useful information, this is limited due to the relatively 
early stage of implementation; cross compliance was introduced in 2005 and fieldwork for the 
examined studies conducted throughout 2005 and 2006. This means there is an absence of 
quantified evidence on which to base any assessment. In any case, any changes to the 
environment that may arise as a result of the environmental SMRs and GAEC standards are 
likely to take many years to become apparent. The second drawback is related to the difficulty 
of detecting non-compliance for some of the requirements. Non-compliance with the tagging 
of animals, under the animal identification requirements, is easy for inspectors to detect as 
missing eartags can easily be observed. Being certain, for example, that landscape features 
protected by GAEC have not been removed is more problematic. In addition, although control 
samples generally include a random element, most farms are selected on a risk based 
approach. The farmers most likely to not comply are therefore the more likely to be inspected. 
Although the inspection system may be an efficient way to monitor compliance, data from 
compliance checks may not fully reflect actual compliance levels across the farming sector as 
a whole. The analysis presented here therefore makes a number of informed judgements as to 
the extent to which each of the five above benefits is likely to be provided by cross 
compliance. 
10.3 The Benefits Provided by Cross Compliance 
This section considers each of the five potential benefits in turn. Examples are provided for 
the beef and cereal sectors, although many of the benefits are more general and cross-sectoral 
in nature. 
 
1. Encourage compliance with EU legislation at the farm level. 
 
                                                 
263
 The arguments presented here are drawn from multiple sources including a number of papers produced for the 
Cross Compliance Network Study (2006-2007) (referenced separately in the text) and the findings of an 
evaluation of cross compliance produced for the European Commission in 2007: Alliance 
Environnement (2007) Evaluation of the Application of Cross Compliance as Foreseen Under 
Regulation 1782/2003: Part II, Replies to Evaluation Questions; and Alliance Environnement (2007) 
Evaluation of the Application of Cross Compliance as Foreseen Under Regulation 1782/2003: Part II, 
Descriptive Report. 
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An aim of cross compliance is to incorporate ‘basic standards’ for the environment, food 
safety, animal health and welfare into the common market organisations. The basic standards 
are referred to as the Statutory Management Requirements and are composed of various 
Articles from a range of EU Regulations and Directives. ‘Basic standards’ therefore are 
equivalent to the standards sought by legislation. The SMRs apply to those Member States 
applying the SPS (i.e. the EU-15, Malta and Slovenia) and will be introduced in the new 
Member States that operate SAPS over a three year period from 2009 (or 2012 in the case of 
Bulgaria and Romania). The SMRs apply to both used and unused agricultural land, meaning 
cross compliance should support compliance with the relevant legislation on all land at the 
farm level. This objective rests on an assumption that public money should only be dispensed 
to those who adhere to legislation. In this sense, cross compliance acts as a safeguard to 
ensure that those in receipt of CAP direct payments are also respecting the law. The extent to 
which cross compliance is successful in this regard is dependent on the effectiveness of the 
inspection system in identifying non-compliance. The threat of a financial penalty, in the form 
of a reduction to the Single Payment, therefore acts as incentive for farmers to comply, if this 
was not already the case.  
Attaching SMRs to the receipt of the Single Payment may help to increase compliance where 
this is less then universal. The achievement of full compliance would be to the credit of cross 
compliance and would demonstrate the added value of the policy if compliance cannot 
otherwise be provided through mandatory regulation264. A key way to understand whether 
compliance improves as a result of cross compliance is to monitor the number of SMR 
breaches over time. Whilst there is an absence of baseline data from which to estimate an 
improvement in compliance, the limited data available on the number of breaches from the 
first year of cross compliance inspections in 2005 helps to give an idea of compliance rates by 
Member State265. An assessment of this kind is hampered by the small sample size used for 
cross compliance inspections (about 1% of farms in receipt of the Single Payment receive an 
inspection every year), the sampling procedures (high risk farms are identified meaning that 
the sample is unlikely to be a representative reflection of compliance levels at a national level) 
and the inspection procedures (non-compliance with some standards may be easier to identify 
than with others). In addition, data is generally absent on the cause or nature of breaches, 
although the penalty applied provides some indication of the degree of severity. Some caution 
is therefore needed when interpreting breach data and comparing inspection results. Clearly, 
some SMRs are relevant to specific sectors whilst others, due to their horizontal, cross-cutting 
nature, may apply to many farm sectors. However, it is difficult to ascribe any increase in 
compliance for any particular sector as data has not been publicly provided at this level.  
According to Commission figures266, 71% of all instances of non-compliance among those 
Member States applying SMRs in 2005 were related to the identification and registration of 
cattle. A total of 10% of all breaches arose in relation to the Nitrates Directive. A total of 68% 
of all reductions were made at the one per cent level, indicating that most breaches were 
                                                 
264
 One consideration is that cross compliance may have been considered to have served its purpose once 
compliance is universal. Whilst this is clearly aspirational, the question then arises as to whether the 
leverage cross compliance and the Single Payment have over farmers would decline if either were 
subsequently downscaled in ambition or removed outright. 
265
 No information on the level of compliance with the animal welfare SMRs - the last set of SMRs to be 
introduced in 2007 and clearly relevant to the beef sector - is currently available and hence is omitted 
from this chapter. 
266
 Report from the Commission to the Council on the Application of the System of Cross Compliance (COM 
2007 (147) 29.03.07) 
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relatively minor. Data is not publicly available on the penalties applied for specific SMRs, or 
by farming sector. Data for 2006 and 2007 is not yet available and so it is not possible to 
estimate whether compliance levels have altered following the introduction of cross 
compliance. 
The variation in compliance levels across Member States can be illustrated through the 
example of the animal identification SMRs, which are clearly relevant to the beef sector. 
Table 10.1 shows the proportion of breaches among inspected farms where data has been 
provided for the first year of inspections (2005). 
Table 10.1. Breaches of Animal Identification SMRs (2005). 
MS SMRs Breaches (% of inspected farms) 
AT 7 and 8 24.1 
7 0.3 BE (F) 
8 6.1 
BE (W) 7 and 8 29.1 
DE 7 and 8 33.0 
EL 7 and 8 18.6 
ES 7 and 8 11.7 
FR 7  48.1 
IE 7 and 8 20.6 
IT 7 and 8 2.8 
LU 7 and 8  86 
NL 8 6.1 
7 19.2 SE 
8 41.3 
UK (E) 7 and 8 6.3 
UK (NI) 7 and 8 17.0 
UK (W) 7 and 8 39.4 
Source: Alliance Environnement, 2007. 
Note: SMR 7 is Council Regulation 911/2004 regarding eartags, holding registers and passports in relation to the 
identification and registration of bovine animals. SMR 8 is Regulation 1760/2000 on a system for the 
identification and registration of bovine animals. MS present data in different ways, hence some breach data is 
combined. MS that group breach data in other ways (e.g. by including SMR 6 on pigs with result data for SMR 7 
and 8) are excluded from the above Table 10.1. 
 
The level of non-compliance, according to this data, varies from 6.3% to 86%. This range 
may reflect differing approaches to inspection inasmuch as variations in the level of 
compliance, rendering comparison problematic. Compliance issues with other SMRs are less 
pronounced and difficult to assess given breaches tend not to be broken down by farm sector. 
The monitoring of compliance rates over time is needed in order to show any improvements 
in compliance within the control sample. It may be logical to assume that improved 
compliance is most likely to occur amongst those SMRs that are easily understood by farmers 
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and where inspectors can easily verify compliance, such as the animal identification and 
registration requirements. 
Despite the current lack of quantitative evidence, a consideration of the wider system that 
supports the operation of cross compliance allows an assessment to be made of the potential 
of cross compliance to deliver improvements to the level of compliance. The need for 
Member States to define meaningful farm level standards from complex pieces of legislation, 
to provide an advisory system and apply an inspection regime may be expected to work 
together to facilitate compliance among farmers. 
 
As a result of cross compliance, the relevant authorities have attempted to translate complex 
legislation into standards that are both meaningful to farmers and, from a practical 
perspective, can actually be checked during an on-the-spot control. This has been a 
demanding exercise, although more straightforward for some pieces of legislation than for 
others. The SMRs for the Nitrates Directive tend to be relatively clear, where the limits for 
organic and inorganic fertiliser loading are relatively clear and where farm and field records 
of Nitrogen application can be easily checked during an inspection. It has been more 
problematic for Articles 3 and 4 of the Birds Directive267 since management plans are site 
specific and hence inspections ought to be as well. Attributing the removal of protected 
landscape features or the killing of a wild bird to a farmer may also be problematic, as 
identifying non-compliance is dependent on the timing of the inspection and the expert 
knowledge of the inspector. The definition of appropriate farmers’ obligations for the SMR on 
food and feed law and verifiable standards for inspectors to check compliance with has also 
proved difficult. The inclusion of the EU legislation listed in Annex III of Regulation 
1782/2003 is beneficial not least because it may help to raise farmers’ awareness of a wide 
spectrum of requirements affecting their business. However, given the range of legislation 
included in the SMRs, a question can be posed about the suitability of a general cross 
compliance control system to help enforce specialist areas of legislation. The inability to 
detect non-compliance may undermine the effectiveness of cross compliance, underlining the 
importance to define verifiable standards at the farm level and communicate these to farmers. 
The distribution of information booklets, the establishment of dedicated websites and the use 
of events such as farm walks, all part of the mandatory Farm Advisory System, have helped to 
make the standards more meaningful to farmers268, and may lead to a change in mindset for 
some farmers away from purely productive considerations to those that also embrace the 
environmental and other elements of sustainable production. The inspection system, and the 
inherent threat of penalisation, provides an incentive for farmers to understand the standards, 
make any necessary adjustments to farm management and achieve full compliance269. There is 
a more coherent approach to inspection, with a range of legislation now controlled for by 
either one competent control authority or, in some cases, a limited number of competent 
control authorities. The use of a risk based approach to identifying the minimum of one per 
cent of farms for inspection may also create efficiencies and benefits relative to the prior 
                                                 
267
 Article 3 refers to the creation of protected areas and the management of habitats and Article 4 refers to the 
designation of Special Protection Areas. 
268
 Povellato, A and Scorzelli, D (2006) The Farm Advisory System: A Challenge for the Implementation of 
Cross Compliance, Deliverable D14 of the CC Network Project, SSPE-CT-2005-022727. 
269
 Nitsch, H and Osterburg, B (2007) Efficiency of cross compliance controls – public administrative costs and 
targeting, Deliverable D18 of the CC Network Project, SSPE-CT- 2005-022727. 
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situation of different agencies inspecting for different standards and applying different 
inspection rates. Whilst the compulsory rate of inspection for cross compliance is one per 
cent, the extent to which a modest increase in this rate, offset against any associated increase 
in costs, would provide a greater incentive to achieve compliance is unknown. As such, the 
design of the inspection system has implications for the achievement of this objective, and 
hence the effectiveness of cross compliance. 
The SMRs will apply to the new Member States from 2009 (or 2012 in the case of Bulgaria 
and Romania), although the underlying EU legislation does. Cross compliance may have a 
slightly different impact in these countries. First, cross compliance may act as a lever to 
encourage the full transposition of EU legislation in these Member States. From the 
perspective of the European Commission, this may avoid the need to pursue infringement 
procedures against Member States for a failure to meet the requirements of a Directive or 
Regulation270. Second, the policy provides a framework to communicate obligations to 
farmers, which should be beneficial for the reasons explained above. However, compliance 
may be difficult to achieve in some cases because farmers may need to make additional 
investments in order to achieve compliance with the underlying legislation. Farmers in the 
new Member States often face problems with accessing credit, although such investments 
may potentially be partially funded by rural development policy. In addition, the governments 
in the new Member States may face difficulties due to the political connotations associated 
with introducing standards to a sector that has previously experienced a low intensity of 
regulation. The impact of the SMRs in the new Member States requires careful scrutiny. 
At the current stage of implementation it is not possible to state whether cross compliance has 
improved compliance with legislation at the farm level. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that cross compliance may have this effect. The delivery of farm advice, an active inspection 
system and the accompanying threat of penalty appear to coalesce to provide conditions that 
encourage farm level compliance. Compliance levels need to be monitored over time in order 
to observe whether cross compliance improves the implementation of legislation at the farm 
level. Techniques to understand compliance across the farming sector as a whole also need to 
be developed271. 
 
2. Improve environmental standards at the farm level though the establishment of 
standards to achieve good agricultural and environmental condition. 
 
The preamble to Regulation 1782/2003 makes it clear that basic standards for good 
agricultural and environmental condition (GAEC) should be harnessed to the receipt of direct 
aids under the CAP. Whilst all Member States have introduced GAEC standards that farmers 
                                                 
270Infringement procedures are common for older Member States, even though these countries have been 
exposed this body of legislation for a relatively long time. The set of infringement proceedings pursued 
by the Commission against Greece, Portugal and Malta in 2007 for different violations of the provisions 
of the Birds Directive may force these Member States to take the necessary measures in order to 
properly implement this legislation. See recent Commission press releases: ‘Nature protection: 
Commission takes legal action against Portugal over protected bird areas’, IP/08/154, 31.01.2008; 
‘Nature protection: Commission takes Malta to court over spring hunting, closes Finnish case’, 
IP/08/153, 31/01/2008; ‘Environment: Commission to pursue legal action against Greece over 
infringements’, IP/08/152, 31/01/2008. 
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need to comply with in order not to risk a deduction to the Single Payment, the work 
undertaken for this and other studies shows a large variation in the number of GAEC 
standards set by Member States and differences in the scope and level of ambition of the 
chosen standards272. In many cases GAEC is composed of existing national legislation or the 
requirements that were in place for Good Farming Practice. In some cases completely new 
requirements have been introduced.  The baseline of environmental protection afforded by 
GAEC is therefore not consistent across the EU. A certain amount of variation should be 
expected given Member States have some discretion as to how farm-level standards are 
defined and that the GAEC framework is designed to be sufficiently flexible to take into 
account the different farming and environmental characteristics of the Member States273. 
Despite these differences, there are examples of GAEC providing new and additional 
environmental benefits as well as evidence to suggest that GAEC is not being used to its full 
potential.  
The greatest level of benefit for the environment is likely to be realised where compliance 
with national requirements was previously poor or where Member States have introduced new 
standards above and beyond pre-existing national requirements that target specific 
environmental needs. Benefits may especially accrue in the new Member States, where for 
many farmers the melding of environmental concerns to production considerations requires a 
step change in the way farms are managed. 
An example of GAEC standards relevant to the cereal sector helps to illustrate the 
environmental benefits GAEC can provide. Cereal farming can produce a number of 
environmental pressures. The use of fertilisers can lead to excessive nitrate loading in soils, 
leading to leaching and a reduction of water quality. The incentives created by the market to 
increase production may lead to an expansion of field sizes and the removal of boundary 
features. The GAEC framework provides the potential to limit and reduce these kinds of 
environmental pressures. Requirements to maintain buffer strips, field margins or 
environmental areas have been introduced in some Member States in the form of specific 
GAEC standards under the Annex IV issues of minimum level of maintenance and soil 
erosion, as summarised by Table 10.2. These GAEC standards are likely to provide 
environmental benefits. In addition, they are all new measures, introduced at the farm level 
for the first time as part of cross compliance, and therefore imbue cross compliance with some 
added value in these Member States. 
Whilst there are positive examples which demonstrate the potential of GAEC to deliver 
environmental benefit, the GAEC framework is arguably not being utilised to its full 
potential. In many Member States, not all GAEC standards included in Annex IV are 
addressed, and many GAEC standards are simply made up of pre-existing legal requirements 
at the national level. In some cases, the GAEC standards are no stronger than the standards for 
Good Farming Practice applied under the previous rural development Regulation. These 
points are discussed in turn. 
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 Including: Alliance Environnement (2007) Evaluation of the Application of Cross Compliance as Foreseen 
Under Regulation 1782/2003: Part II, Replies to Evaluation Questions; Farmer, M., et al., (2007) Cross 
Compliance: Practice, Lessons and Recommendations, Deliverable 24 of the CC Network study for DG 
Research, SSPE-CT-2005- 022727. 
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Table 10.2. Examples of GAEC standards applicable to the cereals sector that are likely 
to promote positive environmental outcomes. 
Member State GAEC Standards 
Austria The standard under ‘retention of landscape features’ defines a minimum 
distance for tillage of 10m near stagnant water bodies and 5m near water 
courses. This should be beneficial for reducing soil erosion and improving 
water quality and may also produce a habitat suitable for wildlife. 
Finland There must be a 60cm wide, untilled verge between fields and major 
ditches and/or watercourses, where no fertilisers or pesticides application 
are allowed. This should be beneficial for reducing soil erosion and 
improving water quality and may also produce a habitat suitable for 
wildlife. 
France Three per cent of the area declared in order to obtain CAP subsidies must 
be sown with an environmental cover (minimum width 5m, maximum 
width 10m, minimum surface 5m2) mainly in strips along watercourses. 
Fertilisers and pesticides are forbidden over this cover. This should be 
beneficial for reducing soil erosion and improving water quality and may 
also produce a habitat suitable for wildlife. 
UK (England) Under the GAEC measure ‘Minimum Level of Maintenance’, farmers are 
required to establish a protection zone in fields along hedges and 
watercourses. It must measure two metres from the centre of a hedge or 
ditch, with a minimum of one metre from the top of the ditch bank. It 
must not be cultivated or have fertilisers, herbicides or pesticides applied. 
This should be beneficial for reducing soil erosion and improving water 
quality and may also produce a habitat suitable for wildlife. 
 
In a number of Member States, some of the issues identified by the GAEC Annex IV 
framework - soil erosion, soil organic matter, soil structure and minimum maintenance - are 
not addressed. Just over half of all Member States have not defined standards for the retention 
of landscape features, the majority of Member States have not defined standards for soil 
structure and two Member States have not included standards for soil erosion274. Unless these 
issues are addressed outside of cross compliance or are not considered an environmental 
problem, the ability of cross compliance to provide environmental benefit is curtailed. 
In many cases, farmers’ obligations are based on the requirements of pre-existing national 
legislation. The soil erosion requirements in the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic, for 
example, are based on pre-existing national legislation, as are many of the minimum 
maintenance requirements in Belgium (Wallonie), Finland, Malta and the UK. In such cases, 
the additional benefit provided by cross compliance might be rather low. The exceptions are 
those cases where cross compliance significantly instigates a higher level of compliance if 
this has previously been less than universal. The added value of cross compliance also lies in 
those Member States where environmental issues have not yet been addressed through the 
national regulatory framework; in such cases cross compliance provides an opportunity to 
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tackle important environmental issues. There are examples where new standards have been 
introduced with cross compliance, such as the soil organic matter standards in Spain (although 
these were based on good farming practice requirements), the soil erosion requirements in 
England and landscape feature retention requirements in the Czech Republic. Cross 
compliance may therefore improve the baseline across the EU. However, it is not clear 
whether the standards are well targeted to the environmental needs and whether they will 
provide the necessary level of protection. Because of this, the GAEC framework should be 
reviewed in the future when the impacts and additional benefits provided by cross compliance 
become clearer. 
In many Member States GAEC standards originate from the Good Farming Practice (GFP) 
requirements applied under the previous rural development Regulation275. Standards of Good 
Farming Practice applied to those farmers claiming an LFA payment or agri-environment 
payment and have since been succeeded by cross compliance GAEC and SMRs. This means 
that non-compliant farmers risk a deduction to both Pillar I and Pillar II aid. As observed with 
cross compliance, GFP standards were diverse in ambition and focus276. Many Member States 
confined the GFP standards to binding measures derived from national legislation. This 
avoided potential confusion for farmers but reduced the scope of the measures, and potentially 
added less value. Cross compliance, in a way, represents a step forward as a more structured 
legal framework, in the form of Annexes III and IV, is provided. However, in many cases, 
GFP standards have been simply rolled over into GAEC. This allows some continuity and 
means any environmental benefits provided by GFP are not lost by the new system. However, 
unless the GFP standards were well designed, they may not necessarily provide any additional 
environmental benefit unless new obligations which tackle identified environmental needs 
have also been introduced. 
The reason for a less than comprehensive approach may at least be partially explained in 
terms of the determination of some Member States to maintain a ‘level playing field’277. The 
need to avoid the distortion of competition could have lowered the ambition of Member States 
with respect to the GAEC framework. It appears that some Member States may have taken 
advantage of the flexibility provided by Regulation 1782/2003 and opted for a conservative 
approach to defining GAEC standards, so as not to introduce standards that may place their 
farmers at a competitive disadvantage. 
The benefits of GAEC are therefore diluted if a Member State fails to make full use of the 
scope afforded by GAEC to address environmental needs. In terms of the wider policy 
context, it is worth considering whether Member States’ use of cross compliance is affected 
by other policy measures. A key example relates to the decisions taken as to which standards 
are appropriate for inclusion in cross compliance GAEC and which are relevant for agri-
environment schemes funded by Pillar II of the CAP. Considerations of the mutual role of 
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discrete regulation and the enabling structure of cross compliance in encouraging compliance 
with standards that otherwise do not have a legal grounding are also relevant. 
The GAEC framework is also, arguably, not static. There was a staggered introduction of the 
SMRs over a period of three years, and it is possible in the context of the CAP Health Check 
that further standards could be introduced to address sustainable water management, climate 
change and the environmental benefits previously provided by compulsory set-aside278. The 
policy rhetoric suggests that cross compliance can embrace new environmental challenges, 
but the extent to which these are adequately dealt with rests on suitable leadership at the EU 
level and appropriate implementation at the Member State or regional level.  
The second objective has therefore been partially met. The baseline provided by GAEC varies 
across the EU. In some cases cross compliance is likely to produce a higher level of 
environmental protection than was the case previously. For those standards where cross 
compliance is simply composed of existing national requirements, the additional benefit 
provided by cross compliance is less clear, although the consolidation of legislation in one 
policy frame may help improve farmers’ understanding of their obligations. The approach to 
implementation should be reviewed once the environmental impacts become clear. 
 
3. The avoidance of land abandonment. 
 
The preamble to Regulation 1782/2003 states that land should be maintained in good 
agricultural and environment condition in order to avoid the abandonment of agricultural 
land. In Member States which operate a fully decoupled Single Payment Scheme or the Single 
Area Payment Scheme, farmers are not obliged to produce any particular agricultural 
commodity in order to receive the direct payment. This creates a threat of the cessation of 
agricultural activity, and potentially, land abandonment. Land abandonment is a complicated, 
multi-layered issue that has repercussions both for the environment and the socio-economic 
fabric of rural areas. In particular, land abandonment threatens more marginal livestock 
farming areas that are associated with high-nature value semi-natural pastures. It is a key 
issue in many Member States of Central Europe279. The management of any trend toward land 
abandonment is highly influenced by other measures within the CAP such as decoupling and 
Pillar II measures. Non-policy drivers, such as market forces and rural to urban migration, 
also play a role. It is not possible to determine the actual impact of cross compliance in 
relation to land abandonment due to the lack of monitoring data and insufficient time having 
elapsed since the start of the policy for impacts to become apparent. However, some 
comments on the potential impact can be made. 
The value of the Single Payment to farmers - and particularly the amount received through the 
Single Area Payment Scheme in the new Member States - is likely to be a persuasive factor in 
maintaining farming activity. GAEC should also ensure that land is maintained in a state so 
that it can readily be returned to farming use, if farming activity does not take place. In turn, 
this may slow down potentially environmentally damaging agricultural restructuring 
processes such as the regional concentration and specialisation of production. In some cases 
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 See, for example: DLG (2005) Land abandonment, biodiversity and the CAP – Outcome of an international 
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the Single Payment may form a large proportion of farm household income and be influential 
in retaining the farmer on land that may otherwise become abandoned. The farmer may 
continue to engage in traditional agricultural practices, which in turn, may help to maintain 
the conservation value of the associated pastures. However, the farmer is not obliged to 
undertake any agricultural activity in order to receive the Single Payment meaning in the 
absence of active management, agricultural land may come to resemble abandoned land. The 
role of GAEC is therefore to ensure some form of activity actually takes place in order to 
maintain the appearance of the agricultural landscape and its ability to be farmed. In this way, 
cross compliance acts as a flanking measure designed to minimise some of the negative 
impacts which may arise from decoupling. It is important to note that GAEC is unlikely to be 
suited to maintaining the environmental interest of semi-natural pastures threatened by 
abandonment, as discussed further below. 
Cross compliance has two key advantages with respect to addressing the threat of land 
abandonment. The first is that it has tremendous policy reach. It applies to all farmland on 
which the Single Payment is claimed, and hence bears an influence on the behaviour of the 
majority of farmers. Cross compliance, for instance, concerns about 90% of farmers in 
England280. Secondly, the GAEC minimum maintenance provisions help to ensure that some 
activity takes place on land that is no longer in production. Standards range from 
requirements to cut vegetation every year (e.g. Germany) to keeping land free of scrub and 
trees older than five years (e.g. Denmark). The standards are designed to ensure that land can 
readily be returned to agricultural production, if necessary, and also help to ensure an ‘open’ 
agricultural landscape free of significant scrub encroachment. Therein lies a crucial 
distinction between cross compliance and the rural development measures under Pillar II. It is 
not the aim of GAEC to maintain or increase the environmental value of farmed areas 
threatened by abandonment. In a coherent policy framework, the agri-environment measure 
should work alongside cross compliance to ensure that appropriate land management takes 
place in order to safeguard, if not enhance, biodiversity value. The LFA measure also plays a 
role, by providing additional support to farmers in those areas most threatened by natural 
handicaps, where land abandonment is a possibility. 
The following example from the beef sector helps to illustrate the role cross compliance plays 
in responding to the threat of land abandonment. Certain beef farming systems, such as in the 
upland and mountainous areas of the EU are less financially viable and the cessation of 
farming activity is a threat. Extensive cattle grazing practices are important to maintaining the 
biodiversity value of pastures. The GAEC minimum maintenance provisions ensure that a 
minimum level of farming activity takes place. A total of eleven Member States require 
farmers to maintain pasture by grazing - potentially beneficial from a biodiversity perspective 
if stocking densities are appropriate - or through appropriate mowing regimes, which are 
likely to be rather less beneficial281. In a decoupled payment context, Member States have 
retained mowing as an option and avoided specifying stocking density requirements. Unless 
the farmer choose to maintain grazing activity at the appropriate density, the emphasis of 
GAEC on basic standards – in particular mowing - results in minimal land management that is 
insufficiently prescriptive from a biodiversity conservation perspective. Rather, it is the role 
of the agri-environment measure, the LFA measure and the Article 69 option of Regulation 
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1782/2003282, if appropriately implemented, to work in synergy with the basic cross 
compliance standards in order to promote the continuation of environmentally beneficial 
farming practices. 
Cross compliance is therefore one of several policy measures that works towards minimising 
the negative environmental impacts that can arise from the cessation of agricultural activities. 
The role of cross compliance is more agronomic; it requires a minimal intervention on the 
part of the farmer in order to maintain production capacity rather than environmental function. 
From this perspective, cross compliance is likely to be successful. However, GAEC standards 
alone are not sufficiently fine tuned to maintain the environmental interest of the associated 
land. This underlines the importance of Pillar II measures to work in conjunction with cross 
compliance in order to preserve the environmental, as well as the socio-economic fabric, of 
areas threatened by land abandonment. This objective is therefore only partially met as cross 
compliance needs to operate alongside other measures in order to address all the issues raised 
by land abandonment. 
 
4. Maintenance of the existing area of permanent pasture. 
 
Member States are obliged to maintain the area of permanent pasture within 10% of 2003 
levels (or 2004 levels in the case of the EU-10). The requirement is founded on a desire to 
avoid a ‘massive’ conversion to arable land and to maintain the environmental benefits 
provided by permanent pasture. Converting pasture to arable land can create negative 
environmental impacts in the form of carbon release, increased soil erosion, decreased water 
quality (if fertiliser use increases) and biodiversity loss (particularly if the pasture was 
associated with low inputs and was extensively grazed). Cross compliance acts as a safeguard 
against arable conversion. However, the level of environmental protection is weakened due to 
poor targeting of the most environmentally important pasture, as explained below. 
The permanent pasture rules, as with the GAEC rules in relation to land abandonment, are 
another example of a flanking measure put in place to avoid the negative environmental 
impacts that might arise from decoupling. The possibility of arable expansion might occur if 
market prices and demand for cereals increased, for example. Given recent rises in 
commodity prices, the permanent pasture rules seem entirely sensible and are likely to act as a 
brake on arable conversion and so meet this objective. 
The success of the rules is partly dependent on how sensitive Member State monitoring is to 
changes in the area of permanent pasture. Member States have established trigger levels to 
determine the point at which farmers can no longer convert pasture or need to establish a new 
area of pasture to compensate for an overall loss. In many Member States the farmer needs 
permission in order to convert pasture when a 5% decline has been observed across the 
Member State. Generally, a new area of land needs to be established as permanent pasture 
when a 7.5% to 10% decline in the area of permanent pasture has occurred. These 
requirements appear suitable for maintaining the area of permanent pasture within ten per cent 
of the reference level. However, the trigger level has not yet been passed in any Member 
State, meaning it is not yet possible to determine the effectiveness of the measure. Evidence 
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suggests that the area of permanent pasture has in fact increased in many cases since the 
introduction of cross compliance, meaning there has not yet been a need to apply the rules283. 
The main objective, to maintain the area of permanent pasture, seems likely to be met. 
However, the potential to preserve the associated environmental benefits, a clear sub-
objective of the measure, is less certain. This is because the targeting of the requirement from 
an environmental perspective is underspecified in the legislation. For instance, there is no 
requirement for Member States to restrict the conversion of more environmentally sensitive 
habitats, to prioritise the re-establishment of pastures according to the potential value for 
biodiversity or to assess the capacity for newly established pasture to reduce environmental 
pressures. For example, the rules appear to allow a loss of high nature value grassland in one 
place to be compensated by an increase in the area of lower biodiversity value fertilised 
permanent grassland elsewhere. In addition, the decision as to which land to reconvert to 
permanent pasture is the responsibility of the farmer, who is not required to take account of 
environmental priorities. In addition, the definition and monitoring of the ratio of permanent 
pasture at the national level is unlikely to be sufficiently sensitive to highlight those areas 
where a small decrease in permanent pasture might result in negative environmental impacts. 
The ability to provide environmental benefit therefore rests on the effectiveness of the 
permanent pasture rules to restrict the exchange of relatively extensive grasslands for more 
intensively farmed arable land. This may be tempered to a certain extent by the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive284 which requires an assessment to be 
made of the environmental consequences of restructuring agricultural holdings and 
exchanging uncultivated land or semi-natural areas for intensive agricultural purposes. 
However, EIA requirements do not necessarily stop environmentally damaging activities from 
taking place. In addition, the Commission state that implementation by Member States has, to 
date, been poor285. 
This objective is partially met by cross compliance. The rules should act as a simple safeguard 
to ward off large scale arable conversion, particularly in the face of rising arable commodity 
prices. Maintaining the environmental value of permanent pasture, a clear sub-objective of the 
measure, requires cross compliance or EIA rules to be adapted in order to adequately protect 
the most environmentally valuable permanent pasture and to target the re-establishment of 
pasture where it will bring the greatest environmental benefit. 
 
5. Contribute to market oriented and sustainable agriculture. 
 
Sustainable agriculture is difficult to define precisely. It is generally seen to convey 
economic, environmental and social aspirations. With respect to the environment, it 
encompasses notions of sound environmental stewardship, the promotion of environmental 
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outcomes which are beneficial to society as a whole and the legally enforced restriction of 
environmentally damaging practices. 
The extent to which cross compliance is able to contribute to sustainable agriculture is limited 
by the policy’s objectives. The analysis of the above four objectives shows that cross 
compliance clearly contributes to environmentally sustainable agriculture. There is evidence 
to show that compliance with legal requirements should improve, as should environmental 
standards, particularly where new standards have been introduced because of GAEC. The 
extent to which this will be achieved is partly dependent on farmers’ reaction to cross 
compliance and how much the policy instils a change in behaviour, where this is needed. 
Cross compliance is likely to play a more limited role in avoiding land abandonment, and 
should act as a safeguard against large scale arable conversion. Cross compliance should also 
contribute to a more economically sustainable sector if standards can be raised at minimal 
cost to the farmer. 
 
Cross compliance could come under criticism in several respects if it is believed it should 
more fully contribute to sustainable agriculture. The emphasis placed on ‘basic’ standards 
severely limits the ability of the policy to more fully address environmental needs. The 
coherence between cross compliance and more targeted environmental measures is therefore 
very important. In some cases, the added value of cross compliance is debatable, particularly 
where compliance rates were high before the introduction of the policy, where pre-existing 
requirements have simply been reframed by the SMR and GAEC framework and where 
GAEC standards remain less than ambitious. In some instances, cross compliance may not be 
suitable to enforce specialist areas of legislation which require inspectors to have expert 
knowledge. 
Decoupling, arguably, plays the stronger role in promoting market orientation by allowing 
farmers to base production decisions on market conditions rather than subsidy payments. An 
increase in the scope and ambition of standards may respond to the broader public’s desire for 
environmentally sound production, although many EU consumers are unlikely to be aware of 
the standards farmers need to comply with under cross compliance. In this sense, cross 
compliance may help to provide the standards desired by consumers and therefore play a role 
in market orientation. In the new Member States decoupling may result in some restructuring. 
This may bring economic benefits and greater market orientation, but may equally result in 
some social and environmental problems, particularly where the existing structure of small 
scale low intensity farming is split up. GAEC in itself is not a strong enough mechanism to 
respond to all of the issues raised by restructuring or agricultural intensification. 
This objective is partially met. Cross compliance contributes to sustainable agriculture and 
may contribute to market orientation, but must work in synergy with Pillar II measures in 
order to address all environmental needs. Market forces and agricultural restructuring trends 
may alter the ability of cross compliance to contribute to sustainable agriculture. 
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10.4 Considerations of Efficiency  
The above analysis shows that cross compliance is likely to be effective in some respects, and 
thus provide a number of benefits. Arguably, it could become more targeted and more 
effective. A debate along these lines should also be informed by a consideration of efficiency 
i.e. the extent to which the desired effects are achieved at a reasonable cost286. Some 
comments on the efficiency of cross compliance are made in this section. 
An evaluation of efficiency may involve a consideration of whether the same benefits could 
have been provided more cheaply by an alternative policy. This involves balancing the 
effectiveness of cross compliance and a number of plausible, alternative policy interventions 
(i.e. that can meet the same objectives) against the associated costs (e.g. public administration 
costs, inspection costs and farm administration costs). One recent study concluded that ‘there 
is some evidence that cross compliance can be an efficient means of increasing compliance 
with statutory standards, and little evidence to suggest that it is not efficient’287. The OECD 
states that ‘By piggy-backing on an existing policy measure [i.e. direct payments], 
environmental improvements are secured at low additional cost’288. This literature therefore 
suggests that cross compliance is efficient and can be a cost effective policy intervention. 
The present Deliverable adds some credence to these statements, by stating that the costs 
attributable to cross compliance at the farm level are low at the EU level, although there may 
be some significant costs for certain farm types affected by certain standards in some Member 
States. However, this chapter also shows that the benefits provided by cross compliance are 
likely vary across the EU, due to differences in implementation by the Member States. Cross 
compliance also cannot deal with the environmental subtext of the objectives related to land 
abandonment, permanent pasture and sustainable agriculture on its own. Whilst it may 
increase compliance with the regulatory baseline, it is likely to be less effective at delivering 
additional benefits. It is likely to be more effective, and therefore more efficient, in some 
Member States than others. 
It has been stated that for cross compliance to be more effective and provide greater added 
value, the payments received by the farmer need to be adjusted to reflect the cost to the farmer 
of implementing cross compliance obligations289. Such an approach incorrectly assumes that 
the rationale for the Single Payment is to reimburse farmers for the cost of the provision of 
basic standards rather than direct income support290. At present, cross compliance is ancillary 
rather than providing a basic justification for expenditure under Pillar I. Arguably, if the 
rationale for Pillar I support shifts from traditional CAP objectives to one that seeks the 
provision of basic or higher standards, the overall policy approach, including cross 
compliance, as well as the current level of Pillar I funding would need to be adjusted 
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accordingly. Not least, the payment received should only cover the cost of those standards 
that exceed the regulatory baseline at the farm level, thus blurring the distinction between 
Pillar I and Pillar II. Furthermore, in future evolutions of the CAP, the approach to calculating 
the value of the Single Payment may also need to be revisited, with the method reoriented 
from historic levels of subsidy towards one that is based on the cost of providing public goods 
and services, which could be provided for by a revitalised cross compliance framework. This 
may or may not be more effective and efficient than the present system. 
 
10.5 Conclusions 
Cross compliance is likely to provide some benefits in relation to each of the five identified 
objectives. The level of benefit is likely to vary across the EU and as such a further research 
effort is likely to be required to assess the suitability of the current system as evidence of the 
impacts begins to emerge. Questions need to be asked about whether cross compliance is the 
most effective tool to provide the benefits identified in this paper, whether these are for the 
environment, food safety or animal welfare. In its current guise, cross compliance is designed 
to implement basic, uniform standards that can be easily applied across the whole of the 
territory in question, irrespective of different agricultural or environmental conditions. This 
has resulted in differences in implementation across the Member States and in some cases 
cross compliance may not be being used to its full potential. There may therefore be a 
shortfall in the benefits delivered when examined against the objectives for the policy. 
The objectives for cross compliance, and the range of benefits the policy can provide, are 
likely to change in the future. Indeed, the longer term relevance of cross compliance, and its 
potential to provide benefit, very much depends on the future relationship between regulation, 
Pillar I and Pillar II of the CAP. One line of argument suggests so long as Pillar I exists, the 
potential for cross compliance to deliver benefit should be maximised by expanding the list of 
SMRs and including more demanding GAEC standards. However, the addition of more 
standards poses the risk of a dilution of effectiveness. The case to expand the SMR and 
GAEC framework also loses weight if the value of Pillar I and the Single Payment declines in 
the future. It may be difficult to ask farmers to meet more standards (assuming more means 
more than simply regulatory compliance) if their Single Payment receipts are less than at 
present or if the cost of compliance outweighs any remaining financial benefit provided by the 
Single Payment. A large set of policy, political and budgetary questions therefore surround 
the future of cross compliance as a tool to influence farm level behaviour and the achievement 
of standards across the EU. 
 
 
 
 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 374 
 
 
11 Concluding remarks and brief policy outlook 
From the previous analysis the following main conclusions can be derived (ordered along 
themes). 
 
11.1 Review of standards 
From the review of all SMR and GAEC standards it appeared that in particular the Nitrate 
directive, food safety requirements and animal welfare standards might introduce non-
negligible cost of production increases, at least at individual farm level and potentially also at 
sector level. Although the potential cost impact of identification and Registration of animals is 
low, from previous analysis this appeared to be a standard facing significant problems with 
compliance. Where the SMRs affect animal productions, the GAEC standards mainly affect 
the arable sector.  Based on the review, for a selected number of products and standards a 
quantitative competitiveness impact assessment was made. 
With regard to the selected EU Member States it became apparent that some Member States 
have used the GAEC requirements that were introduced as part of cross compliance to 
compensate for gaps in their existing national legislation (e.g. Poland defines the GAEC 
standards solely as new requirements and Italy has just one pre-existing standard), while other 
Member States already had a legislative framework in place and merely adopted that 
framework for cross compliance (e.g. the Netherlands, where requirements are based just on 
pre-existing legislation).  
 
11.2 Dairy 
As regards the impact of the Nitrate and Identification and registration standards on 
production, clearly the Nitrate standard has the most impact. At sectoral level for nitrate 
percentage cost of production increases of 0.1 till 0.6 percent were found, with rates varying 
over countries and with respect to variations in the prevailing degree of compliance, as well as 
the assumed improvement in compliance. At farm level the nitrate standard might have even 
much stronger impacts than at sector level. As compared to the Nitrate standard the estimated 
percentage costs increases associated with full compliance to the Identification and 
Registration standard was less than 0.15 percent and thus rather marginal. 
The impact of the Nitrate standard on the EU-15’s external competitiveness can be described 
by the changes in dairy exports and imports. Due to the relative costs increase associated with 
improved compliance to the Nitrate standard EU exports are projected to decline at maximum 
with 1.9%, whereas imports increase at maximum by 2.8%. So the overall effects are limited, 
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with the impact on exports being the most important effect, since the EU is an important net 
exporter of dairy products. When a generic 20% increase of compliance to the current best-
estimate level is assumed (rather than full compliance) these impacts shrink by 80% percent.  
The impact of an improvement of compliance to full compliance with respect to the 
Identification and Registration standard is projected to lead to a decline of EU dairy exports 
with 0.1 percent and an increase in EU dairy imports with 1.1 percent. 
When the measures on Nitrate taken by the US, Canada and New Zealand are taken into 
account and it is assumed that compliance to these measures will improve to full compliance, 
just like was assumed for the EU, this would more or less ‘neutralize’ the trade impacts. The 
projected change in EU exports is than approximately -0.1%. As such this underscores that for 
a competitiveness impact analysis it is rather important what is assumed to be happening in 
key competitor countries.  The trade impacts obtained when no changes are assumed to 
happen in key-competitors countries can thus be argued to provide an upper bound of the 
likely trade impacts.  
The combined impact of the Nitrate and Identification and Registration standards on EU dairy 
exports and imports is estimated to be -0.87% and +1.01% respectively (given no changes in 
standards or compliance for other trade partners).   
A ban on bST hormone use in the US is argued to lead to a 5% percentage costs increase for 
US farmers, which appears in turn to lead to a potential improvement of EU dairy exports 
with nearly 2.5 percent. Alternatively, the EU food safety standard prohibiting the use of bST 
can be stated to have an opportunity cost in terms of forgone trade opportunities. 
 
11.3 Beef 
Within the EU beef is produced in a wide range of farming systems, ranging for the extensive 
cow calf farms in Ireland, the UK and the centre of France down to the very intensive beef 
fattening systems located in Italy and Spain. The Nitrate Directive affects 4.2% of beef cattle 
raised in intensive finishing farms and 3.0% of beef produced on cow calf farms. This low 
percentage of farms affected by the Nitrate Directive explains the limited sector cost increase, 
which has been estimated in 0.095%.  
The relatively low cost impact associated with the nitrate standard does not have significant 
consequences for the competitive position of the EU beef production on the world market. 
The actual trade deficit in beef of the EU would increase, as exports would fall by 0.68% and 
imports would rise by 0.51%.  
More incisive for the beef farms are the regulations concerning the identification and 
registration of beef cattle. Implemented as a reaction to the BSE crisis the beef farmers have 
to register all cattle movements and make sure that all animals are correctly identified form 
birth up to the slaughterhouse. According to the estimates carried out these important 
measures generate a cost increase for the beef farms of 0.454% in the EU. As a consequence 
of this measure the EU’s beef imports are projected grow by 2.2% and exports will decline 
with the same percentage. Again Brazil can exploit most this decline of EU competitiveness 
increasing its exports to the EU with 2.18% and its global exports with 1,1%. The other 
competitors on the world market would benefit much less.  
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11.4 Pigs and poultry 
As the pig and poultry sector are most intensive livestock activities in the EU it is quite 
comprehensible that these sectors are the most affected by the Nitrate Directive. In the present 
analysis the effects have been quantified only for the pig sector, as poultry farms are very 
marginally touched by cross-compliance.  
The extent to which the Nitrate Directive may create extra costs to the pig sector depends on 
the pig density per hectare in each Member State, on the percentage of pigs present in Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones and on the degree of compliance of pig farmers to the Nitrate Directive. 
These three data differ very much from country to country and explain primarily the very 
different sector cost increases for the pig sectors of EU Member States. The overall EU cost 
increase to be attributed to the pig sector due to attain full compliance with the Nitrate 
Directive has been estimated at 0.55%. 
Such a cost increase has a significant impact on the EU trade balance of pigmeat. Total EU 
exports will decline by 3% and imports will increase by 4.4 %. This decline of EU 
competitiveness will favour the exports of Brazil (1%), the US (0.7%) and Canada (0.3%) on 
the world market. EU imports will increase in particular from Brazil (+4,3%), Canada 
(+4.1%) and the US (4,1%).  
From a comparison with the impact of the Clean Water Act in the US it turns out that this act 
raises the cost for the American pig sector with 1.08%, an almost double cost effect compared 
to the impact of the Nitrate Directive in the EU. The reason for this substantial rise of costs 
has to be attributed to the large percentage of pig affected by this measure and its rather recent 
application to US pig farms, which still implies a rather low degree of compliance. This rise 
of costs will cause a fall in US exports of pigmeat of 7.3% and a decline of exports of 4.5%. 
Canada would gain the most of this situation increasing its exports by 4% on the world 
market, of which 4.5% more to the US and a 2.1% increase on the Japanese market. 
A calculation of the animal welfare regulations for pig farmers in the EU shows, that the cost 
increase is very limited. The reasons for this minor cost impact are a high degree of 
compliance with the standards and the limited rise of costs for farmers which still have to 
adapt their farm to the new legislation. At farm level the cost increase is well below 1% and 
this generates a rise of costs at sector level of 0.11%. This cost impact evidently causes a 
growth of imports of only 0.8% and a decline of exports of 0,7%. 
As has been expected the Nitrate Directive for the pig farms creates the most substantial 
burden of costs, in particular in EU Member States a with high pig density and a low degree 
of compliance. 
 
11.5 Cereals 
The percentage cost increases associated with the GAECs for the cereals sector are in all cases 
less than 1 percent of total production costs. Several factors explain this results. The 
additional costs per hectare are generally low, with an exception of the costs for idled land. 
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The best estimates of the current degree of compliance are rather high. Partly this is due to the 
fact that farmers have, for several reasons, already included a number of GAEC requirements 
into their existing farming practices. These reasons include the role of pre-existing national 
legislation and the internal benefits generated from preventing soil erosion and keeping up the 
soil condition. 
This latter factor explains why farmers following their own interest may participate 
voluntarily in programmes reducing soil erosion and are prepared to accept some costs. The 
case of Canada also illustrates this. It also makes clear that rather than following a command 
and control approach a voluntary or self-regulation approach might be effective in particular 
when the government is prepared to provide education and trainings, technical assistance and 
cost-offsets. Since in Canada participation is voluntary farmers are not likely to be faced with 
net costs increases affecting their competitive position. 
The use of set-aside land (idling or cultivating with alternative crops) and the set-aside rate 
will affect the estimated percentage costs increases (see differences between GAEC-1 and 
GAEC-2 scenario’s): higher cultivation rates and lower set-aside rates lead to lower costs. 
With the set-aside rate currently set to zero, the calculated percentage cost increases more or 
less halved as compared to the 10 percent set-aside scenario (GAEC-1). The  3% buffer strip 
requirement in France, whereas previously accounted for within the 10% set-aside 
requirement, can be interpreted as an 3% minimum effective set-aside requirement (which 
holds even when the formal rate goes down to zero). 
The impact of the GAECs on the EU’s external competitiveness varies from a 1.8 percent 
reduction in exports in GAEC-1 (set-aside rate 10% and all land idled) to a reduction of 1.1 
percent (set-aside rate 0%). EU imports increase with approximately a similar percentage as 
exports decline. Total world trade is hardly effected by the impact of the GAEC standard 
(although the changes in set-aside policy are likely to affect trade). 
 
11.6 Comparing Dairy, Beef, Pigs & Poultry and Cereals 
The GTAP tool allows for the determination of the impact of improvement in compliance 
with standards on the product and overall trade balances of the EU.  
Table 11.1 summarizes these impacts. The first two columns provide the percentage changes 
of EU imports and exports. As the first row of Table 8.1 indicates, the cost increases 
associated with full compliance to the Nitrate and Identification and Registration standards in 
the EU dairy sector lead to a decline in EU dairy product exports of 2 percent and an increase 
in its imports of 3 percent. The associated impact on the trade balance for dairy products is a 
loss of 93 million dollar, which is the sum of on the one hand the loss in export revenues and 
on the other hand the increase in expenditure on imports. Similarly, the cost increase 
associated with full compliance to the GAEC standards for the cereals sector lead to a decline 
in EU exports of 1.8 percent and an increase of imports with 2.2 percent (see lowest row in 
Table 8.1). The impact on the cereals trade balance is a loss of  68 million dollar.  
The pigs and poultry sector is the most significantly impacted by a rise in compliance levels. 
As these sectors are most intensive livestock activities in the EU it is quite comprehensible 
that these sectors are the most affected by the Nitrates Directive, if fully enforced (some 
Member States have derogations). However, the change in trade balance should not be 
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attributed wholly to cross compliance. In particular, the poultry sector is barely concerned by 
cross compliance since poultry farmers do not generally receive the Single Payment. The 
same is true for pig farmers, unless they have a mixed enterprise. 
Cross compliance bears more of an influence on the dairy, beef and cereal sectors because the 
majority of farmers in these sectors receive the Single Payment. Cross compliance, as an 
enforcement mechanism, may encourage compliance with the examined standards. Of these 
three product sectors, the greatest impact is on dairy, followed by beef and cereals. This is 
line with expectations, given that the SMRs more greatly affect livestock producers, and that 
the underlying EU legislation may be more costly to comply with. The cereals sector shows 
the lowest product trade balance impact. 
The most right column of Table 11.1 shows the impact on the trade balance (net result of loss 
in export revenue and increased expenditure on imports). The reported trade balance impacts 
include the spill-over and feed back effects of simultaneously achieving full compliance with 
the selected standards in all four considered sectors. For example, the 27 million euro loss in 
the E-15’s dairy sector includes the potential impact from the GAEC standards imposed on 
cereals on feed prices, etc. As such the sectoral trade balance impacts can be aggregated over 
sectors, which results in a total trade balance loss of the considered products and measures of 
289 million dollar. As the small percentage changes (see two left columns) confirm, this 
amount is only a small fraction of the total trade balance value. 
Table 11.1 does not report the overall trade balance impact that would result from also taking 
into account spill-over effects to other (non-agricultural) sectors (e.g. food industry, etc.) in 
the EU economy. Some background analysis suggests that if this would be included the total 
trade balance loss might even smaller due to counteracting effects generated from the 
reallocation of production factors. However, these counteracting effects might be easily 
exaggerated due to assumptions on (an unrealistically high degree of) factor mobility between 
sectors in the EU economy that are implicit in the GTAP-model version used for this analysis.  
Table 11.1: Trade and trade balance impacts of all evaluated standards market-wise 
implemented at EU-15 level 
 EU-15 Imports 
(%-change) 
EU-15 Exports 
(%-change) 
Product trade balance 
(million US$ in constant 
prices of 2001) 
Dairy 1.1 -0.8 -27.1 
Beef 2.7 -2.7 -94.1 
Pigs & poultry 5.2 -3.7 -125.4 
Cereals 2.2 -1.8 -42.1 
Source: own calculations with GTAP (calibrated to 2001 base year) and improvement to full 
compliance as compared to best-estimate levels of compliance in 2005. Impacts evaluated for 
EU-15 based on country, product and measure selections as described in the main text. 
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11.7 Fruit, vegetables (case study and farm level approach) 
The case study results suggest that, in general terms, the cost of compliance with the 
environmental regulations for the fruits and vegetables sector in Spain would be probably low 
or small (or even none or beneficial in some specific cases).  It has to be noted, however, that 
due to the limitations of the study, not all the fruits and vegetables production regions have 
been considered and, therefore, these general conclusions may differ across regions, farming 
systems and types of farms. 
 
In highly productive areas of single-crop productions, such as the citrus groves of the region 
of Valencia, the assessment of the cost of compliance for pesticides and nitrates show that 
benefits of compliance might be possible. In the case of the cost of compliance of GAECs 
related to pesticides and food safety at farm level, certified schemes like EUREPGAP could 
have a potential increase in the farms’ gross margin (due to no reduction in yields and 
premium prices). 
 
In the case of mixed-vegetable farms of Castilla-La Mancha, the impact of compliance with 
the Nitrates Directive (measured as income loss) at farm level varies depending on farm types 
ad adaptive capacity of farmers to face the regulations. When farmer’s adaptation ability is 
low (i.e. changes in cropping patterns are not easily preformed) the most vulnerable farmers 
account for income losses around 15% (validated by fieldwork). When farmers adjust the 
cropping pattern to comply with the Nitrate Directive income loss is low and, in some cases, it 
may even increase, evidencing a clear benefit of the compliance measure.  
 
Short-term competitiveness at farm level indicates that the effects of the nitrate directive on 
competitiveness of citrus production might be slight or null. Growers tend to use nitrate 
fertilizers exceeding the maximum permitted dosage but there is no evidence in yield 
decreases when fertilization is reduced to the directive’s limits. 
 
In the case of the mixed vegetable farms of Castilla-La Mancha, the effects of the Nitrates 
Directive on the overall competitiveness of the region’s farms varies across farm types. 
Competitiveness ranges from 85% for low-adjustment farms to 111% for larger cash-crop 
farms with flexible cropping patterns. This evidences that compliance can have beneficial 
effects on certain types of farms in Spain. 
 
The effects of the water conservation measures (GAEC) on competitiveness are significantly 
larger than of the Nitrates Directive. Aggregate average loss in profitability is 20% as 
compared to a 3% in the case of the Nitrate Directive. Consequently, the average 
competitiveness in the case of compliance with the water conservation measure is 79% and 
for the Nitrates Directive is 97%. 
 
11.8 Olive (case study and farm level approach) 
The results from the case-studies on olive production indicate that compliance might not have 
a clear effect on costs. Even a possible benefit for the Spanish olive groves might come along 
as a consequence of the application of new European policies and cross compliance.  
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GAECs for preventing erosion in slope agriculture for rain fed olive groves in the region of 
Andalusia require specific cultivation techniques such as no tillage operations. All these 
practices imply a completely different production scheme for growers. This scheme is very 
well known since the 70s but it is not always preferred by traditional growers.  These 
cultivation methods presume not to plough and avoid a naked ground using herbicides and 
cutters or just leaving native grass to grow under the treetop or in roads. The cost of 
ploughing and replacing it by herbicide treatments determine equal or rather lower costs in the 
non-tillage system. The cost of maintenance for terraces and the obligatory grass strips that 
many growers should practice in slopes represent an extra cost that might be equal to the 
possible reduction in costs when not ploughing or using no till cultivation methods. Regarding 
yields for these schemes, evaluations during the last decades indicate that untilled orchards 
improve water use efficiency and productivity. 
 
There is no evidence of negative effects on farm profitability when soil erosion control 
practices are applied in the Spanish olive groves. In the case of low cost/income rain fed olive 
groves, the use of green covers, grass strips and terrace maintenance imply an increment in 
yields without no changes in variable costs, due to a better water use efficiency. In more 
intensive rain fed farms, the use of no tillage practices determine slight or null changes in 
competitiveness. 
 
Irrigated olive orchards are presumed to have slight or null effect when complying with the 
new legal framework.  Further yield assessments should be considered when studying the cost 
of compliance in olive production on hill slopes. Long-term assessments will be required to 
fully evaluate the potential competitiveness of the Spanish olive farms as erosion effects 
require to be evaluated in the long run.  
 
The case studies focused on slope olive groves since erosion is the main environmental 
problem in the region of Andalusia and about 70% of farms are above 7% slope. Further 
analysis for cross compliance effects on costs of olive groves cultivated in flat areas could 
complement this study as these types of olive farms might be subject to other regulations (like 
the Nitrates Directive). 
 
11.9 The role of voluntary standards or certification schemes 
The research has also demonstrated that standards within agriculture are also set, and 
compliance achieved, through market led initiatives, particularly through certification and 
assurance schemes. Examples of such schemes can be found in both EU and non EU 
countries. In some cases, these schemes promote compliance with regulatory baselines but in 
other cases, they establish higher or more specific standards that are deemed to confer some 
kind of market advantage. Organic standards and certification are a good example of this with 
the application of organic farming standards usually leading to premium prices applied to 
food stuffs produced to those standards. In other words, standards are used to differentiate 
products in the market place. Since both cross compliance and certification schemes set 
standards and require inspections to verify compliance, this has led to a suggestion that there 
may be some synergies possible between the two approaches. Specifically, farmers who are 
members of certification schemes might, assuming the standards they comply with are 
CROSS-COMPLIANCE 
No. SSPE-CT-2005-006489 
Deliverable number: 13 
15 May 2008 
 
 381 
equivalent to cross compliance standards, be deemed as lower risk when authorities select the 
sample of farms for inspection. This approach might help to improve the targeting of 
inspections and potentially reduce the cost burden of inspections, both for farmers and the 
inspection authorities. There are also numerous difficulties with this approach, not least the 
rationale behind using private bodies to share the control of public standards. 
 
11.10 Qualifications on competitiveness analysis  
Although there are uncertainties in the calculations (for example with respect to the 
assessment of national and EU costs or the upscaling from the farm level to the level of the 
sector and from the selected member states to EU level, the best estimates of the degree of 
compliance, the level of improvement of compliance that could be actually achieved, 
difficulties with establishing one unique base year, as well as limitations in the modelling 
tool) the general picture that emerges is that the impact of improvements in compliance with 
the considered standards on the EU’s competitiveness is rather limited. 
Impacts are not only limited when looking to changes in volume, but also when focusing on 
price changes. The impact of the simulated measures on market prices were very limited. This 
suggest that the impact of standards is easily outweighed by other shocks (weather changes, 
demand shifts, etc.), which normally continuously affect markets. 
The estimates provided in this study are likely to represent the upper bound of the expected 
cost impacts. For example, when not the EU unilaterally, but also key competitors adopt 
similar standards or aim for increasing compliance with existing standards, this is likely to 
‘neutralize’ the impacts on trade flows (see dairy case). The first phase of this project showed 
that the EU’s key competitors face similar issues, although until recently their policy 
approaches rely more on self regulation and voluntary standards. Moreover, since the EU is a 
key player in world trade for agricultural products, being both an important exporter as well 
as importer of these products, its adoption and enforcement of standards might induce other 
countries to adopt or/and follow similar standards. This might be particularly relevant for 
countries exporting to the EU market and for public health and food safety issues. 
Another reason why the actually observed impacts might be smaller than the ones simulated 
in this study is that the burden of the calculated cost increases might in reality (in particular in 
the short run) partly or fully carried by family labour rather than passed on to buyers of farm 
products.   
 
11.11 Some reflections cross-compliance policy as inspired by this 
research291 
EU agriculture policy, in seeking to promote a more market orientated, sustainable 
agriculture, reflecting the concerns of European citizens, continues to evolve. The 
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development of farm and product standards is likely to continue as part of that process. The 
European Commission proposed some adjustments to the cross compliance system in 2007292 
and the Commission’s paper prior to the Health Check of the CAP293 also considers changes 
to this measure. The EU Budget Review294 is likely to have implications for the CAP beyond 
2013 and may result in fundamental reforms to this policy. Any further development of farm 
standards, arising through any of the above mentioned processes, will need to consider the 
possible effects on the costs and competitiveness of EU farm businesses. In addition, at global 
level, the World Trade Organisation negotiations on agriculture, forming part of the Doha 
Development Round, will – if agreement is reached - have broader implications for trade and, 
possibly, the competitiveness of EU agriculture. A new agreement including commitments to 
eliminate export subsidies by a given date and increase market access would increase the 
competition farmers in the EU face from overseas producers. In this context, the European 
farming industry is likely to be particularly concerned about the further development of 
standards, especially if they perceive the standards required of EU farmers to be higher than 
those which overseas producers have to meet and which impose new costs of farm businesses.  
The extent to which standards impose costs on farm businesses is particularly relevant to the 
issue of competitiveness i.e. the ability of a farm to provide products as, or more efficiently, 
and at equivalent or lower cost than its relevant competitors. If some farm businesses face 
higher costs than other farm businesses due to higher or more stringent standards being 
applied to those farms, then such farms may be at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
farms facing lower standards.  
In considering the future of cross compliance - a key EU mechanism for achieving farm level 
standards - policy makers need to take account of the possible impacts that such standards can 
have on the costs and competitiveness of farm businesses. Such cost effects will need to be 
balanced by consideration of the benefits delivered (or the costs avoided) of imposing 
standards. In particular it is felt that the benefits side needs further research.  
Cross compliance is a policy mechanism designed to achieve some specific benefits in the 
agriculture sector but which may, as a result of the way in which the policy is applied, impose 
some new costs on the farming sector. Cross compliance only imposes new costs on farmers 
where new standards are introduced e.g. through GAEC or by imposing new administrative 
requirements. Since SMRs are based on pre-existing legislation, any costs associated with 
meeting SMRs are costs of the underpinning legislation and not costs of cross compliance. 
The balance between benefits and costs is critical in determining the acceptability of the 
policy. If cross compliance achieves few benefits but imposes substantial costs, its 
acceptability is likely to be called into question. But if it achieves significant benefits e.g. 
improvements in compliance with standards at low or moderate costs, its acceptability is 
likely to be greater. This study is particularly concerned with the extent to which cross 
compliance results in costs which are detrimental to the competitive position of EU 
agriculture when compared to agriculture in certain non EU countries included in this project 
(US, Canada and New Zealand).  
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The results derived from this project state that the costs of compliance can be significant at 
individual farm level in the EU, at least for certain farm types affected by certain standards. 
These costs may, in turn, affect the competitiveness of such farms. However, when scaled up 
to sectoral level, the costs of compliance with standards are relatively limited and do not have 
any substantive impact on trade flows. For the dairy, beef, pigs and poultry and cereals 
sectors, full compliance with selected standards results in a cumulative total loss of trade of 
US$289 million, a small fraction of the total EU trade balance for these sectors. Furthermore, 
when the EU does not act unilaterally, but its key competitors also adopt similar standards or 
aim for increased compliance with existing standards, the impact on any trade flow is 
reduced.  
The costs identified and the impacts on competitiveness are those associated with achieving 
compliance with certain selected EU standards. These standards form part of the cross 
compliance policy but most of the costs and impacts identified are not those of the cross 
compliance policy since, in the majority of cases, farmers were already required to meet these 
standards i.e. they pre-existed cross compliance. Cross compliance is likely however to have 
encouraged farmers to comply with the standards examined and can therefore be said to have 
induced certain costs. These costs are rather limited at sectoral level and unlikely to 
competitively disadvantage EU farmers.  Based on this evidence, arguments put forward 
against the use of cross compliance as a means of meeting standards - on the basis of the high 
costs imposed on the agriculture sector - appear rather weak.  
 
11.12 Alternative approaches by EU’s key competitors 
The policy mechanisms and private sector approaches used by the group of non EU countries 
studied here to set standards and achieve compliance contrast with cross compliance in the 
EU and are therefore of particular interest from a policy perspective. Almost all of the issues 
addressed by EU cross compliance e.g. nitrate pollution, soil erosion and loss of biodiversity 
are also the subject of attention in the non EU countries, either through government policy or 
industry led initiatives. But cross compliance has, for the most part, no equivalent in these 
countries and rather different approaches are used to address environmental and other 
problems and achieve desirable outcomes295.   
Some broad conclusions can be drawn regarding the approaches to meeting standards 
employed in the non-EU countries reviewed compared to the EU: 
• Regulation in the non-EU countries is focused on a range of issues, primarily food 
safety and plant protection products but also control of nutrients and environmental 
problems arising from large scale livestock production. This regulation therefore 
seeks to address similar problems to that found in the EU. 
• Much greater emphasis appears to be given to voluntary approaches e.g. voluntary 
codes of practice and best management practices - with the agricultural industry 
playing a leading role in establishing these – than on regulation. 
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• Technical assistance plays an important role in particular regarding environmental 
issues and achieving good farming practice. 
• Some financial assistance is granted e.g. linked to voluntary conservation 
programmes or good agricultural practices. Cost sharing approaches are employed in 
some cases, particularly in the USA but less so in New Zealand.  
 
Some possible explanations for the differences in approaches are put forward.  First, the 
institutional structures in these countries are different to those in the EU and responsibility for 
addressing certain issues lies with different authorities at different administrative levels. In 
Canada, for example, environmental regulations, programmes and policies can be found at 
federal, provincial and municipal levels. There appears to be less unified legislation in these 
countries than in the EU where, for minimum standards at least, regulations apply over the 
whole EU territory in a relatively consistent way. Secondly, in many sectors and locations the 
production intensity in the non EU countries appears to be less than that in most EU countries 
which might account for the lower intensity of regulation and the greater acceptance of 
voluntary approaches. Thirdly, this research has not examined how far cultural and societal 
differences, for example with respect to property rights, determine the approaches adopted to 
meeting standards but these are likely to be influential. It is highly likely that the attitudes of 
farmers, broader society and the presence or absence of different pressure groups will 
influence the final choices made. There is some evidence however of changing attitudes to 
regulation in some countries as environmental problems become more apparent.  
All the countries examined through this research have a need to set, and achieve compliance 
with, standards in the agriculture sector in order to deliver certain outcomes in relation to the 
environment, public, animal and plant health and animal welfare. Policies designed to deliver 
such outcomes must ensure an appropriate balance between the benefits achieved and the 
costs imposed on farmers if they are to be deemed acceptable.  
The assessment of the costs for EU farmers of meeting selected standards, compared to 
standards that farmers in selected non EU countries must meet, has demonstrated that, at 
sectoral level at least, the costs of achieving full compliance are relatively low. These costs, in 
turn, have only a limited impact on the competitiveness of EU farmers compared to some of 
their major competitors. The benefits of meeting these standards have not been fully explored 
by this research but it can be assumed that achieving full compliance with all the relevant 
standards at the farm level, compared to only partial compliance, is desirable and likely to 
deliver the greatest benefits.  
Policy mechanisms that set standards and seek to achieve compliance with them vary across 
the countries examined. The EU has adopted cross compliance as a means of achieving 
improved compliance with existing EU legislative standards and as a means of addressing 
some specific problems within the agriculture sector that may arise as a consequence of other 
policy reforms e.g. land abandonment. In most cases, the standards underpinning cross 
compliance pre-existed its introduction and hence few costs identified are attributable to the 
cross compliance policy per se. Rather, these costs are attributable to the pre-existing 
standards which stem from pieces of legislation, either at the EU or national level. However, 
cross compliance encourages compliance with these standards and hence can be said to induce 
the costs associated with meeting standards and any subsequent impacts on competitiveness. 
It is for this reason that the question of the impacts of cross compliance on costs and 
competitiveness arises. If such costs were estimated to be significant, policy makers and 
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stakeholders might question the efficiency of the policy in achieving its aims and explore 
alternative approaches. That the costs and competitiveness effects of meeting standards, 
induced by cross compliance as currently applied, are limited or negligible endorses the use of 
the cross compliance mechanism as a means of achieving benefits in the agriculture sector 
and helps to justify the policy.  
The non EU countries considered by this research appear to use alternative and fewer 
regulatory approaches to achieving compliance with standards in the agriculture sector. 
Voluntary approaches, cost sharing programmes and technical assistance appear to be much 
more common. Such differences may reflect different institutional structures, the lower 
intensity of the problems needing to be addressed or different cultural values or societal 
expectations in relation to agriculture. The exact nature of these differences deserves further 
investigation. It may also be possible for the EU to learn from experiences in non EU 
countries regarding alternative methods of meeting standards in the agriculture sector. For 
example, it might be worth considering whether cost sharing programmes and technical 
assistance can achieve the same or similar benefits to cross compliance at lower cost.  
 
11.13 Looking into the future 
Regarding the future of cross compliance in the EU, several observations can be made. Cross 
compliance is a relatively new mechanism and early experiences of implementation led to the 
need for some technical and administrative revisions,). The scope of cross compliance is also 
open to scrutiny. Cross compliance currently consists of a defined list of legislation in Annex 
III and a set of issues and standards in Annex IV. As new pressures become more apparent, 
there is an opportunity to revise these Annexes to incorporate new standards in relation to 
issues such as climate change and water management. Some existing standards may also be 
considered unnecessary as circumstances change. The inclusion of any new requirements 
should always however be determined on the basis of the relative costs and benefits of any 
such addition and consideration of alternative means of achieving similar outcomes. The 
question of incentive led approaches versus regulatory approaches is likely to play out here.  
Finally, the future of cross compliance is inextricably linked with the future of CAP 
payments. Currently, the threat of reductions or withdrawal of payments is a strong lever the 
EU can use to influence farmer behaviour.  The reduction of direct payments in the future 
could lessen the leverage administrations have on compliance behaviour.  In addition, the role 
of cross compliance and direct payments could be shaped by increasing internal (societal) or 
external (WTO) pressure to demonstrate that payments are linked to the provision of public 
goods that are not provided by the regulatory baseline.  These questions may be rehearsed 
during the CAP Health Check and the EU Budget Review and the answers will have a 
significant bearing on the future of cross compliance.   
In considering the future development of cross compliance, the analysis suggests that the 
following points are particularly important: 
1. There is a need for better quality data on the effects of cross compliance on on-farm costs 
and compliance rates in order to better judge the effectiveness of the policy (in meeting its 
stated objectives), the efficiency of the policy (in terms of the cost of meeting the stated 
objectives) and its impact on external competitiveness. 
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2. The non EU countries included in this study use a range of different policy tools and 
mechanisms to achieve compliance with standards. The EU could further examine such 
alternative approaches – and the underlying factors that determine their use - and consider 
whether, for example, cost sharing programmes and technical assistance could offer more 
effective and efficient ways of meeting standards in the EU, compared to cross 
compliance, regulation or measures under Pillar II. Such approaches could be 
complementary to current approaches rather than outright replacements. 
3. Further consideration could be given to the role of market led schemes and initiatives in 
achieving standards in the agriculture sector (particularly in relation to monitoring 
compliance) and the extent to which public policy and private initiatives can be 
synergistic or complementary. 
4. In considering whether new standards should be added to cross compliance, a full 
appraisal of the likely costs (both on-farm and administrative) and benefits (improved 
compliance with legislation, more sustainable agriculture) should be conducted. Any 
changes introduced should ensure that cross compliance remains proportionate i.e. any 
costs imposed on economic actors are balanced by the public benefits achieved. 
5. Regarding the future of the CAP, consideration should be given to the most effective and 
efficient way of meeting standards and the appropriate roles for regulation, cross 
compliance, incentives and market led initiatives. The future rationale of direct payments 
to farmers will have a significant bearing on which measures are likely to be most 
appropriate.  
 
It is certain that the cross compliance mechanism will need to adapt and evolve to the 
changing circumstances around it. Currently, its use as a mechanism to achieve compliance 
with standards appears justified as the impact on costs and competitiveness are very limited. 
As the CAP evolves, the need for a mechanism that defines a link between payments, 
mandatory standards and basic environmentally beneficial land management requirements is 
likely to remain appropriate.  
